

THE

CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER.

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ART. I.—‘*Cyclops Christianus*,’ or, an Argument to disprove
the supposed Antiquity of the Stonehenge and other Megalithic
Erections in England and Brittany. By ALGERNON HER-
BERT. Petheram, High Holborn. 1849.

THE march of inquiry is producing wonderful havoc. We are every year dispossessed of some childhood’s fancy or manhood’s prejudice. We once as little doubted the right of our first William to the title of ‘Conqueror’ as, in our unreasoning infancy, we questioned the historical existence of the wives of Bluebeard, or the cat of Whittington. But we are growing wiser. We are now told to attach no higher meaning to William’s *soubriquet*, as the first of his line, than the lawyer who gave it intended we should, and to repudiate its connexion with notions of heroism and conquest. It is many years since German professors destroyed our confidence in Romulus and Remus, but we still regarded with fond security the names and deeds of the Druids as ground which the rude hands of criticism dared not invade, little dreaming that our children would be taught to doubt that Stonehenge—Sacred Stonehenge! was the work of that time-honoured priesthood! Yet that that hour of scepticism is at hand, the ‘gloss’ upon the quaint title of the above treatise will go far to convince us.

The book thus unpretendingly introduced to us exhibits much varied learning and research, and reopens a question of such general interest, that we make no apology for bringing it before our readers. It is, in fact, a partial reproduction, in a more popular form, of a subject discussed at greater length in two works called ‘Britannia after the Romans,’ and an ‘Essay on the Neo-Druidic Heresy,’ published by the author some years ago, but which from their size and arrangement scarcely presented sufficient attraction to the general reader. Mr. Herbert is perhaps also remembered by the *virtuosi* as the juvenile author

of some 'Discussions on several passages of History and Mythology,' an original and not uninteresting attempt to mould into form and order some of the doubts and fancies which the Wolf and Bryant school of criticism brought into fashion. Whatever may be thought of the value of the theories propounded in those works, there can be little question of their being the production of an able and capacious mind animated with all the ardour necessary for the deepest research. So far our author presents sufficient credentials for this his latest task. But the hand which clears the rubbish from the surface of the mine, and opens the first glimpse of the bright veins beneath, performs too often a thankless labour. To remove such a reproach is our present object. It is simply our desire to draw attention to and acknowledge the obligation which works like that before us confer on our literature, hoping that the time may not be far distant when the inquiries here instituted may awaken a corresponding spirit of research, and elicit, what they at least deserve, a deliberate disproof. The doctrine of the 'Cyclops' unfettered tends to dissipate at once the theories of the scholar and the traditions of the unlearned; and lest any one rashly condemn it as fanciful or imaginative, let him remember how simply mythical are all the present notions which, in the absence of sure tradition, we entertain on the subject—mythical too, without rhyme or reason in their falsehood. Mr. Herbert has wrought a great work, if it is only to rescue from obscurity the antimyth of Stonehenge—the true poetical, if not the real historical, version of its origin.

We will abstain here from criticising the real value of the quotations made from the obsolete learning of our author, but will, for the present purpose, take them upon trust, '*perito cuique in arte sua credendum est*;' for we think we shall better deserve the thanks of those who have not time to go through this laborious work, if we endeavour to present them with a slight sketch of some of Mr. Herbert's arguments and general results.

The first part of his task is devoted to the refutation of established traditional prejudice, which, lichen-like, has obscured the original characters imprinted on all monuments of old, rendering them illegible to any but a zealous and discriminating inquirer.

Mr. Herbert contends that it is erroneous to infer, in the absence of any more certain information, that the date of megalithic works *must* be carried back to a remote age, and their origin ascribed to a 'nation of whom tradition has scarcely preserved the name.' 'Antiquity,' Mr. Herbert argues, is essentially a relative term, most grievously abused in common parlance. It is, in fact, to the modern archæologist what the Hyperboreans

or the Pygmies were to the old geographers. As there was nothing too marvellous to be predicated of those nations, so there is no difficulty or absurdity, no inconsistency whatever, which has not been evaded under the convenient shelter of a mysterious antiquity.

Another error consists in supposing that the mere shapelessness and rudeness of megalithic works entitle them to the designation of *ancient*. 'The inference of antiquity,' says our author, 'from rudeness and simplicity of style, is but vague and declamatory. Fine works adorned Nineveh and the oldest empires on record, and rude ones satisfy many nations at this day, and will hereafter. Though rudeness or polish may sometimes distinguish the infancy or maturity of a given state, they may also distinguish its maturity from its last decline; but they can never indicate mere time. Phidias was not a modern, though he lived at a late epoch of the city of Cecrops.' (P. 80.) And he adds: 'But this topic fails entirely when the works, rude and fierce in their taste, imply much resource of art and wealth; for taste or fanaticism may affect stern forms, either inventing them, reviving them, or importing them from abroad. Therefore the argument (from style) destroys itself, or assumes this arbitrary shape: that the primitive ages, and they alone, combined skill with an austere style. Surely this (*sc.* that of Stonehenge) is one of the cases in which (as Lord Aberdeen says of the Attic coinage) the affectation of an archaic style of work is easily distinguished from the rudeness of remote antiquity.'

But the arch-error, in our author's view, with regard particularly to the works under our consideration, is the attributing them, directly or indirectly, to the Druids; or, to express ourselves more correctly, the placing their origin in a period anterior to the Roman advent. We were, we confess, so great was the force of habit, somewhat startled by our author's formal scepticism on this head. For though the hypothesis which he rejects has been often questioned and apparently matched with opposite hypotheses, yet its acceptance always seemed to us, on the whole, to be a case somewhat like that which a great modern statesman has called '*le triomphe du pis aller*.' Indeed, its 'tenure by sufferance' was so far established, that Sir Richard Hoare, with some qualification, admits its claim; for, after reviewing the results of his several predecessors' inquiries, he expresses his conclusion that though the Druids may have been the ministers, yet they were not the *masons* of these temples, which were probably the rude work of the primitive Celts or Belgic tribes, who first colonised our island. Now, we confess, with all submission, that this distinction, though apparently adverse to, is in

fact not inconsistent with, the prevalent notion. For, it is scarcely probable that a proud priesthood like the Druids, who were at once the rulers and teachers of the nation, would identify themselves with any system of worship,—Celtic, Belgic, or Teutonic,—to the establishment of which they were not parties; but if they did identify themselves with any such system, the temples designed and completed in their times, and for the purpose of such worship, might, in general parlance, be said to have been *built* by them, though they exercised no more superintendence over the mere masonry, than did Cheops over the Pyramid, or William of Wykeham over his chapels and cloisters at Winchester and Oxford.

The 'Quarterly Review,' No. XII., in its notice of Sir Richard Hoare's work, gives countenance to the Druidical hypothesis; and we believe it has till now remained substantially unassailed. But Mr. Herbert, disputing its claim simply on its merits, suggests two propositions for our consideration: one, that these temples are not Druidic, nor ante-Roman; the other, that they really and in fact bear the impress of a much more modern date. On the former of these it will be enough, we think, to read his objections, to feel that they are entitled to great consideration.

As to his first proposition, he argues *à priori*, that assuming all we have heard about the Druids to be true, we are guilty of inconsistency in assigning to their times and agency the construction of such temples as Abury and Stonehenge, because we thereby attribute to the same people, at the same period, and under the same circumstances, a two-fold system of worship.¹ If, as we have been taught, their favourite and most efficacious sacrifice was the burning of a wicker giant, with its enclosed hecatomb of human beings,—their most sacred shrine, the mystic oaken grove in the depth of the forest,—how can we account for the simultaneous use of so different a ritual as these temples would imply, celebrated in rude circles of stones on the open champaign, and of which the chief feature was the altar offering? Reasonable doubts have been entertained by most antiquaries whether *altars*, in the sense in which we understand the word, are described in the accounts of the religious ceremonies of the Druids, (see Mr. Herbert's 2d Section and note 3,) whereas all agree in discovering the *ara* amongst the remains of these temples which we are considering, with its 'ring-stone,' to which the victim was tied previous to the sacrifice.

¹ Dr. Henry has indeed endeavoured to combine the two systems. He speaks of groves, 'in the centre of which were rows of large stones set perpendicular in the earth.' But Stonehenge stood in the midst of a *barren* plain; while the nature of the works at Abury would seem to preclude trees as part of the original design.

Mr. Herbert's second objection on this head is still more striking. He contends, apparently with no less force than justice, that supposing the colossal system of works, which we generally call Druidic, to have existed in Britain in the times of those classical authors from whom we derive all our knowledge of our country and its inhabitants in those ages, it is hardly credible that they should not have noticed them.¹ Yet all are silent. The fact is unimpeachable. Of one thing we may be certain, that whatever was the cause of their silence, it is not to be attributed to their underrating such striking objects. We should as soon expect that Herodotus could have walked through Egypt, and omitted all notice of the Pyramids. It would be, indeed, past belief that men like Cæsar, Tacitus, and Pliny—the Napier, the Macaulay, and the Heeren of the age, to say nothing of a host of others, poets as well as prose writers, by whom Britain was rendered famous—should, even if they themselves had not felt very deeply impressed by such monuments, have thought an Abury or a Stonehenge unworthy of notice in their pages, whether their object was merely to gratify a taste for eloquent description, or a love of the marvellous, or to answer the more solid purpose of theorising upon the character and religion of a new and wild people.

Many of these authors have minutely portrayed the Druidic system in Gaul² as well as in Britain; they have dwelt with graphic horror upon the fierce rites and incantations, the forest temples, the savage gods. It is inconceivable, therefore, that they should intentionally, and as if by concert, have been silent upon these the most stupendous features of a foreign superstition. We can hardly evade this difficulty by supposing that such works *escaped* the notice of observant men, especially Cæsar, who, as leader of the earliest invading force, was in continual collision with that fierce and potent hierarchical government which presented the main obstacle to the Roman progress. He it was who spared no effort to eradicate an order that exercised such dangerous influence. He invariably acted upon the method enjoined upon the iconoclasts of the Scripture history,

¹ It is impossible to wrest any favourable meaning out of the language of Tacitus in the passage supposed to allude to megalithic works. Ann. xii. 35.

² We may add here a remark for which we cannot find a more convenient place, but for which we must not forget to give Mr. Herbert full credit, that though Druidism is described as having been more or less prevalent in every part of Gaul, —Marseilles and Toulouse in the south, and Rheims in the north-east, being its chief strongholds,—the megalithic works which modern learning has pronounced Druidic are to be found only in one north-western province, inhabited by what Sidonius Apollinaris (quoted by Mr. Herbert, p. 27) calls the 'Britons beyond the Loire,' and the seat, after the revolution of 408, of the independent Armorican republic.

'to destroy the high places and cut down the groves.' Tacitus expressly tells us 'that the groves sacred to cruel superstitions were cut down:' but says not a word about the destruction, still less of the existence of temples, or other monuments, in any way answering to what, in these days, we call exclusively Druidical. Even the materials of which they were composed might offer a temptation (supposing there had been no other) too strong to be resisted by an active nation of improvers, who could feel no interest in such remains. Here were abundant quarries for the construction of roads, fortifications, or other works, to which their attention was turned. Yet when Aubrey visited Abury in the reign of Charles II., it was almost perfect, and Sir R. Hoare gives a catalogue of those 'Goths' who had carried on the work of destruction there between his own time and that of Dr. Stukeley. Of Stonehenge our own eyes can testify the completeness, if we except only the marks of age and the footprints of the elements.

Such objections, Mr. Herbert thinks, and with much show of reason, to be at once fatal to the Druidic character and the ante-Roman existence of these monuments. Others, who seem to have felt the weight of such evidence, have not put forward their doubts in so distinct a shape. Dr. Lingard, in his remarks upon the Druid religion, says, 'I have not noticed the circles of unhewn stones, the remains of which still exist at Stonehenge, Abury, &c., because I do not find such stones mentioned by ancient writers as appendages to places of worship among the Celts.' (Chap. i. n. 32.) For he, like all the rest, shrank from conclusions to which their doubts would have led them. Mr. Turner inclines, though coldly, to the Phœnician theory. The difficulty that strikes every thoughtful writer, without question, is to fix a satisfactory date for these monuments. One is too remote, another too modern. Besides those we have mentioned, the Celts, Belgæ, Saxons, and Danes, have in turn enjoyed the honour of being the founders. Mr. Wilson, in his *Prehistoric Remains in Scotland*, decides for a still more ancient origin, finding in them and works cognate to them the traces of an 'Allophylian' people, as prior in time to, as different in nature from, the earliest Celts. Even an antediluvian origin has met with its partisans. All, or most, of these would have made them to the Druids and Romans, what they are to us, obsolete and inexplicable.

But do not such various and contrary opinions indicate, Mr. Herbert says, 'an attempt to break away from convictions that press upon us.' An attempt, he adds, which is in great measure prompted and enforced by the 'prepossession' in men's minds that the effects of Christianity would have been

adverse to the erection of such edifices for religious purposes, if we assign them to a period during which the Church exercised any influence in these islands. This 'prepossession' he declares to be unfounded, contending, from the evidence we possess, that the Church had but little authority, or indeed inclination, to use its influence adverse to the bias of the times. (P. 36.) Besides, we may hazard the conjecture (which is not new) that they were not intended as exclusively religious edifices; which, if true, would have prevented Christianity from having more than a nominal influence in the matter.

Having thus disposed of his predecessors' labours, let us see what Mr. Herbert sets up in their place. He has, by the title of his book, as also by his remarks on the mistaken connexion between a rude style and antiquity, which we have above quoted, prepared us in some measure to learn that his 'Cyclops' was a modern, and even partially a Christian. Be this as it may, we shall content ourselves with examining, at present, his theory of the 'reduced antiquity' of these works, which is ingenious, and, we hope we shall be able to show, intelligible. He claims for them a distinct and prominent position in the history of our country, representing them as forming a part of a grand national purpose. The date which he assigns to them is the fifth century of the Christian era, and for the illustration of his doctrine he draws our attention to many extraordinary and special features of this age. But we must not expect to find that he has opened a new mine of information. With all his authorities others have been familiar, but have rejected them. No one before him thought of giving any weight to the narrative of Geoffrey of Monmouth, the Latin translator of Tysilio's 'Chronicle of Kings.' In their contempt for monkish tradition, historians have no doubt neglected many sources of valuable instruction.

Mr. Herbert, however, does not repudiate a fact because it is mixed with falsehood, or turn from his inquiry because explicit statements are not made ready to his hands. He is convinced that history has not been altogether silent upon this subject, if we rightly interpret her pages,—in short, that all, or most, of what we have hitherto been taught to believe, has been invented, 'not in defect of tradition, but in contradiction of all substantial historic fact.' To the guidance of such a pilot, therefore, for a time we cheerfully commit our vessel. We shall not, however, blindly follow in his track, without satisfying ourselves of the depths over which he carries us. But our soundings will not be from mistrust of his experience or skill, so much as from a desire to verify the correctness of the chart which he has given over this dark and untried passage.

Taking, then, the fifth century after Christ as the probable

date, let us see what there is on record to corroborate our author's hypothesis.

Sir James Mackintosh sets great value upon the native legends and songs of a people. Niebuhr, Arnold, and Macaulay, from the half-uttered echoes of Rome's antiquity, picture many of the opening scenes of her drama. Mr. Herbert assigns the like importance to the poetry of Britain, as not less genuine because sometimes tinged with the extravagance of monkish fable. The collection of legends in the 'Triads' is well known. The majority of these are of Bardic date, composed by the Bards, who, with the Britons, had fled from the Saxon yoke to an exile among the Welsh mountains, and who were then what their ancestors, the Druids, had been, the sole depositaries of the traditional lore of their nation. Our author's study of this collection enables him to state, that, of those few legends which bear the marks of an ante-Roman age, (such as the absence of Latin names,) and which are, therefore, in strictness, alone *Druidic*, none contain any mention of the 'Great Cor,' or 'Circle of Emmrys,' as Stonehenge is called in the native poetry; or of the name of Merlin, to whose potent spells that mighty work has been vulgarly attributed. On the other hand, the lays of the post-Roman era abound in allusions, under a variety of names, to the achievement of great national works which no antiquary has hitherto hesitated to identify with those under our consideration. Such are 'the raising of the stone of Ceti, 'the building of the work of Emmrys, and the heaping of the 'pile of Cyvangron' (p. 35). This important distinction seems to have been lost sight of by previous writers, from their not having noticed the various style of these compositions.

Besides, throughout the latter series the Bards speak, not as men reverting to times long gone by, but as if the pride and power from which they had fallen, and of which these temples were the sad monuments, were but a yesterday's loss, bewailing them with all the freshness of the Trojan exile's mourning, *Quæque ipse miserrima vidi et quorum pars magna fui*.

Such evidence Mr. Herbert thinks conclusive, as far as it goes, for the recency of those objects which are thus regarded—a recency which at once contradicts the notion of an ante-Druidic existence, which latter, after what has been said, is perhaps the greatest obstacle we have to get over. With the love which these minstrels testify for their religion and its shrines, to suppose that they would 'go and nestle like owls in the forgotten 'ruins of an untold antiquity, claim them as pertaining to their 'own era, and make them the Sion of their harps,' our author justly thinks 'an incredibility' (p. 36).

But besides the testimony of the legends, he has on his side

the professed native historians, the authors of the various 'Bruts,' or Chronicles. We give his general comments on the value of their evidence in his own language :—

'The native authors' [says he] 'declared that the Great Cor was constructed in the latter days of Britannia, after the Roman emperors had ceased to govern her. They did not draw that conclusion from any reasonings or etymologies; for they neither used any such, nor had any pretensions to the capacity of so doing. It is assertion, not inference. They merely stated it because they were told it; and I will add, they were told it because it was so. The traditions of mankind are *primâ facie* true; though obvious motives may raise the presumption of their being in part or even totally false. National vanity is one such motive; and therefore the origin of traditions which magnify the antiquity of national greatness is to be regarded with suspicion and frequent incredulity. Such, for instance, would have been the case had the same authorities assured us that Gomer, son of Japhet, lay buried under these stones. The spirit of exaggerating antiquity was not one from which the Cambro-Britons were exempt; and it is strongly apparent in these very chronicles of Brutus the Trojan and his lineage. Why should not their giant Cors have been sanctified with antiquity as well as all other modes of honour, and have been made the glorious work of Brute, Locrine, or Beli Mawr?'—*Cyclops*, p. 35.

Yet, instead of reading the names of Gomer, Brutus, Hercules, or even King Arthur, in connexion with these works, we here meet with a plain tradition which assigns the 'Great Cor' to the 'latest period of the British nation's existence east of Severn, and showing that they had scarcely piled up these giant stones when they were expelled (by the Saxon) for ever from the 'lands of their forefathers,' and their religion a second time exiled into the wilds and mountains; an admission, Mr. Herbert exclaims, directly opposed to their national vanity, 'humiliating to their nation and its antiquities, and at variance with all 'imaginable motives for falsehood.'

Of all the native chronicles, the 'Brut' of Kings by Tysilio is the most conspicuous for its absurdly fabulous and 'Trojanistic' spirit. Yet affording, as it does, so many proofs of its author's hardy contempt for the trammels of historic truth, and with every disposition in him to the contrary, it contains the plain statement that Stonehenge was erected posterior to the Roman age. The collateral points of the story are palpably fabulous, and the motives, as we shall hereafter show, dissimulative; but the fact remains broadly and undeniably asserted.

His account of it is the following :—That the site of Stonehenge was the scene of the murder and burial of those British chieftains who were slain by Hengest the Saxon, when they had assembled, on the occasion of the festival of the Calanmai, to celebrate the good feeling between the two nations; and that the Bard Merlin afterwards advised the reigning king Emmrys, or Ambrosius, to remove the Giant's Circle from Ireland, and

set it up as a monument over their graves. ('Cyclops,' p. 34.)

Thus much for Mr. Herbert's evidence, with which, as we have said, many, doubtless, have been long as familiar as he; but they feared or failed to draw the conclusion to which it would seem to point. But the great feature of our author's hypothesis is the new light which its development throws upon a long darkened page in our country's annals. We will endeavour to follow our guide as closely as our limits will allow.

It is the fashion amongst historians to represent the weakness of Rome as the *sole* cause of the separation of Britain from the empire under whose dominion she had acquired so much importance, and enjoyed so much prosperity. They suppose that she was left suddenly defenceless, and that, as suddenly, her degenerate sons fell before their hardier foes, the barbarians. But was it so in fact? Was it not rather from her conscious strength, and by her own act, that, in 408, she threw off the conqueror's yoke, and assumed an independent position, so important as to be acknowledged by the Emperor Honorius? We are inclined to believe the only pretence for the above opinion is, that about this period (but before the Roman fall, as well as after it) we, for the first time since the days of Agricola, hear of our island being desolated by barbarian invasion. Yet strong as is the language of Gildas, when describing the invasions of the Scots and Picts, Mr. Herbert thinks that its strictest acceptation will hardly carry their ravages lower than the Latin town of Eboracum, in either of the great inroads previous to the year 446; the chief contests being confined to the northern districts. No towns are said to have been taken, except such fortresses as were connected with the frontier wall, *relictis civitatibus muroque celso*. (P. 74.) Besides, it is fair that Mr. Herbert's opinion should be tried by the event; and we have a right to assume that, had Britain been so weak, the ravages by land would have been extended, and the maritime descents from other countries more frequent; for, as an island, she was peculiarly exposed; and the absence of her late experienced leaders, and the necessarily divided state of her government, would have rendered her an easy prey. Why did not the vast forests of Scandinavia and Germany, now long charged with overflowing multitudes, pour their thousands upon her inviting shores? We may surely infer that we have not the whole truth here; for it is evident that the new state must, considering all its confessed disadvantages, have possessed in itself a means of resistance beyond what we have generally given it credit for, when we find it without a decisive invasion for more than forty years; and even then the foe gained a footing only by invitation from within; while the

final subjugation of the island was deferred for more than a century. No man can deliberately assume that the scanty contingents occasionally sent from Gaul on the urgent demand of the 'groaning Britons,' could do more than they are related to have done; that is, have repaired the ruined wall and repulsed the frontier enemy: they could not have protracted the conquest of a people who were ripe to be conquered.

Mr. Herbert thinks the true account of this phenomenon is to be sought in the nation themselves. He suggests that there had arisen in Britain a great moral convulsion, which, for a time, fused the differences of race and faith under the stronger heat of some all-powerful influence. 'The revolt of the insular and 'Armorican Britannias in 408,' he afterwards remarks, 'was 'an unique event, curious in its nature, and locally, at least, 'momentous The rest of the empire crumbled away by 'the conquering inroads of the foreigner. But here a conquest 'of the early Cæsars was restored to (and we may add, for a 'time, at least, maintained by) the mixed race of its ancient 'inhabitants and Roman colonists.' (P. 217.)

Religious zeal is one such all-powerful motive. Let us see if this will apply to the case before us. There can be little doubt, he thinks, that the revolution was mainly a religious one, or, rather, that circumstances which, on the failure of the sedition of Maximus and his death, had rendered the overthrow of the Roman power a feasible as well as a desirable object, opened the way under his son Eugenius, (called 'Owen Finddu' in the Triads), and the auspices of the fanatic mother of the latter,—a British 'Helena'—to the re-establishment of the old native superstition. The parties in the field were the remnants of the Druidic body, existing hitherto beyond the Roman pale, small in numbers and weakened by the persecution of more than four centuries, but strong in the prestige of an ancient title, and elated by the weakness of their bitterest foes. On the other hand, the Christians, though perhaps superior in numbers, had been of late weakened by division and heresy, particularly that of Pelagius, and had besides lost the support which the liberal state-religion of Rome had afforded them. Both were anxious to assert and extend their faith. It was not for the interest of either to maintain a contest of intolerance between themselves, which must expose both to the attacks of the vast force of Paganism which lay beyond and around them. Is it improbable that there might have been a compromise between them (with all due submission we advance such a topic), in the first place, intended as an extraordinary remedy, and suggested by common danger and national sympathy—one, too, which seemed feasible without great sacrifice of principle on either side, though the

ulterior results may have proved untoward? On the side of the Church we cannot imagine there would have been much difficulty. Its proselytising spirit and ready adoption of national prejudices is a fact above the necessity of proof. The compromise, which, as we believe, would have been the result of the Judaizing tendencies of some even of the apostles, had it not been denounced and overborne by the fearless character of S. Paul, had been attempted, we know, at a later time, and with fatal success, in the case of the Gnostics in the East, and Platonists in Egypt, and so it was, we may suppose, in Britain.

It must be always borne in mind that we are now only endeavouring to interpret our author's conjectures. He frankly confesses that the whole period is a blank in every annalist. 'It is manifest,' he remarks, 'that British history has been completely falsified in its chronicles, and that another and more true history was formerly known, which a Nennius and a Tysilio did not think good for our edification, and of which the memory is now lost.' (*Britannia after the Romans*, p. 35.) His theory, therefore, at present, rests on such bare gleanings of evidence as his industry has collected. More than this could not be said of much that Niebuhr wrote. It will be for further research to determine the measure of our faith, or the extent of our adhesion.

The chief points of historical evidence to which Mr. Herbert refers for a confirmation of this, his view, are the following:— 'It is almost the precise time,' he says, 'of Britain's separation from the Empire that the paschal schism is said to have arisen there upon the suggestion of Sulpicius Severus. See *S. Adhelm Epist. ad Gerontium*, and *Usher, Index Chron. in anno 410*, p. '219.' We have it on record that the British Church up to the time of Constantine had, in conformity with the Nicene decree, celebrated Easter on the 16th day of the month, corresponding in a cycle of 84 years to the Jewish Nisan; (*Epist. of Const. Ad omnes Ecclesias*, *Spelman. Conc.* p. 45, quoted by Mr. Herbert, *Brit. after the Romans*, p. 42;) while at a later period we find its members incurring the charge of heresy as *Quartodecimans*, for adopting the Jewish celebration on the 14th day. If this change had occurred under the Roman system, we should have found it alluded to in historical or theological writers. Mr. Herbert therefore assigns it to the days of confusion and dismemberment contemporary with Sulpicius, and quotes the authority of Archbishop Usher. (*Brit. Eccl.* p. 483, *ed.* 1687.) That prelate refers the advice of Sulpicius in this matter to a desire of obtaining a medium between the discordant computes of Alexandria and Rome. From this Mr. Herbert dissents, but it matters little to us what was the object. The fact of Britain's separation from

the Latin communion before, and independently of, the Saxon conquest, is all we have to do with, and that he thinks indisputable.

Gildas, an authority certainly not in general favourable to our author's views, expressly mentions the deplorable apostasy of the Britons during the years succeeding their revolt from Rome. His words, 'Non gentium diis perspicue litant,' are not without a very remarkable meaning in the mouth of a sincere Churchman though bigoted historian.

An important corroboration of the above view is to be found in Mr. Herbert's construction of the 'Apology of Bacharius,' published in Muratori's *Anecd. Bibl. Ambrosiana*, and quoted in *Brit. after the Romans*, p. 117. This extraordinary document is an apology purporting to be addressed to the Apostolic See by a man who, coming forth, like Abraham from among the Chaldees, from a nation whose reputation for heresy and sin was only too well known, feels it necessary to vindicate himself from the leprous taint which common opinion supposed him to have contracted. Strange to say, the writer never breathes the name of his country! Africa and Spain have been mentioned as the probable scenes of Bacharius' strictures. But in the former, Mr. Herbert argues, heresy was (if at all) prevalent only among the descendants of the Vandal conquerors, the main body of the population being, as is well known, sincerely attached to the true faith: while in Spain, the voice of Priscillianism had been twice lately hushed by the assembled Church of the nation, so that no Spaniard *could* have spoken of his country as Bacharius does. Mr. Herbert cannot discover any other nation deserving at that time such sweeping reproach besides our own. In confirmation of this view, constant positive tradition identifies Bacharius with an illustrious member of the insular Church, Mochta the Briton. The exact date of this apology is not determined, but in another work, written by him in 460, Bacharius describes himself as then an old man.

By way of illustrating the nature of the national heresy, we may add that as late as the year 1102, in the archiepiscopate of Anselm, we read, among the minutes of two successive Councils of London, a decree directed against the worship of fountains, 'and especial mention made of two where the practice condemned had chiefly prevailed.' Dr. Henry remarking on these passages says, though without giving authority, that such a practice was held to have been a relic of *Druidic superstition*. B. III. c. ii. s. 3.

Lastly, we have proof *a posteriori* that *something*, be it what it may, had suddenly changed the aspect as well as the fortunes of our island. She, who had been the favoured province of Constantine, Theodosius and Maximus, within a few years of the

Roman overthrow sinks into gloom and oblivion, and 'seems,' says Mr. Herbert, 'to have returned into the bosom of that *'ultra-mundane Oceanus* in which she had lain, "quite divided 'from the whole world," until the arms of Claudius dragged her 'into Europe.' (*Brit. after the Romans*, p. 143.) For many years we are chiefly indebted to the mention, in foreign authors, of the British colony in Armorica, that the name of *Briton* meets our ear. The voice of history having ceased, the British isles become the privileged region of fable; and in one legend they are, what the Cimmerian Chersonese was to the ancients—a Hades on earth—to which the souls of the dead were ferried over sea by unseen boatmen; while in another they are described as abandoned to the range of fierce and poisonous beasts. (Cf. *Procopius* with *Tzetzes' Comm. on Lycophron*, quoted by Mr. Herbert, *Brit. after the Romans*, p. 143.)

We have digressed thus far in order to do full justice to what must be considered as the key of our author's position, viz. the convulsion of national feeling in Britain after the revolt from Rome, which convulsion he endeavours to show was connected with, if not greatly dependent on, an attempt to restore the old Druidic system, to which the Church, too weak to resist, submitted on terms of compromise. Mr. Herbert has, we believe, discussed this question, and the general features of the age to which it belongs, at length in his 'Essay on the Neo-Druidic heresy,' but we carefully avoid entering on such a topic in our present 'connexion.' Those, who are curious on this subject, must be content to search for themselves in those books we have already quoted. We shall delay no more in speculating on details where our information must necessarily be scarce, and the ground somewhat delicate. We must leave it to our readers to determine whether or not our author has in his 'pleadings' stated a sufficiently colourable case, as to the date and causes of the works in question.

Dr. Robertson, noticing some of the excesses consequent on the eager adoption of the Reformed doctrines by the vulgar, remarks that we who live at such a distance of time can hardly realise the effects which a new fanaticism would, under such circumstances, be likely to produce. If Mr. Herbert's historical deductions be just, he may well call upon us to consider ere we condemn his theory,—remembering (in spite of Mr. Smee) that there are as yet no laws discovered to which the human will or heart are amenable, especially in an age of strange and striking combinations, of intense religious zeal, shameless dissimulation, and recklessness of means, which overbore all opposition, silenced or excluded waverers, and bonded together the votaries in an union of almost mystical strength. An age distinguished by such features is sure to mark its era in history by mighty monuments.

The enthusiasm of Mahomet carried his followers to distant conquest; in Britain a similar spirit may have led the nation to erect those fierce and stupendous memorials which have alike puzzled antiquaries and philosophers.

The duration of this extraordinary age Mr. Herbert extends from the year of freedom, in 408, to the final triumph of the Saxons about the year 550. He finds united in this 'era of splendour and sin,' to use his own graphic language, 'nearly all the possible requisites for his proposition,—an advanced state of human science'—the great bequest of the departed Roman—'considerable resources existing in the country, the independent use of them, and a public mind of great and energetic aberration.' (P. 75.) This latter quality, he thinks, will account for 'the means of performance and the motives of it'—our greatest moral difficulties—as well as for the specific style and character which the works assumed. For where, argues he, a certain style of architecture wants the *indicia* belonging to a progressive course of art, where it does not hinge upon inventions improving the capacity, but upon motives 'actuating the will,' there we must be prepared to find that an extraordinary cause will produce an extraordinary effect. This would appear to be eminently so in the case before us—that of a 'fanatical and enthusiastic people, constructing a new policy after ages of dependence, and a new religion out of two old ones.' 'From whom that people borrowed their idea, what moved them to adopt such a style in preference to others easier and more elegant, and how old it was among those from whom they borrowed?' these, Mr. Herbert confesses to be 'questions more or less difficult.' We quote his own words as furnishing an attempted interpretation of the difficulty.

'The entire (megalithic) system,' he remarks, 'as it was introduced among the Britons in the last days of the Western Empire, perhaps never existed anywhere else, even in regard of the forms which it assumed, but much less in regard of the feelings with which it was connected. There was this difference, that elsewhere it exhibited the natural materials and rude fashion of a real simplicity, whereas here (in Britain) it exhibits the deliberate choice and fanatical zeal of a people more advanced in civility.' (P. 233.) From whatever quarter it travelled to our shores—and it is very likely connected with the North Western migrations (for in their wake alone can anything cognate to it be found),—it is certain that those nations possessed only the rudiments of what the Britons under the high pressure of their enthusiastic spirit carried much further.

To his second question the best answer we can make is simply to refer to the history. Under the circumstances of so great a revolution as that which we have above supposed, it was not

likely that men would be satisfied without a visible and striking image of their new common faith. 'Let us build a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven,' was the general cry of those who, in the pride of their new state, feared the time when they might be 'scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.' The demand for the marvellous and gigantic was not to be contented with any existing form, whether Christian or Druidic, but by common consent they adopted one they found traditionally connected with the family of nations to which the mass of the people belonged. Here, Mr. Herbert thinks, we may trace the Druid, or rather Bardic, influence. At so small a sacrifice did they in great measure restore the supremacy of their order,—the substitution of stones for trees—the lasting material for the perishable,—and of the solitude of the plain for the silent gloom of the forest! At the distance of eleven centuries, as Aubrey gazed upon the unbroken avenues of stones, they offered to his eyes as forcible an image as ever of the grove which, (as suggested,) they were designed to represent; while, in confirmation of such a theory, tradition and prejudice have to this day stamped such works as exclusively Druidical.

The adoption of such a style of architecture was eminently fitted for the other uses to which the supposed new constitution will have intended to devote those mighty 'Babels.' We have before alluded to the possibility of their being of a mixed sacred and political character. Hitherto with the old priesthood of Britain and Gaul, as in Egypt and India, religious faith had been rather a matter of philosophic teaching, unexplained and unappreciated by the vulgar. The fashion of Christianity had rendered the publicity and popularity of a creed a necessary condition of its existence, and the advantage of combining civil with religious institutions had been duly felt and approved. Hence, in the Neo-Druidic period, the central seat of national worship became, as in ancient Greece, the 'Panionium' of the British name, community of faith being here as there interpreted as the surest earnest of community of interest. Stonehenge (whatever may have been the use of Abury) was, from its situation, admirably adapted for such a twofold purpose. And it may be as Mr. Herbert suggests, that the seat of civil government was transferred to Ambri, or Ambresbury, (now Amesbury,) hard by, for such a reason. The 'Head of Bran,'—the mystical type of the kingdom—was said to have been concealed at 'Caer Caradoc,' which a Welsh writer (quoted, 'Cyclops,' p. 221,) expressly calls the 'Mount of Ambri.' Geoffrey of Monmouth explains it as 'Salisbury,' by a vulgar error confusing everything on Salisbury Plain with Sarum. Hence the 'Great Cor' is, on the one hand, 'the great circle

'of dominion' (we quote the language of the legends), 'the central place of precious stones;' figurative expressions, which obviously describe it as the national assembly; while the name Mynydd Dewis, 'Mount of Election,' would seem to point to it as the 'Scone' of the British kings, where those creatures of the priesthood were anointed by the Bardic hierarchy, and perhaps the surrounding barrows mark their places of sepulture. Among the poetic expressions which shadow forth its religious character, we find such as the 'walls of the Eternal, the melodious quaternion of Peter' (the rock or stone of the Church, as Mr. Herbert interprets it, p. 88). What have we here but an embodiment of the combined majesty of Church and State? We now see a structure which does not dishonour so grand an aim, and discern a purpose worthy to be recorded by so stupendous a monument!

We may naturally feel curious, after following our author in his present ingenious attempt at the restoration of historic truth, to learn what he has to tell us of the previous mutilation of the building, and why it is that such scanty fragments present themselves to the antiquary's notice. The experienced reader need not be told that such a case is probably only one among many, where truth has been obscured by the passions and prejudices of mankind. Look at comparatively modern times—the Cathedral of Cologne dates from no earlier period than the wane of the Middle Ages; yet, though our interest has been excited to the utmost in its behalf, we, as yet, know no more of its early history than ignorance, superstition, or dissimulation will vouchsafe to us. The motives, however, for the concealment of the real history of Britain during the fifth century may at least be guessed at, and the examination of such of them as bear upon our subject, will form, we hope, no inappropriate conclusion to our present remarks.

Mr. Herbert has shown how Britain's birthday of independence was celebrated by a vigorous attempt at self-government and self-defence, and how in their desire of temporary union, the leaders of the movement showed themselves designedly careless of the means by which an end was attained. That a calamitous termination should ere long crown so time-serving a policy may be easily conceived. Fanatical zeal for the hour covered, but could not exclude, schism and discord. The nation, awakening from its delirium, was a house divided against itself, and fell under the curse incident to such a condition. The declamatory style of Gildas may, after all, contain no great exaggeration of the miseries that ensued. We read there of folly, extravagance, depravity, and apostasy; of the antagonism between a proud priesthood, and weak, but haughty monarchs, descendants of Caractacus and Boadicea; while barbarian inva-

ders, incessantly hovering on the frontier, wearied out all the efforts of a divided and oppressed people. Then the ever-fatal device of matching one foe against another introduced the Saxon to devour the now easy prey. These were truths too bitter to find a ready chronicler. Besides, the days of heathenism and darkness which followed destroyed the means (had even the wish existed) of commemorating the national ruin. Hence, except by tradition, the truth was scarce remembered. But it was reserved to a far later age to interpolate a positive falsehood in its place. Such an attempt was made by Tysilio, in his 'Chronicle of Kings,' published some time in the eighth century. The short account there given of the 'Cor Emmrys,' and which we have quoted, affords a forcible instance of what Mr. Herbert calls 'dissimulation' in a historian,—namely, that he clothes his facts with so much falsehood as to create a suspicion of the facts themselves. He could not conceal the truth that the site of Stonehenge was the scene of the well-known tragedy of the bloody 'Calanmai,'—that event had made the 'Great Cor' a subject of too painful interest for a historian to pass it in silence, as he has Abury, or to assign to it a mere fabulous origin. Forced to give thus much truth, he atones for the confession by describing it as a recent monument¹ erected after the Saxon Conquest by piety and patriotism to the fallen flower of British valour;—affecting to be ignorant that it had, in fact, existed long before as the temple of false religion, and that those who had perished there were not devoted leaders, but men who, for their own selfish ends, and by their fanatical policy and teaching, had brought the nation to disunion, defeat, and exile. Everything conspired to assist in establishing the ingenious fraud. The name under which the place was known by the Britons was entirely forgotten, or carefully concealed, with the memory of their disgrace, while one which the Saxon² had given to the monument in his hour of triumph—a name derived from that of his successful leader—survived and continued, and was adopted by Tysilio and Geoffrey, the Latin translator of the 'Brut,' the latter being perhaps ignorant of the true etymology, or, what is more likely, as Mr. Herbert remarks, reading it as 'Hanging Stones.' Of course in Saxon

¹ 'It existed when that event occurred,' says Mr. Herbert, 'of which it is feigned to be a memorial, although it became, as it were, a monument to those who were there buried. So the church of Ste. Genevieve has been made, though it was not built, a mausoleum; and special motives have operated to banish from discourse, and partly from recollection, its original character. This may serve for imperfect illustration.'—P. 85.

² The advocates of the Druidic theory seem not to have considered that there is any inconsistency between the character of the people to whom they ascribe the erection of these stones, and the name which they bear. For that is evidently Saxon; and a passage in Dugdale, where the reading is 'Stanhengest,' confirms Mr. Herbert's interpretation of 'Stones of Hengest.'

England nothing but the Saxon appellation prevailed, and thus the misnomer and the falsehood have passed down the stream of history. But Mr. Herbert, learned in the poetry of Wales, the native land of his house, brings to bear upon the false teaching of the 'Brut' the indignant refutation of the later Bards. These fierce enthusiasts, whose sons and grandsons knew so well how to fire the patriotism of their countrymen against the yoke of the 'ruthless' Edward, could not, without equal disdain, brook the faint-heartedness of those who, to conceal the memorials of defeat, introduced a lie upon their annals, and obscured the 'storied' monument of the high deeds and proud bearing of their order during its second sway, after the fall of the 'men of Cæsar.' Cynddelw, the arch-Bard of Powys, at the close of the twelfth century, thus vented his detestation of Tysilio and his school :

'A copious bard sings sweetly your praise,—
A song without separation (*i.e.* schism), without deception ;
A lofty song, without quietness, without silence ;
Not the detested song of the followers of Tysilio.'—(P. 42.)

We must conclude. We cannot but feel that we have still left much unnoticed in our author's treatise ; but our desire to confine ourselves to the most popular view of his subject must be our excuse. Thus we have neglected the megalithic system, as it appears in the Gallic province on the other side the Channel ; a study of which would suggest a much closer connexion between the *uterque Britannus* than historians have hitherto remarked. We have passed over, too, Mr. Herbert's onslaught upon the mighty fallacy of the 'Dracontian Temples,'—the pet discovery of Dr. Stukeley,—and which many succeeding antiquaries have taken without a murmur—and, apropos of that, the dishonesty and oftentimes the ignorance of that learned Doctor. All which are 'mighty interesting,' as old Pepys would say, and may reward the patient reader. It is a fault inherent, perhaps, in the nature of Mr. Herbert's work, that on many points, even relating to his immediate subject, it is rather suggestive than conclusive ; and this has necessarily led to a want of arrangement which has, we are bound to say, added much to our present task of interpretation. Further, in all that he has advanced we are not inclined to concur ; but we repeat that the desire to do justice to the stride here made in antiquarianism has led us thus far to follow his guidance. And we think that, all things considered, we shall have no longer need to blush for our countrymen in their treatment of subjects like the present, when, in answer to the oft-repeated question, 'What mean these stones?' we point to this production, and compare it with the models of learning and patient labour of our German neighbours.

ART. II.—*The History of Mary Queen of Scots.* By F. A. MIGNET. 2 vols. London: Bentley.

AMONGST all the modes of settling a dispute, and satisfying the earnest longing for justice which disturbs the heart of man, perhaps the old method, by single combat, presents most points of immediate satisfaction. There is something so entirely congenial to the feelings in seeing a cause personified, and adequately represented. Much of this present satisfaction is experienced when we find in the page of history some grand struggle maintained, some vital question worked out, by men alive to their responsibilities, equal to the important interests they support, and with minds and tempers akin to the principles they advocate. Such a combat and such champions we find in the period we are now called on to consider—a period not less remarkable for the mighty interests involved in the battle then fought out, than for the personal qualities of those engaged in it, and their singular adaptation to the parts they severally played. It may be said, indeed, that circumstances have the power of moulding characters and fitting them to the form assigned them, but the adaptation here is something much more particular and appropriate. Had any of the leading characters in this drama changed places, we see that the results might have been altogether different, and these differences of such magnitude, as to alter the whole face of society abroad and at home, even down to the present day.

The course of events connected with the unhappy queen whose character is the subject of our article, by turns brings before us all the principal personages of that period; around her they often group themselves, and with her all were intimately concerned; so closely, indeed, that the contact always develops their inner nature, unmasks their designs and motives, and tests and tries them, as some great power of nature tests every substance that is brought within its influence. It is a test popularly considered fatal to the magnanimity of our great Elizabeth, and to the disinterestedness of Scotland's great statesman: a test to bring out in glaring relief all the fierceness of Knox's nature; to reveal the secret sources of France's duplicity; and the cruelty, the treachery, the ambition of Spain; and to make manifest the utter corruption which lay on the surface at least of the old religion, and to expose every failure of sincerity, reverence, and charity, in that form which superseded it. False herself, Mary of Scotland is yet the mirror of

truth to those who approach her; we see in every instance the bad in blacker colours, and the pure gold of the best sullied by an alloy, which need not have been detected, but for the severe trial she brings them to.

The fair, candid, impartial mind finds in the records of Mary and her times lessons of such rare interest and importance, such a far and clear insight into persons, motives, and the secret springs of great events, as will repay the toils of the most laborious search. But for any real good, for the ascertaining of truth, for fulfilling any of the uses and purposes of history, candour and impartiality are so important, are indispensable in so stringent a sense of the term, that we may say it is better not to study them at all, than to do so in any other spirit; and experience shows us how hard it is for those who bring themselves within reach of Mary's fascinations, to preserve these qualities. For her beauty lives still: three hundred years have passed, and her smiles and tears have yet power to move the heart, and to pervert the judgment. Those well-known features reign over the imagination as though we beheld them with our eyes; we look in her face and forget, not only all that can be said, but, alas! all that can be proved, against her. If this be so now, it was surely a happy thing for England that while all this beauty lived and breathed, our country lay under a woman's rule. Most unfortunate Mary must have deemed it. No king could have withstood the temptation once to behold those charms, no man could have resisted their influence. What would have been the end, who can tell? Had she once came a suppliant before him, the world might have seen the ancient tale realized—

'In robe and crown the king came down
To meet and greet her on her way;
"It is no wonder," said the lords,
"She is more beautiful than day."

And so she might have slid into the unguarded throne, which she never abandoned the hope of one day possessing. Even Elizabeth seems to have known that her safety lay in distance, that it was risking too much to indulge a natural curiosity. We can hardly, indeed, overrate what might have been Mary's living power under favouring circumstances, when we see to what an extent her fascinations blind the moral sense of her historians and apologists at this distant period of time; when we note the tender names they give to her errors, what efforts they make to elude them, how shrinkingly they approach the mention of them, how hastily they pass them over, how petulantly unjust it renders them to all beside, applying all the severer moral standard to her fellow-actors for the licence they allow themselves in her solitary exceptional case.

M. Mignet, her latest biographer, and whose work, ably condensing as it does much new matter, has given the subject a fresh interest, is better described as Mary's admirer than her apologist; for having a taste, and, we must believe also, a tender conscience, for historic accuracy, there is no want of fairness to complain of in his detail of the facts of his heroine's story; her worst enemy (the epithet invariably applied to every conscientious believer in Mary's guilt in the one great transaction of her life) never brought together so great a weight of evidence against her. In fact, he believes all the bad she has ever been charged with. The remarkable point in M. Mignet is, that this conviction of guilt in no way seems to affect his feelings towards her. She still occupies in his mind the niche of injured innocence and virtue. Now and then, it is true, the urgency of the case drags from him some unwilling phrases of condemnation; but the *tone* of his work is sympathising admiration. We know not what may be the secret cause for this perverted judgment. Whether it is to be found in his pride, as a Frenchman, in Mary's beauty and grace, herself half a Frenchwoman by birth, and wholly by education; or whether it proceeds from an equally patriotic hatred of Elizabeth as a main author of our national greatness, it is not easy to decide; probably both these motives have their influence; certain it is that Elizabeth gets all the hard words, is the object of all the virtuous indignation our author has to bestow; and that the same faults which in Mary are passed over without comment, or even sometimes with a lofty tribute of praise to her talent, ingenuity, and matchless resources, are in Elizabeth denounced in a storm of righteous censure. The course of our narrative will afford sufficient proof of this, without lingering at the outset to substantiate our charge. We who are compelled, however ungalantly, to take Mignet's facts,—borne out as they are by every trustworthy previous history,—and to form our own severer conclusions upon them, must proceed, without further delay, to detail these facts as recent search has confirmed, and thrown new light upon them; first attempting to show that in spite of the elegance of Mary's education, and the apparent promise of her youth, there was nothing in her early training to render the darker pages of his history impossible, nor more ungenial and unnatural than great crimes must always be, when we set ourselves deliberately, and in cool blood, to account for them.

Mary is universally called unfortunate and unhappy—too often, to screen her from severer and more appropriate epithets. But unhappy and unfortunate she may be truly called in the circumstances of her childhood and of her education. For what

greater mishap could have befallen a beautiful and innocent child, than to be taken from a mother's care to be reared in the bosom of the Court of France, under the eye and immediate superintendence of her uncle the Cardinal of Lorraine, the most infamous member of the house of Guise, and under the maternal care and example of her mother-in-law, Catharine of Medici, that type and byword of falsehood and cruel treachery? Of this court M. Mignet gives us the following picture:—

‘This court was then the most magnificent, the most elegant, the most joyous, and, we must add, the most lax in Europe. Still retaining certain military customs of the middle ages, and at the same time conforming to the intellectual usages of the time of the *renaissance*, it was half-chivalric and half-literary, mingling tournaments with studies, hunting with erudition, mental achievements with bodily exercises, the ancient and rough games of skill and strength with the novel and delicate pleasures of the arts. Nothing could equal the splendour and vivacity which Francis I. had introduced into his court, by attracting thither all the principal nobility of France, by educating as pages therein young gentlemen of all the provinces, by adorning it with nearly two hundred ladies belonging to the greatest families in the kingdom, and by establishing it sometimes in the splendid palaces of Fontainebleau and S. Germain, which he had either built or beautified on the banks of the Seine, and sometimes in the spacious castles of Blois and Amboise, which his predecessors had inhabited on the banks of the Loire. A careful imitator of his father's example, Henry II. kept up the same magnificence at his court, which was presided over with as much grace as activity by the subtle Italian, Catherine de Medici, whose character had been formed by Francis I., who had admitted her into the *petite bande de ses dames favorites* with whom he used to hunt the stag, and frequently sport with alone in his pleasure-houses! The men were constantly in the company of the women; the queen and her ladies were present at all the games and amusements of Henri II. and his gentlemen, and accompanied them in the chase. The king, on his part, together with the noblemen of his retinue, used to pass several hours every morning and evening in the apartments of Catherine de Medici. “There,” says Brantôme, “there was a host of human goddesses, some more beautiful than the others; every lord and gentleman conversed with her whom he loved best; whilst the king talked to the queen, his sister, the Dauphiness, (Mary Stuart,) and the princesses together with those lords and princes who were seated nearest him.” As the kings themselves had avowed mistresses, they were desirous that their subjects should follow their example, “and if they did not do so,” says Brantôme, “they considered them coxcombs and fools.”—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 37.

It is of this court, and its influence upon the susceptible mind of childhood, that M. Mignet ventures to say, that Mary ‘during this period only gained benefit from it,’ (p. 40,) as if, because she was not old enough to take an active share in its immoralities, that therefore her moral sense was not infected by the atmosphere in which she lived. Whereas it was this union of elegance and polish with deep depravity which constituted its chief danger. She might under another aspect have learnt to view sin with horror and disgust; but in this gay domestic social scene

of wickedness, in which even religion was by no means shut out, and was universally acknowledged and respected, such a foundation of laxity and tolerance of evil was laid, as offers the readiest solution for all the subsequent errors of her life. Mary had infinite charms and graces, but there is hardly any indication of her possessing a conscience; as far as in them lay, those polished princes and cardinals strangled it in the cradle, to make her more like themselves, more the creature of their designs. Nothing is more fearful amongst these masters of dissimulation and profligacy, of which that bad court furnished so many examples, than the absence of remorse after their ill deeds are done. Less sinners show us a mind in torment, full of anguish, if not repentance, when the tempter abandons them to their fate; but these gigantic criminals, these wholesale plotters, and poisoners, and assassins, who filled the earth with their deeds of violence, seem to have been able to sustain their courage and their audacity to the end. No lifted veil reveals what should have been the terrors of Charles IX.'s last hours: he died calmly, his hand clasped in that of his mother Catharine. We might call it an exemplary end, but that there is no sign, no confession, not one symptom of repentance for one of the blackest crimes that disgrace our nature. And the reason for this must be that with them the very salt had lost its savour; their religion was corrupt, as being disconnected with purity of life. Party spirit, no less than self-indulgence, led to this fatal result. With many a grievous failing in Christian love and charity, the Reformers did yet preach morality; and because they did so, and had used the universal decay of it as a powerful weapon against the religion in power, therefore those in spiritual high places did too often only the more defy and disregard the moral precepts of the Gospel, only the more held monstrous transgressions of purity and truth as venial, because that opposite party sternly upheld them. And when Mary early learnt to abhor John Knox, and to reverence and to yield herself to the guidance of her profligate uncle, she learnt, alas! at the same time, to hate along with him the stern moral law which he preached. She learnt to form a wholly different standard of what constituted a faithful child of the Church; and in spite of the sins of her life, it does not seem that according to her own judgment she ever fell short of it.

The difficulties which exist against forming a correct and unanimous judgment on the character of this queen cannot certainly be attributed to a want of materials. No period of history was ever laid more bare, more completely exposed for subsequent investigation; and this constantly in the very handwriting of the parties most concerned. What was scarcely

whispered three hundred years ago, is now proclaimed on the house-tops—plots and dark designs, which it would have been rack, and torture, and death to reveal then, all the world may now peruse in all the comfort of fair type and drawing-room security. The schemes against this nation in particular, what Mary wrote to Philip, and Philip wrote to the Pope, and all that the Pope replied, and all that Alva advised and projected, which would once have made the faint-hearted give up their country for lost, are now food for easy triumph or amused speculation. In addition to the innumerable histories and narratives contemporary, or composed at intervals for different ends down to the present current year, we are informed by Prince Labanoff that in our State-paper Office alone the letters and papers relating to Mary Queen of Scots, collected and classed with the greatest care in chronological order, amount to sixty-nine bound folio volumes. The archives of France and Spain also contribute their share of curious confirmation. Mary's own letters which have escaped to this time amount to 736, and in the midst of documents of little interest, formal announcements, demands for safe-conduct, and professions of friendship, which flowed so readily from Mary's pen, and meant so little, are some which reveal her very heart; letters written in the heat of passion, and with a startling force of expression which brings her whole soul before us—and many equally remarkable for dignity of remonstrance, for a clear terse statement of facts, and for readiness in turning those facts to her own advantage. At a time when most ladies could not write a letter at all; when they could neither spell the words, nor compose a sentence, nor knew how to use these accomplishments for the purpose of expressing their thoughts, had they possessed them, Mary was an accomplished letter-writer; the pen was her weapon,—her letters, as compositions, may stand a comparison with those of the wisest and greatest men of her time. She began to write early, and the melancholy circumstances of her life, and her own indomitable spirit and restless temper, kept her in continual practice. Writing was the occupation of her life.

We need not remind our readers that Mary, a 'beautiful infant' in her sixth year, accompanied by her 'four Maries,' the daughters of noble Scotch houses, of the same age and name as herself, after being affianced to the Dauphin, was committed by her mother, Mary of Lorraine and Queen Dowager of Scotland, to the care of her relations and the French king, to be educated in her adopted country till she was of age to complete the marriage contract:—a measure deemed necessary from the disturbed state of Scotland, and the constant attempts of each party to obtain possession of the person of the young queen.

In France she received an education fitted to develop every gift of nature.

'She early displayed the varied gifts of her rich and charming nature. At ten years of age she astonished all who knew her by her maturity, and wrote to the Queen Dowager with delicate and precocious good sense. When thirteen years old she recited a Latin speech of her own composition in presence of the King, the Queen, and the whole Court, in the hall of the Louvre.'—*Ibid.* p. 41.

And again:—

'Her mental and personal attractions were early developed. She was tall and beautiful; her eyes beamed with intelligence and sparkled with animation. She had the most elegantly shaped hands in the world. Her voice was sweet, her appearance noble and graceful, and her conversation brilliant. She early displayed those charms which were destined to make her an object of universal admiration, and which rendered even her infancy seductive. She had been brought up with the daughters of Catherine de Medici, and under the superintendence of the learned Margaret of France, the sister of Henry II.'—*Ibid.* p. 36.

She was educated with great care. She understood and spoke Latin with facility—she had considerable knowledge of history, knew several living languages, and we learn from Brantôme that she had a fine poetical taste.

'She loved poetry and poets; but, above all, M. de Ronsard, M. du Bellay, and M. de Maisonneville, who have written beautiful verses and elegies on her. She herself composed and wrote verses, of which I have seen some beautiful and well written. She sang very well, accompanying herself on the lute, which she touched very prettily with that beautiful white hand of hers, and those fair well-shaped fingers.'—*Ibid.* p. 43.

Her uncle, the Cardinal, thus writes of her to his sister, the Queen Dowager of Scotland, when she had attained her tenth year:—

'After having assured you of the prosperity and health of the said lords, I will tell you those things which are most important to yourself, and from which you will receive most pleasure and satisfaction. It is, that the said lady, your daughter, is so grown, and indeed increases every day in height, goodness, beauty, wisdom, and virtues, that she is as perfect and accomplished in all things honest and virtuous as it is possible for her to be, and there is no one like her to be found, either among noble ladies or others, of what low or mean condition they may be. And I am constrained to tell you, Madame, that the King takes such a liking to her, that he often amuses himself in chatting with her for an hour at a time, and she knows as well how to entertain him with good and wise conversation as any woman of five-and-twenty would.'—*Labanoff*, vol. i. p. 9.

And going on to make arrangements with his sister for forming a separate establishment for her, suited to her rank, not being satisfied with the existing state of things:—

'I advise that there should be nothing superfluous in the order of it, nor yet mean or sordid, which is what she hates more than anything in the world. And believe me, Madame, she has already so high and noble a

courage, that she makes great demonstrations of being vexed, seeing herself in this inferior position, and for this reason desires to see herself removed from the present guardianship, and to live in authority.'

And at the end of the same letter:—

'As for me, Madame, all my happiness will lie in serving the mother and the daughter, and I will always attend to what it will please you to command me, and I hope so to manage that you shall be content. I only beg you, Madame, to believe me satisfied that never was a daughter calculated to give greater contentment, or better brought up; and I must not conceal from you that Madame de Parroys (her governess) does the best that it is possible to do, and be sure that God is well served, and after the old fashion. The bearer of this will tell you of the harangue which the queen, your daughter, made to the king.'—*Ibid.* p. 14.

Elsewhere he says:—

'I can assure you, Madame, that there is no one more beautiful and more virtuous than the Queen, your daughter; she governs both the King and the Queen.'—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 36.

It was probably unhappy for Mary's moral training that she was so charming and so teachable. Besides the importance for their own ends, which was the primary motive with her guardians, there was a positive pleasure in witnessing her aptitude for the part they designed her to play, and her quickness and docility in receiving their lessons: the earliest lesson of this school—the great weapon of their policy—the art to be initiated into with the first dawn of reason and pursued and perfected through life, being duplicity and dissimulation. This poor child at ten showed herself no mean proficient—she showed herself at least thoroughly alive to its importance, and jealous of her own credit in this particular. There is something at once pretty and melancholy in the following letter to her mother, written at ten years old, which is justly quoted as an evidence of her precocious talent, and with less reason, for the *promise* which these early years held out. Children dearly love a secret, it is quite congenial to their nature to have mysteries, and with requisite training they may become early adepts at concealment. It was Mary's misfortune, rather than her fault, that this natural propensity should have been cultivated and developed, and set off to her own mind with a great show of duty towards her mother:—

'1552.

'Madame,—I have received the letters which you have been pleased to write to me by Azus Asquin, by which I have learnt the pleasure you have felt that I have kept secret the things which it pleased you to send me. I can assure you, Madame, that nothing that comes from you shall be known by me (*ne sera sceu par moy*). . . . I humbly beg you to believe that I shall not fail to obey you in everything in which you are pleased to command me, and to think that the chief wish I have in the world is to be obedient and agreeable to you, doing you every possible service as I am bound. I have seen, by your letters, that you beg me to approve the marriage-gift of the late M. Asquin to his son, who is here. I humbly

entreat you never to give me anything but your commands, as to your very humble and very obedient daughter and servant, for otherwise I shall not think I have the happiness of being in your good graces. As for my master, I will do as you have told me. I have shown the letters you have been pleased to write to me to my uncle, Monsieur de Guise, thinking that you would wish it, though, after the directions you have given me, I should not have shown them but that I was afraid I could not arrange things without his help. I write two other letters with my own hand; the one concerning Mde. de Paroys, and the other for my master, that you may be able to show that of my said master without this, so that they may not think that you have told me anything about it. . . . I should have written to you in cypher, but my secretary has told me that it was not necessary, and that he was writing to you in cypher. I write also to my natural brother (*frère bastard*), according to the advice of my uncle, M. de Guise. The said letters are open, in order that you may deliver them if you approve of them.'—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 6.

What a maze for a poor child's head of secrets and mysteries, and with what satisfaction our queen throws herself into these arcana. We have no doubt she could at this time into command both speech and countenance, so that no one about her should guess she knew what she did not choose to be supposed acquainted with. This is all very ingenious and clever in a child, but we do think may fairly make us mistrust the intrinsic sincerity of the 'frank artless manner,' and the 'open and unsuspecting temper' her panegyrists so constantly extol in her, and by which they will always interpret the hard facts of the case which give so contrary an impression. But our readers may think us harsh in deducing such consequences from a little girl's dutiful letter to her mamma. It is solely to show her an apt pupil in a bad system. This same bad system must also share the greater part of the blame in a subsequent act of atrocious duplicity, in the well known matter of the secret bonds she was induced to put her hand to when she reached the age of fifteen. Previous to her marriage with the Dauphin, and before the arrival of the Scotch commissioners, who were to bring the articles of agreement from the Scotch parliament, Henry and her uncles, the Guises, got her to sign three secret bonds. The first of these acts (Mignet, vol. i. p. 46) was a full and free donation of Scotland to the Kings of France, in case of her dying without heirs, in consideration of the services which those monarchs had at all times rendered to Scotland by defending her from England, *her ancient and inveterate enemies*, and especially for the assistance which she had received from Henry II., who had maintained her independence at his own expense during her minority; the second act made over all the revenues of Scotland to France till a certain impossible sum, alleged to be due but not acknowledged by Scotland, should be paid; and the third confirmed these preceding documents, *whatever public articles of agreement she might be induced to sign*. After stating that for certain

reasons she has no means of opposing openly measures in Scotland which she disapproves, the protestation goes on:—

‘For this reason she has protested, and protests, that whatever agreement or consent she has made, or may make, to the articles and instructions sent by the estate of her kingdom, in case she dies without heirs, she wishes and intends that the dispositions made by her in that case for and to the profit of the Kings of France, remain entire, and have their full and entire effect in spite of the agreements and consents that she makes, or will make, hereafter, if any she makes, on these articles and instructions, or otherwise, as things that will be made directly against her will, desire, and intention.’ —*Labanoff*, vol. i. p. 55; *Tytler*, vol. vi. p. 70.

These three documents she signed voluntarily; and fifteen days after, with equal willingness, she signed publicly before the Scotch commissioners acts and agreements of a directly contrary import, securing the integrity of Scotland, its independence of France, and appointing an heir chosen by them in case of her dying without issue. The sin of this iniquitous transaction lies so heavily on the French court, that, by comparison, Mary, a child of fifteen, may be hardly said to bear the guilt of it; but it at least illustrates what her education had been, and what principles and practices she was already made familiar with.

It is quite in conformity with the tone of her education, that Mary should send a letter to her mother by these same commissioners, full of smooth, graceful satisfaction with everything and everybody, the king, the queen, her young husband, her relations and friends, and also with the favours that had been bestowed on these same duped commissioners, who ‘had been so well received and gratified in every possible way;’ (*de tout ce qu’il a esté possible.*)

Mary is justly termed unfortunate, though not, as we have said, from the circumstances which are understood to obtain for her this affecting epithet; her misfortune seems really to lie in the fitness and congeniality of the position in which she was now placed with the leading features of her character. There was in herself nothing counter to the training she received—no resolute independent sense of right and wrong to resist this false teaching. Things around her were all smooth, easy, and delightful, and she seems to have acquiesced without a doubt in the fact, that this was the way kings reigned, and nations were ruled. She at once acquired high ideas of the rights of sovereignty, especially of its superiority to, and independence of, every earthly tribunal; and low ones of the responsibilities of this exalted station, and of the duties which it imposes. Her sojourn in France deprived her of all feelings of nationality, so that she regarded her own country only as a dependency on

her adopted kingdom, important to her as the source of her own power and greatness, but mere banishment and expatriation as her home. It is hardly a censure to say that Mary wanted patriotism, so removed was she from everything to excite this virtue; but still, on this point we find a great contrast between her and her rival (to adopt the received phraseology) Elizabeth. We do not believe, that, had Elizabeth, even at the same early age, been exposed to the same temptation, she could have been induced by any power, or for the sake of any personal advantage, so to sign away her people and her country by a stroke of her pen. But the deep duplicity in which Mary was bred made nothing seem true or real. No promise was binding, nothing was what it seemed to be; and, consequently, the only objects worth striving for were pleasure and personal aggrandisement, and the only intellectual endowments to be cultivated were such as furthered these ends,—external graces and accomplishments, and a certain subtle penetration, as far removed from the qualities of a sound judgment, as cunning is from wisdom. What real good Henry and the Guises could have proposed to themselves by this sacrifice of the young queen's integrity, it is difficult to make out; any honest man would have seen it was a measure as impossible to carry out as it was unjust in conception, but it was only too much in conformity with the treacherous policy of those times. Beyond its moral influence on those concerned, and as illustrating the principles on which Mary's character was formed, it did, in fact, produce no fruit,—it came to nothing. The next step taken by her under their advice had more definite consequences, though in itself less reprehensible. It was the first of the many 'fatal' measures which mark her reign; fatal, as filling her own mind with pretensions she could never realize, and never abandon; and fatal, as bringing upon her the permanent jealousy and mistrust of that great queen, whose genius always ruled over Mary's. For if we will amuse ourselves with ideas of fatality, apart from the inevitable consequences of men's actions, to Mary might well have been addressed the soothsayer's warning words:—

'Thy daemon, that's the spirit which keeps thee, is
Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,
Where *hers* is not; but, near *her*, thy angel
Becomes a Fear, as being o'erpower'd; therefore
Make space enough between you.'

It was an evil hour for Mary, when, insulting Elizabeth's honour and daring her vengeance, she called herself Queen of England;—an empty claim, as we regard it now, for Elizabeth

knew so firmly how to keep her own, that we cannot understand what a strong grasp it needed; but no empty claim to either queen, never forgotten by her who was injured by it, nor in her inner intention once renounced by Mary. And it should be kept equally in mind by the student of those times, that, on Mary Tudor's death, Mary of Scotland did assert herself her heir to the English throne by virtue of the bull which declared Elizabeth illegitimate. For here we find a key to much of that 'malignity,' 'vindictiveness,' 'envy,' and 'jealousy,' which is ascribed to Elizabeth in all her dealings with Mary; sometimes most unjustly ascribed,—for often Elizabeth acted like the truest friend to her rival, and did what her best friends did, or ought to have done,—but on other occasions, with too much colour of truth. The jealousy that Elizabeth felt against Mary was not, we believe, that weak, personal sentiment, which it is assumed to be. It was not a vain woman's jealousy of another's superior attractions, but it was a queen's jealousy of a powerful rival, who had gifts and talents to assert her claims, and followers to maintain them. Elizabeth, great woman as she was, had yet too high an opinion of her own right to general admiration, and too many flatterers to feed these notions, to have much room for jealousy. All Mary's lovers had been rejected by herself; she was the object of universal homage and unbounded adulation; and, perhaps, none of all the judgments of posterity regarding herself would have surprised her more than its unanimous award of the palm of beauty and grace to her sister queen.

Our author, though full of prejudice against Elizabeth, is yet alive to her great qualities. It is thus that he introduces her to his readers. We omit a long and well-known extract, which occurs in the middle of the passage, from the account of her person and manner left by the Venetian ambassador:—

'What was the character of this princess, whose hostility the court of France did not fear to excite against Mary Stuart, who, from that moment, became her rival, both as a queen and a woman? High-spirited, imperious, extremely proud, with great energy, astuteness, and capacity, Elizabeth had long been compelled to dissimulate her feelings and her religious faith during the terrible reign of her sister, who would have proscribed her but for the support given her by Philip II. She had lived at a distance from the Court under strict surveillance, and had thus acquired those habits of deception which combined in her with the haughty and violent passions she inherited from her father. . . . To the most solid learning Elizabeth united the most agreeable accomplishments. She was an excellent musician, and danced to perfection. Certain gifts of person, great mental attractions, all the adornments of a brilliant education, much originality without sufficient grace, and the resources of a strong and lively imagination, rendered her remarkable as a woman; whilst her acute and

penetrating judgment, her unwearied application, her haughty and politic disposition, and her active ambition, destined her to be a great Queen.

On the day of her accession she displayed those qualities which characterised all the rest of her life. She took possession of the throne as a matter of course, and passed from oppression to command without either surprise or uneasiness. Adopting the policy which was destined to constitute the glory of her reign, she pursued it assiduously, but without precipitancy. We cannot say she was a zealous Protestant, but she was averse to Catholicism, as the religion which had oppressed her youth, and still menaced her crown. She felt more disposed to detest than to contest it. She said that she had read neither Luther nor Calvin, but S. Jerome and S. Augustine, and she considered that the points of difference between the various Christian communities were of very little importance. She therefore restored Protestantism rather from policy than conviction, in order to give the direction of affairs, and the government of the state, to her own party, and withdraw it from her adversaries.

She immediately surrounded herself with men of great ability or entire devotion to her service. Her two principal advisers were Lord Robert Dudley, one of the sons of the Duke of Northumberland, whom she appointed her Master of the Horse, and who remained her favourite as long as he lived; and William Cecil, whom she made Secretary of State, and who was her prime minister for forty years. Careful to retain those whom she had chosen, she was always well served. She never permitted her favourites to become for a single moment her masters, and her most experienced ministers were never more than her useful instruments. On all occasions, though she sought counsel, she acted upon her own decisions. Her will, guided solely by either calculation or interest, was sometimes slow, often audacious, always sovereign. In less than a month after she had succeeded Mary Tudor, the Spanish ambassador wrote to Philip II:—"She is held in incomparably greater dread than her sister. She orders and does whatever she pleases, just as absolutely as the king her father." Speaking of herself, with a full consciousness of what she was and what she could effect, Elizabeth said about this time, "that she would let the world know that there was in England a woman who acted like a man, and who was awed neither by a Constable of Montmorency like the King of France, nor by a Bishop of Arras like the King of Spain."—*Mignet*, vol. i. pp. 51—55.

Such was the woman whom Mary so rashly provoked. We do not esteem M. Mignet a judge of how far Elizabeth was influenced by religious feeling. He probably does not understand the position of the English Church, and its middle course between two extremes, which Elizabeth in her arbitrary way helped to establish. But there is truth, though unfriendly truth, in the rest. Elizabeth had duplicity. It was the art and study of the times, and she was an adept in it, as far as gaining her ends proves it.

But the practice of duplicity being universal, we must learn to discriminate between different kinds. That for which the Court of France of the period is so infamously distinguished was *aggressive* in its character, and so far unprovoked. It used it as a weapon of offence, as an assassin uses a dagger. Elizabeth's dissimulation was first assumed to protect her very life, which one rash word would have sacrificed; and in a general

review of her subsequent conduct we still see the same principle of self-defence—defence of herself and of her kingdom—in her practice of it. Mary began by claiming the throne of England, and though afterwards circumstances obliged her apparently to withdraw it, we see now, and doubtless Elizabeth knew then, that at any favourable moment the claim would be renewed. To guard against this favourable moment ever dawning, was henceforth one of the main objects of her policy, sometimes by very crooked means it must be granted, but it was adopted towards Mary to secure her own position rather than to encroach on that of others. If Mary had let her alone, and if her attitude from inevitable circumstances had been less threatening, Elizabeth, as much from inclination as good sense, would have maintained a sincere good understanding with her.

But between Mary and Elizabeth there was a still further difference in the character of the duplicity each practised; the one is politic, and bound up with politics and state craft, the other selfish and personal. Mary's crying sins of this nature were against the interests and feelings of her country, for private motives and the indulgence of personal ends; though she too, under French influence, could adopt their large aggressive plans of deception. Elizabeth's motives were national and patriotic. Perhaps circumstances may have aided this happy union of interests, but as a fact, no private feeling ever led her to forget the welfare of her people; all her personal wishes for greatness and prosperity were bound up in theirs; in this sense she may be said to have had no private ends. When she sinned against honesty and truth, it was under a false notion that she was promoting her people's advantage as much as her own. Her private feelings and fancies were ever subservient to the public cause. She was often arbitrary and tyrannical, but she never forgot that the course she pursued required of her great personal sacrifices, and she knew she had no right to enact the absolute queen and the self-indulgent woman at the same time. Pleasure and the gratification of natural desires were always made to yield to greatness. She showed her people that if she ruled them with a strong hand she could control herself as sternly. Even her follies and vanities she contrived to make useful. 'The artificial politics of Elizabeth,' (says Hume,) 'never triumphed so much in any contrivances as in those which were conjoined with her coquetry;' and she was not ridiculous without rather helping on the cause in hand than obstructing it.

Mary, on the contrary,—and it is the secret of her influence,—was a woman in the full meaning of the word. First a woman, and then a queen. She could not give up her inclinations to her position. She could *act* the queen to perfection, but she

was unequal to the constant sacrifice, the long self-control needed by those who wield sovereign power. Like the Egyptian queen, whom she in some points resembles, she was

‘E’en a woman, and commanded
By such poor passions as the maid that milks,
And does the meanest chars.’

And on this unqueenlike nature were engrafted perfect grace and beauty, constituting her queen of hearts, perhaps, but not queen of her people. At twenty-five Elizabeth felt herself the mother of her people; Mary through her whole life shows no touch of this maternal instinct. Her interests, her plots, her wishes, were all personal and private ones. Patriotism, such as it was, was to be found amongst her opponents—Murray and even Knox are examples of it; but Mary had apparently no conception of this sentiment. Her cause, and it was sometimes as much her misfortune as her fault, never at the best included more than a very small minority.

Both training and nature conspired to make these women opposites. Elizabeth’s youth had been one of fear, and caution, and restraints, and her deportment always bore traces of this hard discipline in its stiffness and want of grace. Mary’s had been tenderly fostered; she was admired, and even beloved, as far as the denizens of that court had hearts to love. Her ‘charming nature’ could expand in all the sunshine of general approval—there were no cold checks shutting her up within herself: her manner was therefore open, frank, engaging, and cordial—how should a prosperous joyous beauty’s ever be otherwise? but it was only an accomplishment, formed not by the heart so much as by external circumstances. She had no need in her youth for habitual circumspection, and her general demeanour was the gainer by it. But her biographers claim much larger admissions, and expect us to believe in it against positive fact, as if amiable manners were incompatible with great crimes, and the deception which belongs to them; as if Elizabeth must be the dissembler, and Mary the generous victim of impulse, because the one betrays an awkward consciousness of a discreditable secret, the other shows an open smiling face through all, and can keep up two distinct currents of thought, the one represented by the unruffled *viso sciolto*, the other far down in the depths, away from sight and thought, and only stirred when the moment of action arrives. It only shows she was the more accomplished dissembler of the two, according to all the rules of art. All this was understood in their own day, and the general judgment of that time accords with our own. Elizabeth was beloved by her people because she loved them; because she acted for them, they revered and feared

her, but still more did they love her: they identified their safety with her own, and unfortunately the conscience of that period was not easily shocked by ordinary duplicity, where they themselves were the gainers. But Mary was neither feared nor loved nor respected by her people. The misfortune of religious differences might in part cause this; her path craved wary walking: but they never saw her acting for them as a whole; when she was most queenlike and most public spirited it was yet for herself. She could win over partisans, but she never gained her people to her side: when she plotted, it was against them, and not for them, and where treachery was an every day vice, she yet by one act succeeded in raising a storm of genuine sincere abhorrence, which amongst the *people* of her own land was never allayed.

Thus gifted, with such pretensions; ambitious, energetic, loving pleasure and excitement, and unscrupulous in the modes of obtaining them; with an ardent cultivated imagination and a cold heart; with impulses sometimes generous, but with a consistent indifference to truth; with a zeal for religion, but no submission to its precepts,—Mary, after her long minority and upon her early widowhood, eluding the English fleet which Elizabeth, in her indignation at the recent insult, had sent to impede her course, returned to her kingdom,—unwillingly returned: nor can we wonder, for never did a prince enter upon his reign under more difficult circumstances, never was country less fitted to obey and submit itself to female rule. She returned to Scotland, then a seething hot-bed of dissensions, where social misrule and centuries of civil war had undermined all ideas of law and justice, and disorganized the whole framework of society; where the nobility had neither loyalty, nor patriotism, nor honour towards one another, but all were for self, and personal or family aggrandisement; where the people were reduced to extremity and desperation by the alternate oppressions of contending factions: while, to add to these long-standing evils, this country seemed to be chosen for the arena in which the old and new principles of religious faith should fight out their differences with the least restraint from the hand of power,—or rather, with so equal a balance of physical strength to assist the intrinsic merits of the question, as made the conflict more a religious, as opposed to a political one, than in any country in Europe. While Hume tells us that the English were so passive with regard to religious changes that throughout the Tudor dynasty they altered their faith with each reign more willingly than the order of succession, the populace of Scotland were ardent theologians. Weary with oppressions, disgusted by the monstrous immoralities of the churchmen in power, and ripe for change, the principles of a

change in religion spread like wildfire or like light through the land, bringing (to their minds) not only hope of spiritual illumination, but anticipations of freedom, power, learning, cultivation, whatever is most enchanting to the hopes of an awakened people, in their train; and history seems to show that while the preachers of the Reformation brought zeal and sincerity,—tarnished, it is true, by a fierce intolerance,—to the conflict, their antagonists, too like that wicked steward taken at unawares, eating and drinking with the drunken, had little to oppose to the new truths brought to light, and the errors sometimes deduced from them, but an unreasoning bigotry and a vain endeavour to quench the whole movement by persecution.

It was a lasting misfortune to Scotland that there was then no one of power and genius and zeal to stand up for the old truths, which in the flood of new light were too likely to be forgotten, and thus that the mind of one man was left to organize the religion of his country. The hand which pulls down is not commonly fitted for reconstruction; and Knox, remorseless in his destruction of what he called idolatries, has left his religious edifice bare, not only of all graceful ornament, but of its most needful supports and defences.

Mary had conceived a great hatred of Knox, yet it seems clear that, trusting to her powers of fascination, she hoped much from her personal influence. He was too powerful to be put down by the strong arm, which would have been the natural and readiest method; but what effect might not her charms produce in softening the force of his fierce attacks upon her Church and its professors, or even winning him to her side! But Knox was the only man of her day whom Mary could not influence; who was blind to her fair face, deaf to her eloquent and pathetic words, callous even to her tears—never shed by Mary but as a last resource. Very early he seems to have settled Jezebel as her appropriate type, and Jezebel she always was to him so long as he lived to call her so. It would be more fair to charge Knox with brutality towards his queen, had his sombre prophecies and suspicions not been too fully verified by subsequent events. But it is impossible to read his interviews with her without being scandalized at the audacious freedom of his address, and without partaking too in Hume's cynical amusement at the scene they presented. 'This rustic apostle,' as he calls him, 'though he once condescended so far as to tell the queen that he would submit to her as Paul did to Nero, remained not long in this dutiful strain.' Poor Mary might well be bewildered at such a mode of address. The French court had furnished her with no parallel examples. But though she was at first dismayed at the wild rudeness of manners in her new

kingdom, it does not seem that she was permanently dispirited by the change from all the elegance she had been accustomed to. Youth, health, love of adventure, and greater freedom of action, seem soon to have reconciled her to a country which appeared simply barbarous to her at first; and though rude and uncouth, her people were not insensible to those charms which had left so deep an impression in the country she had quitted. On one of her first public appearances Tytler thus describes her court, and the impression she herself produced:—

‘The parliament which met was held with unusual pomp. Mary, surrounded by a brilliant cavalcade, rode in procession to the Tolbooth, where the Estates assembled: the hall was crowded, not only by the members, but glittered with the splendid dresses of the ladies of the court, who surrounded the throne and filled the galleries. The extreme beauty of the queen, and the grace with which she delivered the address in which she opened the proceedings, surprised and delighted her people. Many exclaimed, “May God save that sweet face! She speaks as properly as the best orator among them.”’—*Tytler*, vol. vi. p. 280.

Nor did the austere morality of the Reforming party, and their hatred of every class of amusements, withhold her from indulgence in them to an extent dangerous at least to her character for prudence and royal dignity. So extreme was the popular animosity against the ceremonies and the professors of the old religion, and so ignorant of the principles of charity and toleration were their teachers, that even had Mary observed an austerity of manners equal to their own, so long as she had been zealous and devoted in the practice of her faith, it would have needed policy as well as prudence to maintain her position. She might even have been in the end a martyr to her fidelity. She *might* have been—but her panegyrists and Roman Catholic historians say that she *was*, and she herself died under the same persuasion—and it is this which we deny, and which the whole course of her life disproves. That cause must be ill off for bright examples—must be driven to strange shifts in its defence—that raises Mary, under the most favourable view that ingenious special pleading can take of her character, into a martyr for any good cause. The old faith of Scotland had no doubt its true martyrs, but they were not to be found amongst its leading supporters. Mary was one of the many on whom mistrust and suspicion produce recklessness rather than caution, and she was soon brought under the censures, not only of ‘sour fanatics,’ but of prudent men of the world, for the bold departures from dignity and queenly decorum to which her love of admiration and passion for every form of diversion led her. Angry and jealous eyes did watch her, to note down that she who maintained ‘the idolatry of the mass’ in her chapel, against all their remonstrances, and refused to profit by the godly exhortations of their ministers, was, as they esteemed it, consistent in her

derelictions, in bringing upon herself such indignities as led to the death of her mad lover, Chastelard. But though they might complain of her personal obstinacy in maintaining the faith in which she had been born and bred, in spite of their not very persuasive efforts for her conversion, the Reformers had really very little justice on their side so long as Murray was in power to act out Mary's professions of universal toleration—professions which she was always ready to make so long as there was nothing better to be done. Her government under his administration was really a wise and beneficent one, nor is there any stronger cause of quarrel with those times and their monstrous practices, their crying evils, and the equally desperate remedies which were then tolerated, than that they should bring so great a man as Murray under just suspicion of sometimes sharing, or at least conniving at them. A true patriot, where all besides were for themselves—just, where justice was almost forgotten, and wise in a large sense, where private ends and petty schemes had obscured the general judgment, we are sometimes at a loss to understand how a man of such undoubted qualities should ever be brought into the questionable positions in which we see him.

It was an evil day for Mary, when in opposition to his earnest remonstrances she chose Darnley for her husband, and thus turned her best adviser into something very like a rebel, in attitude at least, if not in intention. But in the first place, Mary liked the 'long boy,' as Elizabeth called him; next, it did seem as though, if she waited till all who had a right to a voice were of one mind, especially till Elizabeth (with whom Murray was commonly agreed) was satisfied with her choice of a husband, she should probably never be married at all; in the third place, Darnley, as being her cousin, and also connected through the mother's side with the house of Tudor, might help on her open claim to be acknowledged successor to Elizabeth, and the secret one, (which in her own mind always went along with it,) her present right to the English throne; lastly, he was a Roman Catholic, and Mary was urged by her foreign allies, and was also herself inclined, in spite of her professed policy of conciliation, to make a push for the restoration of the Roman Catholic religion by mere force. Nothing, we think, can better show that the defence of Mary involves a general depreciation and blackening of character towards all concerned with her, than the line Mr. Fraser Tytler takes on this point towards Murray. We will quote his words.

Murray gave, as the ground of his opposition to the marriage, that the Protestant religion was endangered by it; upon which Mr. Fraser Tytler says—

'Nothing upon the part of Murray could be more futile and unfounded than the pretence that the Protestant religion was in danger, or that the

queen at this moment had adopted any measures which threatened its security. It is happy for the truth, that on such a point we have the declaration of Murray and Lethington themselves. On the thirteenth of July, 1564, they stated to Cecil that the presence of Lenox in Scotland, even if he should be fortunate enough to ally himself with the most powerful person in the state, would be totally ineffectual to shake the national religion from that firm foundation on which it rested. These declarations were made, indeed, a year before this, but during the course of that year, not only had the Scottish queen introduced no one measure which could by any ingenuity be deemed an attack upon the national religion, but she had shown the most decided determination to support it as the religion of the state, and to enforce the cruel and unjust laws against those who adhered to the public exercise of a contrary faith. It is evident, therefore, that the Earl of Murray and the party of the nobles who opposed the marriage had raised the cry of "danger to the Church" merely to cover their own designs.—*Tytler*, vol. vi. p. 345.

Now a year at such a period may lead wise men to change their opinion. Murray spoke when he was in power, and could therefore answer for the conduct of matters according to his wishes; he raised his objection when his own influence was at an end, when Rizzio, acknowledged to be in the Pope's pay, whom his penetration would mistrust, though he might not then know all that we do of his secret workings for Rome, was rising in power. Nor would Mary's professed zeal to carry out the 'unjust laws' against her own religion be likely to deceive such a man into a belief of her sincerity; rather it might well produce a different effect. Though this was one of the very acts which afterwards succeeded under Charles IX. in lulling the suspicions of the Huguenots, the wiser Murray may have seen in these professions only an attempt to reconcile her Protestant subjects to the marriage she had at heart.

But what are the real facts of the case at this period, or at a time very little removed from it, when Mr. Tytler so boldly asserts that all fears were futile? It is true that in July 1565 she writes to a Scottish Laird in the Scotch of that period:—

'July 16, 1565.

'Trusty friend, we greet you well. The evil bruit and untrue report spread by seditious persons among our lieges has grieved us indeed, as that we should have intended to impede or molest any of our subjects in the use of their religion and conscience freely. A thing which never entered in our mind, although over many has credited the report; and to the effect that this vain bruit may vanish as a thing without ground or occasion, we have directed our letters to signify our sincere meaning to all our good subjects,' &c.—*Labanoff*, vol. i. p. 275.

But her earlier private letters to her uncle and the Pope are in a very different strain; not blamable in themselves, but showing another spirit altogether. The fact, however, which shows us Mary's real feeling, through all this profession of toleration, is, that the very first use she made of her power, within a very few months of the date of this letter, the first time that she felt

free to act, on subduing with so much spirit and success the rebellion that arose on her marriage with Darnley, was to sign the Band, as it is called, or League of Bayonne. It was under no sense of fear, but rather in the indulgence of revenge and in the triumph of success, when she for the first time felt emancipated from the restraints that had held her, that she signed what is thus described by Mr. Tytler himself. We give Mary the benefit of his opening apologies for her:—

‘Had Mary been left to herself, there is little doubt that the rebels would have been pardoned. Her natural generosity, and the intercession of some powerful friends, strongly impelled her to the side of mercy, and she had already consented to delay the parliament and to entertain proposals for the restoration of the banished lords, when an unforeseen circumstance occurred which led to unfortunate results. This was the arrival of two gentlemen, De Rambouillet and Clernau, on a mission from the French Court. Their message was outwardly one of mere ceremony, to invest the young king with the order of S. Michael; but, amid the festivities attendant on the installation, a more important and secret communication took place. Clernau, the special envoy of the Cardinal Lorraine, and Thornton, a messenger from Beaton, the Scottish ambassador in France, who had come to Court about the same time, informed Mary of the coalition which had been concluded between France, Spain, and the Emperor, for the destruction of the Protestant cause in Europe. It was a design worthy of the dark and unscrupulous politicians by whom it had been planned, Catherine of Medicis and the Duke of Alva. In the summer of the preceding year, the Queen Dowager of France and Alva had met at Bayonne during a progress in which she conducted her youthful son and sovereign Charles IX. through the southern provinces of his kingdom; and there, whilst the Court was dissolved in pleasure, those secret conferences were held which issued in the resolution that toleration must be at an end, and that the only safety for the Roman Catholic faith was the extermination of its enemies.’—*Tytler*, vol. vii. p. 15.

Rizzio, the paid emissary of Rome, now all-powerful in Mary’s counsels, urged her assent, and in spite of the dissuasions of some, she signed the League, and at the same time determined to carry matters to extremities against her rebel subjects: and here Tytler and Mignet, both favourers of Mary, take different lines; for while the first says, ‘Her *intention* of pardoning Murray and her other rebels was opposed by these foreign envoys;’ and again, ‘Mary was not naturally inclined to harsh and cruel measures, and for some time she vacillated;’ Mignet says, ‘But Mary was too passionate to be politic; she preferred to pursue her schemes of vengeance, and far from listening to Melvil’s representations that persons should not be urged to extremity lest they became dangerous; she angrily told him “I do not fear them. What would they dare, or what could they undertake?”’ (Vol. i. p. 200.)

‘She imagined herself,’ [says Mr. Tytler,] ‘a supporter of the Catholic Church, when she was giving her sanction to one of the worst corruptions of Romanism:’

an apology which may be made with equal justice for all the actors in this affair. Mary had private revenge to gratify, and was actuated by this motive to precisely the same degree as the rest were. Previous to this event Mary had addressed an autograph letter to Philip of Spain, asking his assistance, beginning:—

‘Sept. 10, 1565.

‘Monsieur, my good Brother,—The affection with which you have always employed yourself for the maintenance and support of our Catholic religion has made me before seek your favour and aid, foreseeing what now has happened in this kingdom, which tends to the entire ruin of the Catholics, and to the establishment of those unhappy errors, the which wishing to resist, the King my husband and myself will be in danger of losing our crown, and by the same means the *right which we claim elsewhere*, (*le droit que pretendons ailleurs*,) if we have not the aid of one of the great princes of Christendom.’—*Labanoff*, vol. i. p. 281.

The King of Spain sent twenty thousand crowns in answer to this appeal, and wrote for her to the Pope, who sent her eight thousand. Any other succour it was not convenient for him to give, though he adds that they must not renounce the idea of asserting by armed force the Queen of Scotland’s right to the succession of England. ‘This project,’ he said, ‘concerns the cause of God which is mentioned by the Queen of Scotland, since it is evidently the only door by which religion can enter into the kingdom of England, for all others are now shut.’ (*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 192.)

Subsequent to her signing of the League she summoned a parliament for the condemnation of Murray and others; on which M. Mignet says:—

‘A short time before the meeting of this assembly, which she destined to further her revenge, and was desirous to associate in her plans in favour of the ancient Church, she sent the Bishop of Dumblane to assure the new Pope, Pius V., of her devoted obedience. She besought him to grant her both temporal and spiritual assistance, “in order to change,” she wrote, “the deplorable and unfortunate state of our kingdom. The moment is propitious, because our enemies are partly banished, and partly placed within our hands . . . If God and your Holiness, whose cause we maintain, come to our aid, with such assistance we shall overcome all obstacles.”’—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 200.

After this we leave it to our readers to decide whether the alleged reasons for Murray’s alarm and opposition to her marriage and its consequent change of counsels were so ‘futile’ and groundless. In the meanwhile, Mary enjoyed the life which these disturbances brought her into. At the beginning of the campaign,—on horseback, with pistols at her saddle-bow,—she put herself at the head of her army, and carried all before her, declaring she would rather peril her crown than lose her revenge; she wished to be a man, that she might know what it was to lie

out on the field all night and to walk the rounds; and on one occasion some noblemen of her retinue having represented to her that she would fatigue herself by so much riding, and by following the army in inclement weather, she replied, on the report of Paul de Foix, the French ambassador, 'that she would never cease to continue such fatigues until she had led them to London;' a threat probably not heard by Randolph, the English envoy, who accompanied her in the expedition, and, quite inspired by this restoration of the days of chivalry, thus wrote to Cecil: 'What desperate blows would that day have been given, when every man should have fought in sight of so noble a queen and so many fine ladies,—our enemies, to have taken them (our honours) from us, and we, to save our honours, and not to be bereft of them,—your honour may easily imagine.'

But the scene soon changed from this triumphant success. Events succeed one another rapidly in this part of Mary's history, and every turn of the page brings us upon something new and strange. Shakspeare might well talk of the whirligig of time in his day, for nowhere in man's history do we find such instances of its revenges; nowhere do the actors in the busy scene so rapidly change and reverse their positions towards one another. Faithful subjects become traitors, and are back again to their allegiance, and in favour, before we know how it can have been effected. We cannot tell who are plotters and who are confidential friends; who are faithful, who designing; for all are each by turn. Elizabeth's lovers make no scruple of planning her death; she in her turn is now an ally, now an enemy; no one knows where to have her. Mary is now pursuing her rebel brother to the death, then weeping tears of reconciliation in his arms; at one moment she is on the pinnacle of power, with all her enemies banished, or at her feet; and then, by some sudden turn, for which it is hard to find an adequate cause,—by the death of one man, and he an insignificant adventurer,—the tables are turned; she is the prisoner, and her enemies coolly concert what is to be done with her.

We need not go into the familiar details of her change of feeling towards her young husband; the wild excitement and freedom from restraint which would follow upon a warlike campaign, and the greater liberty of action which her success would prompt her to, might make the ordinary routine of decorous female life insupportable to Mary, and Darnley had nothing in him to counteract these ill influences. Blinded by a weak and childish pride, the consequence of Mary's unwise favours, he took no pains, after his marriage, to confirm his hold on her affections. She grew disgusted with and weary of him, and soon gave him cause for disgust in his turn, by the wilful intimacy

she indulged in with her low-born secretary, Rizzio. She was entirely guided by his counsels, which were well known to be all on the side of severity to the proscribed noblemen, and of active measures for the restoration of the old religion and the suppression of the new. As if all these causes did not sufficiently excite popular feeling against him, he assumed a great state and retinue, and was proud and intolerable in his deportment. Darnley, with good grounds, was jealous. The nobles were indignant at his political power. The people hated him for being a foreigner and a papist. Knox and his coadjutors regarded him as the representative of all the enemies of 'God's people,' (as they exclusively designated their followers and themselves,) from Oreb and Zeeb to Haman, and thought themselves divinely commissioned to sanction his destruction.

Rizzio's murder, with all its savage details, strangely illustrates the times. The public motives for which it was undertaken, and the sort of judicial character assumed by the murderers, seem to resolve it into an exercise of Lynch law, while the circumstances of brutal atrocity towards the queen rank it amongst the most savage deeds of blood of any age. Nor is Mary's courage and self-command amongst the least remarkable features in the affair. She never lost her powers of thought and action, nor was she as overwhelmed by it as the most courageous woman would now be. It was something more within possibility, more conceivable, more a part of the general experience of the age. All persons were inured to the thought of blood; and here, if anywhere, here only lies the excuse for that great deed of blood in which Mary herself so soon after engaged,—that the practices of murder and assassination were too common in Scotland for them to be held in quite the same awe and horror, or so utterly abhorrent to our nature as the law of our being holds them to be in peaceable times. We do not say it *is* an excuse; but with the weight of evidence we have, it would be more reasonable for Mary's apologists to make it one, than to attempt to clear her from the guilt altogether, as some have attempted to do.

And here we may see how Mary was prepared for the part she so soon acted. First, in the deep hatred with which Darnley's share in the murder inspired her towards him, expressed in the natural threat of the moment, 'Well, it shall be dear blood to some of you;' and chiefly in her power over herself at the same time to conceal this hatred, and actually, while her heart was yet sore with the death of her favourite, the scene of passionate recrimination with her husband, and the humiliating insults to herself, to dissimulate with him, to get up a reconciliation, to separate him from the conspirators, making him as contemptible to them as to herself by a public denial of his share

in the plot, and to make him assist her in her escape from the power of the conspirators. With extraordinary spirit and energy Mary escaped from their hands, and in a very short time was again in power, ruling paramount in Edinburgh, where she had so lately been a prisoner, avenging the death of Rizzio; and, to show her adherence to the course she had taken, appointing his brother secretary in his place. But all men saw that in her heart she hated Darnley, nor could she be persuaded, after the purpose of their apparent reconciliation was effected, to conceal her aversion. His life was miserable. She withdrew him from all share of public business, and forbade those about her to hold converse with him. 'He went up and down,' says Melvil, 'all alone, seeing few durst bear him company.' Her confidence was given to the Earls of Bothwell (who now first appears prominent in her history), Huntley, whose sister he had married, and the Catholic Bishop of Ross, who was so long her faithful adherent; but, says Mignet, 'Mary did not proceed to further extremes against Darnley, until her passion for another was added to her increased repugnance to himself.'

On the 19th of June, 1566, she gave birth to a son, which event was immediately communicated to Elizabeth, who on the moment of receiving the news, by a sudden pang of grief and envy, showed how much the course she had so firmly chosen for herself really cost her. She was giving a court ball; while she was dancing, Cecil went up to her, and whispered in her ear. Interrupting the dance, she sunk dejectedly into an arm-chair, and said to the ladies who surrounded her, 'that the Queen of Scots was mother of a fair son, while she was but a barren stock.'

The birth of this son revived the question of the succession, always so distasteful to Elizabeth. The English parliament thought it an occasion for expressing their anxious wish to have the question settled, though they were presently silenced by their queen, and Mary was not less eager on her side. But here, on entering upon the darkest page of Mary's history, we will quote from M. Mignet's straightforward narrative:—

'Notwithstanding Mary Stuart's ardent desire, the English succession remained in the same state as before. She still retained her claims, but had not succeeded in obtaining their recognition. She soon, however, compromised them, and, moreover, exposed herself to the loss of the crown of Scotland. After the birth of the prince royal, the misunderstanding increased between her husband and herself—a fatal passion at this time took possession of her heart. The object of this passion was the Earl of Bothwell, the most enterprising and dangerous man in Scotland. James Hepburn, fourth Earl of Bothwell, was then thirty years of age. He had succeeded his father in 1556, was possessed of large property, and held important offices in the kingdom. By his marriage with Lady Jane Gordon, he had become the brother-in-law of the Earl of Huntley, and had united one of the most

powerful families of the South with the most powerful family of the North. He was distinguished for great bravery, consummate audacity, boundless and unscrupulous ambition. Equally undisguised in his plans as in his vices, he aspired first to gain the affections of the Queen, and then to marry her. Although he was far from handsome, his martial bearing, his taste for pleasure, the undaunted resolution of his character, his air of chivalrous devotion, and the easy and elegant continental manners beneath which he concealed the wild and extravagant passions of his country, charmed the imagination of the Queen, and gave Bothwell great influence over her. Mary Stuart sought to render Bothwell a faithful and useful servant, but she speedily found in him a lover and a master.—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 235.

Side by side with this description we will give his character by Mr. Fraser Tytler, remarkable for the ingenuity with which he turns Mary's toleration, not to say absolute indifference to his infamous morals, into a sort of merit, which is reflected, in some degree, back upon the man himself:—

‘His ambition and audacity were unbounded. He was a man of notorious gallantry, and had spent a loose life on the Continent, from which, it was said, he had imported some of its worst vices. In attaining the objects of his ambition he was perfectly unscrupulous as to the means he employed, and he had generally about him a band of broken and desperate men, with whom his office of Border Warden made him familiar; hardened and murderous villains, who were ready on the moment to obey every command of their master. In one respect Bothwell was certainly better than many of his brother nobles. There seems to have been little craft or hypocrisy about him, and he made no attempt to conceal his infirmities or vices under the cloak of religion. It is not unlikely that, for this reason, Mary, who had experienced his fidelity to the crown, was more disposed to trust him in any difficulty than those stern and fanatical leaders who, with religion on their lips, were often equally indifferent as to the means they employed. It is certain that from this time she began to treat him with great favour, and to be guided by a preference so predominant that it was not unlikely to be mistaken for a more tender feeling.’—*Tytler*, vol. vii. p. 46.

Mr. Tytler never absolutely denies the reality of Mary's affection for Bothwell; he only tenderly delays the admission of it, his honesty as an historian compelling him to a detail of facts which can allow of no other construction. We have, throughout his story, little apologetic hints, preparatory to this disgraceful feature of Mary's character; such as—‘It was Mary's weakness to be hurried away by the predominating influence of some one feeling and object.’ ‘It was the misfortune of her ardent disposition that she was always under the domination of some strong and engrossing feeling, which sometimes led her to disregard appearances, and to believe she could never sacrifice enough to the object of her approval.’ Only Miss Strickland ventures on the bold line of *entirely denying* that Mary ever cared for Bothwell at all—decidedly the best line, we should say, for a lady to take, who advocates the cause of this unfortunate queen—but a line so glaringly opposed to the facts of the case, to the universal consent of all that deserves to be called history, to every docu-

ment worthy of respect, and to the whole course of Mary's public and private conduct, as proves that feminine zeal for the honour of her sex has unfitted her, on this occasion at least, for the rigid and severer duties of the historian :—

'It is impossible' [she says] 'for any one who reads those details,' [Du Croc, the French ambassador, had described a quarrel between Mary and Bothwell after their marriage,] 'and remembers that they were written by a person who was behind the scenes, and related that which he had heard and seen, to believe for one moment that Bothwell was ever the object of Mary's love, or that her marriage with him originated from any other cause than dire necessity.'—*Miss Strickland's Letters of Queen of Scots*, vol. i. p. xxvii.

Du Croc's letter proves nothing of the kind, nor did he think anything of the kind, nor desire to convey this impression when he wrote it; on the contrary, he says, just after the said quarrel had happened, that the marriage is *already* repented of by Mary, which implies a *change* of feeling, and not that she had always been averse to it. This has been a digression, but it is amusing to see upon how slight a foundation a theory can be formed, against overwhelming opposing evidence, and also to what slender straws Mary's advocates have to trust in their defence.

Her contemporaries, at least, were not of this mind; all parties joined in observing this growing preference. Politicians wrote to one another, commenting on the increasing favour of the new favourite, which 'miscontenteth many;'—a circumstance which seems always to have acted as a sort of spur to Mary, who was stimulated by opposition;—and poor Darnley augured all sorts of evils from it to himself. He wrote secretly to the Pope, accusing the Queen of lukewarmness in religion (Bothwell being a Protestant), and feared for his life, which, with his ill conscience, and in the present aspect of affairs, was not unreasonable. He even meditated retiring to the Continent, but wanted resolution; indeed, he had always an affection for Mary, which the slightest kindness on her part could revive. But the time was not come for such experiments with his feelings. She preferred exposing his weakness, and bringing him into general contempt, and making all the world party to her private sentiments towards him. She did not care who should see the 'great grudges she entertained in her heart against him,' and always had entertained since Rizzio's murder. This event, which had so naturally disgusted her with her husband, had also been the means of bringing Bothwell forward, as his services had materially strengthened her position, and from that time he obtained unbounded influence over her. She heaped favours and offices upon him;¹ and upon occasion of his being wounded in some

¹ See Laing, vol. i. p. 13.

Border quarrels, betrayed such an amount of anxious alarm as seems to have raised general suspicion. Her visit to him on this occasion has been disputed, in every stage; its purposes, dates, results, are all canvassed and concluded upon, according to the view of the writer. It is the first great skirmish before the regular battle. M. Mignet has thus concluded upon it:—

‘On the 6th of October, (1566,) the Queen sent hither the Earl of Bothwell with the title of Lord Lieutenant, to repress these disorders, and restore tranquillity. On the 8th she repaired in person to Jedburgh to hold her assizes, and to add the sanction of justice and armed force. On that same day Bothwell had with great bravery engaged in personal conflict with John Elliot, of Park, a notorious freebooter. In the scuffle Bothwell was severely wounded, and it was found necessary to convey him without loss of time to the neighbouring castle of Armitage. His illness furnished most conclusive proofs of Mary’s attachment to him. “Understanding,” says Crawford, “the certain report of this accident, the Queen was so highly grieved in heart that she took no repose of body till she saw him. The discharge of her judicial functions detained her at Jedburgh until the 15th of October, but no sooner was she at liberty, than she took horse and hastened to the castle where her favourite lieutenant was lying wounded. She was accompanied on her journey by Murray and some other nobles. Although Hermitage was eighteen miles distant from Jedburgh, she went and returned the same day.¹ She spent an hour with Bothwell, and notwithstanding the fatigues of the day, she sat up until late at night writing to him whom she had just left. The prostration of strength which ensued, and,” adds Crawford, “the great distress of mind for the Earl of Bothwell, threw her the next day into a most dangerous illness. She fell into a swoon, and remained for some hours at the point of death. She was then seized with a violent fever, and continued insensible for several days. When she had somewhat recovered from this apparently desperate state, she thought her end was approaching, requested the nobles who were present to pray for her, confided her son to the guardianship of the Queen of England, and sent to inform her husband of her precarious condition. Bothwell, now convalescent, had hastened to her with other members of the privy council, and many of the most important nobles of the kingdom. Darnley did not arrive at Jedburgh until the 28th of October, two days after a favourable crisis had placed the Queen’s life out of danger. Finding her so much recovered, he remained at Jedburgh only one night, and returned immediately to Glasgow.”—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 240.

From this time dates the history of the Darnley murder. Mary recovered slowly, and was overwhelmed with melancholy. On the 20th of November she arrived at Craigmillar, a castle about a league from Edinburgh, careworn and ready to sink under the contradictory feelings which agitated her. ‘The Queen is not at all well,’ writes the ambassador Du Croc to the Archbishop of Glasgow. ‘I believe the principal part of her disease to consist of a deep grief and sorrow; nor does it seem possible to make her

¹ Laing says, ‘The difficulties and haste of the journey are still preserved in the tradition of the country; that her white palfrey sank in a morass which retains the name of the Queen’s Moss, and that she was accompanied only by ten attendants, who extricated her.’—Vol. i. p. 17.

‘forget the same; still she repeats these words,—“I could wish ‘to be dead.”’ And Lethington, who so soon devised a mode for releasing her from her troubles, says in a letter to the same person, ‘It is a heart-break for her to think that he should be ‘her husband; and how to be free of him she sees no outlet.’ ‘This knowledge of Mary Stuart’s private feelings,’ says Mignet, ‘originated a number of fatal ideas in the minds of those that ‘surrounded her;’ and of the introduction of these fatal ideas, Mary herself has given an account in the Protestation she wrote and sent to the Earls of Huntley and Argyle, to sign at the Westminster Conference. Of course it was written to defend herself from guilt, but how far it exonerates her is another matter. The murderers of Rizzio—Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsey—were connected by ties of friendship and kindred with many members of the Privy Council. It occurred to these that there was one acceptable service by which they might procure for them the Queen’s pardon. If they had been banished for one murder, they might be recalled to another. Lethington, clever and absolutely unscrupulous, first introduced the idea to her mind. This extraordinary conference is thus described by Mignet. Our readers must remember that the facts are taken from Mary’s own admission; and it should be noted at the same time that Murray always denied the part attributed to him:—

‘He communicated his plan to Bothwell, who joined in it with all the ardour of his headstrong ambition, and made it known to Argyle and Huntley. According to the statement of the Queen’s friends he mentioned it also to Murray, who offered no objection to the scheme. After having concerted the matter among themselves, the new confederates repaired to Mary Stuart. Lethington addressed her in their name. He reminded the Queen of the great and intolerable injuries that she had received from her husband, laying much stress upon the ingratitude which he had displayed towards her, and upon the offences of which he was daily guilty. He then added, that if Her Majesty would be pleased to pardon the Earl of Morton, and the Lords Ruthven and Lindsey, they, in concert with the rest of the nobility, would find means to separate her from her husband by a divorce, so that she would no longer be involved in disagreement with him. This proposition caused her no surprise. She at first gave her consent, upon condition that the divorce should be legal, and should be no prejudice to the rights of her son. But a divorce was not so easily obtained, since it would be necessary to allege as the reason for it their near relationship, in reference to which the Pope had granted them a dispensation, or to bring Darnley to trial for adultery, or else to prosecute him on the charge of treason.

‘These difficulties could not escape Mary’s notice, and she knew that she would be exposed either to the delays of an uncertain negotiation, or to the scandal of a disgraceful trial. She accordingly affected scruples, and said that she would willingly retire into France, and leave Darnley in Scotland until he acknowledged his faults. But Lethington replied to her, that the nobles of her kingdom would not allow her to do so; and he even ventured,

in mysterious terms, to inform her of their dark designs. "Madam," he said, "souce ye not, we are here of the principal of your Grace's nobility and counsel, that shall find the means well to make your Majesty quit of him without prejudice of your son; and albeit that my Lord of Murray here present be little less scrupulous for a Protestant than your Grace is for a Papist, I am assured he will look through his fingers thereto, and will behold our doings and say nothing of the same." The Queen understood the full meaning of this insinuation, and replied that it was her pleasure nothing should be done by which any spot might be laid upon her honour, but she displayed no great indignation at the idea, and contented herself with saying, "Better permit the matter to remain in the state it is, abiding till God in his goodness put remedy thereto." Lethington took no heed of this slight opposition, and answered, "Madam, let us guide the business among us, and your Grace shall see nothing but good, and approved by Parliament."—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 245.

The conversation from this extract is Mary's own recording, and *very shortly after it took place, the banished lords were recalled*; men whom she knew to be capable of any violence, and naturally anxious by any service to restore themselves to her favour. A month after this meeting, the baptism of the young prince took place with great pomp, on the 17th of December, at Stirling Castle. Elizabeth was godmother, (or gossip, as she calls it,) and presented a golden font for the occasion, the fate of which was to be presently after melted down to furnish money for carrying on the war. Mary conducted herself towards the assembled guests with infinite grace and amiability. Bothwell, though a Protestant, had the ordering of the Catholic service, and Darnley, solitary and sullen, remained under the same roof, but did not show himself nor take any part. The King was condemned in his own court; the father had no place at the baptism of his son. After the excitement which any occasion called out, Mary again sunk into despondency, and Du Croc writes, 'I can't pretend to foretel 'how all may turn, but I will say that matters cannot subsist 'long as they are, without being accompanied with sundry bad 'consequences.' How can we doubt, that at this period she was making up her mind to her share in the tragedy that so soon followed. Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsey, by what Mr. F. Tytler calls 'a judicious extension of mercy,' were pardoned, and returned, and, about the same time, (Dec. 23,) she restored the Archbishop of S. Andrew's consistorial jurisdiction, which had been suppressed since the Reformation, a measure to which subsequent events give a dark significancy.¹ Their pardon was declared early in January, an event which naturally filled Darnley with alarm. They were the men who had been once his accomplices, and he had denounced and deserted them. He at once left the Court, and went to his father, the Earl of Lennox, at Glasgow, where he fell ill. It at first looked like the effects of poison, but

¹ Laing, vol. i. p. 23.

presently proved to be small-pox. While he lay helpless, the plot against his life went on, Bothwell being the principal actor in it. He sought an interview with Morton immediately on his return, and pressed him to join the plot, assuring him that the Queen had given her consent. But Morton, grown wary by experience, refused without her hand writ for a warrant. On this, Bothwell returned to the Queen in the hope of persuading her to write what was required, but he failed; upon which Lethington sent a messenger with directions "to show to the Earl of Morton that the Queen¹ 'will hear no speech of that matter appointed to him:'" an oracular sentence, which is accepted by some as her indignant condemnation of the plot, with how much justice, connected with subsequent events, our readers can judge. But she would certainly, in any case, know better than to commit herself in so needlessly formal a manner. On the 20th of January, Mary writes to the Archbishop of Glasgow at Paris, detailing a conspiracy which she affects to have discovered of Darnley's attempt to gain the person of the young prince his son, and goes on as follows:—

'His behaviour and thankfulness to us is equally well known to God and the world, especially our own indifferent subjects see it, and in their hearts, we doubt not, condemn the same. Always we perceive him occupied and busy enough to have inquisition of our doings; which, God willing, shall always be such as none shall have occasion to be offended with them, or to report of us in any ways but honourably, however he, his father, and their fautors speak, which we know want no good will to make us have ado, if their power were equivalent to their minds. But God moderates their forces well enough, and takes the means of the execution of their pretences from them.—*Ibid.* p. 251.

This letter is written on the 20th of January. Next day she departed for Glasgow, accompanied as far as Callender by Bothwell and his brother-in-law, Huntley having engaged Bothwell's confidential servant, who goes by the name of French Paris, and whose subsequent confession is so remarkable, as her chamberlain. On Thursday, the 23d, she arrived at Glasgow. Darnley, having heard of her approach, was seized with an undefinable fear, and sent a gentleman to meet her,—'he was still infirm,' he said, 'and did not presume to come to her until he knew her wishes, and was assured of the removal of her displeasure.' To this Mary briefly replied, 'that there is no medicine against fear,' and, passing on towards Glasgow, came into Darnley's bed-chamber. Here, though nothing had transpired to change her opinion since the previous Monday, she employed all her art to bring about a reconciliation, to reassure his mind, to remove his suspicions, and gain his confidence. 'At heart,' says Mignet, 'Darnley had always been strongly attached to her, and his un-

¹ Morton's Confession, Laing, vol. ii. p. 28.

‘requited affection and wounded pride had been the causes of his withdrawal from Court.’ He was ready now to confess his errors, and to promise everything that she required. He entreated her not to leave him again, and when she asked him to accompany her in a litter to Craigmillar, he gladly consented, on condition that the harmony of former times might be restored. We have a very full and minute account of this interview; strangely circumstantial, indeed; and from whose hand? From Mary’s own, in a letter to Bothwell full of most graphic detail, most vividly given. Our readers all know the ‘Silver Casket’ and its contents. Yet we must pause in our narrative upon this first mention of it. How little did she think when, too excited by guilty love, guilty consciousness, and the weight of a wicked deed in the very act of its performance, to sleep, she traced those passionate, impure, most treacherous lines, that what was then done in secret, at dead of night, with injunctions for immediate destruction, should remain to bring damning evidence against her, to be treated of in Parliaments and read in Councils, to be translated, canvassed, word by word critically analysed, to stand for ever a witness against her which could not then, and cannot now be escaped from or evaded!—feebly denied, indeed, in her own day, and more confidently, as distance and time drew their veil over this perplexed and stormy period; but, as the science of historic investigation advances, only the more firmly established by every attempt to disprove their genuineness: till the only resource of those who *will* not believe that these letters were from Mary’s hand, is indiscriminate, unsupported denial and assertion, which might as justly be applied, and would be as conclusive, against the most universally received fact in history. Our limits will not allow us to do more than assert our full conviction of their genuineness, as literal translations, that is, in English and Scotch, of Mary’s original French, of which, perhaps, we should explain, nothing remains but the opening sentence which heads each letter. But for any who wish to pursue the question and judge for themselves, we would recommend the perusal of Laing’s ‘Dissertation on the Darnley Murder,’ where all these letters and papers may be found, together with the confessions of the principal actors in the murder, and very clear, masterly conclusions upon them. One point of evidence, however, he does not dwell upon, being, we think, insensible to the literary merits, (they possess no other,) of these papers. They are full of nature and feeling, such as it is. We might almost say it is impossible that they should be forgeries, though people have not scrupled to attribute them to one plotter after another, as if any man of business in that period of epistolary stiffness and form-

ality, could assume at the moment a clever, excited, passionate woman's style; and was equal to the task of expressing the conflicting emotions of a mind in a course of sin, and on the verge of committing a great crime.

These papers consist first of eight letters to Bothwell, four of which were written previous to the murder,—two from Glasgow and two from Kirkfield,—and three from Stirling after the murder, which relate to the concerted scheme for her abduction by him previous to their marriage; and an eighth letter from Linlithgow immediately preceding that event; of two contracts of marriage between them—one supposed to be written before her husband's death, the other signed by her and Bothwell, but written by Huntley previous to Bothwell's divorce from his present wife; and a series of twelve sonnets addressed by Mary to Bothwell. Of these remarkable documents Laing observes:—

'The very disappearance of the originals demonstrates that they were genuine. During the administration of the four regents they were carefully preserved. From Murray they passed successively to Lennox and Morton, on whose execution they were conveyed secretly to Ruthven, created Earl of Gowrie, one of the confederates, from whom Elizabeth's solicitude to obtain the custody of the casket attests her conviction that the letters were authentic. It appears, however, that they were retained by Gowrie for the vindication of the confederates. As the young king was informed that they were then (1582) in his hands, as Mary was solicitous to get them delivered up or destroyed, and as the Duke of Lennox, his favourite, who was entirely in her interest, had applied to detain them, their disappearance on the attainder and execution of Gowrie (1584) must be ascribed to the desire of her son to suppress those documents of his mother's guilt, which, if spurious, would neither have been preserved by the four regents nor destroyed by James.'—*Laing*, vol. i. p. 332.

M. Mignet has no doubt whatever of the authenticity of the letters, and quotes largely from them. Some extracts from the 'Long letter' must be given in continuation of our narrative. It must have filled several sheets, taking up nine octavo pages of print. We must give the French opening by which it is known and the words of which must be so familiar to all controversialists on the subject.

'Estant party du lieu ou j'avois laissé mon cœur, il se peult aysement juger quelle estoit ma contenance, veu ce qui peult un corps sans cœur, qui a esté cause que jusque à la disnée je n'ay pas tenu grand propos, aussi personne ne s'est voulu avancer jugeant bien qu'il n'y faisait bon.'—*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 146.

After describing her journey, and the messenger sent her from Darnley, she says—(we quote indiscriminately from the Scotch or English translation, as the sense seems to be best rendered):—

'He said he was so glad to see me that he welcomed to die for gladness. He found great fault that I was pensive. I departed to supper. This

bearer will tell you of my arriving; he prayed me to return, the which I did. He declared to me his sickness, [grief,] and that he would make no testament, but only leave all things to me, and that I was the cause of his malady because of the regret he had that I was so strange to him. And thus, he said, "You ask me what I mean by the cruelty contained in my letter, it is of you alone that will not accept my offers of repentance. I confess that I have failed, but not into that which I ever denied, and so have many other of your subjects, and you have well pardoned them: . . . I am young . . . May not a man of my age, for lack of counsel, fall twice or thrice, or in lack of his promise, and at last repent himself and be chastised by experience? If I may obtain pardon, I protest I shall never make fault again; and I crave no other thing but that we may be at bed and board together as man and wife, and if you will not consent hereunto I will never rise from this sick-bed. I pray you tell me your resolution. God knows how I am punished for making my god of you, and for having no other thought but on you." . . . I did still answer him, but that would be too long to write at length. . . . In the end he desired much that I should lodge in his lodging. I have refused. . . . He said to me, "I have heard say you have brought a litter with you, but I would rather have gone with yourself." I told him that so I would myself bring him to Craigmillar, that his physicians and I also might serve him without being far from my son. He said he was ready when I would . . . as for myself he would rather lose his life than do me the least displeasure, and used so many kind flatteries, so coldly, and so wisely, as you would marvel at. . . . He would not let me go, but would have me to watch with him. I made as though I thought all to be true, and would think upon it. I have excused myself from sitting up with him this night, for he says that he sleeps not well; you never heard him speak better nor more humbly. And if I had not proof of his heart to be as wax, and that mine were not as a diamond whereunto no shot can make breach but that which comes forth of your hand, I would have almost had pity on him. But fear not, the place shall hold unto the death. Remember, in recompense thereof, that you suffer not yours to be won by that false race that would do no less to yourself. I believe they have been at school together; he has ever the tear in his eye: he salutes every body, yea, unto the least, and makes piteous caressing unto them, to make them have pity upon him . . . This is my first day's work, I shall end the same to-morrow. I write all things, though they be of little weight. . . . I am in doing a work here that I hate greatly. Have you not desire to laugh to see me lie so well, at the least to dissemble so well, and to tell him truth so betwixt hands. He hath shown me all on the bishop's behalf, and on Sunderland, without touching any word to him of that which you showed me, but only by much flattering him, and praying him to assure himself of me. . . . You have heard the rest. We are tied to two false races . . . God forgive me. God knit us together for ever, for the most faithful couple that ever he united. This is my faith: I will die in it. Excuse if I write ill, you may guess the half of it, but I cannot mend it because I am not well at ease, and yet very glad to write unto you when the rest are sleeping. . . . I am weary and asleep, and yet cannot forbear scribbling as long as there is any paper."—*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 154.

There are many passages unfit for transcription, interspersed again with aspirations for God's blessing, and sentiments of shame at the course she is pursuing. The next day she continues her letter, beginning with speaking of a bracelet she is

making him (Bothwell), which he is to keep out of sight, and for the hasty workmanship of which she apologises, and then she remembers the loathed task in hand:—

‘I go to my tedious talk. You make me dissemble so much that I am afraid thereof with horror, and you cause me almost to do the office of a traitress. Remember how, if it were not to obey you, I would rather be dead than do it. My heart bleeds at it.’—*Ibid.* p. 170.

And then another scene with her husband is detailed, in which she brought him round to her wishes:—

‘To be short, he will go anywhere upon my word. Alas, I never deceived anybody, but I remit myself wholly to your will, and send me word what I shall do, and whatsoever happen to me, I will obey you. Think also if you cannot find any more secret invention by medicine, for he is to take medicine at Craigmillar and the bath also. He may not come forth of the house this long time. To be short, by all that I can learn he is in great suspicion, and yet, nevertheless, trusts upon my word, but yet not so far that he will show anything to me. But, nevertheless, I shall draw it out of him if you will that I avow all to him. But I shall never be willing to beguile one who puts his trust in me, nevertheless you may do all, and do not esteem me the less for that cause, because for my own particular revenge I would not do it to him. . . . To conclude, for certainty he suspects of the thing you know and of his life. But as to the last, so soon as I spoke two or three good words to him, he rejoices and is out of doubt. I have not seen him this evening for finishing your bracelet, but I can find no clasp for it. It is ready for them, and yet I fear it should bring you ill-hap, or that it should be known if you are hurt. . . . Burn this letter, for it is over dangerous, and nothing well said in it, for I am thinking upon nothing but fasherie. . . . Now seeing, to obey you, my dear life, I spare neither honour, conscience, nor hazard, nor greatness; take it in good part and not after the interpretation of your false brother-in-law, to whom I pray you to give no credit against the most faithful lover that ever you had or shall have. See not also her (his wife) whose feigned tears you ought not more to regard than the true travails which I endure to deserve her place, for obtaining of which, against my own nature, I do betray those that would lett me. God forgive me, and give you, my only friend, the good luck and prosperity that your humble and faithful lover doth wish unto you, who hopeth shortly to be another thing unto you, for the reward of my pains.’—*Ibid.* vol. ii. Appendix, p. 146.

The other letters are in much the same strain. They are given in the same work at full length, and also the notes drawn from them by the English and Scotch commissions when the matter was brought before Elizabeth. There is something almost ludicrous, if it were not too revolting a subject for such feelings, in the gravity of these documents. We have, from a paper endorsed by Cecil, ‘A brief note of the chief and principall ‘pointes of the Quene of Scottes lettres written to Bothaill, ‘which may tend to her condemnation, for her consent and ‘procurement of the murder of her husband, as farre forthe as ‘we coulede by the reading gather,’ and by the Scotch commissioners a longer list coolly separating from the maze of love,

hatred, jealousy, and fantastic fancy, which agitated by turns the mind of the writer, such passages as bore on the matter in hand, and transcribing them in their uncouth Scotch translation, as for example—(we simplify the spelling):—

Item, “As to me, howbeit I hear no farther news from you, according to my commission, I bring the man with me to Craigmillar,” (where it was at first planned to commit the murder,) on Monday, “where he will be all Wednesday.” *Item*, very shortly after: “Summa, ye will say he (Darnley) makes the court to me, of the which I take so great pleasure that I enter never where he is, but incontinent I take the sickness of my side, I am so fashed with it. . . . I pray you advertise me of your news at length, and what I shall do in case ye be not returned when I come there, for, in case ye work not wisely, I see that the whole burden of this will fall upon my shoulders.”

Item, “I pray you, according to your promise, to discharge your heart to me, otherwise I will think that my malheur and the good handling of her that has not the third part of the faithful nor willing obedience unto you that I bear has won, against my will, that advantage over me which the second love of Jason won; not that I would compare you to ane sa unhappy as he was, nor yet myself to ane sa unpitiful a woman as she. Howbeit ye cause me be somewhat like unto her in anything that touches you or that may preserve and keep you to her, to whom you only appertain, if it may be sure that I may appropriate that which is worn though faithful, yea only loving of you, which I do and shall do all the days of my life, for pain and evil that can come thereof.”—*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 215.

Mary seems to have entertained a great jealousy of Bothwell's wife. Like Cleopatra, she could not, in spite of her power and her matchless attractions, for one moment forget ‘the married woman.’ The sonnets abound in allusions to her: her ‘false tears and feigned affection,’ contrasting her own great sacrifices for him:—

*Elle pour son honneur vous doit obeysance,
Moi vous obeysant j'en puis recevoir blasme;
N'estant, à mon regret, come elle vostre femme.*¹

Third Sonnet. Laing, vol. ii. p. 224.

¹ Miss Strickland, in her self-sacrificing devotion to her heroine, summarily sets down all the letters of the casket as forgeries, in a series of arguments which have hardly any semblance of weight and authority when uncontradicted, but which fall to the ground the moment the other side is heard. She thinks the sonnets may have been in Mary's own writing, but because they do not contain any mention of Bothwell's name, suggests that they might have been the composition of some troubadour which she had copied before quitting France. Their apparent relevancy to the matter in hand, would, if this were the case, be one of the most perverse of the many perverse coincidences which Mary's advocates have to assert and to lament over. As conclusive of her views of forgery, she clenches the argument by adducing the following solitary testimony as to the public opinion of Mary's contemporaries. It is in a letter from La Motte Fenelon, French ambassador to Catharine de Medicis. We cannot receive it as so entirely settling the question:—

‘Truly, it is believed by those of the Queen's side, that these letters are false, and that those seen are suppositious and counterfeited; and that since their malice and subtlety has been great enough to dispossess a rightful queen of her crown, they would not stand at counterfeiting her hand; and also they allege that should their queen have done anything of the kind, she never would have done it, excepting under the magic compulsion and sorcery of the Earl of Bothwell, as he knew well

We could go on multiplying extracts and proofs of guilt, but our readers will think we have already given them too much on a most unprofitable theme. We can only assure them that, from respect to them and to our pages, we have refrained from some passages and allusions which are even more conclusive of her guilty hatred and guilty love, while, on the other hand, for what we have given, our apology must rest on our strong sense of the impropriety and mischief of bringing serious charges without also adducing proofs. No man has a right to take away or injure the character of another by his own unsupported word. Nor would we cast an additional slur on the dead without giving the causes and reasons that have influenced us.

The details of the murder we need not enter into; all know that Mary continued her attentions and endearments to the last. She had arranged, through 'Paris,' with Bothwell and Lethington, that the place was to be changed from Craigmillar, to which Darnley had expressed a dislike, to Kirk of Field, on the pretence of its pure air. Thither, when he was well enough to travel in a litter, she took him. Her power over him was truly a *fascination*; he did all she wished him, and yet he mistrusted her. 'I have fears enough,' he said to Thomas Crawford, his friend (whose account remains to us); 'but may God judge between us! I have her promise only to trust to; but I have put myself in her hands, and I shall go with her, though she should murder me.' The place was inconveniently small, and unsuited for such high guests; but Mary remained under the same roof with him, while Bothwell was making his arrangements for the murder. Here the help of Hubert, or, as he is called, French Paris, whom the Queen had just received from his service into her own, was necessary. The evidence of this man, which he gave before his execution, throws light upon the whole transaction, and has, of course, been doubted, but bears strong internal evidence of truth. It is given with a garrulous *naïveté*, as if he had really enjoyed easing his mind of his share of the matter. We need not say it is conclusive against the Queen. He seems to have wished to satisfy himself of her share in the work in hand; for when Bothwell bid him move the Queen's bed (her room was exactly under the king's, and her bed just under his), as the gunpowder was to be placed there, Paris neglected the order, and when Mary came into the room in the evening, she herself ordered him to change the position of the bed.

that trade, having made it his greatest occupation from the time he was at school, to read and study books of necromancy and forbidden magic.' Here it is observable that the writer does not give his own opinion at all, and next, seems to think that the Queen's friends laid more stress on the magic than the forgery, of which no proof, either here or at any time, is attempted. That must have been regarded as a very hopeless case that had recourse to such a defence.

'The Queen said to me, "Fool that you are, I will not have my bed in that place," and so made me remove it; by which words I perceived in my mind that she was aware of the plot. Thereupon I took courage to say to her, "Madam, my Lord Bothwell has commanded me to take to him the keys of your chamber, because he intends to do something in it, namely, (and this explanation is supposed to be to his examiners,) to blow up the King with gunpowder." "Do not talk about that at this hour," said she, "but do what you please." Upon this I did not venture to say anything more.'—*Second Deposition of Paris. Mignet*, vol. i. p. 264. *Laing*, vol. ii. p. 285.

Her self-possession and regard for little things at that time, are amongst the most terrible traits of her character, and connect her in our minds with many of the world's great historic criminals: the well-known care for the new velvet bed, on the ground that it would be soiled by Darnley's bath, and the substitution of an old purple travelling-bed in its place; also, her great solicitude about a rich coverlet of fur which she would not have blown up along with her husband. The Queen remained with Darnley in his room on Sunday night, till those who were in the secret could hear the fatal sounds of preparations going on below, so that Bothwell came down to bid them make less noise. He returned to the King's room with Paris, a signal that all was ready; who had not been there but the 'length of a paternoster,' when the Queen, affecting to remember that she had promised to be present at a mask on the marriage of one of her servants, suddenly quitted the place, and left her victim to his fate.

'He beheld her departure with grief and secret fear. The unhappy prince, as though foreboding the mortal danger by which he was threatened, sought consolation in the Bible, and read the fifty-fifth Psalm, which contained many passages adapted to his peculiar circumstances. After his devotion, he went to bed and fell asleep, Taylor, his young page, lying beside him in the same apartment.'—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 266.

The noise of the explosion which followed awoke all Edinburgh. With what sound did it fall on Mary's ears, who, in the midst of her festivities, must have been listening and watching for it? This can never be known; we only know that the first person admitted to her presence afterwards was the murderer. At ten o'clock on the following morning, the news having been previously told her, she had got up all the external signs of mourning. Paris entered the Queen's chamber, from which the daylight was excluded, her bed, from which she had not yet risen, was hung with black, and one of her ladies was giving her her breakfast. Here Bothwell came in, and had a secret conference with her under the curtain. He soon left her, and reported to those without that the Queen was overwhelmed with grief. The day after, she sent the following cool account of the matter to the Archbishop of Glasgow, her ambassador at Paris:—

¹ *Edinburgh, Feb. 10, 1567.*

'Most Reverend Father in God, and trusted Counsellor, we greet you well.

'We have received this morning your letters of the 27th of January, by your servant, Robert Drury, containing in one part sic advertisement as we find by effect over true, albeit the success has not altogether been sic as the authors of that mischievous fact had preconceived and had put it in execution; an if God in his mercy had not preserved us as we trust to the end, that we may take a rigorous vengeance of that mischievous deed, which ere it should remain unpunished we had rather lose life and all. The matter is so horrible and strange, as we believe the like was never heard of in any country.

'This night past, being the 9th of February, a little after two hours after midnight, the house wherein the king was lodged was, in one instant, blown into the air, he lying asleep in his bed, with sic a vehemency that of the whole lodging, walls and other, there is nothing remaining; na, not a stone above another, but all either carried far away or *ding* in dross to the very ground stone. It must be done by the force of gunpowder, and appears to have been a mine. By whom it has been done, or in what manner, appears not yet.

'We doubt not, but according to the diligence our council has begun already to use, the certainty of all shall be *usit* shortly, and the same being discovered, which we *wot* God will not suffer to lie hid, we hope to punish the same with sic rigour as shall serve for example of this cruelty to all ages to come. Always whoever has taken this wicked enterprise in hand we assure ourself it was dressit as well for ourself as for the king, (for we lay for the most part of all last week in that same lodging, and was there accompanied with the most part of the lords that were in this town) and that same night at midnight, and of very chance tarried not all night there by reason of some masks at the abbey (Holyrood): But we believe it was not chance but God that put in our head.

'We despatched this bearer upon the sudden; therefore write to you the more shortly. The rest of the letter we shall answer at more leisure within four or five days by your own servant. And so for the present we commit you to Allmighty God.

'At Edinburgh the 11th day of Feb. 1566-67.'—*Letters of Mary Queen of Scots*, vol. i. p. 44.

Mary, after the murder, manifested an uncommon dislike to the mention of Darnley's name, which is one of the nearest approaches to remorse that we can find in her. What she said to the Archbishop in this letter she maintained through life, when forced to speak of him at all. But though we see from this example that she did not affect to consider her feelings wounded by the event, there was something about the affair that she would rather keep out of sight. Is there anything in history more detestable than the whole of this letter? The coldness, the hypocrisy, the falsehood; and yet it was by her adherence in the course here first adopted that she, in fact,

¹ To this letter Miss Strickland appends the following extraordinary comment: 'If Mary had had any evil intentions against poor Darnley, she must have given some hint of them to her chief confidant the Archbishop, to whom this letter was addressed.'

gained over her adherents in her own and present times. Partly, it is hard to believe in that long subsequent life of impenitence; men are shaken, in spite of their reason, by consistent assertion and consistent denial. She would be too wicked if it were all true! So, as soon as the overwhelming evidence is a little shoved out of sight by other coming events, Mary gets the benefit of these misgivings and difficulties. But, in fact, her guilt is indefinitely increased by this obstinacy in it. Every good Christian ought to stand aghast at such a picture of impenitent sin. We are tempted here, though out of chronological order, to show our readers what is M. Mignet's mode of judging of character, and how far we are to value anything but his *facts*; and to begin with his just and fair notice of her conduct immediately after the murder:—

‘What was the effect produced upon Mary Stuart by this terrible occurrence which filled Edinburgh with indignation and mistrust? She appeared overwhelmed with sorrow and fell into a state of silent dejection. She manifested none of that activity, anger, resolution, and courage which she had displayed after Riccio's murder: but shut herself up in her room, and would communicate with her most faithful servants by the medium of Bothwell alone. Darnley's murderer was the only person admitted to her presence. Even were we not furnished with the most unquestionable proofs of her complicity by the confessions contained in her letters, the authenticity of which we have established elsewhere, as well as by the declarations made in presence of their judges and upon the scaffold, by the subaltern actors in this tragic drama, her conduct both before and after the murder would suffice to convince us that she was a party to the crime.’—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 272.

He then recapitulates what we have already gone through, and continues:—

‘But if her conduct previous to the commission of the crime thus deeply criminales Mary Stuart, what must we think of her proceedings after its perpetration? Her behaviour, both as a wife and a queen, render her guilt all the more flagrant, because far from avenging the husband upon whom she had so recently lavished her hypocritical caresses, she rewarded his murderer, and eventually married him.’—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 273.

Having thus established her guilt so entirely to his own and others' satisfaction, we must show our readers what is the occasion M. Mignet chooses for a burst of admiration for this wicked queen. We somewhat purposely anticipate the course of events, that our readers may not be tempted to the very common error, that distance of time softens unrepented sin; that is, that a criminal without an act of repentance is, in fact, by the mere passage of time, in some sort cleansed from his crime. We do not believe that M. Mignet could have expressed himself as he does in the following passage, had the scene he describes taken place within a week of Darnley's murder, instead of after a lapse of two years of deserved misfortune; and if, instead of some chapters'

change of subject, he had had to proceed to the recording of it before the ink of the last sentence was dry or the page turned over. When Mary took refuge in England, and was detained by Elizabeth, the charge of murdering her husband was brought against her by her own subjects, who supported the charge by producing the letters in the silver casket. Many hard words are applied to Elizabeth, for pressing for a direct answer; for urging Mary, in fact, to defend herself from the charge, giving her the choice of three separate modes of doing so.

‘Mary declined this insidious request. She would not condescend to appear as the accused party. Adroit and courageous, sometimes perplexed but never cast down, she now displayed all the resources of her mind and all the energy of her character. After having tried every means to prevent the publication of the documents which criminated her; after having had recourse to the skilful manœuvres of Lethington and the prudent counsels of Norfolk; after having once offered to abdicate, and frequently to forgive, even when she was most grievously offended—she now stood up with all the dignity of a queen, and proved herself as bold as she had previously appeared accommodating. Instead of defending herself, she attacked Murray. On the 19th of December she wrote to her Commissioners: “Forasmuch as the Earl of Murray and his adherents our rebellious subjects, have added unto their pretended excuses, produced by them for colouring of their horrible crimes and offences committed against us their sovereign lady and mistress, the charge that, as the Earl of Bothwell was the principal executor of the murder committed on the person of Harry Stuart our late husband, so we knew, counselled, devised, persuaded, and commanded the said murder,—they have falsely, treacherously, and wickedly lied; maliciously imputing to us a crime of which themselves were authors and inventors, and some of them even executors.” Repelling the charge of having impeded the proceedings of justice against Darnley’s murderers, and of having given her consent beforehand to her marriage of Bothwell, she alluded with consummate ability and eloquence to the danger to which the lords declared that she had exposed her son: [she had in fact wished to give him into Bothwell’s hands.] “That calumny,” she pathetically observed, “should suffice for proof of all the rest. The natural love of a mother towards her bairn confounds them; but in the malice and impiety of their hearts, they judge others by their own affection.”’—*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 53.

For our own part, so far are we from sharing in M. Mignet’s admiration of this unparalleled audacity, that we find ourselves on the contrary responding in a way we could not have anticipated, to Knox’s denunciations of the course and character of this woman; his language is strong, we do not defend a subject for using such language towards her who once at least was his sovereign; but our readers shall judge if it is not in most points deserved. It is from one of his sermons:—

‘I am further accused, that I speak of their sovereign (mine she is not) as that she were reprobate, affirming that she cannot repent; thereto I answer, that the accuser is a calumniator and a manifest liar, for he is never able to prove that at any time I have said that she could not repent; but I have said, and yet say, that pride and repentance abide not in one.

heart of any long continuance. . . . What I have spoken against the adultery, against the murders, against the pride, and against the idolatry of that wicked woman, I spake not as one that entered into God's secret counsel, but being one, of God's great mercy, called to preach according to His blessed will revealed in His Holy Word, I have oftener than once pronounced the threatenings of His law against such as have been of counsel, knowledge, assistance, or consent, that innocent blood should be shed.'—*Tytler*, vol. vii. p. 287.

There is something in simple magnitude which attracts some minds; even a crime may be pardoned if it is only large enough and maintained with spirit enough. We have traced Mary's aptitude for so great a crime to her education in the Court of France, and to the principles which she imbibed there. The murder of Darnley and its consequences were direct fruits of those principles and of that teaching; and, as a remarkable confirmation of this view, we find the same teaching producing the very same results in France itself, only two years after. We need hardly remind the youngest or the most forgetful of our readers, that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was designed and carried out by those who had especially the direction of Mary's education, Catharine de Medicis and the Cardinal of Lorraine; and by her fellow-pupils, Charles IX. and his brother, the Duke of Anjou. And in the crimes themselves there are many points of resemblance; in part arising from the dissimulation which is the feature and crowning aggravation of each; and also from the circumstances themselves, which in the domestic act of treachery anticipate on a small scale, and shadow forth, those of the more gigantic enormity. Nor are there wanting points of striking analogy in the minor personage. Each tragedy has its innocent, accidental victim. And the Lady Jane Gordon, forced to a divorce from her husband, represents Margaret of France, compelled to a marriage against her heart and feelings; each being equally gainers by the act of injustice and apparent cruelty. Mary represents the king and court of France; Darnley must stand for the Admiral and the Huguenot party; and the Kirk of Field is Paris.

Mary's open, impulsive, impetuous temper is sometimes brought forward to show her naturally incapable of an act of deliberate perfidy. But Charles's disposition might have been supposed quite as great an obstacle to his long-sustained effort of patient, watchful, insidious, profound dissimulation. Mary had only Darnley to delude; Charles was matched with Coligni and his party, able men, whose lives had been passed in suspicion, experienced in the arts of deception, and in the task of unmasking the covert designs of the most perfidious court in the world. Mary had but a few days of dissembling; Charles, for many months, might not relax nor indulge himself in one

natural outbreak. What must it not have cost a young king, absolute in position, impatient in temper, and utterly unscrupulous in principle, to maintain that long course of concession to his enemies, by which he at length gained his ends! from that first conference with his mother and the other conspirators, up to the successful issue of the plot formed there; the feigned peace,—the support of the Protestant religion, and severe repression of the outrages of his own party against it;—his affected displeasure with the House of Guise;—the disgrace into which he brought himself with his Catholic allies, Spain and the Pope, by a course which he could neither justify nor explain;—the connecting himself by the forced marriage of his sister with one of the detested heretics—the whole series of measures necessary to bring within his net the Huguenots whom he had resolved to exterminate. What unremitting watchfulness, what self-restraint were necessary: what sacrifices must be made to lull their jealous suspicions, what perpetual benignity of aspect veiling the smothered rage within, what toleration of high pretensions and bold demands must he persevere in!—but the end reconciled him to all. That it was an effort we know from that scene with his mother, when he believed her to have let out the plot, and he, on his side,

‘grievously complained to her that she should have made known those secrets, which he with so much patience, and resistance from his own mind, putting constraint on his natural disposition, had concealed; to which words the queen, smiling, replied that she did not need to learn from him the art of silence, bidding him to consider if he himself, by his own impatience, had not let out what he suspected others to have done.’¹

That he succeeded we know, not only from the result but from the naïve admiration Davila expresses for a crowning act of dissimulation by which he distinguished himself. This was on the occasion of Coligni’s arrival at Paris.

‘It was a notable thing (*cosa notevole*) to see the Admiral, grown old in ambitious pretensions and proud thoughts, now conscious in himself of his errors; all France for the theatre, and before the eyes of his own partisans; brought to so public a repentance, that he was seen with a copious effusion of tears, prostrated at the knees of that king whom he had so frequently offended; but it was much more notable that the king, so young in years, of a nature so precipitate and irascible, now seeing before him the man who had so often endangered his crown and dominion, knew how to dissemble so perfectly, that, calling him father and raising him with his own hands, he made every one believe him to be sincerely and entirely reconciled to him.’—*Davila*, vol. ii. p. 273.

Coligni’s attempted assassination, under the King’s orders, and the subsequent visit of affectionate condolence paid to the wounded man by Charles and his mother, and the surrounding

¹ Davila’s ‘*Historia di Francia*,’ vol. ii. p. 269.

him with his own guard, in pretended care for his safety, are all points of analogy with Mary's course, which we need not dwell upon. Mary, it is true, eventually denied her share in the murder, and Charles avowed his; but he had designed to conceal it, depending upon a despairing insurrection of the Huguenots, which did not take place; so that the massacre was obliged to be a more orderly and deliberate affair than it had been planned to be. What lies were left to him to tell we need not say he did tell. Perhaps in one point Charles and his mother stand in honourable distinction from Mary, for she would have given up her infant son to the murderer of its father, if she could; and Catharine and her son, having connected themselves by the ties of blood to Henry of Navarre, found themselves almost, to their surprise, bound by them, so that they used exertions, and disobliged the Duke of Guise, in order to save him and his brother: an act of impolicy, according to Davila; who, treating the whole affair as a political coup d'état, remarks on the great mistake it is to mingle isolated acts of mercy with 'extreme measures.'

And now to return to our narrative. However anxious, for various motives, historians have been to release Mary from the actual guilt of her husband's death,—some from political, some from religious reasons; some from a chivalrous gallantry towards the sex, of which she was externally so fair an ornament, and some indulging the subtle intellectual pleasure of disputing obvious conclusions,—writers may be called unanimous in their admission that Mary did all she could by her subsequent conduct to attach the guilt to herself. Nothing could be more shameless, more blind to common decency, more utterly insensible, than the course into which she immediately plunged. Feeling no remorse, and expressing no sorrow, she was simply intoxicated by one sentiment. She cared for no one but Bothwell, and she allowed every individual in her kingdom to see that this was so. Never, we must say, was the principle of loyalty put to so terrible a test. While the whole world—not suspected, but—*knew* him to be the murderer, she would not endure him out of sight; while high and low felt the deed a national reproach, within a fortnight she was playing games, 'shooting at the butts with him at Seton, and forcing those 'lords who lost with them to pay the forfeit in a dinner.' Engaged in these becoming recreations, she took no active steps towards discovering her husband's murderers; her first care, on the contrary, was to reward various subordinate actors in it by places and pensions.' She had, it is true, on the 12th of

¹ Laing, vol. i. pp. 34—48.

February, offered a reward of £2,000 to any who would come forward with information—something must be done for the sake of appearances to foreign courts, and

‘Scarcely was this made known, when public opinion gave voice to its convictions, and a paper was fixed during the night on the doors of the Tolbooth, or common prison, in which Bothwell, James Balfour, and David Chambers (another of Bothwell’s intimates) were denounced as guilty of the king’s slaughter. Voices, too, were heard in the streets of Edinburgh at dead of night, arraigning the same persons. A second placard charged the queen’s servants with the crime, and mentioned the names of Signor Francis, Bastian, John de Bourdeaux, and Joseph, David Rizzio’s brother. The Queen took no steps to secure the subaltern conspirators, and kept the greatest criminal of them all by her side.’—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 274.

No council was assembled, and nothing was done. Pictured placards appeared in public places:—the initials, M. R., holding a sword, and Bothwell’s, with another instrument of death. The Presbyterian ministers preached with ‘sombre vehemence,’ exhorting men to fasting and prayer, and calling on God ‘to reveal and revenge.’ The Queen’s complicity became more and more suspected. Bothwell rode into Edinburgh with an armed force, and bullied and threatened, but by his suspicious and guilty bearing, only confirmed men’s minds against him. Darnley’s father wrote pathetic letters, imploring Mary to take steps to discover the murderer; to which she returned affectionate but evasive answers. Elizabeth wrote to her, as *we* think, a very good and sensible letter, giving Mary the advice of a true friend, though Mignet characterises it very harshly: our readers shall judge. It is a specimen of the sort of language he always uses towards our great Queen.

‘Elizabeth despatched a letter, by Sir Henry Killigrew, in which she hinted her suspicions of Mary’s implication in the murder, and displayed *the passionate hatred which she entertained against her*, in the vehemence of her ill-concealed reproaches, and the feigned character of her hypocritical condolence: “Madam,” she wrote, “my ears have been so astonished, and my mind so grieved, and my heart so terrified at hearing the horrible sound of the abominable murder of your late husband and my deceased cousin, that I have, even now, no spirit to write about it; and although my natural feelings constrain me greatly to deplore his death, as he was so near a relation to me, nevertheless boldly to tell you what I think, I cannot conceal from myself that I am more full of grief on your account than on his. O Madam! I should not perform the part of a faithful cousin and an affectionate friend, if I studied rather to please your ears than to endeavour to preserve your honour; therefore I will not conceal from you what most persons say about the matter, namely, that you will look through your fingers at taking vengeance for this deed, and have no intention to touch those who have done you this kindness, as if the act would not have been perpetrated unless the murderers had received assurance of your impunity. Think of me, I beg you, who would not entertain such a thought in my heart for all the gold in the world.” She then went on to urge her, in the strongest terms, not to leave so great a crime unpunished. “I exhort you,” she adds; “I advise and beseech you to take this thing so much to heart

as not to fear to bring to judgment the nearest relation you have, and to let no persuasion hinder you from manifesting to the world that you are a noble Princess, and also a loyal wife."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 279.

Letters of condolence are proverbially difficult things, and should always be read with the tenderest indulgence. Who would desire his heart or his understanding to be tested by his own performances in this line? But we must say the difficulty is indefinitely increased when it seems probable, from circumstances, that the person addressed is herself the main cause of the catastrophe we deplore; while yet it would be as unjust as it would be discourteous, to charge our correspondent downright with the fact. Indeed, *suspicion* is all that is in the mind; we do not *believe*, we only misdoubt. So we think, on the whole, that Elizabeth did very well; and are only glad it does not fall to our lot to have such a correspondent. Beton, Archbishop of Glasgow and ambassador in France, writes in just the same strain; imploring her to use vigorous means to bring the offenders to justice; informing her that in France 'yourself' 'is greatly and wrongously calumniated to be the principal 'motive of the same;' conjuring her to take a rigorous vengeance, observing, 'that rather than it be not actually taken, it appears to me better, in this world, that you had lost life and all.' Mary, however, had sinned, and risked all, for the present—for present pleasure; this she would have, and was perfectly headstrong and bewitched in her methods of obtaining it. Therefore, when compelled to have Bothwell tried, she so managed, and used such palpable and manifest injustice, as still more to implicate herself and him. She utterly despised not only popular opinion, but every form of it. She had still some difficulties in the way of attaining her ultimate object; serious ones to most minds, but mere straws to her in her present disposition. First, Bothwell *must* be tried for Darnley's murder; secondly, he was already married to another woman; and, thirdly, her husband had been dead but a few weeks. She chose to overcome these obstacles in this order: Bothwell, himself ordering all the arrangements of his trial, and attended by four thousand armed men, loaded by her favours, supported by her public countenance, and mounted on the late king's favourite horse, presented himself for trial, and was tried and acquitted, no one appearing against him, and, as a sequel to this scene, he procured, by an act of bullying audacity, which was a lasting disgrace to the Scotch nobility, a bond signed by many of them, recommending his marriage with the queen. Next, she contrived with him the celebrated abduction to which some of the letters in the casket relate; a very barefaced piece of acting, by which she affected to show herself to her people a prisoner to Bothwell's

unprincipled violence, and her actions therefore no longer in her own power. This affair came off on the 24th of April; he met her with an armed force, as she was returning from a visit to her son, and taking her horse by the bridle, carried her off to the castle of Dunbar. While here, the divorce with his wife was effected;—in the Catholic courts, in behalf of Bothwell, through that consistorial court whose powers she had restored *before* the murder; in the Protestant, in behalf of Jane Gordon, his wife; his previous course of life furnishing sufficient ground. The sentence was pronounced on the 3d of May, and on that day Mary returned to Edinburgh with Bothwell by her side, where she declared his pardon not only for the late outrage on herself, but *for all other offences*, and announced her intention of marrying him. Although this had long been expected, it filled the country with furious indignation; no fair words or promises could silence the Presbyterian ministers in their denunciations, Craig refused to publish the banns till the law compelled him, and then added from the pulpit these words: ‘I take heaven and earth to witness that I abhor and detest this marriage as odious and slanderous to the world, and I would exhort the faithful to pray earnestly that a union against all reason and good conscience may yet be overruled by God to the comfort of this unhappy realm.’ Nothing daunted, Mary, on the 12th of May, created Bothwell Duke of the Orkneys and Shetland, and placed the coronet on his head with her own hands. On the 15th she was married.

From this period date Mary’s *misfortunes*, as they are always called; that is, being permitted to attain the object for which she had sinned, she was not allowed to enjoy it with impunity. From that moment vengeance and retribution opened on their pursuit, nor once lost sight of their victim till she paid the forfeit of her crime with her own blood. And this should never be forgotten by those who read her subsequent history. It is true that Mary, who had made a mockery of law and justice when it suited her purpose, suffered in her turn from the neglect of their requirements. But we must never say that Mary suffered unjustly. We may charge Elizabeth with harshness and duplicity; she may have erred, and did err, in assuming rights she did not possess; but Mary’s punishment was not the less, as far as she is concerned, a just one.

The very day of her marriage she had a quarrel with her husband; he seems to have discovered that the best mode of sustaining her affection was to be continually testing it. He was rough and harsh in his demeanour, suspicious, jealous, exacting, and it was her pleasure, while her affection lasted, to submit to all this. Her letters to him previous to the marriage

are in an abject strain of deprecation. 'Refuse me not, dear life, and suffer me to make some proof by my obedience, my faithfulness, constancy, and *voluntary subjection*.' 'I would I were dead, for I see all goeth ill . . . Absence hath power over you, who have two strings to your bow' [another wife]. 'I desire not but sudden death, and to testify unto you how lowly I submit myself unto your commandments. I have sent you in sign of *homage*,' &c. It was a favourite form with Mary to wish herself dead, as we see in these letters; on her wedding day she was heard to call for a knife 'to stick herself, or else,' she added, 'I shall drown myself.' She was, in fact, subject to paroxysms of rage, when things were going very ill indeed with her, though ordinarily her temper was not at fault; and now Bothwell was interfering with her freedom of action. 'Even since the day of her marriage,' wrote Du Croc to Catharine de Medici, 'she has passed her time in nothing but tears and lamentation, as he (Bothwell) will not give her liberty to look at any one, or allow any one to look at her although he knows that she loves to take her pleasure and pass her time agreeably, as much as any one.' However, these were only lovers' quarrels, from which they were soon aroused by the serious aspect of their affairs. A formidable league had been formed against them, of the chief nobility; nor should the anxiety of the court of France to join them be forgotten, as it was a fact very likely to influence Mary in her final choice of an asylum.

'In fact, the court of France, seeing that Mary Stuart multiplied the commission of degrading disorders and destructive errors, and fearing that Scotland might thereby fall under the dominion of England, had preferred to abandon the Queen rather than lose the kingdom. Charles IX. sent Villeroy to Du Croc with secret instructions, from which we extract the following curious passage:—"The said Sieur de Villeroy will say that his Majesty having made known to him the opinion which he entertains of the pitiable success of the affairs of the Queen of Scotland, seeing what has been written to him of her behaviour by the said Sieur du Croc, and the strange news which he has received from other quarters; and being also concerned that the enterprise of the said lords is secretly assisted and favoured by the English—whose charity would only entail their ruin—the King wishes the said Sieur du Croc to know, that the desire and principal intention of his Majesty is to keep the kingdom of Scotland in its attachment to himself, without permitting it, under the pretext of the many follies which are committed, to rebel and alienate itself from its attachment to himself, as it is certain it would do, towards the said English, whom the said lords would seek as their protectors in this affair, if they saw they would have no assurance from the King." It appears that Du Croc, in conformity with these instructions, offered the confederate lords a company of men-at-arms, and pensions to several noblemen and gentlemen.'—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 307.

But the confederates preferred to have the support of Eliza-

beth. And here began her difficulties—and very genuine ones they were throughout, though not always creditable ones. Her feelings and principles were entirely opposed to rebellion, under any circumstances. She was sincerely shocked at the thought of deposition—it was a personal question with her; and also at subjects standing up in judgment on their princes' faults. On the other hand, all respect for Mary must have been at an end; it was not possible to regard as sacred the rights of such a woman, and it would never do to allow France to get so powerful a hold upon Scotland as was threatened. So Mignet, after reflections on her tortuous policy, and on actions rarely corresponding with words, concludes with Cecil's promise to the lords, to make his mistress's feelings subordinate to her interests, and to lead her, slowly but surely, to adopt those resolutions which were least agreeable but most advantageous. Mary at first despised the threatened danger, but was soon compelled to view it in a more serious light; and just a month from the date of her marriage, we find her taking the field in person, 'mounted 'on horseback, preceded by the royal standard of Scotland, and 'dressed in a red gown which reached only to her knees.' The confederates hearing of her intrenching herself on Carberry hill, advanced from Edinburgh to give her battle, bearing a banner on which was painted the body of the murdered King lying under a tree, with the young Prince kneeling beside it, and underneath, the motto, '*Judge and avenge my cause, O Lord!*' The sight of this banner greatly moved the people, animated the confederate soldiers, and affected the loyalty of the Queen's men. At this crisis Du Croc attempted to effect a compromise, but he found the Queen very resolute and animated, and not at all willing for a compromise, though she promised pardon on their submission. Then followed proposals for settling the affair by single combat. Bothwell was ready to fight for his cause, and on the other side there were contentions for the office of champion; but in the meanwhile desertion began amongst her own troops, and Mary at length found herself forced to treat with her rebel subjects; and she agreed to deliver herself up to the confederates if they would allow Bothwell to escape; they in their turn promising, on condition of his dismissal, to return to their allegiance. And thus Mary took leave of her husband, probably with the hope of soon being rejoined by him. They were observed to speak together with much agitation, and then to separate 'with great anguish and grief.' Bothwell asked the Queen whether she would keep the promise 'of fidelity which she had made to him, of which she assured 'him, and gave him her hand upon it. Thereupon he mounted 'his horse, with a small company of about a dozen of his friends,

‘and went off at a gallop, taking the road to Dunbar.’ She never saw him again.

Mary’s love was not of a nature to bear a long absence, nor was he an object for pure attachment; yet for a few weeks or months she clung obstinately to him, after which time his remembrance, for all we know, passed away from her. She got engaged in other plots, and had new objects, to whom she must at least pretend to give her interest. He disappears from the scene till, eight or nine years after, we again come upon the mention of his name. Our readers will remember Bothwell’s fate;—that he turned pirate, was captured by a Norwegian vessel, and kept prisoner in Norway till 1576, when he died mad. However, there was a rumour of a confession, and Mary thus writes on the event to her ambassador at Paris:—

‘I have been informed of the death of the Count of Bothwell, and that before his decease he made an ample confession of his faults, and declared himself the author and guilty of the assassination of the late king my husband, of which he frees me, expressly swearing upon the damnation of his soul for my innocence, &c.’—*Laing*, vol. ii. p. 307.

She bids Beton, therefore, try to procure this confession. He in his turn, coldly answers that he had heard of it long ago, and that it had given her son great joy, but that he could not procure an authentic copy without money for the messenger’s journey, to which Mary (who really never wanted money) replies coolly enough—‘It seems to me that the journey of Monceaux (her messenger) is not necessary for this purpose, as from what you tell me the Queen-mother has sent;’ and so the authentic copy never came.¹ But this is a peep into the cold future. Mary, after this parting, gave herself up to the confederates, from whom she received a loyal and courteous reception; but on seeking to communicate with the Hamiltons, who had collected a body of men in her cause, she found herself no longer a queen, but a prisoner. The confederates feared a renewal of the war, and the recal of Bothwell, and would not permit her to hold correspondence with her partisans. Upon this she first realized her position, and giving way to most impolitic but not unnatural anger, exhibited all the ‘rage, resentment, and despair,’ especially attributed to

‘Youthful kings in battle seized alive,

and for once forgot both policy and dissembling. She called for Lindsey, and bade him give her his hand. He obeyed.

¹ Upon this Laing is certainly justified in saying ‘The testament is a shallow forgery, of which Mary and Beton were both conscious; and Bothwell himself, as he died mad, was incapable of a genuine confession at his death.’—*Laing*, vol. ii. p. 51.

'By the hand,' said she, 'which is now in yours, I'll have your head for this.' Morton and Athol she threatened to 'hang and crucify,' with other impotent threats which only served to widen the breach by showing the use she would make of power should she ever be suffered to regain it. However, Mr. Fraser Tytler admires her spirit, quoting her really effective promise of vengeance to Lindsey, and keeping in the background the wilder fury of her threats of crucifixion. He thus describes her miserable entrance into her capital. He is disgusted with her people's reception of her, and their indignation expresses itself no doubt in a sufficiently barbarous mode. The passage is remarkable to us as containing some evidence of remorse. It was the consciousness of her crime alone which caused her despair. A most wretched picture it is:—

'It was now evening, and the Queen, riding between Morton and Athol, was conducted to the capital, where she awoke to all the horrors of her situation. She was a captive in the hands of her worst enemies. The populace, as she rode through the streets, received her with yells and execrations; the women, pressing round, accused her in coarse terms as an adulteress stained with her husband's blood; and the soldiers, unrestrained by their officers, kept constantly waving before her eyes the banner on which was painted the murdered King, and the Prince crying for vengeance. At first they shut her up in the provost's house, where she was strictly guarded. It was in vain she remonstrated against the breach of faith; in vain she implored them to remember she was their sovereign; they were deaf to her entreaties, and she was compelled to pass the night, secluded even from her women, in solitude and tears. But the morning only brought new horrors. The first object which met her eyes was the same dreadful banner, which, with a refinement of cruelty, the populace had hung up directly opposite her window. The sight brought an agony of despair and delirium, in the midst of which she tore the dress from her person, and forgetting that she was almost naked, attempted in her frenzy to address the people.'—*Tytler*, vol. vii. 113.

But we will not pursue the familiar course of history—her imprisonment at Lochleven, her obstinate adherence to Bothwell, the discovery of the casket, the threatened trial by her own subjects, from which she was preserved by Elizabeth; the forced abdication,—drawn from her, there is good reason to believe, by the knowledge of the fatal evidence that existed against her;—her escape, the final battle, her flight into England, and the life of imprisonment which followed. Mary's history had events enough in it to furnish excitement for a very long life; what then must have been the tumult of existence in which her six years in Scotland were past? Within *seven* years she had had three husbands, and had been queen of two kingdoms; had headed campaigns in person; had suppressed insurrections and outwitted statesmen, subdued enemies, fought battles; had found time in these severe occupations for all the delights of society and for every form of amusement; she had had innumerable

admirers, and had experienced every gradation of sentiment, from simple coquetry to the most enthralling passion; she had known too the darkest excitements of conspiracy and crime:—always changing scene, and place, and occupation; riding, hunting, dancing, fighting, alternating from failure to triumph, from success to despair, and sustained through all by high spirits, reckless courage, and indomitable pride. What recollections, what habits, what dispositions and character were these with which to plunge suddenly into the monotony of a lifelong imprisonment!

That truly must have been a strong spirit which never once failed or yielded under the trial,—which for twenty years planned, and schemed, and flattered, plotted, conspired, cajoled, and we must add, *lied* with unabated energy and unflagging hope; and this under the consciousness of a great crime, and the, to her, heavier consciousness that all with whom she had to deal knew and were fully persuaded of her guilt. What bold bad woman was it who said, '*Une femme comme moi n'est jamais compromise?*' This must have been Mary's confidence, a trust in resources which could not be exhausted—a belief that if she could only see men, she could win them—a knowledge of the power of her very remarkable position and her lofty pretensions. There was another thing, too, to sustain her in captivity.

Writers talk much of Elizabeth's hatred of Mary. We believe Mary's feeling towards Elizabeth was a much deeper one. Elizabeth hated Mary,¹ (we take it for granted, as so many say so,) because she was a thorn in her side, the pretender to her throne, her prisoner whom she dare not set at liberty, and yet could plead no just right to detain; one who was perpetually putting her to difficulties; a load on her fears, on her conscience, and on her credit. But Mary hated Elizabeth, because

¹ Mr. Frazer Tytler quotes a reported message of Elizabeth to Cecil at the time when Mary was a prisoner at Lochleven, and in danger of her life from the vengeance of her subjects, which we think points to her general state of mind towards her, and proves that her 'hatred' was not proof against pity for her condition, nor against the accusations of conscience for her own want of strict integrity in her dealings with her. 'Tell Cecil that he must instantly write a letter, in my name, to my sister, to which I will set my hand, for I cannot write it myself, as I have not used her well and faithfully in these broken matters that be past. The purport of it must be to let her know that the Earl of Murray never spoke defamedly of her for the death of her husband, [it was before any communication could have reached Elizabeth from him on the subject of the casket,] never plotted for the secret conveying of the Prince into England, never confederated with the lords to depose her: on the contrary, and in my sister's misery let her learn from me this truth, and that is, that she has not a more faithful and honourable servant in Scotland.'—*Tytler*, vol. vii. p. 130.

There is nothing mysterious or unfathomable in this. No triumph in her rival's misery, but a natural revulsion of feeling towards her.

she knew she was known and despised by her, because her crimes had put her in her power, and even more because she was something to think of, and some one on whom to lay the blame for her misfortunes, diverting the train of bitter thought from herself. She was an object for revenge, some one to plot against, to hope against, to ruin if she could. Elizabeth in the multiplicity of her affairs could think only occasionally of Mary. Elizabeth was the barrier, the ultimate end and thought of every scheme of Mary's.

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'By the hand,' said she, 'which is now in yours, I'll have your head for this.' Morton and Athol she threatened to 'hang and crucify,' with other impotent threats which only served to widen the breach by showing the use she would make of power should she ever be suffered to regain it. However, Mr. Fraser Tytler admires her spirit, quoting her really effective promise of vengeance to Lindsey, and keeping in the background the wilder fury of her threats of crucifixion. He thus describes her miserable entrance into her capital. He is disgusted with her people's reception of her, and their indignation expresses itself no doubt in a sufficiently barbarous mode. The passage is remarkable to us as containing some evidence of remorse. It was the consciousness of her crime alone which caused her despair. A most wretched picture it is:—

'It was now evening, and the Queen, riding between Morton and Athol, was conducted to the capital, where she awoke to all the horrors of her situation. She was a captive in the hands of her worst enemies. The populace, as she rode through the streets, received her with yells and execrations; the women, pressing round, accused her in coarse terms as an adulteress stained with her husband's blood; and the soldiers, unrestrained by their officers, kept constantly waving before her eyes the banner on which was painted the murdered King, and the Prince crying for vengeance. At first they shut her up in the provost's house, where she was strictly guarded. It was in vain she remonstrated against the breach of faith; in vain she implored them to remember she was their sovereign; they were deaf to her entreaties, and she was compelled to pass the night, secluded even from her women, in solitude and tears. But the morning only brought new horrors. The first object which met her eyes was the same dreadful banner, which, with a refinement of cruelty, the populace had hung up directly opposite her window. The sight brought an agony of despair and delirium, in the midst of which she tore the dress from her person, and forgetting that she was almost naked, attempted in her frenzy to address the people.'—*Tytler*, vol. vii. 113.

But we will not pursue the familiar course of history—her imprisonment at Lochleven, her obstinate adherence to Bothwell, the discovery of the casket, the threatened trial by her own subjects, from which she was preserved by Elizabeth; the forced abdication,—drawn from her, there is good reason to believe, by the knowledge of the fatal evidence that existed against her;—her escape, the final battle, her flight into England, and the life of imprisonment which followed. Mary's history had events enough in it to furnish excitement for a very long life; what then must have been the tumult of existence in which her six years in Scotland were past? Within *seven* years she had had three husbands, and had been queen of two kingdoms; had headed campaigns in person; had suppressed insurrections and outwitted statesmen, subdued enemies, fought battles; had found time in these severe occupations for all the delights of society and for every form of amusement; she had had innumerable

admirers, and had experienced every gradation of sentiment, from simple coquetry to the most enthralling passion; she had known too the darkest excitements of conspiracy and crime:—always changing scene, and place, and occupation; riding, hunting, dancing, fighting, alternating from failure to triumph, from success to despair, and sustained through all by high spirits, reckless courage, and indomitable pride. What recollections, what habits, what dispositions and character were these with which to plunge suddenly into the monotony of a lifelong imprisonment!

That truly must have been a strong spirit which never once failed or yielded under the trial,—which for twenty years planned, and schemed, and flattered, plotted, conspired, cajoled, and we must add, *lied* with unabated energy and unflagging hope; and this under the consciousness of a great crime, and the, to her, heavier consciousness that all with whom she had to deal knew and were fully persuaded of her guilt. What bold bad woman was it who said, '*Une femme comme moi n'est jamais compromise?*' This must have been Mary's confidence, a trust in resources which could not be exhausted—a belief that if she could only see men, she could win them—a knowledge of the power of her very remarkable position and her lofty pretensions. There was another thing, too, to sustain her in captivity.

Writers talk much of Elizabeth's hatred of Mary. We believe Mary's feeling towards Elizabeth was a much deeper one. Elizabeth hated Mary,¹ (we take it for granted, as so many say so,) because she was a thorn in her side, the pretender to her throne, her prisoner whom she dare not set at liberty, and yet could plead no just right to detain; one who was perpetually putting her to difficulties; a load on her fears, on her conscience, and on her credit. But Mary hated Elizabeth, because

¹ Mr. Frazer Tytler quotes a reported message of Elizabeth to Cecil at the time when Mary was a prisoner at Lochleven, and in danger of her life from the vengeance of her subjects, which we think points to her general state of mind towards her, and proves that her 'hatred' was not proof against pity for her condition, nor against the accusations of conscience for her own want of strict integrity in her dealings with her. 'Tell Cecil that he must instantly write a letter, in my name, to my sister, to which I will set my hand, for I cannot write it myself, as I have not used her well and faithfully in these broken matters that be past. The purport of it must be to let her know that the Earl of Murray never spoke defamedly of her for the death of her husband, [it was before any communication could have reached Elizabeth from him on the subject of the casket,] never plotted for the secret conveying of the Prince into England, never confederated with the lords to depose her: on the contrary, and in my sister's misery let her learn from me this truth, and that is, that she has not a more faithful and honourable servant in Scotland.'—*Tytler*, vol. vii. p. 130.

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death that he is going to, a hundred parts: and he takes his Saviour to witness of this. He sayeth that nothing that anybody goeth about for her prospereth, nor that else she doth herself; and also that she is openly defamed.—*Letter from Henry Skipwith to Dr. Burghley, 16th Feb. 1572. Mignet, vol. ii. p. 159.*

In spite of the tears Mary wept for Norfolk, we believe he was more sincerely lamented by the queen he conspired against. She most unwillingly suffered his execution. She could not sleep while the question was pending, and wrote bitterly to Mary for having seduced him from his allegiance. His treason being manifest, the House of Commons and her ministers urged his death, and even ventured to demand that of Mary, her life being, they said, incompatible with the safety of the kingdom; they said that the axe must be laid at the root of the tree, but Elizabeth replied, 'She could not put to death the bird which to 'escape the pursuit of the hawk had fled to her feet for protection.' So Norfolk died; and Mary lived to 'betray more men.'

Foreign archives reveal how great had been Elizabeth's danger in the recent conspiracy. The rebels were in communication with Alva, the King of Spain, and the pope; the object being to restore the Roman Catholic religion in England. Norfolk and Mary had asked for arms, ammunition, money, and an army of ten thousand men. Recent discoveries have brought to light a long letter of twenty pages from Alva to Philip on this subject, in which he enters warmly into the plan, but is afraid of Elizabeth's vigilance, and suggests her assassination under the following significant form; 'If the Queen of England 'should die either a natural death or any other death, or if her 'person should be seized without your Majesty's concurrence, 'then I should perceive no further difficulty.' Ridolfi, the messenger of the conspirators, is also charged with letters to the pope, and is the bearer of letters from him to Philip, earnestly entreating Spanish intervention in the plot.

'On the 7th of July, Ridolfi was questioned at the Escorial regarding the enterprise which he had come to propose by the Duke of Feria, whom Philip had deputed to hear his statements. His answers were written down in the handwriting of Zayas, the secretary of state. It was proposed to murder Queen Elizabeth. Ridolfi said that the blow could not be struck in London, because that city was the stronghold of heresy; but while she was travelling; and that a person named James Graffs had undertaken the office. On the same day, the council of state commenced its deliberations upon the proposed assassination of Elizabeth, and conquest of England. The subject of the discussion was, whether it behoved the King of Spain to agree with the conspirators "to kill or capture the Queen of England," in order to prevent her from marrying the Duke of Anjou, and putting to death the Queen of Scotland; whether the blow should be struck while she was travelling, or, which would be easier still, *when she was at the country-house of one of the conspirators, who had surrounded her with persons on*

whom they could depend; and whether they ought not to be assisted in case they carried out their intentions, which they would not do without the orders of the Catholic King. The councillors of state severally gave their opinions, which were committed to writing, and have been preserved to this day. The Duke of Feria spoke first. "Under present circumstances," he said, "the affair is embarrassing, but the Catholic King must not postpone it. The Queen of Scotland is *the true heir* to the realm of England, and she will rightly discharge the duties of religion and friendship towards us. If we allow her to be crushed, we entail destruction on all those that are devoted to her. The proximity of the Duke of Alva greatly facilitates the matter, and not an instant must be lost if we intend to engage in the enterprise."—*Mignet*, vol. ii. p. 144, from the *Archives of Simancas Inghilterra*, fol. 823.

The Duke of Feria, who gives this unscrupulous counsel, had been engaged in very different relations towards Elizabeth, as he was the ambassador chosen by Philip to offer his hand to her on her accession to the English throne. All the council gave their different suggestions. The Inquisitor-General voted that the sum of 200,000 crowns should be placed in Alva's hands, and that he should proceed in conformity with the declaration made by the pope's bull; he added that Ciapino Vitelli had offered to go in person with a dozen or fifteen resolute men to seize the Queen of England in one of her pleasure-houses, and that he would present himself before her under the pretext of demanding justice; but the Duke of Feria, profiting by his English experience, did not think it would be easy for a dozen men to capture the Queen of England. How extraordinary these deliberations sound in our ears! how strange that they should exist to this day to convict the authors of them! how wonderfully was Elizabeth's life hedged about and defended from the mischief that walketh in darkness! Mary and Elizabeth were both bold women, but if we must admire the natural virtue of courage, we admire it much the most in Elizabeth. It is impossible to contemplate her situation,—the dangers open and concealed by which she was surrounded throughout her reign, and which her wise and vigilant nature kept her constantly conscious of,—and not be affected and stirred by her lion-like bearing and invincible resolution. What a train of secret treasons and open aggressions does not her history lay before us, from the vacillating treachery of Norfolk, the interminable plots of Mary, the atrocious deliberations of Spain, down to the last mighty effort of her enemies against her. It is in contrasting her with these enemies that we see her greatness; and in comparing her with Philip, or the pope, or Charles, or Mary, we are tempted to forget her many not easily forgotten faults; and for a moment she stands as nobly distinct and magnanimous as when her poet's fancy drew her the

'Fair vestal thrond in the West.'

All these detestable deliberations preceded but a little while the massacre of S. Bartholomew, which might well infuse a universal suspicion on the great acknowledged heads of the Roman Catholic cause. It decided Elizabeth to detain Mary in perpetual captivity. The two Houses of Parliament went further in their 'hatred and fanaticism,' and wished to proceed against her by a bill of attainder, which Elizabeth suppressed by proroguing parliament. But a commission was sent down to Mary to interrogate her on the Norfolk conspiracy. 'The answers,' says Mignet, 'were more prudent than sincere;' the nearest approach to a censure of her habits of unscrupulous falsehood that we can remember to have met with in his work. However, he is at one time ashamed for his heroine: when, finding all other means fail, and her spirit really subdued by loss of adherents, stricter confinement, and the failure of plots, she begins to flatter Elizabeth, and makes pretty knick-knacks for her; employing her uncle, the cardinal, to send little articles of *vertù* from France which might please the English queen, and busying herself in ordering gold lace and silver spangles to make a head-dress for Elizabeth, which she is overjoyed at her accepting. Mary must be doing something for her cause, and she knew that when anything new occurred, these delicate attentions need not stand in the way of more congenial designs; accordingly, on turning over a page or two, we find her deep in new negotiations with Philip, who must have been a very provoking ally,—so slow and ponderous in his movements, promising much, ready to listen to all propositions, but spoiling all by delay. This new negotiation is remarkable for the use she made of her son, to which we call the reader's attention, not because they resulted in anything, but as bearing upon one of the most impressive scenes previous to her execution.

'He (Philip) would not suffer himself to be tempted by the offer which Mary Stuart made to place her son in his hands, and which was somewhat difficult of realization, although she continually recurred to it. Nor was this the only offer she made: after having proposed to place her son, as a hostage for Catholicism, in the hands of Philip II., Mary Stuart went so far as to contemplate his disinheritance by the transfer of all her rights to the powerful defender of her religion in Europe. Her frequent attacks of illness, the dangers which beset her captivity, and the consequences which might result from her plots, led her to project a will containing the following clause, which, though doubtless very Catholic, is certainly very unmaternal, and quite as unmonarchical. "In order," she says, "not to contravene the glory, honour, and preservation of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church, in which I wish to live and die, if the Prince of Scotland, my son, shall be brought back to its creed in spite of the bad education he has received, to my great regret, in the heresy of Calvin, among my rebellious subjects, I leave him the sole and only heir of my kingdom of Scotland, and of the right which I justly claim to the crown of England and its dependent countries; but if, on the other hand, my said son continues to

live in the said heresy, I yield, and present, and transfer all my rights in England and elsewhere . . . to the Catholic King or to any of his relations whom he may please, with the advice and consent of his Holiness, and this I do not only because I perceive him to be now the only true supporter of the Catholic religion, but also out of gratitude for the many favours which I and my friends, recommended by me, have received from him."—*Mignet*, vol. ii. p. 198. *Labanoff*, vol. iv. p. 354.

This will was written in February, 1577. Now we find her in the pathetic scene which preceded her death, on the very way to the scaffold,—that occasion on which so much of the interest in her character is founded,—expressing herself to Melvil in the following words:—

‘ Bear these tidings that I die firm in my religion, a true Catholic, a true Scotchwoman, a true Frenchwoman. May God forgive those who have sought my death! The Judge of the secret thoughts and actions of men knows that I have always desired the union of Scotland and England. Commend me to my son, and tell him that I have never done anything that could prejudice the welfare of the kingdom, or his quality as king, nor derogated in any respect from our sovereign prerogative.’—*Mignet*, vol. ii. p. 360.

She was false to the last. Our space fails us, nor yet is it needful to enter into the endless train of plots which the peculiar circumstances of the time engendered. The Roman Catholic party in England, oppressed and kept down, were ready to enter into any scheme. The Jesuits in the foreign seminaries were as unscrupulous in the means they sanctioned as their worst enemies could assert them to be. Philip had money for all Elizabeth’s enemies, and had a host of pensioners. Bigotry and treason supplied men willing to take the active part in assassination. Mary, under the strict surveillance of Sir Amias Paulet, could no longer plot with them as freely as before, but her willingness to fall in with the most desperate measures was perfectly understood. But while the science of plotting and conspiracy was thus developed, Elizabeth’s ministers on their side were growing still more skilful in the arts of detection, and very mean arts indeed they often were, and what in the present system of division of labour would be held very derogatory to the character of a gentleman. Though in these purer days we venture to guess that men in office are not curious to inquire *how* intelligence is gained, and criminals brought to justice.

In Elizabeth’s time her ministers were their own police, and seem to have felt a genuine relish for unearthing a conspiracy, outwitting plotters, and counter-plotting, to make them convict themselves. They were weary of Mary, the whole of Protestant England desired her death—they verily believed her deserving of it, and felt that neither Elizabeth’s nor their own lives were safe while she lived. Under these circum-

stances did Walsingham make the use he did of Babington, Ballard, Morgan, and the rest, and allowed Mary again such apparent liberty of action as to be able to enter into the plot they had formed; and by means of a double-dyed traitor, Gifford, she was entrapped into a correspondence with the conspirators, in which she warmly entered into a Spanish invasion, and renewed her promise to make Philip her heir; and upon Babington communicating to her the scheme for Elizabeth's assassination, she gave it her consent. Every letter she wrote or received had passed under Walsingham's eyes, who seems to have had no scruples or repugnance to the means he employed or the agents he worked by. We must regard such devices with abhorrence, but our censures of Walsingham are no sort of exculpation of Mary. She was a free agent, and voluntarily wrote what was brought as proof of her complicity in the plot. She had no scruples in doing so; we can hardly expect her to have them, when Philip, without her provocations, so warmly entered into the scheme, extremely commending Mary for having subordinated her love for her son to the service of God and of Christendom, and regarded the six gentlemen who were to murder Elizabeth as under the protection of God. As soon as the conspiracy was ripe, Walsingham laid before the Queen the plans for the invasion of her kingdom and her own assassination, which he justly thought likely means to bring her to the desired point; the suddenness, the wide extent of the plot, her own imminent peril and that of her country did produce fear, and altered her purposes, and in some way her state of feeling towards Mary. Elizabeth, on the question of the trial, the sentence, and the part which then fell on herself, and which she could not evade,—the signing of the death-warrant,—showed unequivocal dissimulation, a dissimulation which we despise. But this is not incompatible with true feeling, and may often be seen working with it. All her prejudices were against putting a queen to death; her principles were on one side, her personal danger and what she might well plead as necessity on the other; and while she wished to be rid of Mary, she very sincerely detested having to do it. Vacillating counsels constantly look like dissembling, but it seems certain that her ministers were really afraid of not being able to bring her to the point, and braved her displeasure at the last with an air of being more really apprehensive than subsequent writers upon the event seem to realize. Elizabeth was not sanguinary; compared with her times and with the example of her fellow-sovereigns, she was even merciful, and frequently showed a very remarkable forbearance towards her enemies, and a magnanimity for which she does not get sufficient praise. As an instance, Mary at one

time in a fit of passion wrote an insulting letter to Elizabeth, incompatible we should say with any delicacy, not to say decency of mind, pretending to repeat a number of gross slanders uttered against Elizabeth by the Countess of Shrewsbury. There is no doubt about the genuineness of the letter, Labanoff has seen it and vouches for this; but he and M. Mignet think it probable that the letter never reached Elizabeth, for no other reason that we can see but that she never took any notice of it or avenged it, as it was in her power to do. But our concern is with Mary, not with that strange compound of great and little qualities,—of what is admirable and (must we say) despicable?—of magnanimity, tinctured, as Hume expresses it, with ‘malignity,’—of genius, wisdom, prudence, penetration, foresight, vanity, and coquetry, our English queen; who, however far we must abate our admiration and temper our respect with opposing sentiments, must yet be acknowledged for one of the greatest women, and beyond this, one of the greatest sovereigns that ever lived.

The history of Mary's death, when considered in relation to her life, is very remarkable. Doubtless she conducted herself with great grandeur, with an undaunted courage, and what is more, with seeming Christian resignation. Her last hours were calculated to make a great impression on all who witnessed them. But yet we are forced to the conviction that it was a scene, that she was consciously *acting* before the present spectators, and before posterity, for to the very last she was asserting with every circumstance of solemnity, things that were not *true*, in regard both to her son and to Elizabeth. It was probably impossible for bystanders not to believe her in that solemn hour,—at least, those who interrupted the awful pageant with their mistimed doubts, get set down for brutal fanatics—witnessing her dignified composure, her unshaken courage, her religious deportment; but irrefragable evidence proves that what she so emphatically denied was yet true—that with an unflinching constancy, for no other purpose but to sustain her credit and to die grandly, she was false to the last—that she entered the presence of God with a lie in her right hand. It is startling to write such things, it is terrible to believe them, but history leaves us no other course. M. Mignet, who details with enthusiastic admiration Mary's last hours, has by the whole tenor of his previous facts taught his readers to shudder where he himself sees ground for reverence and the most excited praise. Such courage, such constancy in the very face of death, were genuine. It is evident that she thought herself a martyr, that she believed she died in God's favour and for His cause, and yet the wicked habit of her life stuck to her. Truth and purity had never been any part of her religion, her

moral sense, tainted at its source, was utterly depraved. She did not know God as a hater of evil. The Church for which she thought she died was—as *she had known it* from her cradle to her grave—evil and corrupt. She had been inured to see its wickedness in high places—she knew it under no better aspect. She was the martyr, not of the Church Catholic, nor yet of the Church of Rome, but of its corruptions. It was those corruptions which misled her through life, it was those corruptions which held back remorse and terror at her death, and enabled her to die as she had lived, dauntless and heroical in a bad cause.

Such then was Mary; brave, high-spirited, princely, full of talent and intellect, radiant with beauty and grace; blessed too with an even temper, a happy disposition, a freedom from petty weaknesses and foibles, and gifted with all companionable and social qualities—but heartless and unprincipled, and, as her whole life shows, living, acting, hoping, joying, grieving, plotting, sinning, for *self* alone.

- ART. III.—1. *The Law of Pews in Churches, &c.* By G. H. H. OLIPHANT, ESQ. Barrister-at-law. London: Longman & Co. 1850.
2. *Church Pews, their Origin and Legal Incidents, with some Observations on the Propriety of abolishing them.* By JOHN COKE FOWLER, ESQ. Barrister-at-law. London: Rivingtons. 1844.
3. *The Pew System the chief Hindrance of the Church's Work in Towns. A Sermon by the Rev. EDWARD STUART, M. A.* London: Masters. 1852.

If much has been said and written upon any theoretical principles, be they good or bad, the advocates of those principles would do well to keep in view some external index, such as circumstances will never fail to give them, of the manner in which their influence is gaining ground. This external index is afforded, in Church matters, by the material buildings in which Churchpeople assemble together to exercise their common offices of religion, and by the arrangements which are then and there observed. Of architecture, as symbolizing the principles of the Church, in hewing out of earth's deep and awful caverns the glorious temples of the living God, as creating some foretaste of nature's own redemption; or of that inspired wisdom by which God's will may be done in earth, after some sort, as it is in Heaven, through means of a certain exquisite harmony and beauty in which nature cooperates with man in the praises and in the work of our common Maker; of Christian art, in short, we mean to speak but little: it is to the practical arrangements of plain men and women when occupied in public religious offices, that we would now call the attention of our readers. This is the substance, we must always bear in mind, which it is the province of art to adorn; nay, even, in the first instance, of bare walls to shelter and protect, if beauty cannot be consulted. Christians may worship and have worshipped under the open sky; the running stream was the font of early converts; the desert has been the scene of Christian eloquence in its turn, as have aisles and naves of sculptured stone; caves and holes of the earth have witnessed the highest mysteries of our religion, in common with that type of the heavenly Jerusalem which the Christian sanctuary may represent to our outward senses. It is not, then, of architecture, which shuts out the world and suspends a hallow-

ing canopy over the sacred work of God's service; it is not of painting and sculpture, that remind the assembly of God's people of the glory of heaven, and that teach them of Christian truths; it is not of music, that unites and refines and spiritualizes the expressions of assembled prayer and service; it is not of ascending incense, that betokens the oblations of our hearts' devotion, and the sweet perfume with which heaven envelops the performance of its own work; it is not of these adornments, which divers branches of the Church have more or less adopted as the accompaniments of Christian worship, but it is of the rude mass which preceded all these in point of time, and which now precedes them in importance,—it is of the assembly of people themselves that we would now speak, supposing them met together on free and open ground in the primitive and patriarchal simplicity of divine worship. There is a pleasure in the thought of personal freedom on which much of our peace of mind or power of concentrated attention must ever depend. The open air and common ground is the normal type and natural image of this freedom; and now that the joke of *Lydian worship* has had its sway, we must be excused for sympathising in some sort with its noble propounder, in using such a well-authorized figure to express his yearning after a mode of service that was free from certain things which he felt to be restrictions to his soul's free action. This our sympathy is also in common with a lower order of creation than the above-named object, for our own feeling in many churches, is to desire the fair and open banks of a river, resting on the smooth and verdant turf, as eagerly as the panting sheep immured in the pens of Smithfield. Our sympathy, indeed, is more closely connected with these latter objects, for it is not a desire that any of our brethren should, as it were, be shorn of their white garments; it is not our dread of surpliced priests, but it is our natural and personal dislike to be knocked about at the mercy of others, and to be shut up in pens or pews, without any choice on our part, unless we madly rush forth and forfeit the whole object in view; we like not to be stuck up, classed, and registered, according to our sleekness or our poverty, for two or three mortal hours. We do not mean that a certain restriction of personal liberty is to be avoided, for it necessarily occurs in any mutual arrangements between men and men: but our immediate object in suggesting this pastoral simile, is to realize the normal idea of a congregation with its pastor, before any artificial methods of order have been established, or even any conveniences have been developed. We wish to start afresh, as it were, and would be repelled by the evils and abuses of existing practices to the very origin and essential elements of Christian worship, alike free from the

proprieties of a higher state, and from the misuse of such laws and regulations as those proprieties required.

Let us picture then to ourselves, in the first place, an assembled congregation, without reference to any building whatever; no one can doubt that the ministrations of the Church would be valid, and, in Missionary labours, this is often witnessed as the real mode of operation till something else can be attained. From this commencement, then, we may trace what would obviously be the growth of such simple worship into a permanent institution. Conveniencies and adornments would naturally suggest themselves, but yet the original freedom would be witness of a principle which ought always to be retained. The Christian religion is essentially voluntary; 'Come unto Me' are the words of invitation, not of command, and the penalty of not coming is the loss of spiritual not of temporal advantages, except incidentally. The assembly, therefore, of Christians, is that of a voluntary coming to the representatives or ministers of Him who first used these words; it should be one of ready access and easy departure, unless by mutual understanding some private restraint is submitted to, for the public good. Individuals, then, would converge from their respective abodes to some centre where it was known that the teaching and the ministration, which they were willing to join, were to be going on. A crowd voluntarily met together on the common ground of intrinsic equality, feel this; though, if well-mannered, there will be deference shown towards individuals and classes. If this congregation listen to the teaching which they come to hear, they will learn gentleness and forbearance of temper, though individual responsibility and equality of interest will be found strongly urged. The natural laws, therefore, which regulate a crowd will be fixed, though private annoyances will be kept in check. They who have felt the spirit of that teaching, and learnt that some heavenly gift was held by commission in the hands of their instructors, will come again, and the congregation will then not be migratory or temporary, but that apostle of good tidings will be induced to remain, and his flock will gather round him habitually, acquiring thereby the bonds of a common family, from the rites which are administered as well as from the natural sympathy of being united in a common cause.

Another consideration, however, will now occur, which must draw our minds away from the idea of a mere crowd assembled to hear sermons or even to join in some acts of common prayer. The sacraments of the Church will obviously require a certain degree of reserve in their administration, which will prompt our imagined Missionary of the desert to desire a small covering or tabernacle wherein to minister the more sacred mysteries of his

religion, even though he still preached in the open air. Thus a chancel for himself and those immediately engaged in the direction of holy things will be the first building erected. The Bishop of New Zealand and his Missionaries celebrate the mysteries of the faith under a tent, the congregation being in the open air. The very nature of the offices thus performed will immediately suggest thus much of a covering, and this state of things would seem to correspond with the Apostolic era, when upper rooms were selected for the breaking of the bread, while other duties were performed as chance or opportunity enabled. Having now arrived at the stage of having a Sanctuary and Holy Place, the plain and the sky being still the floor and the roof of the nave, with trees to be the pillars and to form the aisles, it is obvious, in that natural settlement of ecclesiastical arrangements which we are depicting from its very elements, that the assembled people outside this chancel will also desire some protection from the heat or cold, the wind or rain, as the case may be. They will also desire a seclusion from others who have not joined their body, or who manifest in different degrees an hostility to their religion. As the habits of Christian devotion gain on them, they will also feel the benefit of retirement from the ordinary sights and sensations of the outer world. All these motives will prompt them to erect a covering over their assembly. Holding the assembly itself as the primary idea, we prefer saying, that they will erect a covering over themselves, to saying, they will make a building in which to assemble; for the natural disposition and order of the assembly, apart from the idea of any building whatever, is what we wish to refer to. Four plain walls, then, will be thrown up, with a roof of simplest construction, which will adjoin the before erected Sanctuary, the doors of which will probably be made of open work, that there may be direct communication between the two, though the place for general preaching will still be outside. According to one theory of the prevalence of pillars and arches in church architecture, these deviations from the simple walls we have described will be carrying out the resemblance to some avenue of trees, under whose shade the first meetings will have been held.

Supposing all this to have taken place on open and common ground, and also supposing that the law of the land subsequently not only sanctioned the whole proceeding, but identified itself with it, by considering it the act of the whole people of a certain district, and not only of a part, we have the entire system of a parish church at once before us as now recognised by law. The branch of the subject thus opened out to us, with which we are now concerned, has only to do with the disposition of the people

assembled in this church. The relations between the State and the management of the Church in other respects, we shall not touch upon, but confine ourselves to the question of that area, which the Church by the very title of nature considers to be common, open, and free; which freedom the law confirms and makes universal to all parish churches, as arising from the act of consecration, whatever the accidental origin of a church may have been in each place. All churches may have been founded by individuals on their own ground, but after the act of consecration, the law, in theory, considers it given to the Church, and exactly in the same position as the church we have pictured to have arisen on the wild desert, owned by none, the labour being performed as a common work.

The normal idea, therefore, of a church is, that of free and open ground for the use of the Christian community within each parish. All baptized Christians who have not been legally deprived of the rights thus belonging to them, as by excommunication, have a right to free admission, as all subjects have a right to walk on the highways. The law defines this right, even in exceptions of individual appropriation, to be of the nature of an easement; that is, not a property, but a right to use, or the privilege of a certain accommodation, as when one man may walk through another's ground, or may have a right of water not passing through his own land. Up to a certain point everything seems to establish this freedom and protect those members of the Christian community, who, owing to the accident of poverty, are not in a position to assert their rights, from being thrust aside. It is supposed that the church is every one's home, where he has a right to go, with ease and freedom, for Christian worship, subject only to such rules as must be established in any public institution for the common benefit of its members; nor, if this is really and truly the case with the inhabitants of the district or parish, will there be any fear lest strangers should be exposed to any unpleasant exclusion. They will share in the general freedom of the place within all reasonable limits, though, strictly speaking, the original open character of the church is a right of a local nature. The unity, however, of the Church, as composed of many local branches and interests, with the mutual interchange of rights and privileges naturally arising therefrom, is a distinct subject from what we need now consider. There is a certain claim, in justice and equity, which all have in churches of their own communion, though not parishioners, which is generally felt and acknowledged, and which it would be difficult to oppose in practice in such an open system as ought to be adopted towards parishioners, and which therefore we need not accurately define,

inasmuch as it is not the right which is principally endangered, or which is most important.

Certain rules we have acknowledged to be essential in the management of this assembly, even to make the best of this free and public right of all parishioners to the use of the church; and here it is that we come to the more intricate difficulties of the pew system. The law provides for these rules in an admirable manner according to its theory, but the precedents of years have so overloaded the original idea, that in too many places there exists the greatest difficulty in asserting it. The freehold of the church is placed in the Clergy, subject to certain laws by which to exercise the privileges of freehold. The church must be open during times of service, and generally for the rites of the Church. The parish priest on his part is also under compulsion to perform those rites. The church therefore is necessarily open. The same authority under which the parochial clergy hold their rights, viz. that of the Ordinary or Bishop, also appoints two officers, called churchwardens, to manage the placing in due order those who come into the building in accordance with their popular rights. They have to see that those who enter come for certain religious purposes, and if they misconduct themselves, they are making a use of the place to which their claim does not entitle them. They may therefore be ejected, just as a man who enters a field to walk on a public path is no longer in a secure position if he begins to dig up the soil; his right in the place is particular, not general. Public freedom, therefore, is no way interfered with by the power of the churchwardens, as long as people are properly engaged.

But now, having reached the point of finding our Church machinery admirably calculated in theory to preserve the elementary freedom which pertains to Christian worship, let us look, before we enter further into detail, at the state of things which, in process of time, grew out of this apparently well-balanced adjustment, and which even now is painfully visible in too many of our churches.

The office of Churchwardens, as representing the Ordinary, was to arrange people as they came into church, according to those principles which natural good taste, acting on the mass, would dictate, so that individuals would have to give up ill-regulated fancies to the general notions of propriety which prevailed over the congregation. The churchwardens, in fact, represented the good sense and experience of the whole, rather than enforced any arbitrary power, for we always bear in mind, that the Church never invites her flock in order to tyrannize over them. Now, good feeling in the mass will ever give a voluntary deference to position and station, and the courtesies

of life are not only encouraged, but highly developed by the whole theory of the Church, and that consistently with an equal development of the doctrine of Christian equality. This voluntary deference was entrusted for its execution to the officers of the Church, who were charged to place men according to their station. So far all is natural and fair, for it is to be presumed that these officers were not only to respect rank and station, but generally were to represent courtesy and good manners; and that, therefore, women, the aged, and infirm, such as the deaf, would be marked out as objects of peculiar consideration. No theory, however, will work without the guidance of a living principle within the sphere of its supposed operation. You may balance a thing as nicely as you like, but there must be some solid foundation, or some innate spirit of buoyancy always kept up, or the balance will be lost. In proportion, therefore, as the Church lost some portion of her true Catholic theory, or lost spiritual vitality, so, in the order of things, may we expect that the well-balanced system of Church arrangements would incline to one side or other, influenced by some worldly attraction, or disturbed by some hostile force. In other words, we may always expect that selfishness and avarice will supplant courtesy and openness of heart, if not suppressed by a constant struggle. The outward system of the Church does not pretend to have a mystical power of going on quietly and orderly, without a corresponding vitality of spirit; it is rather the fruit and token of that vitality; as we have presumed in ascribing the origin of ecclesiastical arrangements to the working of natural principle; common sense and courtesy taking as their premises the truths of revelation, conscious also of the continual guidance of the Spirit consecrating all such means. This injunction, therefore, to the officers of the Church, to place people according to their station, harmless in its first intention, and consistent with the original freedom of Christian worship, though still touching on very tender ground, became a great power for evil, when popular ideas of the use of a Church were somewhat altered, and deadness prevailed over too many of her offices.

The history of church-sittings is thus briefly summed up by Mr. Oliphant:—

‘ In our cathedrals, and other ancient ecclesiastical edifices, there seems to have been an entire absence of any fixed and regularly constructed accommodation for the laity, as an essential part of the building. For, before the Reformation, no seats were allowed, nor any distinct apartment in the church assigned to distinct inhabitants, except for some very great persons.

‘ The first seats permitted to be used were moveable forms, for the ease of the parishioners, to sit during those parts of the service, for which kneeling or standing were not directed by the ritual of the times. These

moveable seats were the property of the Incumbent, and in all respects at his disposal; and they were frequently bequeathed by incumbents to their successors, or others, as they thought fit. The Common Law books of an early period mention but two or three cases upon this subject, and those relating to the chancels and seats of persons of great quality.

'In later times, however, pews have been usually provided, as conducing to more undivided attention, and affording a point of union and mutual good example among individuals of families, so that they are probably an assistance to the devotions of the occupiers.'—*Law of Pews*, pp. 2, 3.

Archæologists would remind this writer of the stone bench surrounding the whole church, which is of so frequent occurrence in our old churches; and he has certainly transgressed somewhat the strict limits of his profession, when he ventured on an opinion as to the devotional, or social, effect of pews. That pews were not esteemed an unmixed good even on their first introduction, we have the witness of Dr. Corbett, Bishop of Norwich, who in 1622 thus writes to his clergy:—

"Stately pews are now become tabernacles with rings and curtains to them. There wants nothing but beds to hear the word of God on: we have casements, locks, and keys, and cushions, and for those we love the church. I will not guess what is done within them: who sits, stands, or lies asleep at prayers, communion, &c.; but this I dare say, they are either to hide some vice, or to proclaim one; to hide disorder, or to proclaim pride." So in the orders and directions of Bishop Wren, issued in the Diocese of Norwich in 1636, it is directed "that no pews be made over high, so that they which be in them cannot be seen how they behave themselves, or the prospect of the church or chancel be hindered; and therefore that all pews which do much exceed a yard in height, be taken down near to that scantling."

The above passage we extract from Mr. Fowler's very able and interesting little treatise on our present subject of pews. In tracing the growth of pews, he first considers the origin of that word. Dr. Johnson defines it, 'an enclosed seat in a church,' and its probable derivation is from the Dutch word 'puye,' signifying an enclosed balcony from which to speak, from the Latin *podium*, a place next the orchestra, where great people sat. It was used for the place where the service was read, and also for that enclosure which the lords of the manor were the first to erect in church for their accommodation. The general idea connected with the derivation of the word is, that of an enclosure of rather a conspicuous character, as Milton talks of sheep in their 'pues' in Smithfield, meaning the pens where they were exposed for sale. The able paper published by the Cambridge Camden Society some years ago, and to which mainly is to be attributed the distaste into which 'pues' have fallen, it is scarcely necessary to recall to our readers. The following is a comprehensive and interesting account of the supposed history of pews, from Mr. Fowler—

‘Persons who have visited Roman Catholic countries, can easily imagine that this would be the case so long as England formed part of the Romish communion. For whatever may be the errors and corruptions of that Church, respect of persons within the walls of her sacred buildings, and indulgence of personal ease and accommodation there, are certainly not to be laid to her charge. The services of that Church indeed make accommodation for *sitting* of much less consequence to her members than to ourselves. Chaunting and prayer, with short selections from the Scripture, form the chief features of those services; and accordingly Roman Catholic congregations will be generally observed to be either standing or kneeling. Nor was the practice of preaching lengthy sermons, or rather (as it should now be called) of reading long essays, so much in vogue as it was afterwards under the reign of the Puritans, who carried it to a ludicrous extent, or as it is at present in a more moderate degree amongst ourselves. Under these circumstances, therefore, we should not expect to find general and luxurious accommodation for *sitting* in the early English churches, even if there were nothing but mere conjecture to rely upon.

‘The most probable account is, that the exclusive appropriation of seats was *gradually* brought into fashion. The origin of English parish-churches was, speaking generally, the erection of an edifice by the feudal lord of a manor on his own property, for the benefit of his own family and his tenants, and the subsequent annexation of the tithes of that district to the church which he had built. Many founders of churches would probably reserve some part of the floor for the use of themselves, their families, and their successors; or if not, yet in the time which elapsed between the foundation of most of our churches and the Reformation, it was natural that the same pride and exclusive feelings which have served to perpetuate pews, should have suggested to their successors, sooner or later, to obtain for themselves a grant or licence of appropriation of some distinct portion of the church. Many years might again elapse before any one would presume to solicit a similar distinction. But in proportion as the awe of feudal dignity faded away, and growing commerce swelled the wealth and importance of other classes, and the property of ancient families began to be transferred to other hands, so the acquisition of Church privileges was extended, and other influential families were allowed occasionally to appropriate new portions of the floor. So that about the period of the Reformation, a parish-church would probably have presented the appearance of a floor partially covered with moveable seats, open benches, chairs or stools, with here and there one or more detached pews appropriated to the principal parishioners. Then the Reformation, with its lengthened services, and sermons, rendered accommodation for sitting of much more importance than before, and pews became rather more common than before: by-and-by the old open seats and chairs required reparation or renewal; and when a general new seating was determined upon, the privileges of the pew were imitated throughout, and the old fashion of moveable or open seats almost entirely discarded.’—*Church Pews*, pp. 7—10.

The progress of this evil is easy enough to imagine. Selfishness and pride made the possession of a church pew a matter of personal dignity. The authorities of the Church sanctioned this by the odious system of faculties, and where these were not granted, the law, which judges by precedent rather than by abstract right, supposed that long use implied a faculty, and called this a prescriptive right. Sales and bartering then followed; the original freedom and equality of a church was

altogether lost; the poor were left to feel their poverty more acutely in church than anywhere else; in town congregations the rich possessed the whole space of the church, and the poor got quite out of the habit of looking on the church as their own; those who went found themselves in back parts, and seated in places which marked their low estate very strikingly. They were unable to enjoy any sense of freedom, and could not choose any position according to their necessities or infirmities. They were put to a very unfair test in the matter of going to church, as compared with the rich. To the latter it was a positive sign and mark of rank, an opportunity of display, a gratification to their pride, while to the former it was quite the reverse. It is not, therefore, just to compare the habits of different classes of people in any matter which holds out these varied inducements; which attracts the one even on selfish principles, but requires a great exercise of humility in the other. To prove the operation of this state of things, we may refer to the habits of the poor in country places, where there are no gentry or influential tradesmen, except the squire and one or two farmers, to have absorbed the whole church to themselves. We there find the labourers generally very regular in attending church; whereas in towns the influence of the middle classes seems quite to have driven the poor away, and to have stamped the church with the ignoble title of the rich man's religion.

This state of things—for it is unnecessary further to describe what all so well know, and what is now an oft-told tale—is entirely, after the common principle of a gradual spoliation, sanctioned by law, according to the received necessity of making abstract right yield to the habits of a people and to a series of precedents. An original right is always supposed to lapse if possession has been held by other parties for a certain length of time. We do not say that this principle is unjust, for it is a necessary law of society, and it is futile to suppose that rights will continue in force, with no claimants, from generation to generation. Nor was that pure and spiritual duty of the Church, to protect the privileges of the poor, likely to be undertaken by the secular arm when forgotten by the Church herself. The Church must either do her work or lose her ground. If, for example, the Church makes no proper use of her revenues, of course, as by nature they are *ipso facto* made secular, so will the law in time establish that fact, and the Church will find herself spoiled of her inheritance outwardly as inwardly she had long been so.

In the case of churches this spoliation has gone to very great lengths, and the matter has been made more difficult to manage,

by modern legislation adopting quite a different theory in the establishment and building of new churches to that which we have pictured in tracing the inherent freedom of our old parish churches. Modern habits and abuses were legalized by being made to form the basis of a new system in district churches and chapels. Still, however, the distinction between the two was always recognised, and the freedom of a parish church has seldom been altogether swamped, so strongly is the principle fixed in the whole legal position of the Church. A parish Church, in which all the pews are rented, is rare. It was indeed a matter of necessity to make district churches dependent on rents, and thus to destroy their free character; not because it was an approved system, but because no one came forward with that self-sacrifice which is always a necessary element of more perfect systems. It is obvious, therefore, that unless we have the spirit of self-sacrifice which is necessary to form endowments, and to give the church, clergy and all, as it were, to the benefit of the cause of Christ, we must be content to pass over the evil of our pew-renting district churches. They may do good in their way, but they are not true churches according to the original type; they are only private associations to relieve the parish church by hiring an ecclesiastic to perform the public acts of religion to a select company, the proceeding being cleared of the charge of schism by special provisions and licences.

With all the difficulties and obstructions that cloud the pure free ideal of a Christian Church, that primeval element has yet, providentially, escaped far more than might have been feared. The fearful unchristian effects of the pew system have at all times stood in such bold contrast to the Gospel blessings on the poor, that advocates have never been wanting to maintain the true principle; and now that the Church is striving to be active in her work, it is marvellous to witness how abuses, which had hitherto been so long established as to form legal precedents, seem to crumble into dust before the obvious and clear light of justice and Christian truth. Yet this is but partial, and the freedom of Christian worship is sadly overlooked in many quarters where we might have hoped that this development of their other professed principles would have forced itself upon their notice.

The prejudices in favour of pews are not overcome, and architects now have to contend with the same feelings which obstructed Sir Christopher Wren, of whom it is said, that 'he considered it to be desirable that there should be no pews in churches, but only benches, and complained that there was no stemming the tide of profit and the advantage of the pew-openers.' No part of the Church movement that has been going on for the last twenty years has been so prolific of visible results as the improvement

in the arrangement of church sittings; and so far we ought to be thankful for this witness to the Christian truth we are now advocating, for we call it nothing less: yet there are many discouraging signs in some of the restorations even now in progress; and we fear there is still a great affection for pews and pew doors, though actual traffic in the church, we hope, has received its death-blow. In many churches lately restored, we have the architectural beauty of a better system; but the door is still allowed, not only to remain, but to be rebuilt, thus keeping up the great mark of the exclusive system, though slightly glossed over by being a little lower and having pretty carving upon it.

Nothing, to our minds, is so disappointing as to see this adoption of revived architecture, without the ideas that ought to go along with it. The only thought that can reconcile one to it is, that to a certain extent the Church is prepared for better things in future. It is singular to observe in how many new or restored churches everything is nice but some one or two points, which, to a correct eye, spoil the whole. This is often connected with the altar; but into this question we shall not enter. The reading-desk is another tender point on which depends much of the character which outward arrangements are able to stamp on the service. There is a new church in the parish of Hackney, really quite a model in most respects. It is nobly situated, the spire is very handsome, the interior very solemn, and the seats open; but in the midst of the church stands, elaborately carved, the offensive structure of pulpit, reading-desk, and clerk's desk; in fact, a regular old three-decker, in full sail westward.¹ This same part-revival of better things is often very apparent in what immediately comes under our present notice. Poppy-heads, with lions, dogs, griffins, with a vast number of mediæval devices, may be seen standing erect in solid oak; the whole area of the church, perhaps, may seem to bristle with luxuriant freedom, as symbolized by art; but yet, on further examination, all this is mere sham: there are nothing but exclusive old pews, after all, though not quite so high. It is really too bad to see the pretty details of architecture actually made use of for purposes so contrary to their true ideal as pew hinges and latches. Solid oak doors, with clumsy bolts and hinges, are very noisy concerns; and if doors are determined on, let them be simple,

¹ That this abomination has been introduced by a new Incumbent, and that it was entirely contrary to the known wishes and intentions of one who spent so much upon this church, the late Rector, Mr. Norris, it is only fair to state. But the crying evil is, that whatever ritual propriety, and at whatever cost, has been as it seems, secured to a church, authority is always ready to spoil and ruin the munificent and pious labours of the departed at the first summons of a conceited or ignorant successor.

light contrivances, with modern spring latches, made in such a manner as to show that they do not altogether harmonize with the rest, but are of a temporary nature. Far better, however, is it to have no doors at all; and in that respect, as well as in all others, let architecture be made expressive of its congenial ideas, and not be introduced as an unmeaning appendage to something quite different from its natural character.

We have implied that there seems to have been a slight pause in the pew agitation during the last few years. It is perhaps well that there should have been time to see how a practical subject of such a nature operates of its own force, unfostered by any unnatural agitation. At the first start of the Church movement, there was a justice so obvious in this department of its work, that many took it up kindly without reference to any other principle connected with it. It stood on its own merits, and produced an amazing change in more churches than is generally imagined, especially in rural districts. Since that, however, it has shared the odium of many other popular cries, and has been forced into doing so for selfish purposes. The cry of popery is a very convenient method of exciting a prejudice against anything whatever to which an individual has had a previous antipathy as being contrary to his own interests.

Having now considered the present state of the pew question as an historical subject up to within the last few years, we are anxious, in the next place, to draw attention to the actual working of open seats where they have been adopted. In doing this we have had recourse to the experience of several persons who have kindly aided us according to their several opportunities. The time required for collecting any great mass of evidence, together with the fact that an anonymous writer in a review has no claim to expect much trouble in his behalf, or much confidence from influential persons, must be our apology for not having a great show of statistics to offer. Many with whom we have corresponded have kindly volunteered to send their experience, but, from the press of other matters, and the difficulty perhaps which some feel in compressing a large and rather indefinite subject, we have not yet received their communications. We are, however, unwilling to defer the subject, and with our best thanks for the kind intentions of those for whom we are unable to wait, with apologies also for not so doing, we shall turn at once to those communications which have been so promptly forwarded. For these we express our sincerest gratitude to the writers, trusting that the use we are about to make of them will be in accordance with their wishes. We shall introduce no names, except, occasionally, those of places where the information afforded is free and open to all.

altogether lost; the poor were left to feel their poverty more acutely in church than anywhere else; in town congregations the rich possessed the whole space of the church, and the poor got quite out of the habit of looking on the church as their own; those who went found themselves in back parts, and seated in places which marked their low estate very strikingly. They were unable to enjoy any sense of freedom, and could not choose any position according to their necessities or infirmities. They were put to a very unfair test in the matter of going to church, as compared with the rich. To the latter it was a positive sign and mark of rank, an opportunity of display, a gratification to their pride, while to the former it was quite the reverse. It is not, therefore, just to compare the habits of different classes of people in any matter which holds out these varied inducements; which attracts the one even on selfish principles, but requires a great exercise of humility in the other. To prove the operation of this state of things, we may refer to the habits of the poor in country places, where there are no gentry or influential tradesmen, except the squire and one or two farmers, to have absorbed the whole church to themselves. We there find the labourers generally very regular in attending church; whereas in towns the influence of the middle classes seems quite to have driven the poor away, and to have stamped the church with the ignoble title of the rich man's religion.

This state of things—for it is unnecessary further to describe what all so well know, and what is now an oft-told tale—is entirely, after the common principle of a gradual spoliation, sanctioned by law, according to the received necessity of making abstract right yield to the habits of a people and to a series of precedents. An original right is always supposed to lapse if possession has been held by other parties for a certain length of time. We do not say that this principle is unjust, for it is a necessary law of society, and it is futile to suppose that rights will continue in force, with no claimants, from generation to generation. Nor was that pure and spiritual duty of the Church, to protect the privileges of the poor, likely to be undertaken by the secular arm when forgotten by the Church herself. The Church must either do her work or lose her ground. If, for example, the Church makes no proper use of her revenues, of course, as by nature they are *ipso facto* made secular, so will the law in time establish that fact, and the Church will find herself spoiled of her inheritance outwardly as inwardly she had long been so.

In the case of churches this spoliation has gone to very great lengths, and the matter has been made more difficult to manage,

by modern legislation adopting quite a different theory in the establishment and building of new churches to that which we have pictured in tracing the inherent freedom of our old parish churches. Modern habits and abuses were legalized by being made to form the basis of a new system in district churches and chapels. Still, however, the distinction between the two was always recognised, and the freedom of a parish church has seldom been altogether swamped, so strongly is the principle fixed in the whole legal position of the Church. A parish Church, in which all the pews are rented, is rare. It was indeed a matter of necessity to make district churches dependent on rents, and thus to destroy their free character; not because it was an approved system, but because no one came forward with that self-sacrifice which is always a necessary element of more perfect systems. It is obvious, therefore, that unless we have the spirit of self-sacrifice which is necessary to form endowments, and to give the church, clergy and all, as it were, to the benefit of the cause of Christ, we must be content to pass over the evil of our pew-renting district churches. They may do good in their way, but they are not true churches according to the original type; they are only private associations to relieve the parish church by hiring an ecclesiastic to perform the public acts of religion to a select company, the proceeding being cleared of the charge of schism by special provisions and licences.

With all the difficulties and obstructions that cloud the pure free ideal of a Christian Church, that primeval element has yet, providentially, escaped far more than might have been feared. The fearful unchristian effects of the pew system have at all times stood in such bold contrast to the Gospel blessings on the poor, that advocates have never been wanting to maintain the true principle; and now that the Church is striving to be active in her work, it is marvellous to witness how abuses, which had hitherto been so long established as to form legal precedents, seem to crumble into dust before the obvious and clear light of justice and Christian truth. Yet this is but partial, and the freedom of Christian worship is sadly overlooked in many quarters where we might have hoped that this development of their other professed principles would have forced itself upon their notice.

The prejudices in favour of pews are not overcome, and architects now have to contend with the same feelings which obstructed Sir Christopher Wren, of whom it is said, that 'he considered 'it to be desirable that there should be no pews in churches, but 'only benches, and complained that there was no stemming the 'tide of profit and the advantage of the pew-openers.' No part of the Church movement that has been going on for the last twenty years has been so prolific of visible results as the improvement

in the arrangement of church sittings; and so far we ought to be thankful for this witness to the Christian truth we are now advocating, for we call it nothing less: yet there are many discouraging signs in some of the restorations even now in progress; and we fear there is still a great affection for pews and pew doors, though actual traffic in the church, we hope, has received its death-blow. In many churches lately restored, we have the architectural beauty of a better system; but the door is still allowed, not only to remain, but to be rebuilt, thus keeping up the great mark of the exclusive system, though slightly glossed over by being a little lower and having pretty carving upon it.

Nothing, to our minds, is so disappointing as to see this adoption of revived architecture, without the ideas that ought to go along with it. The only thought that can reconcile one to it is, that to a certain extent the Church is prepared for better things in future. It is singular to observe in how many new or restored churches everything is nice but some one or two points, which, to a correct eye, spoil the whole. This is often connected with the altar; but into this question we shall not enter. The reading-desk is another tender point on which depends much of the character which outward arrangements are able to stamp on the service. There is a new church in the parish of Hackney, really quite a model in most respects. It is nobly situated, the spire is very handsome, the interior very solemn, and the seats open; but in the midst of the church stands, elaborately carved, the offensive structure of pulpit, reading-desk, and clerk's desk; in fact, a regular old three-decker, in full sail westward.¹ This same part-revival of better things is often very apparent in what immediately comes under our present notice. Poppy-heads, with lions, dogs, griffins, with a vast number of mediæval devices, may be seen standing erect in solid oak; the whole area of the church, perhaps, may seem to bristle with luxuriant freedom, as symbolized by art; but yet, on further examination, all this is mere sham: there are nothing but exclusive old pews, after all, though not quite so high. It is really too bad to see the pretty details of architecture actually made use of for purposes so contrary to their true ideal as pew hinges and latches. Solid oak doors, with clumsy bolts and hinges, are very noisy concerns; and if doors are determined on, let them be simple,

¹ That this abomination has been introduced by a new Incumbent, and that it was entirely contrary to the known wishes and intentions of one who spent so much upon this church, the late Rector, Mr. Norris, it is only fair to state. But the crying evil is, that whatever ritual propriety, and at whatever cost, has been as it seems, secured to a church, authority is always ready to spoil and ruin the munificent and pious labours of the departed at the first summons of a conceited or ignorant successor.

light contrivances, with modern spring latches, made in such a manner as to show that they do not altogether harmonize with the rest, but are of a temporary nature. Far better, however, is it to have no doors at all; and in that respect, as well as in all others, let architecture be made expressive of its congenial ideas, and not be introduced as an unmeaning appendage to something quite different from its natural character.

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Having now considered the present state of the pew question as an historical subject up to within the last few years, we are anxious, in the next place, to draw attention to the actual working of open seats where they have been adopted. In doing this we have had recourse to the experience of several persons who have kindly aided us according to their several opportunities. The time required for collecting any great mass of evidence, together with the fact that an anonymous writer in a review has no claim to expect much trouble in his behalf, or much confidence from influential persons, must be our apology for not having a great show of statistics to offer. Many with whom we have corresponded have kindly volunteered to send their experience, but, from the press of other matters, and the difficulty perhaps which some feel in compressing a large and rather indefinite subject, we have not yet received their communications. We are, however, unwilling to defer the subject, and with our best thanks for the kind intentions of those for whom we are unable to wait, with apologies also for not so doing, we shall turn at once to those communications which have been so promptly forwarded. For these we express our sincerest gratitude to the writers, trusting that the use we are about to make of them will be in accordance with their wishes. We shall introduce no names, except, occasionally, those of places where the information afforded is free and open to all.

The plan we have adopted has been to forward a list of heads comprising such advantages as might be expected to result from open seats, in order to elicit confirmatory remarks or otherwise. It is fair to state that we have received answers of an unfavourable nature as well as the reverse; but where this has occurred, we have only been thereby reminded that the pew question does not stand alone, but that it is involved in many other kindred reforms without which the freedom of churches cannot effectually operate, as for instance, where it is complained that open seats do not bring in money so readily as pews. This we do not dispute, but as it is only the particular question of seats we have now to examine, we must concede, as indeed we have before done, that where there are no endowments and a clergyman is unable to run great risks, the necessity of the case must swamp the benefit we now advocate. Again, where open churches fail to attract the poor, we must not at once come to the conclusion that they are an unimportant element in the reformation of religious habits in those classes; for the services of the Church also require more adaptation to their powers and convenience than is generally the case before we can hope that they will be attracted, especially if we bear in mind the strength of habit, and the entire absence for many generations of any true popular feeling in large towns of the holiness of consecrated places.

We propose in the first place to lay before our readers each head, under which we endeavoured to elicit the advantages of open seats, with such direct testimony as we have already obtained to that particular proposition, reserving more general and unclassified remarks to follow after.

Our first proposition was as follows:—

‘That open seats, even if appropriated, are more easily apportioned to the actual and varying wants of each household, and occasion less waste of room than is found by experience to be the case in the old pew system; and even where room is no object, enable the congregation to be more closely gathered together in the best parts of the church.’

The lay author of a very widely circulated and interesting little work, on the subject generally of reverence due to holy places, to whose courtesy we are greatly indebted, having paid much practical attention to church seats, both before writing that work, which was some years ago, and also since, now says,

‘My views as to the appropriation of seats, since that work was written, are somewhat changed. From experience, I doubt whether *any* appropriation, however restricted, is desirable, or at all needful.’

The active and laborious clergyman of a large sea-port district, where a handsome new church has lately been built, thus gives his experience:—

'The seats in my church are *all free*, though by common consent persons who are in the habit of attending regularly find their way without molestation to their favourite sittings. Not only is room saved by this arrangement, but gas and trouble in cleaning, no unimportant items in churches where service is celebrated daily, as here. On ordinary week-day evenings we only light six burners, and on festivals, when there is a sermon, eight, and those in the best part of the church, so that the congregation is more closely gathered together. I have never found any difficulty in the way of the congregation seating themselves from the seats being open.'

To vary the scene we now turn to the testimony of a rector in a small rural parish of Wiltshire, in which the church has within the last few years been rebuilt with very great care as to all internal fittings. He thus writes in answer to our first proposition:—

'I see the truth of this every Sunday. Three seats in my church (for special reasons) have doors—low doors, it is true, but still doors. They are appropriated to three distinct families. One is constructed to hold seven persons, the others four each. In a morning, the average attendance in the three seats is five; in the afternoon, two. But though they are only allotted seats, held neither by faculty nor prescription, and the vacancies might therefore legally be occupied by other parties in case of stress of room, the doors appear to form an insuperable obstacle; and I see people crowded in other parts of the church, five into seats only constructed for four, while there is room to spare here. We have three other allotted seats without doors, which are not liable to this abuse to anything *like the same extent*; though certainly, the fact that they are allotted, is not without its deterring influence even here.'

The Incumbent of a country town, with a noble church lately restored from the worst abuses of the old system, under this head says:—

'There is certainly less waste of room with open seats than in the old square pew system; and there is a greater disposition, I think, to be accommodating to strangers.'

From the Clergyman of a new church in the suburb of a cathedral city, we thus hear:—

'There can be no doubt of the saving of room effected by the adoption of open seats; the poor, instead of being huddled into galleries, in the side aisles, and under the organ, may be thus placed in a favourable position to hear and see.'

A Clergyman of great influence, both from his position in the Church and in society, a most judicious observer of all that passes around him, and who has three churches in his parish, thus confirms this first proposition:—

'There can be no doubt that open seats, if appropriated, occasion less waste of room, and enable the congregation to gather together more closely. The advantage of this is great on week-days and Saints'-days.'

We heard, personally, from the Vicar of a country town, that he had found the truth of this by most vivid contrast in his church between the state of things before a late restoration and

since. He managed with some difficulty to avoid having doors erected, and finally prevailed, on the ground of saving money which might be devoted to a new heating apparatus. All are now well satisfied, the body of the church is fairly and evenly filled, though, from the strictness of the appropriating system, and the great number of the middle classes in the place, the poor were not benefited as he could have wished.

We add to the present division of our subject by the testimony of a layman, whose knowledge of different parts of the country, as a tourist and otherwise, and whose interest in the subject, together with a lively manner of narration, will doubtless make his communication very acceptable to our readers, especially when they bear in mind that the coming extract is but one of several which will be introduced under their proper headings:—

‘ So far as I have had experience of churches containing open seats, I can bear explicit testimony to the truth of this first proposition,—so far as regards open seats generally,—for I do not know many instances in which the open seats are appropriated; but these few are in no respects exceptions to the general rule. Weybridge, Surrey, is one of these. In the old church, where there were the old high pews, the congregation in the week were scattered here and there over the church, each one in his own pew; in the new church,—built where the old one, a wretched structure, was pulled down,—the seats are appropriated, but open, and the congregation now are “closely packed together in the best parts of the church.” By means of the open seats, two great family pews were got rid of, one always empty, belonging to an extinct family; the second almost always empty, and never nearly full. Thus a great saving of room was effected, as no seats answering to these are found in the new church. The same remarks will apply to Thorpe Church in Surrey, where a pew that would hold sixteen was tenanted by one lady only, whose servants on one occasion actually left the church, not being able to find room elsewhere. In the same church there was a single pew which filled up nearly the whole of the south transept: when the church was arranged with open seats, this was removed, and four or five seats substituted, holding on the whole about twenty persons. In this church, also, the open seats were appropriated. In S. Mary’s church, Kidderminster, there are a few appropriated open seats, which are found far preferable to the old pews, and many unappropriated. The practical advantage of these over the high pews, as collecting the congregation together, is clearly manifested in this church; for whenever any persons in possession of pews happen to attend the daily service, they resort to their pews in all parts of the church, whereas the rest of the congregation are gathered into one place. This will, probably, not be applicable to future times, as all of the pews remaining in the church are at this time either actually removed, or immediately to be so. In the mother church of a parish in Wiltshire there is a “private aisle” blocked up by a very large pew thrown across the arch, which fills up nearly half of the aisle, and makes the rest of it utterly inaccessible. This pew, when it is not kept locked, is sometimes occupied by the page belonging to a lady’s household in the parish, who was placed there originally for the purpose of keeping out another family who wanted to use it. The whole aisle is therefore useless. Another large pew is empty regularly for half the year. This one would hold about twelve or fourteen persons. Although

on account of the prevalence of dissent in this parish, the church is unfortunately by no means straitened in room, the fact of the *waste* is equally undeniable. A few appropriated, and a good number of unappropriated open seats exist, and the effect of these is similar to that which I have mentioned with respect to Kidderminster. At Shepperton, in Middlesex, before the removal of the great pews, which was about seven years ago, evils of a similar nature abounded. The church is but small, certainly not larger than the parish requires, (especially as Shepperton is one of those few places in which there is not one dissenter;) indeed, the Rector would be glad to enlarge it if he could, and yet under the old system, fully one-third of the length on one side was swallowed up by two pews of unusual magnitude. In the larger of these two only two persons generally sat; occasionally there were others, but it was seldom or never anything like full. There were other pews which occupied far more of the church than was justified by the size of the households of the occupiers. Now these evils are removed, and the new seats, though to a considerable extent appropriated, from the circumstance of having low small doors, not in strictness *open* seats, are not the cause of any waste of room, or at the worst of very little.

‘With respect to the extent of saving in room attained by the substitution of open seats for old pews, I cannot speak decidedly, not having examined a sufficient number of instances; but leaving out of the question those which are generally seated in an omnibus fashion, *i. e.* on both the long sides, and at least one of the short ones, I should think that the gain would be fully equal to one in six, probably rather more than less, taking the average width of both pews and open seats. Of course, in reseating any ordinary church, the proportion of gain over the whole area would probably be considerably more than this, as there would almost certainly be some one or more pews of more imposing dimensions than I have allowed for; one in five would be more near the mark.’

One case mentioned in this communication would seem not legitimately to further our argument, inasmuch as there are doors; we have not, however, excluded it, as in the contrast between the old and the new system, the present advantages are obviously derived from what is an approach to open pews, though we should have preferred seeing that principle literally and boldly developed.

Our second proposition was as follows:—

‘2d.—That open seats, not appropriated by definite authority, do ultimately admit of a parochial congregation, quietly and orderly arranging themselves for service, without any serious inconvenience or evil results.’

Under this head our correspondents all say much the same thing, agreeing that there is no trouble in the arrangement of a congregation in perfectly open seats. Indeed, if any one fairly inquires whether the open or enclosed part of any particular church, he may be acquainted with, has been the cause of most trouble and ill feeling in the arrangement of a congregation, there is, we think, no doubt that the enclosed part will be found most guilty of misdemeanors. One whom we have before quoted, says: ‘In the free seats, I find the people almost always occupying the same place without confusion, and, as far as I

'know, without dispute; though of course an irregular church-goer will come in and occupy a seat which is generally in the tenancy of his more regular neighbour, and a momentary dissatisfaction may have been created at his having to turn out. But I have never known the dissatisfaction more than momentary.' Another says: 'I find by a short experience in a new church and congregation, that they gradually, by common assent, set apart certain seats to themselves. I encourage this appropriation by regular attendants among the poor: there is no disorder at all in the matter.' Again: 'We find the portion of our open seats which is not appropriated, filled in a quiet and orderly manner; and that, too, long before the service commences.' One before referred to says: 'I built a church nine years ago, in which all the seats are open and free, and I have never known any one deprived of the seat he usually occupies, nor have I seen any inconvenience to result from it. The congregation arrange themselves very quietly, and there is far more courtesy manifested.'

In a church built about eight years since in a sea-port town, as far almost from the town before mentioned of that description, as east and west in our island can make it possible, there are open benches throughout calculated for more than a thousand; two hundred of these are appropriated, but the remainder are perfectly free. The clergyman emphatically assured us that he could testify most strongly to the truth of our present heading, judging from his constant observation. Our more general correspondent writes thus:—

'I have seen many manifest proofs of the truth of this proposition, but never met with any single instance which could legitimately be urged in contradiction to it. The congregation assemble and arrange themselves quietly and orderly; and in many cases those who are regular in their attendance always occupy one unchanging place, which seems to be assigned them by general assent of their neighbours, and left vacant for them as a matter of course by those who may come in earlier. It may be well to add to this statement, that I never met with any one who so far imagined that he had any right to such a seat, as to attempt to remove from it any one who might happen to have occupied it before his arrival; I am aware that such cases exist, but I speak of my own experience; the whole arrangement, so far as it was found to exist, being apparently produced simply by the courtesy and common sense of the congregation, who were aware that it would tend in its measure to produce order and quiet in the church. This perhaps would be practicable only in small parishes, or at least in places where the congregation was composed of nearly the same individuals from day to day; hence it arises that I have observed it more in the congregations attending daily prayer, than in the Sunday congregation, although the persons whom I have alluded to frequently retain the same seat on the Sunday that they do in the week. Kidderminster and — are two cases very much in point, particularly the former, where the congregation being much larger than in the latter place, the practicability and convenience of this scheme of arrangement is more clearly set forth. The daily morning prayer was

usually attended while I was there, (*i.e.* for periods of three or four months at a time over a space of seven years,) by 70 or 100 persons, which is pretty well as times go; the evening prayer by about the same number, in the winter frequently by as many as 150 or from that to 200. Of the average congregation I should think 30 or 40 had their regular places; perhaps scarcely so many, but still a considerable proportion, and this certainly promoted the quiet and order of the church. Christ Church, Birmingham, is a good example of this second proposition; the body of this church is filled with open unappropriated seats; I believe the sides have pews, but I am not quite certain; (there are no *aisles*, as it is a modern Grecian affair, with no division between body and aisles except what the shafts supporting the galleries afford; and, though this has nothing to do with our immediate object further than to show this need not be looked on as a "party question"—it is the only church with which I am acquainted that is destitute of a font;) but certainly the congregation assemble themselves in a most regular and orderly manner, without any inconvenience at all. But to give full testimony to the truth of this proposition would be little else than to enumerate those churches which either in whole or in part contain open free seats, those being excepted where there are a few only, and they either thrust away under galleries, or hidden by large pews standing in front of them; I should be afraid to speak so much for these.'

Such then is found by experience to be the general benefit of open seats as regards the economy of room and the facility of arranging a congregation. To expect that free seats will draw large congregations, irrespective of other considerations, is of course unreasonable, in proof of which we may refer to that vast district of London called Bethnal Green. The new churches built there are, as far as sittings go, well constructed, though with some grievous faults of ecclesiastical propriety, not only in this respect, but in more important arrangements. It is a mysterious problem for the curious in social manners to solve, what becomes of the closely packed inhabitants of streets after streets in this part of London on their only day of rest. Persons best acquainted with their habits describe them as not badly off, for they are rather the better class of workmen; as being quiet and orderly so far as any political sentiments are involved in demonstrations of discontent; as not violently immoral or drunken, but as utterly regardless of any religious responsibility. The whole district is very uniform in character, consisting of streets, most of them recently and neatly built for the use of mechanics, with scarcely a house in the whole district adapted for the income of one hundred a-year. This kind of population on the Sunday, when all are released from their toil, might be pictured perhaps as turning out of their houses and filling the streets with noise and clamour expressive of unrestrained efforts after amusement; but these streets are perfectly quiet, as if most of the inhabitants were flown. The man indeed is seen, house after house, sitting in his shirt-sleeves reading the *Dispatch*; but that employment cannot

account for the general dearth of visible and youthful merriment. Where they all are we know not : some go to Victoria Park, but not in such numbers as to imply that it is a general resort ; some extend their walks further, and some occupy the public houses with their gardens and different enticements to pass away the time. One thing, however, is certain, that lamentably few of the real working class are to be found in the churches provided for them ; nor can dissent boast of any better success. It is not within our present subject to discuss any want of power which hampers the Church, as presented before these people for their religious edification ; but there is a great lack of that unity or corporate character, that central strength, which should always be preserved as a type of the Church's very existence. If churches here and there are scattered about, void of any plain and obvious unity by which all are seen to be instruments of a great central idea, that idea not only being an abstract vision, but a visible and earthly system as much as the single church or clergyman immediately before them ; if each church is left as it were in isolation, to take its chance among multitudes who have no conception of any particular claim on the part of the Church Catholic to their allegiance ; it must be expected that they will share the fate of all other unprotected institutions ; that disunion or even rivalry—witness the unhappy bickerings and under-selling in marriages among the clergy of this parish, which recently caused so much scandal—will spring up, and that, with the additional hindrance of great poverty in the external appointments of the churches, there will be a general want of dignity or greatness to command attention. If a clergyman is not seen to be acting as part of a living system, backed up in all he does by the whole momentum of that system, he is thrown back unfairly on his own individual powers of gaining popularity, and this, in the case before us, with very small means at his command.

But it may be said that the parochial system is the same there as elsewhere ; that the Bishop of the diocese is as much the centre of the Church in Bethnal Green as in rural districts ; yet this very mode of stating the case shows a nakedness in the Church's co-operation, as exhibited before an almost unchristian population. In rural districts it is not practically on the mere abstract existence of a Bishop that the poor and uneducated depend for the unity which is attached to the churches of each parish. The Church has a consolidated character from many associations and habits that come into their daily life. In Bethnal Green, however, the local antecedents have been very different. It is but a few years ago that the Church had no voice at all, as it were, in the manners of the people, from an

absolute dearth of churches or clergy. Thousands and thousands of men, women, and children, lived in small low houses, built back to back, with little plots of garden before each, in which bull-dogs or other animals, according to taste, were kept for Sunday recreation; the unfortunate cattle on this road to Smithfield being the hebdomadal objects of sport. A clergyman has informed us that, in his recollection as a boy, the streets of the whole district were given up to the amusement of bullock-baiting; that a wretched animal was separated from his fellows and chased from the helpless drovers as a sort of black-mail toll for the security of the rest. The recollection of our informant is much quickened as to the reality of this picture by himself having once been in very perilous proximity to the horns of an infuriated ox. Now, in planting Churches through a place like this, more demonstration of the Church's unity is required than the mere knowledge of episcopal superintendence over them all; this alone will not place the true character of the Church before the minds of the people. In early times all efforts at making a people Christian emanated from a central establishment, which in time became the full-blown cathedral or great church of the diocese; and no one can properly estimate the advantage which those very buildings have been of to our Church, in keeping up the central idea of unity through ages of indifference; the fact of S. Paul's Cathedral standing big and high in the centre of London, as a mother protecting her brood of smaller churches, has been a standing witness to the Church's consolidated character, which has taught an extensive lesson by a certain momentum, that derives its force from former times, and keeps it in spite of further impetus being almost stopped.

It is not for us to devise how this precedent might have been carried out in the case before us, but the lack of some solid foundation is a great hindrance to the Church in gaining influence over a fresh population; without this a church does not come before them with much greater appearance of authority than a dissenting meeting-house, and if that is the case it follows that the balance of attraction is to the latter, for it has more power of adaptation to popular taste, be that good or bad.

This digression from our immediate subject is admissible in order that our readers may comprehend a certain difference which we conceive to exist, in the general position of the Church through this district and elsewhere. The question, therefore, of open seats is not fairly tested by reference to such a field of operation; yet many of the advantages already enumerated cannot fail to be manifested, though large congregations are not thereby attracted. We have visited nearly all of the new churches, and can speak from observation that during the after-

noon services on Sunday the congregations are almost nominal; indeed, that it is only a matter of courtesy to use that expression to the few there assembled. In the evening they are larger, but in some cases they do not number more than a hundred even then. Few exceed two hundred, which is a small proportion of 7,000 supposed to be under the parochial care of each church. Those, however, who are present, seem well placed, and have the appearance of arranging themselves naturally and easily in the most convenient portions of the church, which avoids that aggravation of a small number afforded by a scattering into remote corners even of those few.

Under this branch of our subject we will introduce some useful examples of masses of people meeting together in an orderly manner, furnished by a layman resident in London:—

‘That large bodies of people can assemble and occupy seats not appropriated to them without any confusion or disorder is found at the sermons known as the “May Sermons,” when crowded congregations assemble as well in churches as in meeting-houses, and occupy the pews without regard to their ordinary appropriation.

‘The large meeting at Exeter Hall and similar places, where a few seats only are reserved, and the rest are open to all comers, are instances of the same thing.

‘There is a large chapel—the “City Road Chapel”—a central place of the Wesleyan Methodists; it is capable of holding, it is said, two thousand persons. Adjoining to it, and having an entrance from it, is a place called the “Morning Chapel,” capable of holding perhaps some hundreds. It is very common after the principal preaching in the larger chapel to hold another meeting in the smaller one, which is on such occasions crowded by persons who have been present in the large one, but even this, passage from the large place, where each has his own rented seat, to the small one, where each takes the first seat which pleases him, is effected without confusion.

‘Of course, the ordinary assembling of a parochial congregation would be far less liable to confusion than any of the bodies above referred to.’

An instance of a similar kind has long been afforded in Ely Cathedral, where two congregations, one from the cathedral itself, and another from a neighbouring church, were regularly in the habit of assembling in the nave for the same sermon. Forms were arranged, and, of course without the smallest attempt at appropriation, which would have been impossible if desirable, all placed themselves with most perfect facility and mutual convenience. We do not know whether this practice continues, but it is a very good example, which we should like to see followed by all cathedrals, as far as preaching in the nave is concerned, apart from the whole Church Service in the same place.

We will now, however, proceed with the digest of our correspondence, under the head of dividing the sexes, as a help to the orderly arrangement of open seats. This is not a common practice, and therefore many who have written on other parts of

the subject are unable on this to give more than their views or their partial attempts, unsupported by any great experience.

One country correspondent says,—

‘This is an arrangement I have carried out, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the results. It certainly economizes room. There may be a spare place in a seat, but a single woman coming in does not like to occupy it, if she has to crush past two or three men to get to it. Where the sexes are divided there is no such delicacy, nor need there be. The people fell naturally into the arrangement, and I have never heard a grumble about it. I should have wished, if possible, to carry it through the whole church. But I had some impracticable people to deal with, and in the appropriated seats it could not be done.’

Another says, ‘The sexes are divided with good effect.’

Again, with regard to a new town church :—

‘I have observed a certain voluntary separation of the sexes in the seats under the pulpit and reading-desk; the male (aged) attending generally on one side. I shall encourage this; but I doubt the advantage of directly enjoining it, though it is done so, I believe, in Lutheran churches abroad with good effect, and is an ancient and primitive custom.’

One, to whose practical wisdom we attach great value, says,—

‘I think the division of the sexes an advantage. It is remarkable that without any hint from us, the congregation for the most part adopted this plan of their own accord. With very few exceptions the women sit on the south side and the men on the north; and I am not aware of any request having been made by any one, that they would so arrange themselves. I think that the persons who would be inclined to object are the middle classes, because they take their children with them to church, and they dislike the separation. The poor do not dislike it, but their children go to the school and sit with the school children. This may cause the difference of feeling.’

Under this head another remarks :—

‘The division of the sexes would be no doubt a help in carrying out the orderly arrangement, but in many places the people are prejudiced against it. Families like to sit and worship together. I have attempted to indicate my feelings on the subject, by assigning seats for the male teachers of my Sunday School on the north side, and for the female on the south side of the church; and directing the vergers, when strangers enter, to follow that plan in placing them. The same sides are adhered to in seating the children of our schools.’

Our lay tourist says :—

‘The chief instance that I am acquainted with is Christ Church, Birmingham, mentioned under the last head; and here I have no doubt that the separation is the greatest possible help in promoting the orderly and quiet arrangement of the people. Knowing the general character of towns, I have very little hope that evil results can be effectually prevented in those localities without their separation.’

In very many churches this separation is more or less observed among the poor; indeed it is always found that they sort themselves more according to the divisions of their natural

estate in life, than by families. Old men are generally seen together, and old women the same, while young men invariably and properly herd with each other and come to church in company. Of young and middle-aged women the same may be always observed as their natural habit. In churches where no rule is kept as to north or south, we find particular pews, or benches, or the different sides of the same gallery, appropriated by long custom to the particular conditions of this transitory life. What is so awkward as to see a young man or young woman, isolated from his or her companions, and surrounded by those of another sex? A rustic youth feels this awkwardness so acutely that in self-defence his only resource is a certain stupid giggling behaviour, which is not desirable in itself or conducive to future good manners. The case of S. Barnabas is well known; as far as our observation goes, the congregations fall naturally into the arrangement, though, from the circumstances of the church, they are composed of that class which is said to have the strongest objection to it. How far S. Barnabas is as yet an example of a parochial church, is not for us to consider, nor in these days is it the fault of the clergy, if church congregations are not strictly parochial. Certain it is, that the division of the sexes is most advantageous, constituted as that congregation is, and that it adds much to the solemnity and to the sense of awe-inspiring exclusion from the world, which ought to be associated with consecrated places. All churches also must be liable to the intrusion of unpleasant people, and open seats of course, to some extent, more so than others; and this being the case, it will undoubtedly remove one great source of uneasiness on this score, if the sexes are necessarily divided. Even thieves go into churches to carry out their avocation, and it is better that this species of humanity, who are of the male gender, should at any rate be kept from annoying Christian ladies in the hours of prayer, as also may be said *vice versa*.

The church of S. Mary Magdalene, Munster Square, is another example of this division. It was remarkable how quickly the whole congregation fell into the arrangement, the only exception, it is said, on the first Sunday, being a newly married clergyman and his bride, who manifested some unwillingness to part company. Under such interesting circumstances the relaxation for one year from ordinary duties, allowed in the Mosaic law, might be granted if demanded, after which time the question might right itself. On the second Sunday we attended ourselves in our capacity of a Remembrancer, and are able to record the most entire and willing assent of a large congregation to this separation. It was obvious that men squeezed together on one side and women on the other, so as to

economize room for more than would have been convenient in a promiscuous amalgamation of bonnets and hats. Very few hints were needed from the vergers. One man, evidently of a retiring and bashful habit of mind, from sheer want of observation, sat upon the edge of a silk dress; the smallest touch, however, of the authoritative wand was quite sufficient to awaken him to a full sense of the horrors of his position and the enormity of his offence. This question will be found more and more connected with open seats as they become, which we hope they will do, the habit of the English Church. The poor adopt it already by very instinct, or from tradition, and it would be a graceful uniformity on the part of others to concede to what is plainly a natural and convenient principle as a general rule. But we shall recur to this again in our general summary as it were of the evidence collected, and meanwhile content ourselves with a conciliatory suggestion for which we have endeavoured to obtain some examples, though without much success. The body of the church might be used according to the free and open system, including the division of the sexes, while the aisles were reserved for those who preferred a more exact appropriation, without any separation of members of a family. We should certainly prefer seeing all after one model, but there would be a kind of balance of advantages in allowing a peculiar and exclusive privilege only in the side aisles, while the unprivileged, who comply with the natural and established rules of the church, occupy the main central part of the building. There is a dignity about the body of the church which would ever prevent its being an *inferior place*; and whatever system was adopted in it would be the rule, and anything else the exception, on the very same principle that at present open benches are often an ignominious exception to the pews in the body of the church. We know of one church where this plan is adopted with good effect. It is not, however, our place specially to advocate it, for we only suggest it as a less evil, and as carrying a less flagrant show of injustice, than appropriating every privilege to the rich, and leaving every fair and open principle to be the despised portion of the poor.

We will now consider open seats as tending to wear away the notion of property in a church. That this is an evil no one can doubt, except those persons who maintain the reverse for their own personal interests. It is obvious that private property in a church is spoliation from the public rights of churchmen. If such claims could be legally substantiated, all that the Church would be able to say would amount to this, 'I imagined this building mine, but I find it is not, so I must get a building elsewhere.' The Church must have buildings of her own; she

cannot perform her offices in other people's property, for then the owners will necessarily have a veto, as it were, on her offices being performed as she wishes. This notion of property is really at the bottom of many objections to the revival of the Church's ritual. The clergyman is only considered to be on sufferance, as an officer appointed to do certain duties in a building that belongs to the shareholders, and therefore, as they suppose, to the Crown, as protector of their rights. It is not for us to dispute legal claims, but it is well that we should be alive to the consequence of them when established. Church property, with such incumbrances on it, is simply lost. If a man has a right to a great pew, why, let him have it, and the Church must get on as she can without it. The bishop, whoever he was, that gave him a faculty, was betraying a public trust in thus alienating the Church's property to private purposes; but if that does in law stand good, the Church must be in the position of one who has received a gift, but who has had it taken away. There are many degrees of spoliation, not only in extent, but in kind; the necessity of extreme measures depends on how far it has gone. In some churches there are one or two pews thus taken from the public, and where from time immemorial the squire of the parish, who is presumed to represent the founder and patron of the church, has thus reserved a portion of the gift originally made, for his own exclusive use, it is not reasonable to say much; there is no fair grievance on the part of the public, and the kind of use made of that pew is a matter concerned with his own religious feeling rather than a subject of legal objection. If he chooses to lock it up, curtain it round, put tables and stoves in it, we can hardly say more than that we do not approve of his religious feeling; provided, of course, that the pew thus used is not in a position to spoil other parts of the church, or be a scandal to the devotional character of the building. It can never be presumed that the founder of a church handed down this right, or any other equally inconsistent with the character of a church, and offered his gift thus spoiled of its value. The Church, moreover, has never accepted such gifts.

The real grievance, however, is where a gradual appropriation has been allowed, either by faculty or prescription on the part of those who represent no original claim at all, but who simply have acted on the general idea that the church belongs to the parish, and therefore may be apportioned to its inhabitants according to their wealth, in the same way that a common is enclosed and divided among the landowners of the parish, reserving only some small portion to represent the rights of the poor. This of itself may often render a church useless from the extent

of ground thus appropriated, even if the further evil is spared of those pews being made absolutely private property for purposes of rent and traffic. In some places these evils have grown up to such an extent that the church is no longer a place to which the clergyman can invite his parishioners. He is rather the private chaplain to certain pew-owners. A few years ago there was great danger of the Church being altogether swamped in her public character by these claims, and consequent exclusion of all but a few privileged persons; now, however, things are much improving, and precedents in a legal sense of the word are now going against this spoliation rather than for it, which is a hopeful sign for the future. Carried to a certain extent, it is obvious that the clergy must be driven to perform their offices elsewhere. Those offices are surely of primary importance to the place in which they are to be performed, and therefore if the accustomed place is taken from them, as regards the poor they must seek for another place, and in a parish in Gloucestershire, a new church has actually been built near the old one, because the old one, though amply large enough, has no room for the poor.

We suggested this advantage of open seats to our correspondents, as tending to wear away notions of property in a church, and so self-evident did it appear to all, that few remarks were added to a strong affirmative.

In one case, a clergyman speaking of his own church, which is a town parish church, lately restored, says :—

‘ This will be undoubtedly the case. The whole of the sittings have been redistributed under a commission, and the churchwardens have been strictly enjoined by the Chancellor, whenever a change takes place in the occupation of a house, to let the seat attach to the *persons* still, if they continue in the parish, and under no circumstances to allow the *same seat* to be occupied by the new occupants of the house in question; in order that the idea of church sittings being attached to a dwelling-house may be destroyed.’

In this case, the question of property is not left solely to the openness of the pews, for the appropriation implied by these remarks must need a further remedy, beyond the absence of doors; but still we find that the openness of church sittings and precautions against personal rights go together. The remarks of our lay correspondent, however, are so much to the point on this subject, that we shall continue it in his words :—

‘ I imagine that the best practical proof of this proposition (that open seats tend to wear away the notion of property in a church) will be found in the almost universal opposition made to the introduction of open seats on the ground, that thereby persons would lose “their pews.” I have found it the most common line of objection, more than even the cry of “Popery,” and even where this latter has been made use of, it seems to have been principally to serve as a more decent cloak for the other and

more real objection. And it is natural that they should cling to their pews, if there be many places in which, as at Chertsey, in Surrey, the possession of a pew entitles to a vote for the county. This instinctive feeling in the minds of men that open seats will tend to wear away the notion of property in a church, leads to the most determined opposition, which is often too successful, at least for a time. At Kidderminster, proposals were made some years ago to remove all the pews, and Lord Ward agreed to bear all the expense of it, if the people would consent; but the mayor and some of the middle classes refused to give up their pews, on the simple ground that they *were their pews*, and that they could not be turned out. The mayor said, that "if they wanted to build a poor man's church, he would subscribe to it, but that he would not give up his pew, even if he stood alone in it." Others said the same. One of the churchwardens, at a time considerably subsequent to this, endeavoured to seize on a pew by inserting a false floor raised some inches above the old one, placing a lock on the door and marshalling his family in on Sundays; doubtless intending to raise a permanent barrier against the further introduction of open seats in that part of the church: as he had done it on his own private authority, and was a very factious man, the other churchwarden dealt summarily with him, and ordered the lock and false floor to be removed in the course of the week. The existence of locks on the doors of pews, and tables, soft cushions, fire-places, &c. inside, are so many standing witnesses to the fact that high pews tend naturally to foster the notion of property in a church, and therefore, as a necessary consequence, that open seats, in which none of these things can find place, must tend to wear away such a notion. In common with every one else, I know too many such cases. There is more than one locked pew in — Church, one of which has been kept practically empty, for a display of political enmity against a gentleman who wished for it. In Walton Church, (Surrey,) there is a pew, jealously guarded, not merely by a lock and bolts, but furnished with iron spikes all round the top. Some few years ago, two ladies went into a church at Brighton, and at the request of the "pew opener" were ungraciously admitted into a very large pew, occupied by one lady: when the sermon was over, she came up to them, and displaying a large key, asked "whether they wished to stay for the sacrament, as she always locked up her pew." Of course the intruders retired, and the lady made her property secure. There can be little doubt that she would have considered a proposal to introduce open seats as a great violation of her rights. At Cobham, in Surrey, several persons, not content with building themselves private galleries in the church, appropriated each one of the windows, turning the centre light into a glass door to give admittance to the gallery, and building a staircase from the outside up to it. At Shepperton, (Middlesex,) under the old system, a single lady had possession of the chief pew in the church, which she inhabited alone. A gentleman fancying that he had a right to the same pew, the following scene was transacted every Sunday. The lady hurried very early into church and locked herself into her pew; in process of time the gentleman came, and placing a form outside the pew, scrambled over the side and thus triumphantly asserted his rights. About the same time all the pew-holders put locks upon the doors of their pews, whereat the poor complained bitterly that they were being locked out of the church. In more than one place I have seen some portion of the rood screen allowed to escape the general ruin, on purpose to barricade or dignify the family pew of the squire. The notions of private property in a church, of which all these things are at once the manifestations and the nourishment, must be seriously weakened, and in time very probably quite rooted out, by the introduction of uniform open seats throughout the church, more particularly if they were not fastened into their places. The idea of personal property, the only tenure

whereof was a moveable oak seat, or part of one, would soon become vague and undefined. There appears to be no need to multiply instances of an evil which must be familiar to every one, nor would it be easy perhaps to select any instance so outrageous as to be incapable of parallels in many other places.'

The general state of the law with regard to pews, with its indefinite claims and perplexing precedents, is a great hindrance in many places to church restoration. It requires great courage to face the kind of opposition which some are enabled to make, who are determined on preserving their so-called property. We have but to refer our readers to Mr. Oliphant's '*Law of Pews*' to convince them of the difficulty of saying absolutely what you have a right to do and what you have not. It is no wonder that unlettered or even lettered churchwardens succumb entirely to an asserted right, or let the whole question settle itself without any interference whatever. Yet such a course on the part of the authorities of the Church perpetuates and strengthens the evil each generation. If allowed to go on unheeded, the Church would find at some future time her places of worship openly claimed as private property; the law giving its sanction without any apparent spoliation, but simply on the ground of simplifying what is, obviously and to all practical purposes, private property, and clearing individuals of obsolete and troublesome claims on it. The law alters with habit and actual practice, and, if precedents of what may be esteemed the general custom for a certain length of time can be brought forward in evidence, the judges will not decide against it. This principle was apparent, in matters of doctrine and Church discipline, as recently tried in the Hampden and Gorham cases; and in Church property, we may be sure that all theories of openness and freedom would share the same fate, when brought in legal opposition to the overwhelming force of a whole nation's acknowledged practice. Luckily, however, the question has not come to this pass yet, and the reaction already existing, as a fact, must operate very powerfully on all legal decisions. It is, moreover, an invidious thing in the present state of feeling to assert any claims of a very selfish character against the interests of a parish. If circumstances, however, connected with the first suggestion of restoring a church, give any excuse to take the ground of mere resistance against a supposed neglect of personal respect, there are plenty still who will be very troublesome opponents. Such excuses will be assumed often without just cause; but as a matter of prudence, it is well carefully to avoid any use of irritating arguments, or any legal defiance, lest public opinion should support an opponent under such circumstances, when it would not, if he were clearly seen to be acting a mere selfish part.

Any appeal to law is to be deprecated at present. It may be necessary sometimes, but experience shows that very much may be done in a quiet way, and especially by a diligent exercise of their proper offices by the authorities of the Church. The question now seems to be in that state, when an adverse decision, resulting from some peculiar circumstances of the case, might be a general discouragement, not at all to be counter-balanced by the chance of a favourable judgment, because time itself is now working the very ground on which future law will be established. It is more wise to keep hold of the popular arguments, than to face the danger of encountering notions of property, which may, perchance, be difficult to destroy, even in law, however unjust they may be. Let, however, cases of assumed right, by faculty or otherwise, be clearly understood and singled out in any attempted restoration; let not a difficult case of such claim protect a whole row of pews by an indefinite supposition that all may be alike. The following letter, extracted from the *Ecclesiastical Gazette*, we commend as having this in view:—

*‘ Nottinghamshire.—East Retford.—Selling and letting of Pews.—*Archdeacon Wilkins has addressed the following letter to the churchwardens of East Retford:—“I am informed that it has become a practice with some of those claiming a right over certain pews in our parish church to sell or let them to various persons at an annual rent,—a practice perfectly illegal, and which, if permitted to continue, would operate injuriously against the common rights and privileges of the parishioners at large, and to the prejudice of the Church itself. I request you, therefore, to transmit to me the names and addresses of such persons, that I may cite them to show their faculties, or to prove their prescriptive rights to any such pews as are appurtenant to those houses, or as are described in the faculties, that I may limit the appropriation of them to the occupiers of these houses, and to none other, and that the illegal sale and barter in all such may be arrested. I have further to request that where no such faculties or legal prescriptive titles are forthcoming, you, with the advice of the minister, may place the parishioners forming the congregation in the manner and order prescribed by the regulations and laws of the Church.”

If archdeacons generally were thus to incite churchwardens to examine into cases of claim, and present them to a superior authority, how many shadowy ideas of possession, which are growing into more fixed tenures by length of time, would at once disappear. The multitude, by this means, will be transferred into advocates of a free system, inasmuch as finding their own claims entirely unsupported, they will be jealous of some one or two pews still remaining; and this feeling of jealousy is a powerful instrument in eradicating, by very shame, those few claims which are legally privileged. We know an instance of an obdurate gentleman, who required, when a church was rebuilt, that in the elegant new arrangements he should have

a pew the sides of which were some five or six feet high. As he showed fight in his claims, and was the only troublesome case, his request was conceded; not, however, by disfiguring the appearance of the church with so elevated an enclosure, but by sinking the floor of that one pew, so as to gain the desired height of sides. The gentleman therefore descends into his pew, and as representing the height of pride and the depth of humility, affords an instance of extremes meeting. No one, however, can doubt that by thus exposing so obstinate a claimant to the ridicule of all around him, the claim will soon be extinct.

With regard to legal rights in a church, there are two points which lead to much misapprehension. The one is where, by an unjust bargaining, the churchwardens in time past have obtained a faculty for repewing the church, and have collected money on the understanding that seats are appropriated, in fact given, for ever at so much a head to subscribers; pews are now claimed in many churches because so much money was given to the repewing. Now the fact of building and repairing a pew is received as evidence in favour of a legal claim, but this only when brought in proof of an old faculty or other right; where the origin of such a practice is manifest, and is seen, moreover, to have been unjust, no claim whatever is established by it: nor is the general faculty of any use to establish all the minor arrangements the churchwardens made with individual subscribers. It was only to enable the churchwardens to make those alterations which they saw convenient, presuming of course that they would be guided by law and justice, and therefore not sanctioning anything which they did that was unjust. Such appropriation, therefore, was only in exercise of the common power of churchwardens to arrange the congregation. It was a private agreement between the churchwardens and subscribers that the former would use their power of appropriation, if the latter gave their money to the church. The faculty had nothing to do with it, and the churchwardens, even if they promised more than a common appropriation, did so without any right. The money paid was in law a voluntary offering to the church, involving no claim whatever; in fact, it is absurd to imagine that the small price of putting a few boards together should establish so great an invasion of public rights; as well might any one carry a house made of cast iron into the middle of Hyde Park, rear it up, and because a gatekeeper, for a small fee, said it was all right, imagine that he had established a claim to the site of his house. In that subscription to the church the only expense considered was the mere seat, but there are many other things in a church which must be taken into account before a legal transfer could be supposed, even if

legal at all. In estimating the value of any right, it is necessary to include all privileges connected with it, and if only one trifling part of those privileges has been paid for, the presumption is that the right conferred is equally trifling. For purposes of public worship there is more than a seat required, and more is enjoyed by those who have church pews; there is a roof and a building to protect it, to maintain which church-rates are collected, and in which, therefore, all ratepayers continue to have an interest; consequently, without going into the case of demanding any greater possession of a pew than its use during public worship, it is unreasonable to assume any more authoritative appropriation, simply because a seat has been paid for, under circumstances thoroughly known, than is in the common province of churchwardens to allot.

Another common misapprehension is with regard to galleries; it is supposed that they are under a different law to the rest of a church. The same argument just used will apply as well to the erection of a gallery as to a seat in the body of the church. The building of a gallery is no private work, which does not affect other interests. The same roof covers all, and all rest on the same ground. Moreover, a gallery may injure seats under it, and in an architectural point of view there is a public right to preserve the original church in its correct form. From these considerations it follows, that the same powers which rule the body of the church must set the conditions on which a gallery is built. The cases brought forward by Mr. Oliphant explain this subject satisfactorily. He shows the erection of a gallery to be a parish act, exactly the same as if the ground of the church was enlarged. If private parties are allowed to build a gallery for their own use, they have no other tenure than the ordinary appropriation of churchwardens, unless they have a special faculty similar to one they might have had in the body of the church. There is no faculty of right attached to a gallery, as a gallery. The probable cause of the common mistake on this subject is, that the age of building galleries and that of granting faculties were somewhat identical, and therefore that many galleries have specific faculties, though many others pretend to have them, which have not; for a general faculty to build it means nothing; any private right must be supported by a private faculty to an individual.

Further than this we cannot enter into the distinctive province of legal rights, but must refer to the useful works on the subject at the head of our article. Mr. Fowler's little treatise is so easy of access, so plain and unpretending in its character, yet so comprehensive in its information, that to transcribe its pages

into our review would be as unnecessary as to go over the same ground with it, when our readers can so easily obtain the book for themselves. We commend it for the general perusal of churchwardens, and all who take interest in the practical restoration of churches, and for this purpose, recommend a cheaper edition, for half-a-crown is enough to exclude it from many houses where it might do much good, and moreover, the appearance and size of it does not quite justify that sum in this age of cheap literature. Coming, as it does, from a layman and a lawyer, it is calculated to carry more weight with it in many people's minds than what might be set down as the rhapsody of an ecclesiastic.

Another proposition which we suggested to our correspondents was the following :—

‘ That they promote general reverence of behaviour, and bring out the congregational character of our services.’

To which we have the following answers :—

‘ All persons must admit the truth of this proposition. Without any request from me, the example of two or three devout persons has had such an effect upon the whole body, that they now naturally stand at the Doxology and other parts of the service, when, in the churches round, the careless and slovenly manner of the last century prevails. Kneelings are provided for all, and the majority use them, in time I hope all will do so. The responses are more attended to, and the whole character of the service, which is choral, is improved. To show the evil of high backed seats, I might mention, that a youth was detected smoking a cigar a short time ago behind the pews in a church in this town. Such a thing could not have occurred in my church. Many in my congregation have been dissenters, and at first were accustomed to put on their hats as soon as they rose to leave the church; this practice they have been shamed out of, and the change I attribute to the low seats in a great measure.’

Another Clergyman writes—

‘ I have found it so. Outwardly I now call mine (measuring them by the average) a devout congregation. The larger proportion of them kneel, which in the old church not one in ten did. But to procure this desirable end, you must provide hassocks, and see also that the seats are wide enough apart, (ours are three feet two inches,) otherwise you will only get “make-believe” kneeling. The great fault of most of our open seats hitherto has been, that the seat itself, and the space between the rows, have been both too narrow and uncomfortable.’

The above remarks we commend to our readers' special attention. The seats there instanced were the result of no ordinary care and experience, in the pattern selected and the space allowed for them. In one old church, visited for hints in the making of them, it was observed that the seats were slightly hollowed out, the result of which was found so very advantageous in the ease of posture afforded, that it was adopted, and is thought a great improvement.

Several return under this head a mere affirmative; and in some cases we have observed, more especially in conversation, a hasty passing over of the question, with the remark, that they are afraid it makes but little difference. In some of these cases, however, we suspect that the duty of outward reverence does not come very prominently forward in the teaching of the Clergy attached to the church. Open seats promote reverence where a good example is set, because they increase the force of example generally; but they are quite capable even of a contrary effect where the example of others is bad, or no great point is made of reverence in behaviour. All we expect of the Church system is, that it shall be a fair machinery for the infusion of proper teaching; we do not require it to have a spontaneous effect, though still we believe, that good behaviour is so instinctively attached to the religious services of the Church, that publicity in their performance will have great power in teaching it, and compelling it even from unwilling minds.

Another correspondent says—

‘People can kneel all in one direction, without interfering with one another, or exciting notice, whence it produces an unity and intensity (as far as the fit use of outward means can assist), in the devotions of the people.’

Under this head we also find another useful suggestion as to the formation of open seats:—

‘I think one point not sufficiently considered in the “lowness” of the backs of seats. The back of one seat should form the rail for another when the congregation are kneeling, and the lower the seats are the more readily are people disposed to gather together closely.’

Many of the advantages of open seats do, in reality, depend on their being well made. They may be so uncomfortable that they defeat the benefit they are calculated to produce. The essentials are found, by experience, to be a low wide seat, a low back, slightly inclined backwards, with a small horizontal book-shelf or elbow-rest for the seat behind, and plenty of space to kneel down in. In S. Mary Magdalene’s Church there are no hassocks, and good cocoa matting is, to our taste, quite sufficient; for kneeling on the ground we conceive to be a more easy position of the body, one that balances itself better than kneeling on a height. We speak of course of a body in health and strength; infirmity is the exception, and should have its special provisions. The ordinary arrangements ought always to be on the presumption of health and strength. In kneeling on the ground the whole body rests easily on that part of the knee endued by nature with a strong protecting bone, but in kneeling on an elevated hassock, that part of the knee is brought to bear which

is peculiarly tender, and therefore it is that people are compelled to sit, while they pretend to kneel. Again, some room is saved in front by kneeling on the ground; for when the knees are elevated, the body, if it has not recourse to the expedient of sitting, has a tendency to lean forward and rest against the desk in front; in short, it cannot remain upright, and must go backwards or forwards, whereas, in kneeling on the ground nothing more is wanted than the rail or shelf, just spoken of, belonging to the seat in front, perpendicular to the knees. On the supposition, then, of reverential kneeling, the seats must be placed wide apart, in proportion to the height of the hassocks, in order to produce an easy posture. Where persons find difficulty in the act of going down so low, or rising up, they must provide otherwise, but as regards the ease and capacity of the body to remain in the posture of kneeling for any length of time, we feel assured that the lower the knees are the better.

We conclude this head with the following more extended and interesting communication:—

‘ This position follows in a great measure as a necessary consequence of the truth of the last. It is morally impossible that those persons, who exalt themselves above their brethren in one manner in the house of God, should evince no signs of the same spirit in other things also. I have frequently noticed that the irreverence of certain members of a congregation is in proportion to the greater magnitude of the pew. In a small district church well known to me, one of the congregation presuming on her importance, or, which is practically much about the same thing, the relative importance of her pew, was accustomed to dictate magisterially what hymns should be sung, and was not slow to express her disapprobation in case of any violation of her will. In another church, very near to the last-mentioned, the Vicar having suppressed the hymn-book altogether, the representative of one of the largest pews in the church was, and is to this day, guilty of the gross and rebellious irreverence of finding any hymn of the same metre as the psalm which is being sung, and singing it out to the same tune, in defiance of the Vicar and to the scandal of many of the congregation. I believe there are other large pews in the same church responsible for a similar irreverence. In ——— church there is in one pew a table, the use of which is in no respect clear, except to enable the occupants, or some of them, to sit at the table instead of kneel on their knees. In the chief pew in the church of S. Ives, Cornwall, I remember two tables, or rather desks, equally useful, except that there the occupiers of the pew would either lounge over them, or *sometimes* kneel round them, so as to look into each other’s faces. I remember some years ago, there were two families who sat together in a pew in Christ Church, (Newgate Street,) London, and though they could not dispute about the possession of the pew, they did dispute about the pre-eminence of places in it. So that there was a regular race every Sunday for the top places; and I heard one of the contending parties relate rather an acrimonious dispute, which took place in the church about the priority of seats. At Chertsey, in Surrey, there was something of the same kind, but still worse. Two ladies always quarrelled for the top seat in a pew: one, who lived near the church, kept a look-out for the approach of her rival, and then darted into church and took possession of the top of the pew. One Sunday, the

defeated lady, seeing no other help, asked her neighbour to hand her a prayer-book, to reach which she had to get up: in a moment the other one darted into the place thus left vacant, and thought she was safe for that day at least; but the rival lady sat down in her lap, and such an altercation commenced, that the priest came out of the desk, and sharply rebuked them both.

‘These scandalous irreverences were all voluntary, but there are many which are scarcely in the choice of those who sit in pews to commit or abstain from. In many pews it is almost impossible to kneel down.

‘In Ilfracombe church I could manage it by kneeling along the pew, but if there were many persons in it besides myself, I was obliged, more than once, to give it up altogether. In one or two churches near Dublin, I found the seats so constructed as to render kneeling, except by turning my back on the altar, scarcely practicable. The congregations seemed to acknowledge the difficulty, and either knelt on the seat, leaning over the backs of the pews, or stood upright, or sat still.

‘The irreverence of talking or sleeping in church I pass by, because it may be committed under any circumstances, although the high pew system is unquestionably the mother and nurse of this, as of so many other profanations of the house of God. Under shelter of the high walls of a pew, people wax bold to do things, which, were their actions open to the eyes of men, they would not dare to do so. I have sometimes been disturbed throughout a whole service by the conversation of others in the next pew, whom there was no possibility of requesting to behave more reverently, without a process of climbing which would have made the remedy fully as bad as the evil itself.

‘Still persons will say, as they have said to myself frequently, when in conversation on such matters, that these evils arise from the state of the heart, not from the size of the pew, or the height of its sides, and that precisely the same things may take place in open seats. Without entering into the question critically, which would probably show the above statement to be, as usual, a compound of truth and error, it will be better and more appropriate to the nature of these remarks, which respect simply my own personal knowledge, testimony, and experience, to say simply, that as a matter of fact I believe that assertion to be a great mistake; if it be meant to imply that where there are open seats these same abuses are *equally* found. In every church that I know, where the seats are open, there is far more reverence (taking it as a whole, and making an average calculation) than in those churches where high pews remain. I was particularly struck with this contrast a very few years ago in Penzance. In the great church, where there were pews, there was a great deal of general irreverence visible throughout the service; while at a new chapel, or district church, S. Paul’s, I believe, which I attended the same day, the congregation being all in low seats, (I forget whether all were open, or whether there were some low doors,) I saw more reverence of demeanour over the whole congregation, which was, for the size of the chapel, very large, than it has ordinarily been my privilege to witness. At Littlemore, also, which I attended occasionally during my Oxford life, there was every appearance of great reverence. And as regards the congregational character of our services, I fear this is prized but lightly by those who support pews, because they are “more private” and “quiet” than the open seats. All the paraphernalia of brass rods and red curtains, &c. &c. seem designed especially to exclude the notion of our services being congregational, or of “common prayer” altogether. In several churches which I remember (I may make particular mention of Ilfracombe), if all the congregation knelt down properly, any one might stand at the west end and not see a single person in church, except perhaps in the pews close to him. Some

of the pews at the east end of Ilfracombe church are six feet high. As a type of the advantage of open seats in making the services more truly congregational, S. Barnabas may serve instead of a whole string of less perfect examples.

'A high pew carefully fenced off from all communion with even its fellow-pews, and raised sublime above the poor "free seats," is no inapt symbol of a supreme and contemptuous and truly independent private judgment, which, as the advocates thereof love to express it, makes religion a matter wholly and solely between the individual man and his Maker. The communion of saints seems a little out of place in such a creed.'

The last proposition to which we shall here give any methodical order is the following:—

'That their adoption does, as a general rule, promote the cause of the Church among the poor, by giving them certain positive advantages, both of comfort and situation, and also by setting before them the equality of Christian worship.'

In reply to this we read from one quarter:—

'My people are mostly poor, and any distinction in the seats would have had the effect of driving them away. Numbers attend our daily service in consequence of the comfort they enjoy at church.'

Another says:—

'I do believe that the people feel that they have some property in the church, and can worship without respect of persons, as far as the first subordinations of life allow. There is nothing, indeed, more difficult to arrange than an adjustment of pews. At Yarmouth it caused great discontent in one or two parties; but as these rights manifestly were at variance with the general benefit, they have been lost in the feeling of the rest. Nor do I believe that even they would now advocate a return to the old system. It is one great means to *popularize* the Church as an institution to meet the spirit of the times, and resist the outward pressure, for the old state of things was adapted to quite a different view of both spiritual and political relations and intelligence.'

Again:—

'There can be no doubt, as open seats become more general, and the theory of congregational worship is better understood, that the prejudices of a past generation will wear out, and our posterity will wonder what the religion of their forefathers could have been, when wealthy people boxed themselves up in huge square tall pews, half as big again as their necessities required, and left the poor, the aged, and the infirm to sit in such out of the way corners as they might chance to find.'

The relations between rich and poor vary much in town and country. The same persons, who fall into the most exclusive notions when in London, almost from the necessity of the case, feel very different when surrounded by their own labourers and dependents in the country. Let, however, the true spiritual position of the poor be fostered where it may. There is no occasion for country places to labour under difficulties, so strongly felt in London, but which may be more easily overcome on their own parts. The *general* tendency of open seats towards

this wholesome equality is borne witness to by the experience of our *tourist* :—

‘As far as my experience carries me, I can give unqualified testimony to the proposition. In many places,—Kidderminster, Chippenham, may stand as instances,—I have met with proofs of this. At Kidderminster, when the church was opened first after the alterations, very few poor comparatively were present; the reason which they gave, to those who inquired the reason, was commonly, that they supposed that that was only meant for the gentry and not for them: they thought they would not be admitted at the reopening. However they very soon learnt that the beautiful church was for them as much as for others, and, for a considerable time, it was filled to overflowing. The daily service, I should say, has been far more numerously attended than before, and I know that many of the poor take more delight in the Church and her services. Of course, in a place like Kidderminster, the stronghold of all separation since the days of Baxter, this effect can only be very partial; but still I am persuaded that such has been the result, and I think I may say that the open seats have very much conduced to it. In many places I have heard the poor lament over the pews, as practically excluding them from the church, and they, like the Mayor of Kidderminster, began to think that a poor man’s church must be a different kind of thing altogether; and I agree with them, the churches must in this particular be changed, if we are to lay any very firm hold on the affections of the poor. What a poor man would think of a church, where the altar was thrust westwards to make room for a great pew behind, I do not know! certainly he would not suppose it was done for his use or spiritual advantage. This was done in a church in Worcestershire. I have seen the pew, but have some impression that it has been removed, though I am by no means certain. In the following churches, also, I know that pews have been exchanged for open seats with the happiest results :—S. Martin’s, Salisbury; Coombe Bassett and Woodford, both near Salisbury. The congregations, in all these cases, have increased exceedingly since the alteration, and that not from the poorer classes only, but from all. In one case I am informed that the congregation has nearly doubled.’

The advantages of the poor are much brought in contact with the prejudices of the rich, in all proposals of making church seats free and open. Therefore, as a corollary to the last proposition, we endeavoured to elicit any remarks our correspondents were enabled to make on the chance of those hostile prejudices wearing away. In reply to this, our above-quoted most able and valuable helpmate in our present article gives his experience as follows :—

‘That the prejudices of the middle classes may be overcome to these arrangements, may be inferred from the fact of the existence of these arrangements in many places where they were not some time ago; for I fear there are not many cases in which the alterations were made without opposition. In Shepperton there was a furious opposition, which was not overcome till long after the alterations had actually been made, a vote in vestry deciding in favour of it in the teeth of the adverse faction. By degrees, however, it wore away, and I should think that all parties now are perfectly reconciled to it. At Kidderminster, patience, and reasoning, and preaching, have at last been successful; and by this time I hope there are no pews left, either in the body of the church or in the aisles. The galleries and their pews are

at present, I fear, beyond reach, and they are the worst abuses of all. Even the mayor, who was so obstinate when the same thing was proposed before, and whom I heard declaiming in the streets, the next Sunday, against "all Roman doings," has signified his consent, perhaps not persuaded, but for some reason rendered malleable. At Ilfracombe, the Vicar told me that he did not expect any serious opposition to the proposal, which he will make as soon as the money can be raised, and spared from the building of a new church which is in progress. At Trowbridge it has been done, and gives, I believe, gratification to all. At —, if we had the money, I have great hopes that we might succeed in weaning the people over, except perhaps in one or two instances, where it seems to be a point of honour to hold by the pews, equally with other things that hinder the restoration of the church. But even these cases, which appear so stubborn, may, by little and little, be sometimes brought over. I know one or two instances of persons holding out alone for a long time, hoping to hinder thereby the whole work; and, at last, when it has been done without them, coming and begging that their pew might be removed also. At Chippenham the prejudices have been successfully surmounted, except in the case of one lady, who still holds "her own;" and a kind of compromise seems to have been effected with the mayor and corporation, who have now seats made like the rest, only with doors, and rather higher, so as to be easily distinguishable from the surrounding crowd; but yet are far, very far better than the old-fashioned "corporation pews."

We shall now bring the general collection of testimony in favour of the open-pew system, with which we have been kindly furnished, to a close, by giving one letter entire, as its general character would have been lost if dissolved into parts:—

'I feel that both my parish and myself are of too rustic a character to furnish any satisfactory answers to methodical inquiries like yours. We are not in circumstances to say anything at all to most of them. Meanwhile this is the sort of result we have found among ourselves. The people are vastly pleased to have the Squire and the ladies mixed up, for their prayers and instructions, among themselves, and have a very comfortable feeling that, so far, we are all right, and that what Scripture says, and what we do, agree very well together. Then, it is evident that they leave off ugly habits of their own, and adopt very seemly ones, from those whose reverent behaviour at church is a part of their good breeding, taking the course of devotion. Thus, almost all learn to do as they should; and any offence is seen by all, and is a nuisance to all. All know, too, that it cannot be hid, whether they are at church or not; the Parson sees all without staring, and is heard of all without screaming. There are, indeed, drawbacks, real or pretended. Thus the farmer who will take two goblets of ale at his good Sunday dinner, when one would have been enough, goes fast asleep still, and snores, and lays it upon the fatigue given to his stout back by being kept bolt upright, with nothing to rest his shoulders or his head; but his wakeful labourer, in the next bench after him, sets the matter right, and shows how the world goes in the church as well as out of it. There will also arise disputes about places, from time to time; but they are much more easily settled and traced straight home to ill tempers, and not to real inconveniences. And certainly the whole character of the congregation, and so of the parish generally, has vastly improved under the open-seat system, and I am commonly asked whether the people were always as attentive and well-behaved as they are now. I have nothing more to add, &c.'

Two other letters also, which we are unwilling to exclude, have arrived too late to be placed under the several heads we have been considering; we therefore leave them to be arranged, in a retrospective manner, by our readers.

The first is from a country Clergyman of most varied acquaintance with the ecclesiastical arrangements in all countries and ages.

'A new parochial district was formed in Yorkshire, and the church consecrated fourteen months ago. The seats are all open, and all are unappropriated except about six pews; and, except in these pews, the sexes are divided. The clergyman finds this arrangement work extremely well; it admits of the church being used with ease and success by the whole of the parishioners. On all Sacrament days, the morning service is divided, with entire acquiescence on the part of the congregation, and services are multiplied without any difficulty.

'My own opinion is entirely favourable to open and unappropriated seats, and the division of the sexes. At the consecration of a church in a large town some few years ago, I met a numerous body of clergy at an Inn, and took the opportunity to ask if any of them had divided the sexes in their churches. Three of the clergy replied that they had done so; and they said it worked so extremely well, that if the clergy in general would only try the same plan, they would all like it.'

The opportunities of our other correspondent are stated by himself:—

'1. In my last parish, in Kent, I had a favourable opportunity of observing the results of the open-seat system in a chapel of ease which was built in a distant hamlet, and where unquestionably it worked very beneficially. I will, therefore notice, *seriatim*, your questions so far as I can in any way assist you. Some of the open seats were appropriated to the principal farmers in the most eligible parts of the chapel; but, although appropriated, were never, or scarcely ever, empty. For in the absence of the parties to whom they were appropriated, they were occupied by others; or, when the chapel was very full, the room not occupied by members of the particular families, was filled by those who required accommodation. I cannot say that I found the congregation assembled in the best parts of the chapel, when room was not an object, for even in the unappropriated parts regularity of attendance seemed to secure one and the same seat or seats to the same parties; and I have frequently noticed that, when such parties have not been early at church, the seats have for a time been left unoccupied, presuming on the certainty of attendance. Undoubtedly there was less waste of room than in the pew system; for when the *vacant* seat was needed, it was claimed even in the appropriated parts, and there appeared to be a greater desire to accommodate those in want of accommodation, than I have noticed in the old *doored*-pew system.

'2. Of this (*viz.* that open seats do not cause disorder, &c.) I think there can be no doubt. So far from observing any disturbance or confusion, I have frequently noticed (after the commencement of Divine Service) the parties, to whom seats were appropriated, taking their places in other parts of the chapel, because their own seats had been previously filled; and this without any question or difficulty.

'3. About this, (the division of the sexes,) I am not so sure. Women are more captious than men on their *rights* in church. And throughout my

experience I have had more questions raised between women, as to their particular places, than I have ever had with men.

'4. I think it will be generally found that where there is a division of sexes, the aisles must be the unappropriated, and the whole or a part [of the nave, (as the case may be,) the appropriated division of the building. The church at Great Tew, however, in Oxfordshire, is an illustration of the contrary, where, in a church of nave and aisles, the whole large area of the nave is for the poor, and the aisles for the farmers; the free sittings being much more filled than the others.

'5. There can be no doubt that they promote general reverence of behaviour; for being low as well as open, the occupants are so completely under eye, that none of those irregularities of behaviour, or want of reverence, which frequently take place within the enclosure of a pew, can occur. Shame, if no better feeling, prevents persons from attracting attention by singularity of conduct or gesture.

'6. I certainly remarked, as one of the results of the open-seat system, that there was a greater willingness to attend on the part of the poor; that no excuses were ever made on account of the position to which they were banished, and the only annoyance expressed was when residents in another part of the parish made a practice of coming to "our" chapel, as they called it, and occupied the room and accommodation which they felt had been erected for their use and benefit.

'7. Inasmuch as the poor especially take a greater interest in the open seats, I have no doubt that they would lead to the more frequent opening of churches for public, if not for private use. When first I went to —, Christmas Day and Good Friday had never been observed in the district in which the chapel of ease was built; but within three years after its erection, the observance of those days was strict, and the attendance at public worship large.

'8. When once accustomed to open seats, I do not think that any class desires to return to the old pews. The greatest difficulty is to reconcile the middle classes to a change, which, in their estimation, deprives them of distinction and dignity; but when they see their superiors occupying open seats in no respect distinguished from the poorest, they soon become satisfied.

'I do not think I can have thrown any light upon your questions, so as to help you in any respect; but I will not withhold the result of my experience, such as it is, especially as it extends over a period of eight or ten years' observation.'

There is one large branch of the subject of pews, which requires a distinct notice, apart from any remarks that have yet been dwelt on: we mean the question of pew rents in district churches. The original theory of openness and freedom, which, more or less, is still legally attached to old parish churches, had been so far forgotten in practice, as a necessary element of Christian worship, that when, in later times, the need of fresh churches was forced upon the public, the system of pew rents was resorted to as the foundation and support of Church extension. Parliament issued Church Building Acts, authorizing and regulating the system, bargaining only for a small share of the church to be free, for the use of the poor, and not making any conditions as to the position of those seats. In London and other populous

districts, the great church-going population of the middle classes are now habituated to this system, for their religion has long depended on it; the peculiar privilege of a parish church being confined to a very few in such parishes, for instance, as S. Pancras, or Birmingham. The whole state of things, in a social aspect, is, moreover, so very different in these situations to what it is in moderate sized or country parishes, that there is a peculiar difficulty in urging the *equality* argument against such purchasing of religious privileges. For quiet and respectable people, who love repose on the Sunday, who pay their way in other things and are willing to do so in religion, without any notion, either in themselves or others, of munificent offerings to the Church, there is a great charm in taking a seat in the neighbouring church, to which they may go or not as the humour takes them, but in which they are undisturbed when they do go. The idea of neighbourhood, which gives reality to the congregational feeling of a small parish,—where all know each other in their respective positions either of master, labourer, buyer, seller,—is extinct where nobody knows who lives next door; and spiritual equality with the greengrocer is neither sought for, nor is much considered among the various items of social economy. The advocacy of open churches will, therefore, require a greater amount of unsupported faith in London than in the country. Nor are the difficulties likely to decrease; on the contrary, if things go on as we should desire, they will much increase, as the lower classes are brought into the question by a greater wish to go to church. It is but reasonable that we should consider the different relations which subsist between the rich and the poor under these different circumstances of locality. In the country, your poor neighbours are men who work in your fields, whose cottages you visit, whose wives you talk to and help in their troubles, and whose children go to your school, and who themselves greet you on meeting, in recognition of your office or station,—whether that be lay or cleric. A country parish is a family, the members of which are really known to each other, or between whom there is really felt to be a bond of union, either in the working of the Church, or even in the periodical gathering together of the main body of masters in a parish meeting, in order to regulate all parochial matters of general interest. There is a chance also here of the very worst of your neighbours leaving the place, because their habits find no encouragement or field for their exercise. In such a place, there is a sensation of the various classes of society being within the scope of individual sympathy, and therefore it is a manageable thing to impress on well-disposed people the benefit of all this parochial family worshipping God on an equal footing

within those walls consecrated to religion. Contrast this with London. Your neighbours there are connected by no sort of social tie with yourself, a large class of them are perfectly inaccessible, and do not want any connexion with you, except in the way of trade or employment. The few children, in proportion to the parish, whom you may know in the school, are isolated children, affording but a slender link between the clerical or lay visitor of the school, and the parents; while the lanes and alleys are inhabited not exclusively by that class of poor, over whom the necessary habits of industry are some check, but perhaps by those who are the very refuse of the whole country, who live as ministering spirits to the vices and luxury of others, and who taint the whole neighbourhood and the whole condition of poverty with a ban of exclusion from all intercourse with their respectable rich neighbours.

Under the sanction, then, of Acts of Parliament regulating the affairs of 'the Established Church,' it is no wonder that the church going population of London are altogether associated with pew rents. The practical desertion of the poor from church was not their fault, they may say; all they wish is that they may go to church quietly. Satisfying any scruples about the theoretical poor, who ought to be in the house of God, by looking at the word 'free' in some corners near the door as they enter, they shrug their shoulders, (or, if ladies, wave their dresses,) walk up in stately independence to their pew, and after well securing the latch of the door and repeating a short litany to the name of their hatter, are prepared to 'hear divine service,' with the honest consciousness that they have paid beforehand for the privilege, and that the balance of account is always in their own favour. Such is the way of the London world, though, of course, with exceptions; and for this system were the greater number of churches expressly built. The Clergy depend on pew-rents, and therefore *ex officio* are their advocates, or are perhaps helpless parties in what they do not like, but are obliged to endure. Now this would be all very well, if the church thus built only professed to be the private chapel of certain individuals who club together, and, like Micah, hire a Levite of the Establishment to be their priest, with the ephod, teraphim, and graven image of pulpit hangings, altar cushions, and all the paraphernalia of a *neat* church, and who give him victuals in the shape of an occasional invitation to dinner, and a suit of apparel, represented by a black gown from the ladies, in testimony of their esteem, and also ten shekels of silver in the form of pew rent. In this case we might excuse one church, thinking that another would supply the obvious deficiency in accommodating the poor. But the case is quite different when

these churches are meant to have, and in a sense have, a parochial territorial charge, and represent the mother Church, in all its advantages, to those within certain limits. Now in the present state of feeling which a London Clergyman finds among the poor of a parish, has he any hope of drawing them to such a church, when all the force of habit is against going at all? does he not feel it an unreal invitation, because he cannot ask them on such terms as he feels that the services of his church ought to receive them? It was surely in the first instance a rash departure from the ancient system of our Church—that by which the land was spread over with noble buildings and ample endowments—to allow the miserable substitute of pew rents to be the means on which to extend our Church to an increased population; and experience now shows, that however it may have benefited one class, yet that the poor are not included in such a system, as they were in the more ecclesiastical type; in fact, that such a church is not in any practical sense a territorial centre of the Church Catholic for the district allotted to it, in the manner which a country parish is clearly seen to be. The very principle of uniformity should have prompted the building of new churches under the same principle as the old, especially when this country owes so much to her parochial system; but experience now most amply proves, that our forefathers were wiser than this generation in such things, or, which is more to the point, were more liberal; for Providence ordains that the Church's best system shall not be one which cost her members nothing: she flourishes best on the practice of her highest virtues, on chivalrous self-denial and bountiful munificence.

The evil of pew rents is not, however, confined to the class who are altogether excluded by them; there are many whose notions of religious service altogether are much injured by the trickery and underhand work resulting from the whole system, especially among those who are ashamed of going to *free seats*, and are unwilling or unable to pay rent. On this point we have received the following communication:—

‘ In the new churches, not endowed, the question of open seats cannot be severed from the question of pew rents. It is to be remembered that in London there is a large class who are not poor (*i. e.* recipients of alms) who yet cannot pay pew rents, and to drive whom into benches distinguished as “free,” is to drive them from church; while, if the contribution to the maintenance of the church were voluntary, by a weekly or monthly collection, they would contribute more in proportion to their means than those do who now rent pews. Pew renting is a matter of business, and is treated as such. It is thought a proper economy to consider how few seats need be rented. In a family of four or five, it is thought sufficient to take two or three seats, as one will most probably be absent from church, and there is a certainty of some other vacant place in the same or a near pew, “and so we can manage.” Others, yet more economical, rent no seats,

but by a liberal gratuity to the attendants, secure the seats of absentees. These things are done by people, who, if appealed to to maintain divine service, would treat the matter in a different spirit. Others, ashamed to occupy seats for which rents are asked which they cannot pay, wander from church to church, making a rule to themselves not to be at one church above once in a month, or two or three times successively. Great laxness naturally follows, or some cheap seat at a dissenting chapel attracts them. I cannot but think that, as a general rule, as liberal a provision would be made by voluntary offerings as by pew rents; but where the Clergy have not confidence enough to rely on their people in this manner, some proper sum might be fixed upon and raised by subscription through the district, on the personal application of a lay committee. Of course there is a want of independence in the clergyman where the provision is so obtained, but there must be as great a want or greater where it is obtained by pew rents.'

The present system of pew rents, with the exclusive congregations they foster, has a doctrinal evil attending it as well as being a breach of Christian morals, and especially so where the church has a district allotted to it, and thus is entrusted with the territorial charge of all members of the Church resident therein. A church thus built seems to be founded on the business-like theory, that the pew renters are the parish, and that admission to the services of the Church, except under very humiliating circumstances, is in their hands. Now, in an abstract point of view, Christians have a right to meet together and shut the doors against strangers, but this is on the supposition that the excluded persons are heathen. To shut any persons out from the full equality of Christian worship is a kind of excommunication, and is felt to be so. Yet the sacraments and ordinances of the Church are administered to this excluded class; they are in such things esteemed Churchmen; they are baptized, confirmed, married, &c., by the Church, and yet the worship of the Church is not open to them with like freedom that her sacraments are afforded. The result of which must be to make such ordinances degenerate in their minds; for an inner circle is seen to exist, of persons far more privileged than the reception of Church ordinances of itself implies; whereas all practical ideas of excommunication from the body of the church, ought to be connected with the reception or non-reception of those ordinances. To some extent this danger applies to other evils in our Church, but it admits of most clear demonstration with regard to pew rents. It seems altogether unchristian to allow any practical exclusion of those whom the true discipline of the Church admits to be her own children, nay, territorially dependent on that very Church with its Clergy. The discipline of the Church is here sunk in consideration of mammon, and her exclusion is not sacramental, but pecuniary.

But those churches would seem to require special notice

where a better system has been tried ; where great sacrifices have been made to establish a more ecclesiastical type of Church extension. It is difficult to bring such churches forward in proof of any particular principle which forms part of their system, for many other questions are involved in their general working. S. Barnabas, for instance, S. Andrews, Well Street, or S. Mary Magdalene, are in a peculiar position, and whether right or wrong in what they do, they are obviously not a fair test of all points connected with open seats, though, as to the fact of congregations assembling in them quietly and orderly, they are eminent instances. A *few* churches only can indeed never be proper examples of any general principle in a place like London, and for this reason : they are filled not with a true parochial congregation, but with persons who from preference to the system there carried out, or even from curiosity, go to them, and prevent any quiet working of the Church into its own parishioners. This is not the fault of the Clergy nor of the system ; for, suppose the system good, and generally adopted, there would be no motive for individuals to leave their own district, for they would have the same at home. Then, again, the question of open seats is at present involved in so many other points of theology, that with them its merits are only as yet appreciated by that class which takes general interest in Church questions of the day. Among the poor those few churches are not extensively known or distinguished from their general idea of all other churches, because the Church question, as a whole, has not yet interested them ; moreover, their previous conceptions of the church as a place for rich people, must necessarily be kept up, against all effort of the Clergy to the contrary, by the numbers of rich people who flock into them and fill them. This is a necessary state of things, and has its uses ; but such churches will for some time labour under the difficulty of being models and examples of certain principles, rather than being quietly let alone to work their own way as churches of a territorial division in the Church Catholic. Yet, in spite of this peculiar difficulty in such churches as we have mentioned, no one can have attended them without perceiving a far different character in the congregation to what is seen in a closely pewed metropolitan church. There is a congregational brotherly freedom, which makes a stranger feel at home and at rest. In the case of S. Andrew's, we fear that the necessity of supporting their exquisite choir, has rather kept out the considerations we are now chiefly advocating, and that there have been many concessions towards the pew-renting system ; but so it must ever be, for the mind of man is not all-comprehensive ; by developing one principle, the mind loses sight of another ; or

rather, when bent on one object, any difficulties which present themselves assume the aspect of something to be got rid of at any risk; if money is wanted, money must be got. The principle of free and open churches has, in the other cases, however, taken a firm root, which we trust will not be torn up under any trials or temptations. The non-parochial character of such congregations must be regretted, but is no reason for altering the system; the fault lies in other churches not following their example, rather in their not conforming to the too common practice of pew rents, with all their contaminating evils.

The question of pew rents assumed last year a more offensive aspect than ever, because there was danger of its being engrafted into our Church more inextricably than at any previous time. Various schemes for Church extension among the poor have been suggested, but last year, as our readers will probably remember, the plan of very low pew rents in churches, even for sittings that had been guaranteed free for ever, and also the plan of churches specially for the poor, was hit upon, and provisions for the former were very nearly being introduced into the Church Building Amendment Act of the session. Luckily, however, this was warded off, thanks to those Churchmen who are on the alert for such things. We extract a useful letter from the *Guardian*, with its signature attached to it, which was written while this was in discussion:—

‘THE CHURCH AND THE POOR.

‘To the Editor of the *Guardian*.

‘SIR,—I would most earnestly call the attention of every Churchman and friend of the poor to those clauses in what is called “the Church Building Amendment Act,” now before parliament, and which would impose a rental upon free sittings—upon those seats which were given to the poor for ever, and which are therefore their own.

‘The poor, it is said, prefer paying a small sum, in order that they may ensure for themselves a sitting.—I deny it. There are amongst church-goers some persons so very poor, that they cannot spare, from their necessities, any the very smallest sum in addition to their present outgoings; the education of their children, or their continuance in a clothing club, is often prevented by the onus of a weekly penny.

‘The evils of the pew system have been again and again exposed. Pews have, in many cases, cast out the poor from our churches, and have thereby caused ignorance and schism; they induce irreverence—they lead to hatred and uncharitableness amongst neighbours.

‘I may be told that a revival of pews is not contemplated by this bill. But what will be the result? A bench will be appropriated for an annual payment to a family—not necessarily to a poor family; what will then follow to make it exclusive? a door—perhaps, a lock to the door—the front and back raised for *privacy*? Have we not here a legitimate pew? The last words uttered by the late Bishop Stanley in my hearing were these: “If I live six years, I do not believe there will be a pew in my diocese.” How little did he contemplate that, three years only after he spoke, a bill

would be sanctioned by some of his brethren on the bench, which would tend to undo all that he and others had been zealously striving to accomplish! What a gross breach of faith is this, as regards those munificent persons who have either built, or given money for the erection of churches, on the express condition that they should be altogether free; and thus that Christ's fold should be enlarged by admitting the poor of His flock! These rents may be applied for the benefit of the clergyman himself, or for building him a house; so that the poor will consider themselves robbed by the Church Commissioners for the benefit of their clergyman. Will this insure peace and harmony in a parish, or increase respect for the pastor? And is there no other mode of adding to a clergyman's income? Has not the Church her offertory? In ancient times one-fourth of the offerings was allotted to the clergy. What is still read from the altar? "Do ye not know that they who minister about holy things live of the sacrifice?" "Let him that is taught in the word, minister unto him that teacheth."

'I was never disposed to "stir up strife," and my object in writing this letter is "to prevent the beginning of strife," for such will unquestionably be the fruits of this bill.

'May God grant success to every effort which shall be made to arrest it in its progress!

'I am, Sir, your obedient and faithful Servant,

'Bath, June 23, 1851.

'J. H. MARKLAND.'

A private letter, also, to the writer of the above, and with reference to it, has been kindly sent for our perusal, as containing the opinion of a clergyman in a populous neighbourhood, well entitled to respect from the amount of his experience:—

'I was very glad to see, in the *Guardian* of last week but one, a letter from you, calling attention to the act of gross injustice, which, if Churchmen be not vigilant, may be perpetrated by parliament in the matter of free sittings. I quite agree with you, that a *large* majority of the poor would *not* prefer paying even a nominal sum, to receive a sitting which they can call their own. This is the case with some who have been brought up under the pew system, but it is not true of the mass, who are ready to avail themselves of Church privileges as soon as the odious distinction between rich and poor shall be generally obliterated from our churches. The iniquities of the pew system have alienated so many, that time alone will do away with the prejudices which tend to keep some persons from church, even in cases where that horrid system is abolished.'

But, it is often said, there is accommodation for the poor: so many seats are allotted to them. Now there is much absolute deception in the statistics of Church Building Societies. An imposing proportion of free seats is put before the public, but on examination this is found sometimes to include some out-of-the-way corner—under the tower, for instance, fitted up with minute benches for the school children. The law is said to be satisfied by that arrangement, and a grant, accordingly, is obtained, on the supposition of benefiting the poor by giving free seats. We heard, on one occasion, a few facts of this kind brought before a meeting of the Church Building Society, which sadly disturbed that quiet self-satisfied composure with which the Bishop in the chair, the Archdeacon and others on the plat-

form, were, according to custom, praising the immense liberality bestowed on the poor. The 'disturbing influence' stated, in an honest and straightforward manner, that the number of seats sounded well, but he feared nobody ever occupied them, which really could hardly be wondered at, considering the sort of accommodation they were. The unfortunate individual who had ventured thus far, began now to perceive the awful mistake he was making by such unpleasant allusions. Dead silence and uncomfortable looks greeted such ill-omened words, till the impression was conveyed to him, that really it was uncourteous to the Bishop to ruffle the tranquillity of his lordship's mind, and that an apology was due for perverting so amicable an assembly, to the discussion of subjects little designed for it.

We have not, as yet, noticed Mr. Stuart's Sermon, the title of which we placed at the head of our article; nor is it necessary that we should repeat what he there says on these pages;—indeed, since our first perusal of it, we have avoided any further reference to it, and for this reason. That Sermon and Appendix, with the noble example of its teaching set by the author himself in the Church of S. Mary Magdalene, are so open to all who take interest in the subject—that is, we should hope, to all Churchmen—that it is most advantageous to our present purpose simply to adduce the author, his words and works, in confirmation of all we have said. We feel that he and ourselves are aiming at one and the same object; and as our wish, at present, is not to commence an interchange of compliments between fellow-labourers, but rather to promote a certain cause, we have desired to take our own line, without any reduplication of his arguments, and in perfect independence of them.

At the commencement of our article, we pictured, as it were, certain *primæval* ideas of Christian worship, in order that our readers might look at all which followed through a free and natural atmosphere. It remained for us to survey the question in a practical manner, and consider how those essentials which nature and Christian morals require in our religious worship, may best be complied with under existing circumstances. Availing ourselves of the kind help of friendly experience and friendly suggestions, we have accordingly brought forward many facts and general remarks on the whole subject, which now it is becoming that we should sum up by some reflections that may seem to arise from them.

Freedom and openness to baptized members of the Church for her services and offices is an essential of Church arrangements, for otherwise there cannot be proper stress laid on the duty of Christian worship. When a congregation is assembled together, there are many great advantages in producing that

sensation in each individual's mind, which makes his service a free and voluntary act, prompted by his belief in certain spiritual benefits to be derived by it, and his desire to obtain them. Each member present should therefore feel, that what is going on is his own, that he is a component part as it were of the transaction; that the Clergy are exercising certain functions for him, and that the building itself is all his, by a common participation in it with others. One part of the church he ought to feel as much his own as another. Objects of interest may be dispersed throughout the church,—painted windows, fine and touching pieces of sculpture, corners suited for retirement, or meditations of a specific character, and other suggestive details, in which the general effect and sublimity of the Church and her services may be more gloriously contemplated. Now, each member of the Church should feel that all these are his in their turn, and that he need not be confined to one or a few of them, but that he may walk about free and open in the courts of the house of his God, and dwell on the beauty of holiness with some foretaste of celestial exemption from the barriers which earth and matter elsewhere place before him. But such considerations as these bring us at once to the general use of a church, for there are many theories on this subject, to some of which our remarks would not be applicable. That theory which places each household in a box, (we know an instance of a little child on returning from church, saying she had been in a box,) and ignores anything but the voice of the reader or preacher, is right so far as it makes the functions of the Clergy the natural focus of the building; but it is wrong in its comprehension of the nature of those functions, for it does not recognise that sacramental union which flows from them, and which makes all who come within their influence members one of another, as well as recipients of instruction from the clerical office for their individual profit; for the true grace of the Church's ministrations makes the whole building a type of a more immediate Divine presence that will be hereafter. The material building of the Church may, by another theory, be raised to be the first consideration, the Clergy being looked upon as ministers in the *Church*, rather than the Church, as but the veil and protection of clerical ministration,—holy because they are holy, consecrated by them. The consecration of churches is no charm apart from other and regular offices of religion: it has become a distinct office, because the general sanctity of all places of Christian worship is so established a rule, that it is represented in an express manner when a new church is built, as if to impart to the new comer the overflowing sanctity of its fellows, to welcome it by anticipation with the fruits of its own future ministrations, in common with

those of the whole Church Catholic. The consecration of churches arose from the typical character of Christian worship, producing a true and impressive sentiment of attachment, for that part of the material world, which is honoured with serving to heavenly purposes. The powers of art were resorted to, to carry out this idea, by making the building itself to speak of heaven and heavenly thoughts. These considerations were also seen to be in conformity with the whole type of Divine worship recorded in the Old Testament, and therefore the holiness of the place itself is thoroughly engrafted into the Church system. The holiness of Christian offices, by this means, seems to linger in the accustomed place of their performance, and not to be restricted altogether to the actual periods in which they are done. They create an abiding sanctity, a holy atmosphere in the building.

Taking therefore, what seems to us, the true view of Christian worship; that the clerical functions are the central objects of attraction, while the holiness of the building is most true and profitable, but arises out of the former, and is therefore secondary; holding these two considerations together for mutual explanation, we shall arrive at a clear insight into the proper arrangement of a church, which may best carry out the object for which it was built.

The idea of family worship in a square pew does not make the clerical functions the centre of attention any further than prompting or teaching is concerned, and its gross violation of reverence to the altar destroys every principle of the holiness of consecrated places, as it forbids any common right of enjoyment in the whole church by each member of it; it gives each family so much space and no more, and consequently so much feeling of the communion of Christian people as one family suggests, and no more. This theory therefore we notice no further. Next let us consider the somewhat better plan,—of all being placed toward the altar and the ministering Clergy, yet in closed pews. This is so far better, that the congregation looks to one centre of united worship; but still there is the want of freedom we so long for: doors shut in and shut out, give a confined sensation to some, and an excluded one to others. They prevent those present from coming close round what they wish to see and hear, and produce many evils we have been all along attributing to them. Let our readers have pity for those clergymen who have to stretch their voices over a blank space of the church, in order to reach the distant congregation. Not only is power of voice needlessly used in this, so common a case, but the comfortable feeling of addressing a company of listeners gathered round you, is lost in the cold abstraction of merely preaching a sermon from a pulpit.

Surely, then, it is a far higher type of Christian worship which is at once suggested by the absence of doors. It is to them that we owe all the distinctive marks of many evils we are now complaining of. We know a clergyman who has long been so impressed with this, that, for years, he has been on the watch to take one door away after another, from the old pews as he could persuade persons to allow him, even at the risk of a very motley appearance in the church. He was unable to restore the church according to a better system of architectural effect, yet he felt that a principle was involved in the doors, which came before any mere considerations of effect. We may also say that his success was very encouraging.

Without doors we may easily imagine a parochial congregation assembling together in perfect freedom, as in the exercise of a common privilege. Take the case of a country parish, where no great hindrances exist, such as must require special provisions to meet, a subject we shall presently consider. This is the highest type of Christian worship; the parochial family all come and join together in the services of their Church, with a real feeling of being therefore pledged to each other, as well as united under one head. Each one feels a property in the use of the whole church, and is only connected with one seat in particular, for the sake of order and propriety in the settling down of the congregation. He may always sit in the same place, or he may not, but from want of a door he attaches no peculiar or individual right to that one place as his own, beyond the preference of habit at the most. This makes a real and a legal difference, the effect of which we may depend on. In Mr. Oliphant's '*Law of Pews*,' we find this important passage:—

'The fact of a pew having formerly been open would operate very strongly against any claim to a prescription, because the difference between an open and a closed pew is so strong, that the probability is, that, so soon as the party had ascertained his rights, he would enclose; therefore, Mr. Justice Parke was of opinion that the fact of the seat having formerly been open, destroys the prescription.'

In the freedom of the parochial family thus gathering together, as we now picture it, there is no disorder from the fact that each one feels the whole church his own; the result is rather otherwise, for all, in consequence of this feeling, assemble together in the most natural manner, and scope is given for the exercise of all the courtesies of life, which are indeed so far the rule of the place, that the parochial officers watch with zealous eye any rude infringers of them. When the whole parish in one place meet together for common worship, the natural law is for individuals to be sorted together into classes, young men and young women together, old men and old women the same, while

mothers naturally take charge of their little daughters and fathers of their boys, unless schools absorb the children under a peculiar charge. This natural sorting into the classes which life itself points out, is more obvious among the poor than, according to present manners, among the rich; but as the former are the majority, we may surely take their manners as the standard; and where a great advantage is seen to result from them, it is a graceful concession on the part of others to adopt the same practice for the sake of uniformity, though absolute sameness and imperative uniformity on a minor point is not essential even to establish the principle as a general rule. Let it then be a matter of courtesy to place the aged near the clergyman, and to suffer all others to dispose themselves in a free and natural order, curtailing any extravagance on the part of individuals by that authority which the general sense and wisdom of the Church commit to its officers. A regular division of the sexes will naturally follow, as the legitimate mode of authoritatively settling the most natural arrangement of the congregation, as far as the more set and public services of religion are concerned, when all the parish is supposed to be present. To keep this division up at all other times would often be needlessly rigid, and tend to preserve an unwillingness which is often seen to use a part of the church, as, for instance, an aisle or transept, for minor services. In our churches, indeed, where there is but one altar, and that in the chancel, it seems hardly wise to suggest that services should be conducted in the aisles, or smaller parts of the church; for as this one chancel is the natural position of the Clergy in the performance of their offices, it follows that the congregation will always prefer being in front of it, *i. e.* in the nave, if there is room for them. Still there may be catechising of the young, or instruction to the old; in which it would be difficult to adhere to the common places allotted to the sexes, though the same general rule might be adopted, making use, for the time being, of whatever the place might be, to carry out on a small scale what the whole church was on a large one, as we observed to be done in S. Mary Magdalene, where the aisle is for both sexes, north and south of the passage, in the same way as the body.

What we have described as the parochial family assembling together for common prayer and the principal offices of religion, is the Elizabethan type of the Church. Every member of the parish was supposed to be there, on pain of being mulcted to the amount of a shilling. Now where the parish is small, and all are really bound together like a family by mutual compacts of daily life; and also where there is only one clergyman, and he, perhaps, in charge of more churches than one, from the poverty

of means, and therefore compelled to appoint his time, and then and there to go through a combination of services; under these circumstances, this theory seems all that can be aimed at; barring the fine, each parishioner must be expected to come to his church at these services, and then, of course, from the sameness of the congregation on every occasion of public worship, each one will have, as it were, his stall, like the members of a corporate body, where he will go as naturally as he occupies his own house when at home, for there will never be any reason for going to a different place.

This theory, however, though exceedingly good as far as it goes, and where it is applicable, yet is obviously not all our Church contemplates, and much of her practical stiffness seems to arise from forcing this one idea down all parishes, with no correction of its evils and deficiencies, even where circumstances do not in the least render them necessary; and still worse, with no allowance for other circumstances, which do not allow its beauties really to develop. The evils and deficiencies we refer to this theory are the paucity of the services, chiefly confined to the Sunday 'combination,' arising from the few Clergy. Where, however, there are more Clergy, who can with perfect convenience have frequent services, it seems an unnecessary hindrance to have a system which implies few services for the whole parish to be present at; which, in fact, does not recognise the utility of service unless the whole surrounding population are supposed to be then and there assembled. The Church has frequent offices, and daily prayers morning and evening, but she does not imagine that all can go on each occasion: yet pews seem to act on this supposition: once however imagine different congregations, it obviously follows that if they place themselves naturally, for whatever service they are present at, their places will not always be the same, but will vary according to many accidental circumstances. The hindrances, again, which militate against the development of the more rural picture we have described, are the result of the fact, that in a district of 10,000 it is impossible to have a place for each individual, whether present or absent, and therefore that there must be a system which allows of the most easy arrangement of those present, without waste of room in allowing for those that are absent. The appropriation system of reserved seats is, therefore, in such a place, directly to the injury of all who have not the same privilege; for, to whatever extent it is carried, so far is a portion of the church abstracted from what undoubtedly is the plan most adapted to the general good. Frequent services, for each of which the whole church is free and open, will thus make the same building far more available to a large population,

than the rigid idea represented by our present manner of conducting public worship; and open seats are necessary to foster such a plan, for otherwise our frequent services will not have the change of congregation they are designed for. The many plans for what is called 'dividing the service,' do not come within the province of our present subject, further than the general recommendation we have already expressed; but we wish to commend what seems to us a simple and easy method for commencing an improved system in this respect; and it gave us great pleasure the other day to observe that, in the arrangements announced for the chapel of St. Peter, Pimlico, our ideas were to some extent carried out. In the first place, it is desirable not altogether to throw out the fixed habits of churchgoers by disarranging everything, though, with a view to counteract acknowledged evils, it is perfectly fair to ask of them some moderate concessions. Now early services on Sunday are independent of the habits thus to be considered, and therefore may be commenced with perfect safety. There must be many in London, who, on that their only holyday, might wish to combine their presence at the services of the Church with the relaxation of a little country air. These might attend the early or late services, and still have a long day; whereas at present churchgoing is the day's work, and nothing else can be done. Suppose then early morning prayer at half-past seven, to suit purposes of this kind; and early communion, a short quiet service at half-past eight, adapted for invalids and frequent communicants generally, as well as for those just mentioned; in this case a great number will have gone through their devotions, —will, as it were, have made their use of the church before the larger congregation assembled, leaving also a sufficient interval for weddings and other like offices. The point, however, we are chiefly commending is that of leaving the present order of our services, that is, the Morning Prayer, Litany, and Communion Office, with Sermon, so far the same, that persons may, if they wish, remain through them all; but to make such a distinct break that persons may go out or come in. For this purpose there should be a definite time arranged for the commencement of each, and the bell should sound as the immediate signal of the change in the service within the church. Morning Prayer may be announced for half-past 10, Litany for 11, Communion Service for half-past 11. Any interval may well be occupied either by private contemplation or in hymns. The afternoon and evening may be employed in a succession of catechisings, baptisms, &c., and sermons, making each of such ministrations available, as much as possibly, singly by itself, and the appointed ritual of Evening Prayer either once or twice. Private use of

churches is thus seen to follow from the free system we have been tracing through its various stages; and it is this general freedom of churches, both for public and private devotion, which we feel sure is the only way of making the same building serve for a large population, and adapt itself to the various classes of age, sex, and position, which make up its numbers.

We have now but a very few words to say, and we have done. If the Church feels any practical difficulties, she naturally looks to her constituted authorities for help in reforming them. On many points it is said that Bishops and Archdeacons can do nothing, if they would; but with the pew system it is not so. The Bishop is the origin of the Churchwardens' power, as well as the ecclesiastical ruler of the Clergy. Surely, then, they may do much in teaching and encouraging Churchwardens to do their duty. Let them point out some plain rules by which they should act, and give them the whole weight of their personal and official authority in carrying them out. It is not to be expected that, in the face of complicated rights, an unassisted Churchwarden can do much, unless of peculiar energy and power; but supported by the Bishop, how quickly would many defenders of selfish claims disappear, and how easy, in comparison, would be the work in each parish, of restoration to a better system! Let Bishops and Archdeacons suggest and urge the correction of pew abuses; let them make all inquiries they can previous to visitation, and enlarge on the subject in their Charges; let them not flinch from fears of unpopularity with the middle classes, for it is their peculiar province to face any prevalent evil, with regard to the Church, from whatever class it comes. Their high position enables them, with peculiar force, to overwhelm vain and grasping claims, to confront absurd or ill-founded prejudices.

ART. IV.—*The Record Newspaper.*—*Report of the Meeting of the British and Foreign Bible Society, in Exeter Hall, on Wednesday, May 5.*

WE shall ask our readers to give their attention for a short time to a very remarkable violation of a very common rule of morals. We do not view it with surprise; that is not our feeling; but only as a complete and exact instance of such a violation. A philosopher would regard it with admiration as a specimen. We cannot afford to be so indifferent, but must, in accordance with Christian feeling, express our sorrow that any one who stands before the public as a champion of religious interests, the improver of public morals, and the promoter of benevolent and useful schemes, should be the guilty person in the case. The rule we mean is that which is expressed in the third and fourth verses of the seventh chapter of S. Matthew's Gospel—
 'Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye,
 'and considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how
 'wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of
 'thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye?'"

On the 5th of May last, Lord Shaftesbury presided at a Meeting of the British and Foreign Bible Society, in Exeter Hall, and made a speech from which we extract the following passage:—

'There could be no doubt that in the present day infidelity was assuming a speciousness of form and a cunning of action that had scarcely ever been known in antecedent periods in this or any other country. It rarely happened now, in comparison with former times, that infidelity was propounded, either in speaking or writing, in the same language of coarseness and obscenity, or the same repulsive and disgusting form, as of old. It was now insinuated in a far more dexterous manner. Doubts were very cleverly dropped, and left to fester and rankle in the minds of the hearer. Every kind of sleight-of-hand, every species of adroitness was resorted to, and hundreds and thousands were entrapped by these arts, and became victims of this specious, vile, and diabolical system. In addition to that, they were beset by another danger, by that foul enemy which he would not scruple to name—Tractarianism. Of all the "isms" that ever existed, that was in his mind the most offensive, and, in many respects, the most deceitful and hypocritical. It was singular to remark the tenderness with which Infidelity looked upon Tractarianism, and the tenderness with which Tractarianism looked upon Infidelity; and how they had a common feeling, and a bond of union when set in opposition to Evangelical sentiments, which they looked upon as the great bane of society—the great pest of the present day—simply and solely because it was the only thing that stood in irreconcilable antagonism to that detestable union. No wonder, then, that they exchanged compliments—no wonder, then, that, although they might be careful not to speak in direct approbation of each other, yet, reversing

what was said in the Scripture, "He that is not with me is against me," it might be fairly said of these things, "He that is not against Infidelity and against Tractarianism is decidedly with it."—*The Record*, May 6.

Now, first, with respect to the charge which Lord Shaftesbury brings against—we will for brevity's sake borrow his term—the 'Tractarian' School. It may be quite true that writers of that school have exercised great mildness and forbearance in particular cases of scepticism, where they thought that circumstances warranted and called for such treatment. They have felt for the difficulties and temptations which beset particular minds, and they have seen in the great commotion of thought which characterises the age of the world in which we live, a general predisposing cause to a sceptical temper, which ought to be taken into account in judging individuals. In particular cases, they may even have sympathised with a zeal and enthusiasm of which they lamented the misdirection, and with a devotion to the cause of truth, as the individual supposed it, fatally as he erred in so supposing. It may suit the oratory of the platform to pass a rough and indiscriminating censure upon all opponents; but those who, in the process of forming judgment, bow to an inward sense and conscience, and not to an audience, and who express their opinion according as they themselves after consideration believe, and not according as a roomful of people can without any consideration understand, must act differently. They must make allowance where allowance is to be made, and they must acknowledge and appreciate the good, whatever it may be, that mixes with the evil. Christian charity and Christian policy alike dictate such a course. No one pays attention to another whom he sees not to understand him, not to appreciate his difficulties, or enter into his case: and the coarse judgment is received with a smile by an arrogant antagonist, with disgust by a sincere and zealous one, but with respect by neither. A long career of platform services, however useful and public spirited some may have been, leaves one disadvantageous result behind them, of which, unfair as it may appear, their liberal donor is the victim. His mind becomes too much accustomed to one particular mode of passing judgment, viz. the wholesale one. He thinks no agreement or disagreement real which is not vehement and unqualified, not to say irate. He brings the habits of the platform into his study, and judges books that thoughtful men have written, by that standard. A writer is set down as a crafty traitor, and at heart an infidel. For what reason? He has been guilty of the unpardonable offence of being cool. A distinction here, an admission there, are quite enough to stamp him as a person who is not sincere or hearty on the side on which he professes to write. Lord Shaftesbury may

have dipped here and there into 'Tractarian' books, or pamphlets, or reviews, when some sceptical work may have been under comment. He may have seen some sympathy expressed with the sincerity of the author, some pity for his temptations, some appreciation of his talents: and he has, in consequence, immediately set down the writer as not a real disapprover of sceptics; he has inferred some fundamental sympathy between scepticism and 'Tractarianism.' We need not say how controversy would lose by such a standard. Active, and earnest, and deep thinkers on all sides will respect each other *for* that earnest, active, and deep thought, and so far as it is concerned: it is only those who do not think at all that have no respect at all for thought. Even Lord Shaftesbury must in his calmer moments allow that the deepest disagreement may go along with such sympathy, and may be all the better expressed for it. It would be, indeed, a lamentable conclusion to arrive at, that the only test of sincere opposition was virulence, and the true expression of disapprobation, abuse.

So much for one-half of Lord Shaftesbury's charge, viz. 'the tenderness with which Tractarianism looks upon Infidelity.' Into the other half we do not feel ourselves called upon to enter. For 'the tenderness with which Infidelity looks upon Tractarianism,' let Infidels themselves answer; we have nothing to do with their looks, whether they are tender or whether they are severe. We cannot control their opinions either about ourselves or about others. And if it is replied that a favourable opinion from such a quarter is a bad sign, still it is to be proved to what part of the 'Tractarian' it applies, to his creed or to his conduct. We have never heard yet of an infidel who entertained a favourable opinion of the 'Tractarian' creed; he must therefore have been thinking of his conduct, if he entertained such an opinion. But an infidel, if he is only an honest man, may be a fair and competent judge of conduct; that is, he may see that one side is overbearing and abusive, and that another is patient and calm, and he may sympathise with an ill-used party as against those who ill-use them. But, lastly—for there remains another question not wholly irrelevant—do infidels look tenderly upon 'Tractarians?' Lord Shaftesbury brings no evidence, and till he brings some, we shall beg leave to doubt a fact which he has so boldly stated.

But what is the position which Lord Shaftesbury himself occupies, when he brings this charge against the 'Tractarians,' of an alliance with scepticism? In what company is he himself when he makes it? That, and not the charge itself—about which, on its own account, we should not have troubled

ourselves to speak—is the point to which we call attention. There is that specimen of moral blindness and obliquity, of a man accusing others and doing the very same thing himself, which we have thought so curious, so valuable, and so instructive, as to deserve a distinct notice in this Review.

He brings this charge while he himself is acting publicly in company and concert with a very distinguished and accomplished sceptic; acting with him not for any object of secular utility for which men of all religious sentiments may without reproach combine, but for a strictly religious object—the spread of religious truth, the dissemination of the Bible. It is, while receiving such a sceptic for a religious ally, acknowledging him as a brother, putting him forward as a supporter and patron of a religious cause,—it is with the Chevalier Bunsen on his right hand, on the platform of the Bible Society, that he brings this charge.

In attaching this epithet to the Chevalier Bunsen, we do not mean to pronounce any personal censure upon him. He may simply have imbibed the tone of society in which he has been brought up on such subjects. He may even have—and we give him credit for it—a sincere desire to raise the tone of German society on such subjects. His wish, however qualified, for an alliance between the English and German communions through the medium of the episcopacy, may have had that motive. In calling him a sceptic, we only mean to say that his opinions on the subject of the inspiration of Scripture, stated to any ordinary Churchman or even dissenter in this country, would be considered sceptical opinions. He takes a licence in his treatment of the Bible, from which Christian society in this country would shrink as fatal to the *bond fide* reception of that book as an inspired one, the word of God; considering that, with respect to historical facts, even those most intimately connected with the scheme of man's redemption, it may be in error, and that its information is not to be depended on. That he may reconcile such want of inspiration in the matter of history, with a certain inspired substance or central truth contained in it, in his own mind, we can easily believe; but we say, nevertheless, that such a want of inspiration as he attributes to Scripture in the field of history, would be considered a sceptical conclusion by ordinary religious society in this country. We will give, by way of illustration, two instances, one a less and the other a more important one—if on so serious a subject we can admit degrees of importance—of his method of treating Scripture history.

It is stated in Exodus xii. 40, that 'the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and

'thirty years.' And in Genesis xv. 13, a prophecy is stated to have been made, during the lifetime of Abraham, and to that patriarch, announcing that period as the time that such sojourn would last, the only difference being that in the prophecy the round number of four centuries is given, in the historical relation, the specific number of four hundred and thirty years. Now this period of four hundred and thirty years does not suit the Chevalier Bunsen's chronological system, as gathered by him from the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Accordingly, he treats it as a mistake of the inspired writer. In the absence of eminent names during the sojourn in Egypt, and consequently of a genealogical basis on which to determine the length of this sojourn, the inspired writer is supposed to have adopted the summary method of doubling the patriarchal period. The patriarchal period, including the lives of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, was 215 years: the historian knew that the period of the sojourn in Egypt was longer than that, but he did not know how much longer. As a convenient mode, therefore, of settling the point, he supposed it to be twice as long; that is to say, 430 years. Such is the treatment of the sacred narrative; that of the prophecy corresponds. The prophecy is supposed to have been made 'somewhat earlier or *later*, for this is doubtful,' than the event to which it related, viz. the termination of the sojourn in Egypt.¹ That is to say, the statement which the Bible says was prophetic, the Chevalier Bunsen says was not.

The other instance of the Chevalier Bunsen's treatment of the historical Scriptures is a more important one, involving, as it does, a whole set of facts, intimately connected with the scheme of man's redemption, its promise, its type, the family selected as the instrument of its fulfilment, and appealed to constantly throughout the New Testament, with such reference. The sacrifice of Isaac was the significant type of that higher sacrifice which God the Father made in sending His only Son into the world to suffer death upon the cross for man's redemption. The Messiah is declared throughout Scripture to be the veritable seed of Abraham. The relation, then, in which the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob stand to one another and to the Jewish nation, is an important fact in Scripture history. Nevertheless, the Chevalier Bunsen destroys it, coming, as it does, into collision with his chronological system. To Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob he allows a personal existence, but without a family relationship. 'The genealogy of the chosen friend of God is historically to be looked upon as exhibiting great and long-enduring commotions of the old population of Asia; it

¹ Christian Remembrancer, vol. xii. p. 300.

'represents the relation of tribes to each other, not personal 'relations of father and son.' And the genealogy of Abraham, as M. Bunsen uses the term, includes his posterity as well as his forefathers, for he includes in it Abraham's posterity by Keturah; adding, that 'any one who still wishes not to see 'with regard to these names, that they are the names of tribes 'not of persons, will here, through the plural form of the names, 'be compelled to acknowledge that he is in the presence of 'traditions as to the connexion of tribes of people.' In the midst of this great province of names, representing tribes, he makes, indeed, an exception in favour of the three patriarchs, so far as to suppose that they were not tribes but persons; an exception of which, while we admire the spirit, we must confess an entire inability to understand the rationale. But their personality is all which is allowed; their relationship, and with it the whole affecting narrative of facts supposing it, as well as their bearing upon the scheme of the gospel, falls to the ground. Indeed it has been observed, that of the whole history of Abraham, upon M. Bunsen's plan, only one chapter is retained as true, viz. that in which he fights with four kings of Canaan for the delivery of Lot. And by a strange coincidence, that remarkable German critic, M. Ewald, selects the same chapter for unqualified approval, as 'an account of inestimable value;' the value apparently lying mainly in the circumstance that it is considered 'wholly at variance with all other accounts.' Thus Abraham 'appears like Eshkol and Mamre, with whom 'he stands in a mutual defensive alliance, as the head of a 'mighty house of Canaan—he wages war, an act not even 'distantly hinted at in the older Mosaic documents, as not 'being suitable to a prophet and holy man in the Mosaic 'view.'

But M. Bunsen's responsibility extends beyond his own particular written opinions and conclusions. We do not say that for a man to praise those who go all lengths on any question, is exactly the same thing as going those lengths himself. But we do say that it is a very grave additional responsibility which he undertakes. And when such praise is given with warmth and earnestness, when it is applied not to any general talents or endowments of mind which the other may show, but to his services on the particular subject, it is difficult to believe that the commender can object heartily even to the very lengths to which the other carries his speculation, and that he does not agree fundamentally with him. We have just mentioned a remarkable German theological critic, M. Ewald, the author of a book called a 'History of the People of Israel.' Of the principles on which M. Ewald deals with Scripture, his general view of inspiration, we may form some idea when we

learn that he has adopted it as an axiom that 'a passage seemingly containing prophecy' is of the date of the event of 'which it speaks.' Thus the authors of the prophecy of Jacob, of the prophecy of Moses, and of the prophecy of Balaam, are placed respectively in the time of the Judges, in the reign of Josiah, and in the reign of Uzziah or Jotham. These writers are called 'prophetic relators of history,' and their predictions are considered to belong to a peculiar style of authorship. On a similar principle of criticism the author of the book of Deuteronomy is placed very late, viz. 'in the second half of the reign of king Manasseh,' the reason for the assignment of so late a date being that the book of Deuteronomy itself states that it was written by Moses' own hand. M. Ewald sees in such an assertion 'a boldness of historical assumption' which only belongs to the later ages of history. 'Such an assumption,' he remarks, 'is certainly one of the many signs of the later date of this writer, who, on the very ground that he felt himself to be at such a distance from the time of Moses, gave the freest play to the mode of looking upon and treating history.' Such a mode of treating history is indeed a very free one, being no less than the assertion that something took place which never did.

It can be no wonder if on such principles of criticism the whole of the early Bible history melts into mist and darkness; if the prevailing character of the Bible relations is declared to be unhistorical; if the patriarchs are supposed to stand at the head of a series of ideal pictures, analogous to the heroes as distinct from the gods of heathen antiquity; the juxtaposition of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob being compared to the triad of Agamemnon Achilles and Ulysses, on which the Iliad, and that of Anchises Æneas and Ascanius, on which the old tale of Troy, the basis of the Æneid, turns. Nor can it be any matter of surprise if from the age of heroes we ascend to that of gods, and on passing from patriarchal into antediluvian times, meet with two demigoddesses in the wives of Lamech, Ada and Zillah, with Janus, or the modern Yanacea, in the person of Enoch, with Mars in the person of Methuselah, with Apollo in that of Mahalaleel, with the river-god, or the Indian Varuna, in that of Jared. The critic does not indeed impose these analogies dictatorially upon his readers, but only as the most reasonable conjectures he can form, considering the great difficulties under which his inquiry is conducted. 'Our inquiry,' he says, 'into this period is rendered the more difficult, because with very slight exceptions our only source is the Bible.' Abandoned, however, to so poor (as he imagines) an authority or guide, he has made the most of his resources; for no sagacity less than that of an acute German critic could, by the light of

Scripture principally, have discovered such remarkable analogies. Moreover he considers that however obscure the source, some truths, even of an historical kind, may be drawn from Scripture. 'Although,' says M. Ewald, 'we cannot here own very much so securely as we could wish, as pure history, yet at least some strictly historical truths of importance do come up, the more welcome out of that distant sea of fog, so soon as we are adequately qualified to see them right.'¹

After settling who the patriarchs themselves were, M. Ewald settles their religion; which was, according to him, polytheistic in its bias. It had, indeed, a monotheistic element, which 'Mosaism' afterwards took up and developed, but the element was then but a partial one. The monotheism of the patriarchs was a local and a domestic monotheism; there was no more than one god for one place, or for one family; but another place and another family might have another god. The god of the three patriarchs was one god in relation 'to their rule, which was simply domestic,' he was 'essentially a single family-god.' He 'was conceived of indeed with strict morality, and in contrast with any degraded conceptions.' But 'such a domestic god, however elevated were the conceptions of him, admitted of other gods together with himself, for other houses or other men, and accordingly was in no way a security against polytheism.' Indeed 'that God in the time before Moses was conceived of with this idea of indefinite extension and possible divisibility, the standing use of the plural *elohim* proves (especially as compared with the corresponding *teraphim*, *penates*). The oldest tale itself proves this, in that in an oath it makes Jacob and Laban call upon the God of Abraham and the God of Nahor as two different gods.' The two altars built respectively to the 'God of Bethel,' and 'God, the God of Israel,' prove the same. Thus 'together with the chief god, the house-god of the chief, a hero-pantheon was formed;' and 'there was wanting to the One God of the patriarchs all the more precise definiteness and sharp severance of the Mosaic God.'²

Such is the critic of whose labours the Chevalier Bunsen thus speaks:—'The first part of Ewald's History of the People of Israel has appeared; a work which we look upon as the beginning of a truly historical corrected research into this ever-memorable portion of the history and its sources, and hail with glowing thankfulness as an honourable memorial of German learning and historical science.' 'Oh for the earnest and sifting eye of Ewald!'

So much for the opinions of M. Bunsen himself, and the

¹ Christian Remembrancer, vol. xii. p. 311.

² Ibid. p. 415.

opinions of those whom he admires. We may add, on the authority of a correspondent in the *Record*, that these opinions of his have already excluded him from the platform of two societies, of whose impartial estimate of him, and strong reluctance to take such a step, nobody can doubt—the London Missionary Society, and the Religious Tract Society.

Can Lord Shaftesbury then show cause why the rebuke which we quoted from the Gospel of S. Matthew should not be addressed to him—‘Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?’ If Lord Shaftesbury has not placed himself within the legitimate compass of that rebuke, no one ever has, and no one ever will do so. With a writer who openly knocks down the inspiration of Scripture whenever it suits his own theories, with a most distinguished sceptic, by his side, he dares to accuse another party of an alliance with scepticism. It is not we, but the very letter of Scripture which rebukes him, and which proceeds to rebuke him further, and to combine with its rebuke advice:—‘Thou hypocrite! first cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother’s eye.’

But we have not yet done. The ‘Tractarian party,’ which Lord Shaftesbury accuses of an alliance with scepticism, has one eminent member, who is so far, to the popular eye, in the position of a leader, that his name has been given to it. Now it so happens, that just six years ago an elaborate letter appeared in this very Review, with the initials of that eminent person appended to it, warning the religious world of the opinions of M. Bunsen, their contradiction to the Inspiration of Scripture, and so to the very foundation of Christian belief. We have referred to it throughout this article. That letter must have caused no small pain to its writer, for, if we mistake not, it was written at the cost of many private friendly recollections of the distinguished person whom he thought it a public religious duty to oppose. It was a letter marked with all the care and earnestness for which its writer is so remarkable, with all his fulness of proof, reference, and quotation. The work of M. Bunsen, ‘Egypt’s Position in the History of the World,’ which had then recently become known in this country, was regularly entered into, examined and laid bare; all that portion of it, that is, which related to the Bible history, and its inspiration. Society was solemnly warned against audacious speculation upon sacred ground, against all tampering with the Bible, against the inroads of Scepticism and Infidelity. So far, then, as that writer represents ‘Tractarians,’ and we may add, so far as

this Review, in which his letter appeared, represents them, 'Tractarians,' so far from allying themselves with Infidelity, have, on the contrary, been the very first to oppose it; the first to discover it when it came under specious disguises, and under the authority of an eminent name, which might have blinded the ignorant and careless. So far from entrapping others, on the contrary, they first warned others of the snare; warned them when they did not see it, and might in consequence have fallen into it. We leave it to the impartial bystander to determine which is the ally of the sceptic, he who discovers and convicts him, or he who, after he has been discovered and convicted, openly unites with and hails him upon a religious ground as a brother; the 'Tractarian,' or Lord Shaftesbury.

The rebuke, then, which was just now addressed to Lord Shaftesbury, was, indeed, a too indulgent one; it assumed a higher state of morals in the offender, than we can admit in his Lordship. For the rebuke supposes that the offender, in speaking ill of his neighbour, speaks the truth about him, only that he is a hypocrite to speak it, when he himself is just as bad, and should therefore hold his tongue. But Lord Shaftesbury has not yet learned those rudiments of morals which the Gospel text supposes even in the hypocrite. He comes under the Jewish law, before the Gospel has a word to say to him—an offender against the ninth commandment of the Decalogue, 'Thou shalt not bear false witness.' When the Jewish law has rebuked him as a calumniator, and he has mended that fault, he has a title to be brought under the Gospel count of hypocrisy; but as yet he is not sufficiently advanced for it. A man is fit for reproof on a higher and more refined ground, when he has profited by reproof on a lower and simpler one, but not till then. It would be wasted on him; it would be casting pearls before swine. When Lord Shaftesbury has learned the simple duty of speaking the truth, he will be ripe for instruction in the deeper one of knowing when he has the right to speak it. He may unlearn hypocrisy when he has ceased to be a slanderer. But he is not likely to unlearn it before. Meantime, we shall watch any amendment which we may discern from time to time in him, with that satisfaction which we ought to feel when a man, who has been a long time employed, and most honourably and usefully, in improving society, begins at last to think of improving himself. We shall rejoice to see, of the two characters which he at present owns by accumulation, even one dropped, and still more, if that release prepares for the other; as, indeed, it will probably do. Veracity about others will lead in return to knowledge of himself. And when Lord Shaftesbury speaks the truth of others,

and knows himself and his own position, he will not accuse the 'Tractarians' of an alliance with scepticism, and certainly will not do so in company with the Chevalier Bunsen.

Whilst we were at press, indeed when most of the foregoing sheets were worked off, Dr. Pusey's important 'Letter to Lord Shaftesbury' appears in the *Morning Chronicle* of June 26. Dr. Pusey, as our whole argument has urged, is not only specially aggrieved by this slander of Lord Shaftesbury, but has shown, on an occasion when Revelation was particularly assailed, and that by his own friend, that on him that slander falls with the least effect. For either reason his remonstrance is most important. He, at any rate, has a peculiar right to speak. Whether Lord Shaftesbury, after disregarding private warnings of so touching a character as Dr. Pusey alludes to, will still retain his supercilious disregard of truth and decency, remains to be seen. To complete the case, however, as far as it has at present gone, we reprint Dr. Pusey's letter from the *Morning Chronicle*:—

'My dear Lord Shaftesbury—In writing to you publicly, on account of a statement which you made some time past, as to "the tenderness with which Tractarians look upon infidelity," and "the organs of infidelity upon Tractarianism," let me, in the first place, assure you that I would not speak or think one word or thought unkindly towards yourself. I have looked with interest upon all your exertions in behalf of the poor, whether in Parliament, or through private institutions. Every Christian must be thankful for whatever is done, directly or indirectly, to raise any of our degraded poor, or bring them to the knowledge of our Redeemer.

'Nor do I ask for any personal explanation as to myself. Your charge was quite general. It alluded specially to no one, but, on that very account, it included all. It was reported thus:—"They [Christians, now] were beset by another danger—by that foul enemy which he would not scruple to name—Tractarianism. Of all the 'isms' that ever existed, that was in his mind the most offensive, and in many respects the most deceitful and hypocritical. It was singular to remark the tenderness with which infidelity looked upon Tractarianism, and the tenderness with which Tractarianism looked upon infidelity; and how they had a common feeling, and a bond of union, when set in opposition to Evangelical sentiments, which they looked upon as the great bane of society—the great pest of the present day—simply and solely because it was the only thing that stood in irreconcilable antagonism to that detestable union. No wonder, then, that they exchanged compliments," &c.

'I did not believe, until you yourself informed me that these words were substantially correct, that any human being could have brought such a

charge as this. Accustomed as my friends have been for nearly twenty years to all sorts of misconception and misrepresentation, I never met with anything like this. I know not whether you used the word Tractarian in the narrower sense of those who wrote the "Tracts for the Times," a publication closed about eleven years ago, or in the larger sense of those who, in main principles, agree with them. In either case, I know that (although unconsciously, of course, to yourself) *your lordship's statement is absolutely and entirely untrue*. If you took the word Tractarian in its narrowest sense, it might be enough to remind you who are the chief surviving writers of the "Tracts for the Times," with one only exception, who has been lost to the Church of England. And of the remaining writers, not of him, you must have been speaking, since you were speaking of the Church of England. The chief remaining contributors, then, are the two Mr. Kebbles, Mr. Isaac Williams, and myself. I would appeal to yourself, my dear lord, to find one sentence in any of our writings during this whole period which should give you the slightest plea for any such statement as this. If you took the word Tractarian in the wider sense, you must necessarily include in it some of the most valued and thoughtful defenders of our common faith, whose names I will not unite with such a name of reproach as Tractarians.

'Your lordship's statement is threefold: 1. (to drop the abstract term, since Tractarianism can have no existence independent of its writers,) that "Tractarians look with tenderness upon infidelity;" and this, 2. out of "opposition to Evangelicalism;" and this not in itself, but, 3. "because it is the only irreconcilable antagonist to the union" between Tractarianism and infidelity.

'1. I have already written to you in private that "I cannot even imagine what plea you can have for this dreadful charge." Tenderness for individuals, who are unhappily perplexed about their faith, or have lost it, all must have who believe that our Lord died for all, and that even these may be won back to Him. But your charge is, that "Tractarianism looks with tenderness," not upon infidels, but "upon infidelity." I can conceive, as I have said to you, that persons might say that infidelity might come as a reaction from "the Catholic faith," *i.e.* that persons who would not receive it, would, if not allowed any compromise, adopt infidelity in preference. I can understand its being said that people "drive others to infidelity" (as they speak) by the claims which "the Catholic faith" makes upon human reason. But I cannot understand how any writers, teaching (*as the writers of the Tracts did*) that Holy Scripture is implicitly to be believed—that it is the source of all faith and truth; that it is to be understood in the sense in which it was always understood by the Church from the time of the Apostles; that the human mind is implicitly to submit to authority—can be supposed to have any leanings towards infidelity. The first principle on the one side is the submission, or, as Archbishop Howley said, "the prostration of the human understanding" before the revealed will of God; that of the other, of course, its uncontrolled sway.

' 2. Your second charge is, that this tenderness to infidelity arises, in fact, out of a blind hatred to Evangelicalism as "the great bane of society, the great pest of the present day." I need only appeal to any of the writings of the persons whom I have named, or to their personal history, to show this to be untrue. I know it to have been the uniform desire of those writers, and of every other whom I know, who would be entitled a Tractarian, (as it has been my own,) to point out, both in public and in private, what we have in common with Evangelicalism—to seek out (where we were permitted) those called Evangelicals—to confer with them, remove prejudice and misunderstanding when we could, to seize on every point of approximation, to recognise, in their teaching, all which we believed to be true. We have wished, not so much to oppose Evangelicalism, as to supply its defects. All its positive teaching almost is ours too. We have looked upon it as a maimed exhibition of the Gospel, teaching nakedly certain truths, and leaving others out of sight. We have wished to teach all the fundamental truths which it, too, teaches, and to supply what was wanting to it. I know, too, that to a very great extent, this our endeavour has been blessed. Prejudices have disappeared, misunderstandings have been cleared, when people ventured to become acquainted either with Tractarians, or with their writings. I believe that, in proportion as we love one another, we shall understand one another. For the glow of love draws up those mists which hinder people from seeing each other, or the truth clearly, and mostly refract and distort the form of both.

' 3. It is more shocking than the rest to have to deny the last charge, that the ground of opposition to "Evangelical sentiments" is, that they are antagonistic to the union of Tractarianism with infidelity. I believe that the "opposition" has, for the most part, been that of defence—explanation against attacks. But, in as far as any of us have written controversially, it has not been—God forbid!—against any of the blessed truths which enter into the Evangelical system, but against its denials, direct or indirect, of other truths of the Gospel.

' I agree with you, and have felt these twenty-seven years (ever since I became acquainted with German), that the faith in England would have to go through a fiery trial in conflict with infidelity. It was impressed upon me in the study of the history of rationalism then, that neither a dry orthodoxy, nor Evangelicalism, could stand against it. Pietism began as fervently as the early Evangelicalism. Some of its early members were learned. But in the next generation it degenerated, for the most part, and was swept away by the flood of infidelity. I believe that none of my friends have failed to be alive to this evil of rationalism; and part of the offence which we have given has been that we discerned rationalism in the minds and systems of Zwingli and Calvin. We may not have used armour which you wished, or may have used arms which you, on your side, would mistrust. It is true that I did once decline your wish that I should write against a work which was attracting some notice, and which we both believed to be

mischievous. I forget upon what ground. I imagine that I had more immediate and pressing personal duties. For we have to learn in life that we cannot, intellectually also, do what we would: life passes away, while things which we would do even for the glory of God remain undone. Or I may have thought that anything which I could do in that direction, I could, with God's help, do much better by teaching truth positively than by writing against another's book. I asked you to apply to your "friends the Evangelicals," not as thinking that the task especially belonged to them, but wishing that they would bear part of the burden and heat of the day, instead of wasting our time and strength by their controversies against us, and misrepresentations of our faith.

'I wrote most of this privately to you more than a month ago, and I expressed "my hope that your statements may have been much misrepresented," and my conviction that, if it was so, "you would wish publicly to correct it." You think this unreasonable. I have asked you again to think whether it is "unreasonable, when an unfounded and heavy charge of indifference to Christianity itself, in a blind hatred against a popular system of it, is brought against a body of fellow-Christians, more or fewer, and those bound by our holy calling, as well as by our common faith, to maintain and teach the blessed Gospel"—is it unreasonable in one of those accused to ask you publicly to correct the statement?

"In another" (I have written to you privately) "one might have passed it by as a shocking calumny. But when one who, like yourself, stands forward as the advocate of religious truth, makes such a statement, it may take its place among the popular impressions of the day. The gainer, I believe, by all these unseemly imputations, is not the cause you would wish to see prosper, but that very infidelity. For if we were such as you represent us, we should have been half infidels ourselves. And nothing outwardly so disposes to unbelief as the impression that those who profess to be Christians do not believe, or are indifferent to, what they profess."

'I do then again call upon you, not as a matter personal to myself, yet, as having some right to do so, as being included among those of whom you spoke—I call upon you, in the name of our common Christianity, of our one Lord and Redeemer, to re-consider the charge which you have made, and if you find that you were, in speaking, hurried beyond your deliberate conviction, or beyond what you had adequate grounds for saying, to unsay it as publicly as you said it. Surely you cannot persist in what you are warned (although, of course, you did not intend it) is a false accusation, contrary to every principle, feeling, desire, to the whole faith and being of those against whom you made it.

'Yours faithfully,

E. B. PUSEY.'

'*Christ Church, June 23.*'

- ART. V.—1. *Miss Sellon and the 'Sisters of Mercy.' An Exposure of the Constitution, Rules, Religious Views, and Practical Working of their Society; obtained through a Sister who has recently seceded.* By the Rev. JAMES SPURRELL, A.M., Vicar of Great Shelford, Cambridgeshire. London: Hatchards.
2. *Reply to a Tract by the Rev. J. SPURRELL, containing certain Charges concerning the Society of the Sisters of Mercy of Devonport and Plymouth.* By the SUPERIOR OF THE SOCIETY. London: Masters.
3. *A Letter to Miss Sellon, Superior of the Society of Sisters of Mercy, at Plymouth.* By HENRY, Lord Bishop of Exeter. London: Murray.
4. *A Rejoinder to the Reply of the Superior of the Society of the Sisters of Mercy of Devonport and Plymouth, to a Pamphlet entitled, 'Miss Sellon and the Sisters of Mercy.' by the Rev. James Spurrell, A.M.* By the same. London: Hatchards.
5. *A Letter to the Rev. James Spurrell, A.M.* By A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE. London: Masters.
6. *Sisters of Mercy, Sisters of Misery; or, Miss Sellon in the Family.* By the Rev. W. M. COLLIS, A.B., Curate of Melton Mowbray. London: Hatchards.
7. *Miss Sellon and the Sisters of Mercy. Further Statement of the Rules, Constitution, and Working of the Society called 'The Sisters of Mercy,' together with an exact Review of Miss Sellon's Reply.* By DIANA A. G. CAMPBELL, a Novice lately seceded. London: Hatchards.

THE reader will conjecture, from the list of books placed at our heading, what subject the next few pages will offer to his attention. Our notice of it shall be as short as possible, for more than one reason. In the first place, the acts of—if we may use the expression without offence to the Superior of the Sisterhood at Devonport—a young lady, are not usual material for the pages of a Review. We criticise the lady as authoress, when she comes out as such: we have seldom to do with her as actor. Any comment, therefore, upon her in that capacity is made at a great disadvantage. It is made at the expense of those natural feelings which, under ordinary circumstances, erect a barrier between her and the public: and the writer of the comment feels the effect of an unfavourable position, and anticipates his

reader's observation of it. There are other reasons why such a task is not an agreeable one.

We submit cheerfully, then, to a disadvantageous position. At the same time we must add, in justice to ourselves, that we could not have avoided it. What all the world talks about, a review is expected to notice. If no notice appears, the charge is made of negligence or cowardice. Whatever responsibility, therefore, there may be in bringing the acts of a zealous and noble-minded lady under public comment, belongs to the world at large, and not to ourselves. We can give no more publicity to the subject than it already possesses.

But after apologizing for commenting upon Miss Sellon's proceedings at all, we have next to apologize for the circumstance, that that comment will not be one of unmixed approval. We deeply regret this, more especially as we cannot but fear that some, for whose opinion we entertain a high respect, will consider such absence of entire and simple approval, as very misplaced in this quarter, and will make the remark, if not to others, at least to themselves, that we had better have said nothing, than said what did not amount to that.

To begin, then, with some remarks addressed to persons who have these feelings,—remarks on the general subject of criticism; for the objection they entertain falls under this general head.

A strong objection, then, is sometimes felt to criticism in one particular case, by persons who adopt a high and refined, though, perhaps, an over-tender and sensitive standard of humility. The case supposed is that in which a person of extraordinary Christian attainments and gifts, great self-denial and great spirituality of mind, is the subject of criticism. Such persons happily there are, in all ages of the world, and sometimes their schemes and labours bring them prominently before the public eye. In such cases, that is to say, where positive action is before us in the shape of objects pursued and undertakings carried on, there is necessarily room for criticism. But unhappily, the great body of those who have to form the judgment in such a case, are not of this extraordinary Christian stamp. Numbers of them may be good conscientious persons, doing their duty in that station of life in which Providence has placed them; but the many are necessarily ordinary. There is, therefore, in the present case, the ordinary Christian sitting as judge, while the extraordinary one appears before him to undergo judgment. Such a state of things, say these persons, is an anomalous and improper one; and they recommend in such a case the suspension of the operation of the critical faculty. It is not, they argue, for commonplace Christians to be forming a judgment upon those who are infinitely their superiors in self-denial, loftiness, and spirituality

of life. They cannot comprehend their motives, or appreciate their aims. They judge them by some mixed, half Christian, half worldly, standard which they have adopted for themselves, and forget that that very standard incapacitates them for such a task. It is for such to put their minds into an attitude of respect simply. They cannot assume the critical office without offending against the first law of humility.

It must be admitted that this is, within certain limits, a very natural and just line of thought; nor is there, perhaps, any Clergyman of a parish, schoolmaster, or parent, who has not to fall back upon it as a basis of discipline, and a check to presumption and impertinence. But the absolute rule, that no inferior is ever to judge the conduct of a superior, is such an exaggeration of the natural law, as cannot, either in the department of reason or of practice, support the test of sober examination.

For let the persons who urge such a rule only consider what it involves in every judgment whatever made by one man upon another. We presume that they allow, in the first instance, that the power of forming a judgment upon man's character and conduct, was not implanted in us for no object whatever, but was intended for use. But what is the preliminary position which this rule makes essential for the performance of any act of judgment upon another, the inseparable condition of any use whatever of the faculty? It obliges him to say that he thinks himself morally and spiritually better than the person who is the subject of judgment. Now it is, in the first place, questionable, if we insist upon strict right, whether any one man has a right to say absolutely that he is better than any other: for, however reasonable a conjecture he may form, he cannot know it as a fact; and till he knows it as a fact, he had better abstain from asserting it. And in that case the present rule would act immediately as a universal prohibitor and suppressor of the act of judgment in man. But allowing for the right of formal self-preference in particular instances of comparison, in which an enormous and extreme moral disparity was apparent,—a very wide field would still be left in which the judgment would remain prohibited from exertion. For certainly no man has a right positively to assert himself to be better than another, except it is a very clear case—so clear as that there could be no disagreement about it among impartial judges of any class. Apparent difference of degree in goodness, where both belonged to the general class of good characters, even considerable difference, would be far from a sure basis for such a decision. And therefore the whole class of good men of all kinds, all well-disposed and respectable society, would be disqualified on this rule for forming any judgment upon conduct and character

within their sphere. But lastly, even could we imagine the right to exist, and to a large extent, still the exertion of it is so invidious and so opposed to delicacy, modesty, and taste, that no right-minded person can bring himself to it. A higher law than that of justice interferes to prevent him. So here is a rule, according to which the only passage to the exercise of a certain faculty is made one which no well-disposed mind can take; a rule by which an act of judgment is thrown back upon a basis of presumption, no other being equal to supporting it.

But to the inconsistency of such a rule in reason, we must add some most injurious effects in practice. First, the effect is most injurious as regards the persons themselves whom it thus lifts above all the reach of criticism. There cannot be a more dangerous temptation, even to the highest and most spiritual minds, than the offer of such an unguarded and unchecked deference—a deference which tells them that with respect to them the reason has given up its natural functions; that they have nothing to do but to follow out their own ideas as they please, and that they are sure to be right. It was never intended that man should enjoy such a position as this. There is no despotism in morals. Every one, however high be his character and rank spiritual, should be considered under the jurisdiction of the moral and religious part of the community, so far as that they may call him to account for what he does, and examine and decide upon it, whether it is right or wrong. If persons are encouraged to regard the community as beneath them, they are put in a false position; and so far as their own minds accept this position, they receive moral harm. The general sense of mankind is the proper constitutional check upon the caprices and impetuosity of the individual; and if he throws it off, he deprives himself of a providential discipline. Moreover, such an elevation of the individual is very injurious as an example. It awakens the vanity of many a religious beginner. He aspires to a position which he sees placed before him as the reward of zeal and activity, and he is no sooner an aspirant than he forestalls the goal, and enjoys all the sentiment of such a position long before he has done anything to gain it. So true is it, that where persons are not content with a virtue as nature has made it, they first spoil, and finally destroy it. The rule which we have been considering begins with an undue claim upon humility, and ends in the greatest encouragement to pride. There is first an exaggeration, and then a fall. The reason is deprived of its functions in order to deepen humility, and the result is a great snare to that very virtue, in the creation of a post too high for man,—as great a scandal and an offence as one man can put in another's path. It may be said, indeed, that

the mass are the gainers, though at the expense of those whom it elevates; for that the humility of the mass is not impaired by the arrogant use made of it by the few. But no one can seriously imagine that one party can be benefited by what is an undue scandal to the other. We are all one body, and what injures one is sooner or later injurious to the rest. If a certain form of the virtue of humility is found not to work well in the body, but to produce mischief upon strictly natural principles, then that form, we may depend upon it, is not the true and proper form of that virtue, but is an artificial form of it, invented by man, and therefore not a sound and proper humility even in those who exhibit it.

But it is of comparatively slight consequence, except to themselves, that some individuals should either in whole or in part lose the grace of humility. It is of great consequence, indeed, to all, that the moral sense of mankind should be preserved in integrity. But this rule, could we imagine it really in operation, would ultimately deprave and corrupt the moral sense of mankind. An act of judgment upon any proceeding of another is nothing but an exertion of the moral sense. Whenever an action takes place, it either agrees or disagrees with our idea of what is right. The perception of this agreement or disagreement by a person is his judgment. Whether he expresses it or not, if he definitely perceives it, he judges: the right of expression following upon the first principles of reason. This being the case, it is evident that if men cease to exert such judgment as we are speaking of, they cease to exert their moral sense. On coming across such and such phenomena of conduct which come before it, this faculty gives way and does not perform its functions: it is suppressed in deference to the same faculty in some other person. Now, remember, that in the present instance the party suppressing its moral sense is the community, the one whose sense is deferred to, the individual. The general result follows, that the moral sense of mankind at large is accommodated to that of individuals; made to coincide with the individual's in its whole scope and direction. But are individuals safe standards? Is it right to entrust to their keeping and control the moral sense of mankind? Certainly not: not even the noblest, wisest, and best are to be so far trusted. The individual's sense is partial and distorted; the body's alone is large and proportioned. The individual is soon exhausted, soon absorbed: the very attention to one duty often withdraws him from another, and in withdrawing him from it practically, lessens even his perception of it. He is entirely occupied in some limited field of labour, and thinks that the whole world; his narrowness makes him eager, his eagerness makes him

narrow. Does he set his mind on some work? All other considerations must give way. The idea of relative importance, of comparison of interests, of balance and adjustment, goes. He runs into obliquities and extravagances. All this is necessary, because the individual is the individual, and not the body,—a fractional, a small being. Commit the control and moulding then of the moral sense of mankind to individuals, and what must ensue? The moral sense of mankind will become partial and distorted. A change will take place like the great diluvial revolutions which geologists describe. Some whole tracts of duty will disappear, enormous new ones will be cast up. Some important moral rules will be forgotten entirely, others will domineer; and a capricious and artificial idea of right or wrong will supersede the natural one.

Indeed we have here the true direct answer to the rule, that no inferior in character must judge a superior. It is quite true, that no superior ought to be judged by an inferior on those points on which he is the superior, and has the better and truer perceptions of the two. But it does not follow that a person, who is superior, on the whole, in his perceptions of duty to another, is superior on every point. A person of inferior perceptions to him generally may have a superior perception, to his, of some one or other particular duty. The very possession of a more intense and earnest mind, will cause a too small estimate of some duties, as it will a too large one of others. And where an estimate is wrong, it may, be corrected by another mind whose estimate is better.

There is another consideration. We have been supposing here all along that the extraordinary Christian, the one who makes some remarkable sacrifices of a tangible and distinct kind, and adopts a peculiar plan of life, *is* superior to an ordinary Christian; meaning by that term, one who mixes with the main body, and has no external peculiarity. But it is obvious, that such an assumption as this must be largely modified, if it is to be made consistent with truth. This is so old a topic, that we need only touch on it. It is obvious to any one, who is an observer of character at all, that many persons who adopt no peculiar external plan of life, are better persons than some who do. The circumstance of making distinct tangible sacrifices, is no absolute test of superiority. The Christian character may be more deeply seated in one who has not made this class of sacrifices, than in one who has. And if the body of ordinary Christians contains, as it unquestionably does, such characters as these, we ought to be careful how we depreciate the judgment of that body.

If this whole line of remark on the situation of individuals,

and their amenableness to criticism, be true, we will add, that they are not inopportune in the peculiar circumstances of the Church to which we belong. There have been always parties in the Christian Church, for there have always been differences of opinion within the Church. But our branch of the Church has been especially divided into parties, and the tone and feeling of these have of late years become more intense. We use the word 'parties,' applying it alike to both the great divisions of the English Church; not that we think both alike in point of truth, but because we are going to speak now of a property which belongs to all parties, right and wrong ones, alike. It is the nature of all parties to be adulatory. They praise their prominent and serviceable adherents, without limit or qualification. And they do this upon a principle not unreasonable or unjust. We will illustrate the case by one, not wholly similar, but somewhat analogous. Everybody knows the unqualified tone which prevails at public meetings, especially at public dinners, with regard to individuals. That a man has lived so many years in a town or county respectably, and has been an attentive magistrate, a courteous mayor, an active churchwarden, or a vigilant poor-law guardian, is sufficient to procure him a tribute of commendation which would not have disappointed the appetite of a Roman Emperor or an Eastern Caliph. Every motive which has distinguished heroes, from the earliest dawn of history, is attributed to him in perfect purity. He has been inspired with the love of his fellow-citizens, and been absorbed in their interests. For their sake he has braved the greatest dangers, and surmounted the most overwhelming difficulties. His sacrifices are supposed to be incalculable; but what is that to one to whom private interest has been always an idea unknown? Such is the warm estimate of character which speakers adopt on such occasions, and the benevolence of praise grows with its exertion, and demands fresh and fresh objects. Perfect virtue before long owns for her sons the proprietors of the chief seats in the neighbourhood, and the leading inhabitants of the borough. In due course she has made a considerable inroad on the principal streets. Now a spectator of such a scene, who only looked upon the surface, would beyond a doubt set it down as ridiculous. But—we pardon a mistake which is so easily made—it is not. Let us not treat such a subject superficially. The basis on which these demonstrations take place is this, that that is the *place* for praising people. True, it is said, all these persons may have their faults, and they may be noticed in their proper place: but this is not the *place* for noticing them. We are met *here* to commend one another. That is our object. The theory of such demonstrations thus at once confines them to

praise, to the entire omission of whatever may jar with that object. But praise which is without balance is obliged in consistency to be high. Its subject is by the hypothesis faultless, and it must equal its subject.

Now party praise proceeds upon a rationale not unlike this. Just as the public meeting is not the *place* to notice the faults of its principal attendants, so a party, if we may be allowed the expression, is not the *person* to notice errors in its eminent and conspicuous members. There may be two sides in the case, but it is only our function, says the party, to notice one. If there is anything wrong about our friends and supporters, let the opposition find it out, but it is not our especial duty to be calling attention to it. We have the duty of helping and encouraging them; so if they write anything we praise it; if they do anything, it is correct in our eyes. There is some reason in this ground. Parties are collections of persons who agree in certain main objects, which they wish to forward. To forward such objects it is necessary to encourage individual activity and zeal. But encouragement implies a hearty and warm tone in the encouraging tongue and pen. The criticizer is in the position, at the outset, of a friend. He is preengaged on the favourable side, as friends and relations are to one another. It would be out of place for him to be 'damning with faint praise' and studious balance every effort that zeal on his own side made.

But while the ground which a party takes, on this subject is not itself unreasonable, it is to be feared it has its disadvantageous effects; and that such a position, however necessary for it, and on the whole working well, is procured at some expense. It is quite true that really sensible minds will understand this position, and will value the praise they get accordingly. They will know that it is praise upon an hypothesis of partiality. They will take such a proper business-like view of it, as results from perceiving the natural laws of party action, and the original exigencies of party which create those laws. But, unfortunately, it is not every clever, or every zealous, or every sincere mind, that is sensible. Moreover, it is not every one who is sensible with regard to others, who is sensible with regard to himself. It is to be feared that unqualified praise does operate disadvantageously upon some, who receive the tribute, and forget the understanding on which it is paid; are satisfied with the effect, and make no curious inquiries into the cause and foundation. There are many excellent persons who are tolerably indifferent as to what is underneath, in such a case, provided there is merit in the superstructure. To such the liberal offerings of party sympathy are somewhat of a snare, too

soothing to the spirits, too grateful to the sense; they domesticate certain infirmities of the character, and drag upon the ascent in the path of Christian humility.

We may observe, by the way, that this *rationale* of party praise accounts for a fact which would otherwise be very inexplicable, viz., the coolness with which the desertion of an eminent champion is sometimes taken by the main body. After the favouring voice of several years has given an individual a position, he goes, and the body would seem to be in a great difficulty. But it proceeds almost unconscious of its loss. The reason is, that the great man was its own creation. It made him, by its own act of setting him and keeping him up. The party itself, therefore, is the substance of the man. He cannot deprive it then of his substance, whatever he does, for that does not belong to him; but only of the residuum, which is left over and above the substance, that is to say, his own particular person. There are various degrees of the real and artificial in most reputations, and according as the one ingredient or the other predominates, the loss of the man is felt.

We may consider, then, that we have shown that, upon broad and general grounds, individuals are always amenable to criticism, and that the particular circumstances of our own Church and day, make it expedient to exert, occasionally, this right over them, the tendency of even honest and necessary party action being to over-estimate them and elevate them unduly.

No greater tribute can be paid to the character and services of Miss Sellon, than that we should think this long apology necessary before venturing to make the least independent criticism upon her proceedings. She may be assured that after all we feel ourselves not a little audacious; nevertheless having summoned spirit for the occasion, we shall speak with that freedom which is necessary for proper clearness and serviceableness.

We shall not go into details. The pamphlets before us are full of minute charges, affecting Miss Sellon's prudence, temper, and orthodoxy. She has refuted some of these particulars. We are willing to believe that she might refute more if she thought it requisite; and perhaps we could wish that she did think it requisite, for society has a claim upon her for every explanation which she can afford for its satisfaction.

But amidst much that is trivial and idle, these pamphlets reveal one point about Miss Sellon's institution, which we cannot pass over. The 'Rule of Obedience,' as enforced there, would seem to involve a very large and serious change upon the original purpose of the Sisterhood. We give it as

laid down in the rules of the Society—we say *rules*, for though Miss Sellon denies their formal and established character, calling them ‘a little sketch, or suggestive sketch of rules, which I was asked to write, which has passed from hand to hand, first in London and then elsewhere—I do not know who has it, I have not a copy;’ it appears, at any rate, that they exist in writing, and facts which come out show that she practically adopts them. The rule on the subject of ‘holy obedience’ runs thus: ‘Ye who have offered up to God your judgment and your will, must strive to persevere and grow in the submission ye have professed.’ . . . ‘Ye shall ever address the spiritual mother with honour and respect; avoid speaking of her among yourselves; cherish and obey her with holy love, without any murmur or sign of hesitation or repugnance, but simply, cordially, and promptly obey with cheerfulness, and banish from your mind any question as to the wisdom of the command given you. If ye fail in this, ye have failed to resist a temptation of the Evil One. Ye shall never discuss with any person, (except by express direction of the spiritual mother,) either within the Society or without it, the rules of the Order or the commands of the Superior . . . and ye shall make it a subject of immediate confession to your Superior, if ye have unhappily been betrayed into this error; and ye shall receive a penance, but no word of admonition or reproof for the same . . . ye shall learn, through daily control, observation and practice, that through the exercise of lowly and entire obedience ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost . . . If any sister fail in obedience, or resist with contumacy and rebellion, she shall be punished at discretion . . . Be ye well persuaded, that on negligence or exactitude in obedience depends the preservation of discipline, the purity of the Society, and the progress of each soul in the way of life.’

Now when the Sisterhood at Devonport was first established, it was established upon a very simple and natural basis—a basis, viz., of Christian charity and self-denial, as these virtues are ordinarily understood. There was a large poor population, destitute of spiritual instruction and care, and appealing to the pity of Christian society. To supply this want a Sisterhood was formed, to reside upon the spot, and engage personally in the work of visiting and educating; besides administering the alms entrusted to them. There was nothing in such an institution, either as regarded the labours of the Sisterhood, or the objects to which they were applied, but what harmonized with natural feelings. All men are agreed that it is advantageous that the poor should be visited, the ignorant instructed; and all are agreed that it is a good and charitable thing to visit and

instruct. Thus, though the particular form which the institution took was new and not common, the idea of duty to which the institution appealed was a common one, the idea which the Christian world at large has.

But this rule of obedience appeals to a very different standard from the common or recognised one. Here we feel at once that we are leaving the large and open field of Christian morals, and entering a much more confined, esoteric, and conventional one. The duty of obedience, stating it generally, is undoubtedly a natural and common-sense Christian duty, and one of the most important of existing duties. There can be no difference among Christians here. But on examining what the obedience, thus required by common Christian consent and feeling, is, we find that it is in every case limited by some natural consideration of use and purpose. Subjects are bound to obey the laws of the State under which they live; but it is because such obedience is necessary for the welfare of society. Soldiers are bound to obey the commands of the general; but it is because such obedience is necessary for the success of military undertakings. Servants are bound to obey their masters; but it is because such obedience is necessary for the order and management of a household. And generally all persons are bound to submit to those masters and directors to whom either Providence or voluntary engagement has attached them, on those points on which their authority applies; but it is only on those points, and not upon others, that obedience is incumbent on them. Here, then, is a natural limit of use and purpose, up to which obedience is obligatory, and beyond which it is not. The subjects of a State are not under any obligation to agree with or approve of its laws because they are bound to obey them. The same remark applies to the case of soldiers and servants. Even the parental authority, the most searching that nature presents, does not extend to a dominion over mind and conscience.

This, in a word, is the distinction between human authority and Divine. Divine authority extends to the conscience,—human authority only to the acts of men. When it is proved that such and such a command has been given by God, it is the duty of every human being not only to obey it in act, but to conform his own moral sense to it,—to think within himself that to be right and that to be wrong which Revelation announces respectively to be so. But human authority has no claim to the submission of the moral sense, but only of the outward conduct; because every man receives his moral sense immediately from God, and that which comes immediately from God cannot acknowledge any creature as absolute master. It is quite true that obedience, in these human relations, ought to

be as much as possible a cheerful and willing one. A person in a subject position ought always, if he *can*, to think his superior in the right, and ought to start with every bias in his favour. His obedience ought even to extend to the mind and conscience, so far as he ought reasonably to suppose his superior's mind and conscience to be better than his own on the matter in question. But whether he ought to suppose that or not, depends upon various circumstances of knowledge, opportunity, and relative position, and not upon any absolute law. A child ought to think its parent always right, for its intellect and conscience are in a very rudimental state, and therefore ought in all cases—for we will not contemplate at present any exception—to accommodate themselves to those of the parent. But as the child grows up, this duty is modified. A common soldier ought to take it for granted that his general is in the right in commanding any particular line of operation; or rather, he ought to pretend to no judgment at all in the matter. On the other hand, a superior officer, who is equally bound with the common soldier to pay the obedience of act, has much greater liberty of internal judgment,—a liberty which he not only may, but ought to use; otherwise he may be spoiling his own military eye, and depriving his country of future services. Any one who reflects will see that this pliable rule with regard to individual judgment secures all the humility and temper in its exercise which morality requires, providing as it does that every man should give way on those points on which his sense and knowledge are inferior. If people saw their own deficiencies properly, and drew this practical inference from them, nothing more would be wanted, but humility would be at once in operation on the amplest scale.

The duty of obedience, then, as owed from one man to another, is, as understood by the common sense and conscience of mankind, a limited thing. It rests for its foundation on the absolute need of such a rule of action for carrying on the system of things in which we are, and conducting any business whatever in which human interests are concerned, religious, political, or social. And when it has answered these purposes, it ceases to be obligatory and essential. The rule prescribes that everything shall be *done* which competent and authorized persons in the several departments of human life appoint. But, after securing full and proper action, it does not pry into the interior of the man, and command the motions of his mind and moral sense.

Now let us examine the Rule of Holy Obedience as put forth in Miss Sellon's code. No sensible person would grudge the Superior of such an institution as hers the amplest powers which are wanted for its efficient management. No sensible person, therefore, would grudge her very large rights over the obedience

of the inferior sisters. But does the 'Rule of Holy Obedience' limit itself to this practical object, and content itself with this useful jurisdiction? 'Ye shall banish from your mind,' it says, 'any question as to the wisdom of the command given you. If ye fail in this, ye have failed to resist a temptation of the Evil One. . . . Ye shall never discuss with any person, either within the Society or without, the rules of the Order or the commands of the Superior; . . . and ye shall make it a subject of immediate confession to your Superior, if ye have unhappily been betrayed into this error; and ye shall receive a penance, but no word of admonition or reproof for the same.' No sister, then, must ever express any opinion as to the Superior's acts and proceedings; and no sister must even entertain and harbour any opinion, if it is unfavourable. The rule stretches the duty of obedience beyond the sphere of action into that of word, and even into that of inward and secret thought. Now, the prohibition of outward expression of opinion, had the rule been limited to that, might perhaps have been defended on a practical ground; for it might be said that such expression tends to spread dissatisfaction among the members of a society, and so to enfeeble even necessary external obedience. To carry such a consideration as this, indeed, so far as to forbid absolutely all expression of opinion whatever, would appear to us a great overstretching of it; and a rule which took a middle line, and forbad formal, vehement, or promiscuous discussion, while it left a sister at liberty to make privately to another, as conversation might lead her, any remark that might occur to her on the Superior's proceedings, would not seem more than a due concession to the natural wants and claims of the human mind. Religious and educated ladies might be trusted to draw the distinction between a word of comment and an act of insubordination. An unqualified rule against 'discussion,' if by discussion is meant any intercourse of opinion whatever, does appear to us a gratuitous burden. Still there is some room for a practical ground of defence with regard to it. But how can it be said that it is necessary for the management of the institution, that no sister should *think*, with respect to any proceeding, differently from the Superior? Yet this is what the Rule says:—'Ye shall banish from your mind any question as to the wisdom of the command given you.' That is to say, the mind is to banish its own idea, and receive that of the Superior, in every instance in which there is any difference between the two. The very inner sense and judgment must be reduced to an agreement with those of another person. There can hardly be a pretence, to say that an institution which has the simple practical object of visiting the poor, teaching children in schools, and distributing

food and clothing in a destitute district, can positively not be carried on without this most extraordinary transmutation of one person's mind into another's. Cannot any person of ordinary capacity and good feeling be made to perceive that his judgment may differ from a superior's, but that he must do what the superior tells him? Is not this the commonest and most acknowledged distinction which society holds? But if it is a plain distinction at all, it excludes the necessity of any such obedience as Miss Sellon's rule describes, so far as the legitimate objects of her institution are concerned.

Here then we see insisted on an obedience which is not the plain and commonly understood duty, but a peculiar and esoteric one; an obedience which is released from the tie of a practical end and purpose. It may be thought by some that the duty gains in dignity and depth by such a release. We do not think so. It becomes unmeasured indeed, and expands indefinitely, when released from this tie: but measure is no degradation, if there is a good and sufficient reason for it, if it is the nature of the duty to be measured; while, on the other hand, the separation of a duty from the great objects and uses for which it exists, makes it insipid and meaningless. Removed from a solid basis, it hangs suspended in the air, an idle absurd thing, without place in nature. Utility is that which really ennobles it; that which makes the rational being not ashamed, but proud, of being obedient. Man works, and is proud of working, because the divine decree has gone forth which makes labour necessary for the welfare of mankind. So he obeys, and is proud of obeying, because obedience is necessary for the same end. He knows there must be order, system, subordination; otherwise no work under the heavens can go on, and the world must come to a stand-still. He consents then with satisfaction to making himself so useful, so serviceable: he is, though but one, yet one of the countless props on which the world, under Providence, rests. But to an obedience independent of object and use, to an individual as such, where is the call? A man meets you in the streets, and says, Obey me,—you will find obedience salutary; it is good to abandon your own will. What do you say to such a request? you say naturally, Obedience is good, but why should I obey *you*? why should I accommodate my mind to yours, any more than you yours to mine? It is thus that the severed and isolated duty is cast off, like dross from the great system of human life; no pathway of reason conducts to it. How can I be satisfied with obeying you, because you are yourself in the year 1852? What jurisdiction does that circumstance create? And just as obedience to an individual as such is absurd, so obedience to an individual who possesses over you legitimate

authority for a practical object, is absurd so far as it is claimed beyond that object. Miss Sellon differs from a man who meets you in the streets in this,—that she starts with a real claim. But so far as she exceeds that claim, so far she is exactly in the position of the man who meets you in the streets. The Superior of the sisterhood at Davenport can only claim obedience so far as concerns the welfare of her institution; if she claims any more than this, she claims it as Miss Sellon. But why should Miss Sellon be obeyed, more than any other intelligent and religious young lady in Her Majesty's dominions?

We cannot, indeed, but pause an instant to observe what appears to us an inconvenient consequence of such a rule. If obedience performs so absorbing a part in the formation of the Christian character in a sisterhood, it seems a pity that the Superior should be deprived of so essential an advantage. Who has so much claim to the beneficial influence of the institution as a school of spiritual education, as she who contributes most to it, the head herself? But upon this rule she is excluded from the benefit. Obedience indeed pervades the establishment from one end to the other, but most unfortunately she receives it, and does not pay it. She is condemned to the unprofitable side of the action, while all the rest are flourishing upon the fertility and the fatness of the side opposite; she famishes in the midst of plenty, and is mocked by a luxuriance all around her, which she cannot touch. We could indeed admire the generosity of the sacrifice, but justice is too alive to its severity. It is too romantic, too sharp a self-denial to order, under such circumstances, instead of obey, control instead of submit, dictate to others instead of being dictated to, and insist on your neighbour succumbing to your mould, instead of claiming your right of admission to his. Not that Miss Sellon is not equal even to such a trial, but it should not be required of her. For it must be remembered that the exchange is not simply of a privileged state for one without such privilege, but of a privileged state for one that has directly the contrary properties. For there is no argument upon which obedience is proved to be salutary, by which a situation of command is not at the same time proved to be dangerous. Were the obedience we speak of indeed only one ingredient among others in the formation of a spiritual character, its loss might be supplied by some other trial; though in that case there would be no necessity to make this duty so dominant and absorbing. But if it is endowed with these exclusive powers, and made the one channel to perfection, then its loss must be irremediable.

The remark then that we made to begin with, that whereas Miss Sellon's institution, at its first establishment, appealed to

the large and commonly recognised standard of Christian duty, it has now formed an alliance with another and conventional standard, has, we fear, been verified. We cannot but regard this 'rule of holy obedience,' as a foreign element introduced into the ethics of the institution, gratuitous, esoteric, and artificial; and consider that so far as the institution has adopted it, so far it has diverged from its original purpose. Nobody wanted Miss Sellon to become the head of a new school of spiritual education, and embody a new theory of Christian ethics. She was wanted for the practical purpose of teaching, visiting, and administering charity in a destitute population, and for the superintendence of the labours of others like herself for that purpose. It was thought that the members of the sisterhood were under her for that purpose, and not for the purpose of being themselves operated on, and used as the material for exemplifying an idea. They were considered her coadjutors, not her subject matter. And doubtless they are her coadjutors now; but it is difficult not to see that the other aspect of them is at least as favourite a one in the mind of their Superior.

We may add to the unsoundness of such a standard of obedience in itself, some bad effects which will follow from it, affecting the institution itself and the cause of such institutions in general. While Miss Sellon has gathered around her, and will gather, some earnest and valuable minds, who happen to be cast in a mould congenial to such a yoke, she will exclude many others of a stronger and firmer mould, who cannot and ought not to submit to it. She has narrowed her ground. Nor can we forget the fact, however particular circumstances may modify our inference from it, that already, in two different instances, sisters have left her establishment, scandalized at it, and declaring themselves unable to bear its peculiar rules longer. These facts, after giving all due weight to the explanation which has been given of them, leave on an impartial mind the impression that the bow has been bent too tight. Moreover, the cause of sisterhoods in general has suffered from this new development of this one; for the impression has been left upon the public mind, that such institutions are necessarily connected with an artificial religious standard, and that they do not rest upon any large ground of Christian principle.

And as we cannot approve of this change itself, so neither can we approve of the mode in which this and other changes were introduced, and cannot but consider that some grave claims were unattended to in the process.

The institution at Devonport commenced with a body of rules. There was a rule, for example, to guard the liberty of the sisters, giving 'free liberty to any sister to withdraw, if it shall

so seem good to her.' There was a rule to guard the property of the sisters: 'that any sister so withdrawing, or in any way ceasing to be a member of the Society, shall be entitled to her own personal property.'

But the Institution at Devonport had not only rules, but a Visitor. The Bishop of the diocese consented, at the request of the Superior, to undertake that office. It was thus a complete institution in its formation; with a set of rules, and an official interpreter of those rules, in case any question or doubt arose.

Under these circumstances one step would seem to have been right and necessary before introducing any changes in the basis of the institution, or departing from the natural construction of the existing rules. The Superior had no right to do this without first consulting the Visitor. But this, we regret to say, Miss Sellon did, and that largely. We refer to the letter of the Visitor himself on the subject:—

'I frankly avow that I do not think those rules form any longer a true criterion of the nature of your institution. Let me cite the two first of them:—

'I. A legal instrument has been prepared, by which certain of the sisters have agreed to live together (conforming to certain regulations sanctioned by the Bishop, for the better conduct of the interior of the institution), but *with free liberty to any sister to withdraw, if it shall so seem good to her.*"

'This was the prime, the fundamental principle on which I consented to be your Visitor. That it has been knowingly and intentionally departed from I am very far from saying. You are incapable of knowingly departing from any condition under which you have ever placed yourself; yet that it has been *virtually* abandoned, is, in my judgment, manifest, not merely from the portion of your letter to Miss —, cited in the pamphlet of Mr. Spurrell, p. 39, but also from your own comment in your "Reply," p. 9, and still more from your observations, in p. 21, on "the sacred calling," "the calling of God" to your sisterhood, and the sinfulness of "looking back" in any who "had perceived this calling, and who having, after due trial, given herself to it, had yet retracted."

'I avoid entering into consideration of the sacredness of such a calling, still more into the question whether it be of such a kind that to relinquish it is indeed, as you scruple not to declare, "yielding to temptation, as did Demas," who, be it remembered, forsook an apostle, and with him the service of his divine Lord, "loving this world rather than to suffer hardships." I enter not into this consideration, I say, because it is enough for my present purpose to show the virtual inconsistency of such a calling with the first fundamental rule of your institution, that there be "free liberty to every sister to withdraw, if it shall so seem good to her."

'Now let me not be misunderstood. I am very far from blaming you and the sisters at aiming at what is impossible, when you and they have listened to "that voice in the heart which bids it think no longer of earth, which calls the soul to live only for the Lord, in bringing other souls to Him." I only mean that this is a course of life beyond and above that which was contemplated when I accepted the office of your Visitor.

'II. Again, with regard to your second rule:—"That any sister so withdrawing, or in any way ceasing to be a member of the Society, shall be entitled to her own personal property; but neither she nor her heirs shall be entitled to any share of the common property of the Society."

'Now, how does the course actually followed by you accord with this? The rule implies that the property which every sister may bring with her shall continue to be hers, at her sole disposal; and that when by death she ceases to be a sister, she may bequeath her property to whomsoever she may think fit. This was a matter particularly contemplated when those rules received my sanction; for I apprehended that, without some such provision, great abuses might occur, and still greater be suspected; and yet I read, in p. 22 of your "Reply," "We have all things in common. When we receive money of our own, we put it into the treasurer's hands, and it goes to the common stock, unless any sister thinks it *her duty to send it out of the community as soon as she receives it.*" What then becomes of her personal property in anything which she does not think it her duty to send away as soon as she receives it? It should seem that nothing but a sense of "duty" would justify a sister in employing any part of her own funds; in any manner, or for any purpose, except the increase of the common stock of the community. Inclination, affection, preference on any account, except "duty," is not to be permitted to influence a sister in disposing of her property, even "as soon as she receives it." Nor, if she then omit to attend to what may be deemed the demands of "duty," is she at liberty afterwards to regard the property as her own: it will have been merged in the common fund.

'Again, if she use the liberty reserved to her by the first rule—"to withdraw, if it shall so seem good to her"—it should seem that there will be no "personal property of her own" to which she will be "entitled." All will have passed to the community; and if she withdraw, she must be content to withdraw penniless, or with only that which the sisters may think fit to give to her.'—*Bp. of Exeter's Letter, &c.* pp. 3—6.

We are obliged, then, to observe that Miss Sellon departed largely from the natural construction of the rules of the sisterhood, and introduced important changes upon her own idea, without once consulting the official authority appointed for such questions. And we cannot but remark on the occasion, how easily too high an estimate of a particular duty combines, in the very same minds, with a much too low one, according as circumstances affect them. There was no engagement of obedience which Miss Sellon's coadjutors had made to her, which Miss Sellon herself had not made to her Visitor, quite as strongly and definitely, with respect to the points to which his authority applied. Yet while she enlarges the standard of obedience in the case of the sisters, till it absorbs their whole reason and judgment, she diminishes it as from herself to the Visitor, until it becomes no obedience at all. She can see the duty much too readily when it comes in the shape of a mysterious and unlimited prostration; she cannot see it at all when it comes in the shape of a plain and positive engagement. And we are compelled also to make another remark, which we do with much pain and reluctance; and that is, that persons are too apt to see the duty of obedience with different eyes, according as they owe it to others, or as others owe it to them.

We have given our judgment, formed with all the consideration we have been able to bestow, on the main features of Miss Sellon's proceedings, and the principles she has adopted for the

management of her sisterhood. And now the reader may ask, what practical conclusion is to be drawn? Are those who have hitherto supported the institution to continue to support it, or not?—those, we mean, who have supported it hitherto upon the understanding that the principles upon which it was managed were such as the ordinary Churchman acknowledges, but who now discover that that standard has been departed from.

Now, with regard to this question, we must at the outset admit, that the institution does in one respect stand on a different ground from that on which it stood before the recent events, and that that difference of ground does affect the appeal to the members of our Church, as far as it goes. As an institution proceeding upon a set of rules, of which a Bishop of the Church was the official interpreter and guardian, it gave a pledge to members of the Church that it would adhere to a certain standard. That pledge it does not now give. It has no longer an official connexion, and stands on an independent ground. Moreover, it has actually diverged from the recognised standard. But these admissions made, leave, we think, still a large and ample ground on which the institution may appeal to public support. On the practical question of support, it is not whether *any* divergence at all from an approved standard, but *how much*, has taken place, that is to be decided.

We could wish this distinction were more commonly attended to than it is. It is, indeed, a most important one, one essential to every mind that is bent upon acting fairly by all persons and all objects and causes that it has to deal with. And yet how much it is lost sight of; how do multitudes of men, as a matter of course, upon the first sight of any one exceptionable element in an undertaking, however many others there may be good, start back; the immediate impulse being that they will have nothing to do with it. How do others, who have sufficient good sense to distinguish between what is obviously trivial and what is of importance, yet suppose, as a matter of course, that *any* importance whatever is enough to make a ground of separation. In matters social or political the unreasonableness of such a rule is soon seen, and men agree to differ even on points of acknowledged importance, to forward some common object. But in religion it is otherwise; any importance at all is immediately considered to be fundamental.

The rule which general sense and fairness seem to establish in cases of individual exertion, where it serves important objects, and is made at great cost and sacrifice to the person, is this; that in proportion to the sacrifice he makes and the talents he contributes to an undertaking, he ought to be allowed to have his own way in the management of it. We say this, leaving to be understood the proper exceptions to such a rule, and proper

limitations of its meaning. No amount of sacrifice or ability on the part of an individual in conducting an undertaking, is any reason why we should allow anything which we think essentially wrong. Again, no amount of sacrifice or ability give him the right to demand our *approval* even of what we allow. But reserving our approval, and excepting essential points, a large field is still left of allowance in things not essential. Let us not grudge him his own way to a large amount within these limits. If he has any peculiarities, let him indulge them; if he has favourite ideas, let him bring them out. Expect him to give the undertaking the mould, in some measure, of his own mind. If he is not allowed a fair amount of his own way, the result is, that he throws up the matter altogether, and that society is deprived of his services. The very charm, to a large extent, of the work to him,—that which keeps him close to it and enables him to undergo so much toil in the prosecution of it,—is the employment it affords to his own individual biasses, tastes, and ideas. He likes to feel the individual element within him energizing; that he himself—as distinguished from all other mortals that ever have been, are, or will be—is doing something. He enjoys the sensation of a productive, as distinguished from an inert individuality, one which impresses itself on the world without, and makes some portion at least of nature—*rerum natura*—however limited, obedient to it.

When, three or four years ago, a large, enthusiastic, and then unsuppressed party in France were agitating for the regeneration of the social system upon principles of pure equality and benevolence; when the Socialists were contending for a new commercial basis, viz. that all should contribute labour and skill to one large object, the good of the community; the individual being content to receive as the reward of his exertions, however great, his own share, however small, of the general product, they were met in the National Assembly by an argument. The man of the most acute practical intellect in that assembly, and its ablest and most commanding speaker, who did not disdain, moreover, on the occasion, to borrow from the pages of a writer even more philosophic and acute than himself,—M. Thiers, repeating Hume, said this simply—(if we give the kernel of the argument it will be enough.) He said—If you want to have certain effects produced in the world, you must have a *motive* which is *strong* enough to produce them. Society wants to have produced for it, the effects—trade, manufacture, art, skill, labour, capital—the whole commercial system. The only motive which is strong enough to produce these effects, is the motive of private interest. Give the individual a private interest in the result of his labours, allow him to look forward to the possession of an estate, the founding of a family, and he will work as hard as you like.

And the result will extend from himself to society at large. The public will ultimately profit by that which private interest set going. Discoveries will be made, skill improved, system extended, and a whole commercial world arise upon this principle. But this is the only principle which is strong enough to produce these effects. Introduce in its stead a general benevolence, and the whole fabric will fall from simple want of support. The latter is too weak a motive to work upon.

The great ancient moral philosopher applied the same principle to a much more delicate and sensitive subject. We have not his great work by our side at present, and must use the recollections of many years ago, under the correction, if they or their application be erroneous, of the friendly reader who knows better. Aristotle treats the subject of morals in an order, as it may be called, first abstract and next concrete. First the important questions are settled, that virtue is necessary for happiness, and that such and such habits are virtues. An elaborate catalogue of these noble habits is given, and each is described with great accuracy and completeness. But at this stage of the treatise,—that is to say, every part of an exalted moral character having been successfully drawn,—the mind of the great pagan appears to be impressed with some apprehension respecting its embodiment. He appears to see some great difficulties in the way of the actual man exhibiting these perfections, at any rate on a triumphant scale. And yet his philosophy would demand that there should be such persons in the world, and that they should be more than one or two: for his idea of existence was confined to this world, and therefore he would naturally expect that this world should be able to produce in a good and sufficient number of instances, the perfect character; otherwise, we have ideas which are not realized effectually, and nature is guilty of a fiction. In this difficulty he has recourse to the same eminently serviceable principle to which Hume and M. Thiers appeal. The virtues of the good man, are allowed to grow up *περὶ αὐτὸν*,—‘about himself.’ The permission is a significant one, too significant. However, once given, the convenience of it is felt. Virtue becomes a more practicable thing, the path to perfection much more commodious. The ‘good man’ is made the member of a state, a leading member. In this capacity he does noble services to his country, fellow-citizens, and friends: he exhibits, in doing them, wisdom, magnanimity, benevolence, courage, &c. But all this moral formation goes on *περὶ αὐτὸν*, ‘about himself;’ his position is greatly improved by means of it, and virtue is the highest, the purest, and the noblest engine, but still the engine of promotion. Under such fostering influences, she has a splendid growth; she makes powerful strides in the individual, the whole community

outside looking on; till at last, commanding universal respect, he grows into a model, and the highest combination of position, reputation, and ethics stands before us. The character is not unlike that of the modern statesman of the higher class: one who is attentive to the improvement of public morals, and adopts a conscientious and honourable standard of public service. Such a man exhibits high public virtues, and a moral formation may be said to go on in his case, *περὶ αὐτὸν*, about self. The stimulus of an honourable ambition, the idea of the career which he has to fulfil, sustains his ethical aims, tastes, and labours.

It is thus that Aristotle produces an embodiment of the virtues. He saw that a strong motive was wanted to put in effective action the moral powers of man, and he supplies one. The motive is one indeed which has a more suitable application in the commercial world than in the moral, and produces the physical good of the community more faithfully than the virtue of the individual. But either application will do for the purpose of illustration.

That which the motive of private interest, then, effects in the material system of society, religious bias and peculiarity effect in the world of religion. There is a department of large and general religious truth which all in the same Church acknowledge; and there is a department of peculiar and controversial truth, which some think to be truth, and others not. The tendency of human nature is to take much more interest in the latter than in the former department of truth. Large and general truth has no charm for many minds. But set them upon some idea which they are conscious is rather peculiar to themselves, and which appeals to the resources of their own private and particular treasury of thought, and they are all alive: they want to communicate it to others; they become teachers. If they are preachers, they will begin sometimes with common and acknowledged truths, but the discourse soon falls into the private channel. This is the stimulus which makes them interested, zealous, and active, about religious truth at all. If they are practical workers in the Church, they try to impress the peculiar, the favourite sentiment upon their work. That is their stimulus to production. Do not most of us know men with whom the alternative would simply be between a working peculiarity and a total inertness, who if they were not arbitrary would be weak, and who make a bargain with religion at the outset, to colour her, or take no trouble about her? And yet the services of such minds are not to be lost to religion. It is better that they should teach a coloured truth, provided no vital part is affected, rather than not teach at all; and that they should do a mixed work rather than none. Indeed, we are here con-

cerned with a mysterious question relating to the human mind, which we shall not try to solve. For in the present narrow condition of our faculties, cannot we conceive it to be a sort of impossibility with many that they should embrace truth, other than in this way ; inasmuch as if they admit it into their minds at all, it cannot be by any other opening than such as their minds have? May not the very instrument for attaining all the compass of thought possible for them, be this very individuality, which operates as a quickening principle, sharpening the sense while it confines it, and causing whatever appreciation even of truth, general and large, such minds can attain to?

If this is the case, then, it is to the advantage of the Church that it should acknowledge and avail itself of this principle, allowing for the bad results which may follow, together with the good ones, in its working. The work of religion in the world is conducted by individuals; the consequence is a mixture. But those who know the laws upon which the human mind acts, will expect no less. And they will expect it most in the case of those very persons who are most anxious to do good, for in the zealous and the energetic the individual element is most strong. Undertakings large and important for the benefit of society are not begun without some great impulse ; but a strong impulse is more difficult to regulate than a weak one, and must often go further than the mark. The rule, then, that we laid down applies : if those who have all the trouble and pains of sustaining an undertaking do impart to it some peculiarity from their own minds, let us not be surprised, or complain too bitterly. Go through the wide world, and you will see pervading every department a rule—the rule of *quid pro quo*. Search east and west, north and south, look high and look low ; in society, trade, politics, it is the same law, and you cannot escape it. Those who give will take, those who expend their own strength will indulge their own bias, and those who do the work will claim their own way of doing it. Do not demand, then, that a work shall comply with your own standard before you support it. You will never see such a work, and will have to wait till doomsday. There will be always something to object to, some divergence from your own idea. Some persons do, indeed, go on to the last day of their lives, wondering why others do not see as they do ; the fact never ceases to surprise them, and after the experience of the whole day long retains the first freshness of the early dawn. They go on to the last, having their model, to which everything whatever done must come up, at the cost of absolute offence, if it does not. But of such it is only necessary to say, that it is marvellous how they do not see those laws of human action which obtrude themselves upon their observation every day. There is certainly a primary difference between

minds, that some do, and others do not, see the world which they are in.

The question then is, whether Miss Sellon's institution has diverged from the standard, which the body of our Church people recognise, *more* than is fairly tolerable, and may be allowed, though not approved? And to that we answer decidedly, No! We regret, and have given our reasons why, the turn which she has of late given to her institution, her extravagant demand upon the obedience of her sisterhood, and other changes. Such a demand is itself improper, and cannot work well either for her own sisterhood, or the cause of sisterhoods generally. Still we see nothing in it but what comes within the pale of Christian liberty. If any society of young ladies choose voluntarily to put themselves under Miss Sellon's guidance, and accept her judgment on all points, so long as she does not tell them to do what is wrong, we do not see why they should be interfered with. They have a right to do what they will with their own, and if they deliver up their own judgment to another, it is yet their own judgment, and not any body's else, that they give up. And if such submission leads them to spend their lives in visiting the poor, and instructing children in schools, it is not a result which either the Church or the community can complain of.

It has been the fault of the English Church that it has been over jealous of its own standard, and looked with too much suspicion on zeal and energy wherever they have at all deviated from it. This is an old topic. There is the case of Wesley and the Methodists in the last century. This jealousy does, indeed, lie very deep in the main body of our people. They will allow no interval between the substantial squire's, the reputable tradesman's model, and fatuity. And yet there is a cry on all sides for workers. We hear how much is wanted to be done, how the people are perishing for want of knowledge, and vice reigning in our crowded cities. But the worker comes, and because he does not do his work exactly in the way we want, he is dismissed. But if we wait for the convenient and accommodating workman, who will take all the trouble and have none of the choice, we shall wait long enough. Here is a case in point—the very case before us. Here is an institution which has been at work about three years, and in that short time it has managed to diverge considerably from the original idea on which it was raised. Shall we suppress this institution then that diverges, and have another which does not? So be it; and let us suppose another institution raised: and in three more years it will diverge like its predecessor. We do not say this always must be the case; but in a greater or less degree it is to be expected. And so we shall go on for ever inviting labour and dismissing it,

raising fabrics and destroying them. The correct, the model institution, which is to work faultlessly, will never come. How idle is such a course; how unworthy of serious minds, who want good to be done, know there must be workmen to do it, and know the laws of work! See the necessities of the case then, and submit to them. Keep your workman, with his peculiarities, and use his large zeal, his unwearied activity, his noble devotion and self-denial. In a word, be liberal. Let the Church of England be a Church, and not a sect; an empire, not a club. It is the characteristic of empire to be omnigenous; to include as many forms and species, as many laws, customs, nations, and languages, as possible. An empire cannot be stiff; it is contrary to the law of its existence to be so. Until our people learn this liberality and largeness of heart, until the despotism of one model is put down, the Church cannot make use of her resources, but there will be a perpetual waste going on. It is a thing never to be lost sight of, that the despotism of this model ought one day to be deposed. Let no opportunity be lost of showing people how much they lose by their mistake. Let them be at any rate told that it is a mistake. It is something for them to hear such a thing said. Repetition impresses the imagination even where the reason is preoccupied, and a process which has domesticated countless absurdities may promote, perhaps, one truth. Such resistance may be thought the height of absurdity, but the fact is, at any rate, seen that it is made. The Church of England never has yet learned, indeed, this lesson of true liberality, but there is no reason why she should not. There is no impossibility in the case—none, at any rate, of which we are informed, from natural sources.

We have endeavoured to exhibit in this article the combination of a right with a duty, or rather of one duty with another; and we will repeat it at the close, as our advice to any person who may think us in the position to give advice, with respect to the proper posture of mind to assume towards the case of Miss Sellon, and all other such cases. First, use your judgment independently on the right and wrong of any proceedings which come before you, be the agents who they may. Whether particular defects of knowledge or understanding may make you an exception to it, you must of course decide; but this is the general rule. Secondly, when you have made your judgment on the act, do not let it separate you from the agent, or his work and object as a whole. Exercise the strength of your judgment, control its pedantry and arbitrariness. Be independent in opinion, social in action. Give your support to undertakings which on the whole do good, and do not think too much of a few irregularities or obliquities attaching to them.

ART. VI.—*Les Provinciales; et leur Réfutation.* Par M. l'Abbé MAYNARD, Chanoine Honoraire de Poitiers. Ouvrage dédié à Mons. de Vesins, Evêque d'Agen. Paris: 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.

THIS is a curious book. Pascal's famous Letters elicited, at the time of their publication, a vigorous defence on the part of the great order whom they had attacked so unceremoniously; but of that fierce and eventful controversy they are now almost the sole memorials. It may be supposed that the able and shrewd men against whom they were directed, had something to say to them. As a company, the Jesuits possessed more available talent, more concentrated resources, more discipline, than any public body in Europe. They sifted and contradicted the 'Provincial Letters;' they explained with ingenuity, and even with wit. They made out, with much plausibility, that they had said nothing but what other people had said. But it is very hard now to get a sight of their books. We may look in vain in some of our most famous libraries: they seem all to have disappeared—the Jesuit books which Pascal attacked, and the Jesuit books which attacked Pascal; the Pères Bauny, and Binet, and Garasse, and Le Moynes, his victims, and their defenders, Pères Annat and Nouet, and Pirot and Pinthereau, and even the polite P. Daniel. This want, however, has been supplied by the work before us, an edition of the 'Provincial Letters,' with their refutation by the Abbé Maynard, a French ecclesiastic of some literary pretensions, who may stand very well for the Baunys and Daniels, now so seldom met with.

In noticing this book, we wish one thing distinctly to be understood. It is not that we are opening afresh these bygone scandals. It is M. Maynard who has brought them before us, to show us how he could dispose of them, by an elaborate and ostentatious refutation. And what we propose to consider, is not so much Pascal and his charges, as the way in which M. Maynard deals with them, and the light which his statements, whether in attack or defence, throw on the practical system and feelings of those in whose behalf he speaks. We notice the book the more, because it is a characteristic specimen of the style and spirit which mark the school of Joseph de Maistre—of the line of argument which they adopt—of the self-complacent contempt of facts, the extravagance of misrepresentation and even calumny, which seem to sit so lightly on the consciences, and are expressed so glibly by the pens, of the disciples of that

master of brilliant and insolent theory, who bids fair to become the acknowledged exponent of the principles of modern Romanism.

The book is what we might call in England a 'Family Pascal.' Pascal's 'Provincial Letters,' says the Abbé Maynard, have done more harm to the cause of religion and the Church in France, than perhaps any other book in the French language. They are the most hypocritical and lying production of the most hypocritical sect of heretics, that ever assailed Christianity. Yet they are so clever, that it is hopeless to expect that Frenchmen will ever cease to read them; and equally hopeless, that they will read the solid refutations which the Jesuits wrote of them. The effect of answers, he says, has only been like that of Père Daniel's book on James the Second's courtiers at S. Germain, who were so delighted with the extracts that he gave from Pascal, in order to refute them, that they sent off at once to Paris for a copy of the *Provinciales*, and thought no more of Père Daniel. What is to be done in this case? says M. Maynard. Doubtless, the best would be, that the *Provinciales* should be forgotten, at any sacrifice to literature. But as this is past praying for, M. Maynard has taken the next best course. He has published, '*on the favourable opinion of the highest ecclesiastical authority existing in France*,' a new edition of the *Provinciales*, with all the attractions of Firmin Didot's elegant typography, and a collated text, accompanied with a running and popular refutation in the introductions and notes. The method is convenient, but it has its disadvantages. There is something ungracious in editing a great writer, avowedly to pick him to pieces. But in Pascal's case, it is also rather a perilous method; for we are apt to compare the note-maker with his victim; and a hostile editor of Pascal had need be a considerable person, to venture to place his remarks in proximity with their text, without running the risk of looking very like a lacquey, soliciting our attention to the faults of his master.

The Abbé Maynard, however, fully sensible, as he professes to be, of Pascal's genius, cannot be said to have any fear of this contrast. We might have expected that M. Maynard would have confined himself to careful rectifications of quotations or facts, and to comprehensive expositions of principles or systems. But the lively Abbé is not satisfied with the resources of theology and history. He adds to them the perilous ones of pleasantry. Over and above his heavier artillery, a running fire of sharp little sayings at the bottom of the page, makes answer to the rapid and deadly hits which succeed one another in the text. Besides carefully recording his opinion of the probability of everything that the Jesuits said or insinuated

against Pascal and his friends, as that Jansenius swindled for the benefit of his friend's nephew,¹ M. Maynard has enriched his edition, and thought to damage Pascal, by a vast quantity of brief notes, such as impatient readers scribble with pencil on the margin of irritating books—such, as we are sorry to find, have considerably damaged our own copy of his elegantly printed volumes. They are very commonly in the second person—direct addresses to the offending writer, or his Jesuit interlocutor. Now it is a brisk dialogue in which he pushes Pascal to the wall; now indignant interpellations, such as we used to see reported in the French Chamber; now ironical answers to Pascal's ironical questions; now apostrophes by single words, brief and emphatic:—*'Mensonge!'* *'Calomnie!'*—*'Pourquoi falsifier toujours?'*—*'Non, non! c'est pas vrai!'*—*'Courage, bon père,* (to the Jesuit speaker,) *'vous avez droit dans le fonds, quoique Pascal vous donne tort dans la forme.'*—*'Voilà ce qui est plaisant!'*—*'Mon Dieu! quel entêtement!'*—*'C'est le comble de l'impudence!'*—*'C'est une infamie!'*—*'Eh, misérables Gallicans, soyez donc conséquents avec vous-mêmes.'*—*'Allons! voilà Gros-Jean qui en remontre à son curé, quelques docteurs pédants qui font la leçon aux Papes!'* Pascal observes that the Jesuits called him *'impie, bouffon, ignorant, farceur, imposteur, calomniateur, fourbe, hérétique Calviniste déguisé, disciple de Du Moulin, possédé d'une légion de diables,* et tout ce qui vous plaît: the measured annotation says, *'Il y avait bien un peu de tout cela dans l'auteur des Lettres, moins peut-être la légion de diables.'* These sarcastic interjections are varied by others of candour or compassion. At the end of some merciless paragraph of Pascal's, we find his editor only laughing at the joke, *'Nous rions de tout notre cœur;'* or we have little bursts of *'Charmant!'*—*'Charmante satire du pédantisme de l'école!'* showing that he can appreciate the beauty which he deems so fatal. At the end of the ninth *Provinciale*, about the devotional novelties of Pères Bauny and Binet, Pascal adds a postscript to tell his correspondent that since he had written the letter, he had himself seen the books—*'ce sont des pièces dignes d'être vues.'* We used to think that this was part of the joke. But we were, it seems, mistaken. M. Maynard is both indignant and grieved:—*'Quoi! vous avez écrit une lettre sur des ouvrages que vous ne connaissiez pas, et que vous n'avez lus qu'ensuite! L'aveu est naïf, et se conçoit difficilement d'un homme ordinairement si habile; "mentita est iniquitas sibi."*—*'Preuve nouvelle,'* he adds, with a sympathetic allowance for genius, *'que le pauvre Pascal était victime de ses amis, acceptait aveuglement leurs mémoires, et se*

¹ Vol. ii. p. 233.

'faisait l'écho docile de leurs erreurs et de leurs passions.'—Vol. i. p. 441.

These little explosive protests, in which he bandies irony with Pascal, are a curious method of turning the edge of the 'Provincial Letters.' His way of meeting their direct charges is equally remarkable.

Pascal's book, it appears, must be dealt with in a sweeping manner. The safe, and we should imagine, the old answer would be, that the Jesuits were not the Church; and that the relaxed and extravagant opinions which he attacked, were those of individuals, or, at worst, of an order, for which the Church was not responsible. It might be further observed, that lists of propositions, many of them the very ones which Pascal had quoted, were formally condemned shortly after by the Popes; and finally that the Church at length disclaimed the general policy of the Jesuits, showed that even their zeal and services could not excuse their errors, and publicly separated her cause from theirs, by formally dissolving the order. This is one line of defence. There are others also; as that Pascal hit a weak point, but exaggerated it; that he and his friends went as dangerously in one direction as the Jesuits did in the other; that it was really a dispute about speculative and open points, in which both parties lost their temper and their way. But these answers are too tame, have not enough of 'principle' in them, for the dashing philosophy of the disciple of De Maistre.

The Abbé Maynard is one of those eager combatants who disdain to do things by halves. The battle seems to him not worth gaining, unless he can gain one of those heroic ones in which every man of the enemy is killed on the spot, and not one of his own. He accepts the whole weight of the Jesuit case. One side was right without any wrong, and that was the Jesuits; the other wrong without any right, and that was the Jansenists. This is the simple issue, according to M. Maynard, of the quarrel which distracted the great Church of France, in its palmyest days, for a century and a half.

At the same time, M. Maynard is far from giving up the charge against Pascal of gross falsehood and wilful misrepresentation in nearly every text that he cites. But the substance of the refutation is that in all the points which Pascal singled out for attack, whether doctrine, or morality, or discipline, he attacked in the Jesuits what is now universally accepted by the Church. The Abbé's ambition aims at a triumph short of nothing less than the brilliant one of putting Pascal out of court for ever, as being, after every allowance made for genius and bad company, a convicted and notorious liar, hypocrite, impostor, slanderer, and heretic.

After M. Maynard's book, it is to be supposed that no one can any longer entertain a doubt on the subject. He, and—if it will take his advice—the rest of the world, will leave Pascal in peace, and his Letters also. The following peroration shows how M. Maynard considers that he has accomplished his task, and is suggestive of the spirit in which he has worked:—

'We are at the end of this long controversy; what is there wanting to complete what we have said in the course of the discussion? For the first time for two centuries, all the documents relating to the cause have been submitted at once to the examination of the public. Well: without any presumption, it seems to us, that no man of fairness will hesitate to pronounce, that the Provincial Letters are the most notoriously calumnious charge ever framed by passion and hatred. As to Pascal himself, divided between our profound sympathy for his person, and our still greater love of Catholic truth, we feel, when we wish to judge him, that our thoughts become confused, and that our words die away on our lips. At the risk of scandalising many men of our days, we will say, nevertheless, that we would gladly tear a page out of his life, even if the provincial letters must go with it. But,—severe for a doctrine, and for a work which have been so fatal to religion in France, we have nothing but indulgence and compassion for the unhappy writer whose genius was made a tool of. Contrary to the majority of our contemporaries, we condemn the work and absolve the man; the reason is, that the work has been judged by the highest authority which exists in this world, and that no one has the right to disturb the ashes of the man, and to cite before his own tribunal his intentions and his memory.

'Son cercueil est fermé; Dieu l'a jugé; silence.'

'Le vrai malheur des Jesuites au dix-septième siècle,' he says, 'a été de n'avoir pas en un Pascal.'

But from M. Maynard himself we must go on to his statements. We propose to notice the ground which he takes against Pascal, first, historically; next, as disclosing the principles which he represents as established in his own communion. It is mainly for this latter purpose that we have given so much space to the subject. It may be as well, however, at starting, though we are not dealing with the controversy in itself, to say a few words on the alleged unfairness of Pascal.

We certainly do think that his charges, on the whole, are very serious, both in their matter and evidence; and also, that they reach beyond the Jesuits. But we certainly cannot defend Pascal as M. Maynard does the Jesuits. Few persons read him without more or less of misgiving as to his perfect fairness. Indeed, it is not unnatural that after such a sweeping victory of human wit, there should come a reaction; the mind feels disposed to be sceptical whether in reality the triumph could have been as complete as it appears. It seems to violate likelihood—to be more

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 440, 441.

than Providence, which is jealous of human pride, is wont to allot to man. And this natural suspicion is not without grounds. Pascal was by no means always fair, especially in the detail of his proof.

Pascal's Letters have the exaggeration, inseparable from an able, earnest, passionate attack,—the exaggeration of a clear statement and lucid arrangement of the case *on one side*; the exaggeration of ridicule and irony; the exaggeration of strong and indignant feeling. Further, they leave unsaid how the system which they attacked grew up; how long custom, and a general use not confined to the Jesuits, if it had made this system dangerous, had also in all probability, in a measure, corrected it, as it certainly in a degree excused it: and they leave the impression, that *that* was a distinct *intention*, which was mainly a *result*, not very coyly accepted and followed up. Further, he leaves unsaid, for he did not on principle acknowledge them, the practical necessities of a popular, and much more, of a fashionable religion—much the same under all circumstances, whether resisted as temptations, or accepted as facts.

As to his quotations, the Letters, we think, will bear favourable comparison with any work that deals as largely in controversial citations. He solemnly declares that he had looked into text and context of every passage that he used; and we can see no reason to doubt his belief that he was dealing fairly. Still it is undeniable, we think, that he is at times really, and still oftener, apparently, unfair in his use of passages. We say, apparently, where in quoting, he omits restrictions and conditions which in the context accompany some startling decision, because he feels them to be mere surplusage. Where the point of a passage really remains unaltered by qualifications, which seem put in simply for verbal show, Pascal makes little ceremony in sacrificing limitations which he thinks unmeaning or trifling, to the convenience of his own statement. And besides, it must be confessed, that it was an unlucky chance for his victims, clumsy writers, singularly confident in their formal methods and their own authority—coarse and technical about refinements which almost defy words, and not dreaming of any opposition but that logical one which was the delight and business of their lives,—to fall into the hands of Pascal. The skilfully chosen, and skilfully exhibited passage, which looks so monstrous in his pages, not seldom subsides in their own into mere grotesque absurdity; often too, what really illustrates the mischief of the whole system, seems to bear hard in each separate instance when pointed against individuals. But there are cases where he is substantially unfair; we will give an instance or two.

The following is a case which has been more than once quoted against Pascal. He is speaking of the *jolies questions* which Escobar and others have framed on the subject of fasting: it may be remembered how, as they proceed, they become more and more delicate and thoughtful for the penitent, who wishes to have a good conscience and not to fast. These questions and answers are not disputed by M. Maynard. He only sneers at Escobar, or else backs him with S. Thomas. As to the man coming of age an hour after midnight, and thus having a right to be let off, he dismisses it with 'c'est subtil, ridicule, si on le veut, mais *c'est vrai*. Puis, en quoi cela va-t-il à la corruption de la morale?'—there being no harm apparently in a director of conscience, or his penitent, being shufflers. At length, Pascal comes to the following climax:—

"O que cela est divertissant!" lui dis-je. "On ne s'en peut tirer," me repondit-il; "je passe les jours et les nuits à le lire; je ne fais autre chose." Le bon père, voyant que j'y prenais plaisir, en fut ravi; et continuant: "Voyez," dit-il, "encore ce trait de Filiutius, qui est un de ces vingt-quatre Jésuites, 'Celui qui s'est fatigué à quelque chose, comme à poursuivre une fille, *ad insequendam amicam*, est-il obligé de jeûner? Nullement. Mais s'il s'est fatigué exprès, pour être par là dispensé du jeûne, y sera-t-il tenu? Encore qu'il eût ce dessein formé, il n'y sera point obligé.'"—Vol. i. p. 233.

On this M. Maynard begins his note with a triumphant chuckle:—

'Oh! pour le coup, voilà Pascal pris en flagrant délit de falsification. D'abord, Filiuci n'est point l'inventeur du problème. La question avait été traitée bien avant lui par S. Antonin, Sylvestre, Médina, Sancius, et beaucoup d'autres auteurs étrangers à la Compagnie. De plus, la question n'était pas oiseuse. "Si vous vous souvenez," dit à ce propos M. Sainte Beuve, (*Port-Royal*, tom. iii. p. 59,) "qu'il se présentait souvent au tribunal de la confession des pénitents bien étranges, comme Louis XI. par exemple, ou Philippe II., ou Henri III., (je parle des plus connus,) pour qui c'était une affaire sérieuse de jeûner le lendemain d'un meurtre ou d'une course libertine, vous trouverez moins étranges les précautions et distinctions que Filiutius prescrivait à la date de 1626, et qu'on retrouverait plus ou moins chez les autres Casuistes de ce temps." Et maintenant abordons le texte de Filiuci, et traduisons-le littéralement. Ce sera moins joli que chez Pascal; mais dans toute cette longue discussion, ayons le courage de prendre pour adage le vers de Boileau:

"Rien n'est beau que le vrai, le vrai seul est aimable."

"Vous demanderez en second lieu," dit-il, "si celui qui se fatiguerait à mauvaise fin, comme à tuer un homme ou à poursuivre une fille, ou à quelque chose de semblable, serait tenu au jeûne. *Je réponds*, qu'il pêcherait, il est vrai, par la mauvaise fin qu'il se propose; mais que la fatigue en étant résultée, il serait exempté du jeûne: à moins, disent quelques-uns, qu'il n'eût agi en fraude de la loi; mais les autres répondent mieux, que la faute consisterait à apporter une cause de rupture du jeûne, mais que, la cause posée, il n'y serait pas tenu." Qu'a fait Pascal? Il a arraché au texte de Filiuci le milieu et la fin, pour faire croire que le Jésuite exemptait de toute faute dans les singulières circonstances qu'il décrit.

Mais non, le Jésuite, comme tout le monde, *enverrait bien un pareil homme en enfer* ; seulement ce ne serait pas pour n'avoir pas jeûné, ne le pouvant faire, mais pour sa crime, et pour s'être mis dans l'impossibilité de jeûner, *Et il a raison, le bon Filiuci* ; car Pascal nous dira-t-il qu'un homme qui se serait fait saigner aux quatre membres pour ne pas jeûner, y serait obligé encore, malgré son épuisement complet ? Allons donc, ce serait absurde ! et il faut avoir un front Janséniste pour chercher à excuser Pascal comme a voulu le faire Nicole en répondant aux accusations du P. Nouet.'—Vol. i. pp. 233, 234.

We will not excuse Pascal. He has left out what '*le bon Filiuci*' could ill afford to spare ; the worthy man certainly does admit that this 'strange penitent' would sin, though not about fasting, and Pascal takes no notice of the admission. But the considerateness, which remembered that to such '*very strange penitents as Louis XI., Philip II. and Henry III.*' it was '*a serious affair*' to fast after a murder, or a day of debauchery, and the 'precaution' which anxiously guarded against laying on their conscience under such circumstances one sin more, and was so careful to clear the murderer from the guilt of fast-breaking, is passed over by M. Maynard too lightly.

We will give another instance. In the Seventh Letter, Pascal quotes Lessius, (de Just. l. ii. c. 9. dub. 12, 19,) as saying that a man may resent a blow with the sword, not from vengeance, but to clear his own honour. He makes Lessius responsible for this doctrine. He does not say that Lessius qualifies it, doubts about it, puts it as a matter of any question whatever, or does anything but lay it down simply as a safe and practical rule of

¹ We give another specimen of the very subtle distinction between *what leads to a necessity, and what follows from a necessity, or quasi-necessity*. Lessius says, '*adulter se debito moderamine defendens, maritum interficit ; non est reus homicidii, sed occisio illa censetur fortuita.*' For he says, 'the original crime is only the remote cause and occasion ; and every man when he is hard pressed, is not bound to let himself be killed, but may defend himself. Then after maintaining his view, he proceeds in the following, in which we cannot help thinking of the *bonté et douceur* of Père Bauny's *brûleur des granges* :—'*Adverte tamen, si suspicabatur adulter, talia incommoda [i. e. that he should kill the husband,] ex adulterio secutura, tenebatur ex charitate abstinere. Unde volendo adulterium committere, peccat non solum peccato adulterii, sed etiam contra charitatem proximi, quatenus per adulterium constituit se in necessitate damni proximo inferendi ; . . . quando tamen constitutus est in tali periculo, non peccat, etiamsi se defendendo, occidat alterum ; quia jus habet se defendendi. Idem dicendum, si imminente marito poterat fugere ; tenebatur enim ex charitate, si videbat inde marito periculum : unde non fugiendo peccat contra charitatem proximi. Non tamen peccat, si postquam non potest amplius fugere, se defendendo, occidat invasorem : occisio enim illa, non est peccatum, sed effectus per accidens secutus ex peccato.*'—*Lessius, de Just. l. ii. c. 9. dub. 15. pp. 106, 107.*

The sin *lasting on till a certain moment*, and then metaphysically vanishing, is singular enough. Still it may be taken as a philosophical analysis, whether right or wrong, yet purely speculative, of the action. On the other hand, we are told that these were not '*questions oiseuses*,' that they were *practically* necessary for delicate cases, for '*strange penitents*' like Louis XI. and Philip II.

action, as Escobar may be fairly said to do. But in fact it turns out that the real state of the case is this:—1. Lessius quotes it from some one else. 2. He gives arguments, by which it, and some other maxims of the same sort, may be supported. 3. He ends by saying, in the scholastic formula, that though ‘it is speculatively probable, it does not seem to be easily allowed in practice.’ That is, whether mildly or not, he does distinctly condemn the maxim; first, from the danger of hatred or vengeance in the agent; second, because likely to lead to other bloodshed.

Certainly, no one reading Pascal’s account would imagine that Lessius had said anything of the kind. Accordingly the Jesuits made the most of it against Pascal’s good faith, and Pascal answers them in his thirteenth Letter. They said that Lessius quoted it from some one else, and quoted it to ‘combat’ it; Pascal, that he quoted it to ‘follow’ it. Lessius’s style of ‘combating’ is of a very mild order: but Pascal is unfair nevertheless. His reply to the Jesuits, who quote *certain* words of *condemnation*, is that *these* words refer not to this case, but to another; which is true. But Pascal himself persists in shutting his eyes to the fact that Lessius had *spoken against* it, in some words, and in refusing him the benefit of what he *did* say:—‘Il ne se trouve pas,’ he maintains, ‘une seule parole de condamnation en ce lieu-là; mais il parle ainsi: “Il semble, qu’on n’en doit pas facilement permettre la pratique: *in praxi non videtur FACILE PERMITTENDA.*”’ This he will not admit to be any sort of real condemnation.

He further suppresses the fact, that he himself had originally taken no notice, except in a *general way*, of this limitation. And he tries very unfairly to weaken the force of the words themselves, a technical form of disapproval. Thus he begins with charging Lessius with inventing and maintaining a maxim, and he ends by really proving against him only that he discountenanced it in too mild language.

This is unfair. But in this, as in most other instances, if we criticise the accuser’s fairness, the case of the accused is not much mended. An inspection of the text only conveys more vividly the cool way in which Lessius entertains and has difficulties about the doubt, whether we may kill a man for a blow. M. Maynard is still better, and gives us the reason for Lessius’ hesitating and faint rejection,—*videtur non facile permittenda*. ‘If,’ says he, ‘Lessius does not speak more expressly, *it is out of respect for Victoria* (from whom he quotes); when he treats of murdering for *calumny*, he absolutely condemns the practice, ‘n’étant *géné-là* par aucune autorité.’ (Vol. ii. p. 135.)

We will add a third case, where unfairness seems to arise from

the two parties being at cross purposes. The Roman system is a great system of external legislation, yet bearing intimately on conscience. On the one hand, it must wear the technical form of ordinary law. The crimes it denounces have to be defined; the rules which apply to all penal enactments must govern and abridge its severity. But, on the other hand, it appeals to more than outward obedience; it claims the submission of the Christian in his conscience, as it is meant to provide for the good direction of his religious life; its penalties are assumed to touch his soul, even though applied by the rules of human punishment.¹ This was the long-established system in the Church to which Pascal, as well as the Jesuits, belonged. But in several of the questions between him and his answerers, each drops one side of this double system. He assumes solely its *practical object*; that Pope's Bulls, for instance, when they denounce, and enact punishment against, some particular crime, are to be taken in a broad and common-sense view, as intending as hard a blow as can be given against the crime in all its forms; and so he quotes, as specimens of explaining away authorities, in order to favour crime, cases where terms are defined, or penalties restricted. The Jesuits and their friends bring for answer, the necessary *method and practice* of such a system as the Canon law. Thus Pascal shows from Escobar, that a man who murders, not for money, but to oblige his friend, is not to be called an assassin:—

‘Le Pape Grég. XIV. a déclaré que les assassins sont indignes de jouir de l’asile des églises, et qu’on doit les en arracher. Cependant nos vingt-quatre vieillards disent, que tous ceux qui tuent en trahison ne doivent pas encourir la peine de cette bulle. Cela vous paraît être contraire; mais on l’accorde, en interprétant le mot d’*assassin*, comme ils le font par ces paroles. “Les assassins ne sont-ils pas indignes de jouir du privilège des églises par la bulle de Grég. XIV. Mais nous entendons par le mot d’assassins ceux qui ont reçu de l’argent pour tuer quelqu’un en trahison. D’où il arrive que ceux qui tuent sans en recevoir aucun prix, mais seulement pour obliger leurs amis, ne sont pas appelés assassins.”’—Lett. VI. vol. i. p. 254.

Now the result of this interpretation certainly is, either that *real* assassins get off, or that people may with truth think that he who is not *canonically* an assassin, is not a *real* assassin. Yet it is fair to remember, as M. Maynard reminds us, that it is primarily a question of legal definition. ‘The privilege of ‘sanctuary,’ he says, ‘has always been regarded in Italy as ‘very important.’² Abuses occurred, and were restrained by

¹ ‘Idem pontifex refert, quod Innoc. X. et Innoc. XII. *excommunicationem* inflixerunt, in eos qui in Ecclesiâ Vaticanâ *tabacum sumerent*; et eandem imposuit Urban. VIII. pro ecclesiis Hispanicis: sed Bened. XIII. omnes istas prohibitiones abstulit.’—*Liguori, Hom. Ap. Tr.* xv. p. iii. No. 38.

² Vol. i. p. 254, 255.

bulls and censures; and the extent of these restraints gave further occasion to disputes between Churches and magistrates. This had to be settled as the interpretation of other legal terms—who were *assassins* in the view of the bull? And in penal matters, the maxim is, '*odiosa sunt restringenda et rigorosa applicanda.*' The effect of this mixture of civil and spiritual perils—of excommunication and hanging—in this system, is a fair question. But it is not the question that Pascal is here dealing with.

We might add other instances of summary and unfair ways of dealing with what he attacked. Pascal was as unceremonious or unscrupulous as powerful and earnest minds are apt to be in dealing with what they not only detest, but thoroughly despise. When he had made up his mind that he must be unsparing, he did not stop to think whether he made his victim too absurd. But the main question still remains. Pascal may have been guilty of more or less unfairness; under the disguise of a man of the world, he may have had in him a good deal of the partizan, and something of the Puritan. Still it is a question whether the state of things he alleges to have existed was substantially true; and if so, we may be excused for being curious to see how a modern French ecclesiastic volunteers to deal with it, especially when he presents his labours with considerable pomp, in all the luxury of typographical elegance, and introduces it to the world with the 'favourable opinion of the highest ecclesiastical authority in France.' We take it up not to go over the quarrels of the past, but to learn the principles and views of the present.

We shall find, that, first, he denies the existence, as a fact, of this corrupt moral teaching among the Jesuits, or indeed in the Church; and next, that he supports his assertion by absolutely identifying the teaching of the Jesuits at that day with the teaching of the Church at this. The question then remains, as to the view which he presents, of the nature of this teaching. These three points we shall attempt to illustrate as we proceed, and in this order.

First, as to the fact on which Pascal's attack rests, the existence and influence of a system of easy Casuistry. M. Maynard, as we have said, broadly denies it. There was nothing, he maintains, in the morals or the teaching of the period to warrant it; far less in that of the Jesuits. 'It is absurd,' he says, 'to suppose of the Society of Jesus that they taught bad "doctrine." . . . 'Never was there a society, perhaps, which takes 'more precautions to maintain the purity of its doctrine and 'morality, and which, with this view, has recourse to rules more 'severe, and, it may be said, more exactly observed.' Nor will he allow of the distinction between the earlier and later Jesuits.

They strike him, on the contrary, by their unity of purpose and character. He quotes instances of their boldness and severity in the court of France:—‘En un mot, les Jésuites transigèrent—ils une seule fois avec l’immoralité dans la voluptueuse cour de Versailles?’ They harassed—P. Annat, especially, it is said in Bayle,¹ ‘chagrinait tous les jours’—Louis XIV.; ‘lui permirent-ils jamais de conserver le dehors de la religion et de s’approcher des sacrements, tant qu’il était livré à ses scandaleuses amours?’ . . . ‘Courage autant plus digne d’éloge, que chacun était pris d’admiration, ou du moins se taisait devant ces brillants désordres.’ . . . ‘Toutes les courtisanes eurent les Jésuites pour persécuteurs.’² ‘All the efforts,’ he observes, ‘which they made at the time of the *Provinciales* to refute the slanders of Pascal, prove clearly that the doctrines ascribed to them were not those which they applied to the direction of souls. One only among them, Père Piro, wanted to defend them, and he was disavowed by his brethren.’³ And what inducement had they to do otherwise? ‘Eh! mon Dieu,’ exclaims their defender; ‘quel intérêt auraient donc eu les Jésuites à favoriser de tels crimes, eux si purs, qu’ils pourraient presque dire à leurs ennemis, avec l’air de toute innocence: *Quis ex vobis arguat me de peccato*?’⁴ There was, in reality, ‘as has been so well observed by Comte de Maistre, no *parti de la morale relâchée* in the Church.’⁵

Now, the report of history and common belief is, that there was,—and that it was found among the Jesuits. Not, as Voltaire puts it, and the Abbé after him, a party with the deliberate plan to corrupt morals,—which, as Voltaire observes, and might have recollected before he fathered absurdities on Pascal, ‘no society ever had, or can have,’—but a party formed for the purpose of directing morals, and which, in directing them, allowed them great liberties; a party which urged virtue where they could, but compromised, on principle, with disobedience, where they could not. Pascal has made no improbable charge, and has taken care to state it in terms which keep clear of the desirable exaggeration. He has but described, in the most exquisitely organized specimen of a party, the natural malady of all parties, even religious ones; and its effects, when exhibited on so large a scale.

‘Sachez donc que leur objet n’est pas de corrompre les mœurs; ce n’est pas leur dessein. Mais ils n’ont pas aussi pour unique but celui de les reformer; ce serait une mauvaise politique. Voici quelle est leur pensée. Ils ont assez bonne opinion d’eux-mêmes pour croire qu’il est utile et comme néces-

¹ ‘Il est dit dans Bayle.’ M. Maynard weighs his words; in Bayle, not by Bayle, but by the writer of a ‘fabulous and satirical’ work, from which Bayle quotes the passage referred to, for the purpose of showing up its anachronisms.

² Vol. i. pp. 178—180.

³ Vol. i. p. 209.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 264.

⁵ Vol. i. p. 185.

saire au bien de la religion que leur crédit s'étende partout, et qu'ils gouvernent toutes les consciences. Et parceque les maximes évangéliques et sévères sont propres pour gouverner quelques sortes de personnes, ils s'en servent dans ces occasions où elles leur sont favorables. Mais comme ces mêmes maximes ne s'accordent pas au dessein de la plupart des gens, ils les laissent à l'égard de ceux-là, afin d'avoir de quoi satisfaire tout le monde. C'est pour cette raison qu'ayant affaire à des personnes de toutes sortes de conditions et de nations si différentes, il est nécessaire qu'ils aient de Casuistes assortis à toute diversité. . . . C'est par cette conduite *obligante et accommodante*, comme l'appelle le Père Pétiau, qu'ils tendent les bras à tout le monde.'—Lett. V. vol. i. pp. 218, 219.

Pascal may be elsewhere carried beyond this, in his disgust or indignation; and here he speaks as a partizan, when he implies that their 'severe directors' were but few—merely enough for a bait. M. Maynard has a right to remind us of the bright side of the Jesuits—of what they did for literature and piety—how, when Pères Annat, and Pinthereau, and Bauny were speculating or calling names in Paris, their brethren were dying at the stake of the Hurons, or under the sword of the Chinese—how the very Père Garasse, the buffoon of the *Provinciales*, asked, as a special favour, to wait on the plague-stricken people at Orleans, and died among them, and one of them. But Pascal is not unfair, if his facts are true, in making the Society, whose boasted excellence was its perfection of government, and absolute control over the very thoughts and will of its members, responsible for all that it sanctioned. The world heard a good deal, from itself, of its singular merit in this matter. It was only taking it at its word, if Pascal fixes on it what its superiors allowed their subjects to print, and obtrude with no little ostentation on the Church; if he assumes that 'un si grand corps ne subsisterait pas dans une conduite téméraire, et sans une âme 'qui le gouverne, et qui régle tous ses mouvements.' Once for all it must be said, that even in his hands the charge was not, that the Jesuit institute had not great virtues, but that it had also great vices: '*neque virtute propriâ tantum profuerunt, quantum in hoc nocuerunt, quod aliorum virtutem corruerint et perdidierint.*'

¹ 'Outre,' he proceeds, 'qu'ils ont un ordre particulier de ne rien imprimer sans l'aveu de leurs supérieurs.' 'Pascal,' answers M. Maynard, 'donne à l'approbation à laquelle sont soumis, en vertu des constitutions de S. Ignace, tous les ouvrages de ses membres, un valeur et une signification chimérique. D'abord, cette approbation est imposée communément à tous les ouvrages religieux. Quant aux Jésuites, ce n'est pas le général qui lit les ouvrages. . . mais le provincial, aidé de deux ou trois examinateurs, qui se conforment dans leur jugement aux doctrines des divers pays où ils se trouvent. Ce jugement en conséquence n'est pas plus l'impression des idées de la Société, qu'il n'est irréfragable.'—Vol. i. p. 210. It hardly does for M. Maynard to call this giving '*une valeur et signification chimérique*' to the licensing of books, when in the next page he argues from the rigour and practical success of the precautions taken, the absurdity of supposing that bad doctrine could have found its way into the order.

As to the evidence, we will only say that others of great name and authority besides Pascal spoke, at the time, as strongly as he did, both of the existence and dangers of this accommodating morality, as a feature of the time; and further, we will venture to engage that no one at this day, except he felt his position already compromised by it, would any more dream of saying a word in its justification, than he would of committing himself to the physics of the schoolmen, or the political maxims of Machiavelli. It was not Pascal who said,—*‘Certes, je ne vois rien dans le monde qui soit plus à charge à l’Eglise, que ces esprits vainement subtils, qui réduisent tout l’Evangile en problèmes, qui forment des incidents sur l’exécution de ses préceptes, qui fatiguent les casuistes par des consultations infinies, qui ne travaillent, en vérité, qu’à nous envelopper la règle des mœurs. Plus malheureux encore les docteurs indignes de ce nom, qui adhèrent à leurs sentiments, et donnent du poids à leurs folies. Ces sont des astres errants . . . ils confondent le ciel et la terre, et mêlent Jésus-Christ avec Bélial; mélange indigne de la piété Chrétienne; union monstrueuse qui déshonore la vérité, la simplicité, la pureté incorruptible du Christianisme.’* Pascal never said anything stronger: yet it was no Jansenist who wrote these words, but Bossuet, who goes on in the next paragraph to condemn with equal severity the rigour of the Jansenists: Bossuet, the man of strong good sense and impartial justice—Bossuet, in his panegyric on the very theologian, who first extracted and denounced the *Five Propositions* of Jansenius, the Grand Master of the College of Navarre, Nicolas Cornet—Bossuet, himself a director, and not an extravagantly severe one, celebrating the praises of another director, ‘whom all France knew, for he was consulted by all France,’—a theologian of the ‘ancient mark,’ as hostile to impracticable and ‘affected’ rigour, as to laxity and ‘affected ignorance.’ It was Nicolas Cornet, the enemy of Jansenism, who, according to Bossuet, showed himself equally implacable to those maxims, *‘moitié profanes et moitié saintes, moitié Chrétiennes et moitié mondaines; ou plutôt toutes mondaines et toutes profanes, parce qu’elles ne sont qu’à demi-Chrétiennes et à demi-saintes.’*

‘Nicolas Cornet,’ he goes on to say, ‘n’a jamais trouvé belles aucunes des couleurs de la Simonie . . . Il a condamné l’usure sous tous ses noms, et sous tous ses titres. Sa pudeur a toujours rougi de tous les prétextes honnêtes des engagements déshonnêtes, où il n’a épargné le fer et le feu pour éviter les périls des occasions prochaines. Les inventeurs trop subtils des vaines contentions et questions de néant, qui ne servent qu’à faire perdre, parmi des détours infinis, la trace toute droite de la vérité, lui ont paru, aussi bien qu’à S. Augustin, des hommes inconsidérés et volages—*“sufflantes pulverem et excitantes terram in oculos suos.”* Ces chicanes raffinées, ces subtilités en vaines distinctions, sont véritablement de la poussière soufflée, de la terre dans les

yeux, qui ne font que troubler la vue. Enfin il n'a écouté aucun expédient pour accorder l'esprit et la chair, entre lesquels nous avons appris que la guerre doit être immortelle."

So wrote Bossuet in 1663. After an interval of many years, we find him still in the same mind. In the General Assembly of 1700 we find him urging, with all the earnestness and force of his character, the condemnation by the authority of the whole French Church of those 'monstrous opinions, which had so long 'caused scandal to the Church and to Europe, and which 'offended the sanctity of Christian morality in its purest and 'most certain maxims;' and he adds that, 'Si, contre toute 'vraisemblance, et par des considérations qu'il ne voulait ni 'supposer ni admettre, l'Assemblée se refusait à prononcer un 'jugement digne de l'Eglise Gallicane, *seul, il révélerait la voix 'dans un si pressant danger; seul, il révélerait à toute la terre 'une si honteuse prévarication; seul, il publierait la censure de tant 'd'erreurs monstrueuses.*'² Could Pascal have said more?

Bossuet saw a '*parti de la morale relâchée*' in the Church. He talked, as M. Maynard tells us, of 'two dangerous maladies 'which had afflicted in his days the body of the Church—one 'an extreme severity; the other, *une malheureuse et inhumaine 'complaisance, qui a pris quelques docteurs, une pitié meurtrière, 'qui leur a fait porter des coussins sous les coudes de pécheurs, 'chercher des couvertures à leurs passions, pour condescendre à 'leur vanité, et flatter leur ignorance affectée.*' And where did he find these doctors, whom, at the close of his career, he thought it his duty to impeach before the assembled Clergy of France? M. Maynard shall interpret Bossuet's words, for he named no one.³ It was among the Jesuits—the Jesuits, whom as an order he honoured, and among whom he had many friends.

But was it fair to lay all this on the Jesuits? It is true that Pascal attacked as peculiar to the Jesuits a system of casuistry

¹ Bossuet, 'Oraison Funèbre de Nicolas Cornet,' 1663, vol. xi. pp. 201, 203.

² Bausset, 'Hist. de Bossuet,' l. xi. No. 7.

³ 'These ideas prevailed in the Assembly of 1700—a great number of propositions were there denounced as being the doctrine of a party dangerous to Catholic morality. This was, on the part of the Jansenists of the Assembly, a lie; a mistake, and blind acquiescence, on the part of the rest, and even of Bossuet. How could Bossuet have said, that, if people spoke against Jansenism, without at the same time repressing the errors of the other party, the manifest iniquity of so visible a partiality would make men despise such a judgment, and think that there was the wish to spare half the evil?... What was this *other party*? Bossuet talked, indeed, of *priests and religions, of all orders and all habits*, but he used the words as a blind; and, in spite of this prudent generalization, no one could be understood but the Jesuits, who alone had been the subjects of discussion for half a century, and whose authors had furnished nearly all the propositions submitted to the censure. It is true that Louis XIV. forbade the mention by name of the Jesuits in the censure, but all the world understood perfectly well who was meant.'—Vol. i. pp. 185, 186.

run to seed, which was pursued by theologians of other orders, and which was at least highly respected by the authorities of the Church. But it is true also, that no order did so much with it as the Jesuits. No order pursued it so systematically, with so much zest, and such unintermitting purpose.¹ It was one of their instruments in gaining that reputation of which no order ever made such parade,—the reputation for skill in directing consciences. They had no right to complain that the '*Praxis secundum Societatis Jesu*,' should be presented in as prominent and strong a light by others as the boasts of the '*Imago primi sæculi*' had been by themselves. They had no right to decline the odium of representing casuistry, who had claimed its first honours.

M. Maynard starts, as we see, with denying *in toto* the historical fact of the corruption either of doctrine or morals. But we shall understand him better when we know what principles guide his judgment. What Pascal thought once of putting into the mouth of his '*bon père*,'—'*Accordez-moi ce principe, que la Société et l'Eglise courent même fortune, et je vous prouverai tout*,'²—expresses without irony M. Maynard's view. That the Jesuits could not have been wrong, he maintains, follows from the broad fact that their doctrines were simply those of the Church. He states it as incontestable that what the Jesuits held, and their opponents attacked,—making allowance for open questions and individual mistakes, corrected as soon as noticed,—was but what every good Catholic now takes for granted. He lays down in strong terms, that in reality the '*Jesuits have no doctrine of their own*. They attach '*themselves immovably to the decisions of the Church*'; for the '*rest, either they follow the doctrines which are most commonly authorized, or in case of a divergence of opinions, they embrace the sentiment which pleases each, in all the liberty of thought*,'³

Thus with the famous doctrine of Probability. As Pascal represents it, it is a curious perversion of the principle of authority—the application of it to legitimize doubt and licence. M. Maynard states, as its characteristic rule, that you may follow the *less* probable, as well as the *less* safe side, provided it is really probable. Such a rule is obviously vague enough to admit any application, from the boldest truism to the most bare-faced quibble. As expounded by Liguori, the S. Thomas of the modern school, it seems to be simply a theory to provide for and justify the natural and legitimate liberty of individual acts.

¹ Ste. Beuve, vol. iii. p. 67.

² Faugère, Fragments, vol. i. p. 297.

³ Vol. i. p. 211.

It does not seem to come to more than that when a *law* is uncertain, a man is not bound to its most rigid sense, but is left freely to other guidance. It is a poor and clumsy theory, based on the application to human life in general, of the maxims of equitable interpretation of *law* between man and man, or subject and ruler. But it does not present the singular features of Pascal's representation. It is otherwise, however, when we turn to the Casuists from whom he drew. There we recognise what he describes; there, what is prominent is, not the scope and purport of the theory, but the *practical idea and test of what is probable*, and its value in settling questions of conscience. There, the common sense rule of following a wiser or better man than ourselves when we can do nothing better, is turned into a universal and exclusive basis for conscience, and expanded into logical consequences. There we find it argued, that since it is prudent to trust those who are *in arte sua periti*, and to submit to the judgment of the wise and good, therefore it is prudent to follow Sanchez, and seventeen wise and good authors, whom he quotes, to prove the general maxim, that it is lawful in conscience to leave the *more* and follow the *less* probable opinion, even if it is less safe; that an opinion is *probable* which rests on a reason of some weight; that therefore the opinion of one good and learned doctor is probable, because such authority is not light but weighty; that one learned man may make his opinion, even to the unlearned who trusts him, more probable than the common opinion;—that the general opinion of the more recent authors cuts off, in general, appeal to older ones, as their vigilance is a sufficient guarantee that no error would be allowed to creep in;—that the same person may judge two opposite opinions equally probable.¹ Many common sense ways of acting might indeed come under these rules; but it is equally plain, that thus broadly stated, as exclusive or leading rules of any man's mind, they will lead him a long way, at least from common sense. They *may* mean anything; and their writers take no trouble to show that they *do not* mean the 'leaden rule' which they seem.

What does M. Maynard? He tells us that it was not a Jesuit but a Dominican invention, in 1598, which immediately was adopted universally in the Catholic schools, where all theologians were '*tenants passionés du Probabilisme*.'² He gives his own

¹ Filliuc. Tr. xxi. c. 4. nn. 128—137. ('*Pénitencier, du Pape à S. Pierre, et Casuiste en Chef du Saint-Office*,' Mayn. ii. 456.)

² Pascal might have seen a new illustration of its principles in the fact, that, according to M. Maynard, 'there was no religious order from whence issued such solid dissertations against it;' yet when Gonzalez wanted to publish his, so warmly was the company in general attached to the opinion, that they would not permit him; and Innocent XI. interposed his supreme authority in vain, *pour vaincre les opiniâtretés*; and even when Gonzalez became General of the Order, he had to publish not as General, but as an individual doctor.

exposition of 'Probabilism,' guarding it by cautions as vague as its rules. He admits Pascal's quotations. He makes no attempt to disprove his inferences, or allow us to judge by extracts whether the tone and spirit of the originals seem against them. But he charges him generally with misrepresentation, and tells us that his own, the Jesuits', and Liguori's view are all one with that of the Church. It is rather hard upon Pascal, considering that the very 'abuses' which the Church had to condemn were those which some Jesuits had allowed to pass current, and he had attacked.

'True Probabilism, which Pascal has so strangely misrepresented, confined within these limits, the Church has not condemned, nor will ever condemn; and recently she has yet further placed it out of the reach of any censure, by placing on her altars *S. Liguori*, who has, nevertheless, carried out its consequences to the very utmost.¹ In fact, apart from certain propositions condemned in some Jesuit writers, who had themselves borrowed them from older authors, there is the greatest analogy between the theology of *S. Liguori* and that with which Pascal reproaches the Society; since both one and the other are based on Probabilism, regard the diversity of opinions as allowed, useful, and even necessary; and since, moreover, the holy bishop draws from these common principles, in the way of inference, a great number of the propositions condemned in the "*Petites Lettres*" as subversive of all morality. The Church has confined itself to restraining the abuses of Probabilism, by condemning those propositions which reduced to nothing the conditions of true probability, or extended the application of the system to matters to which it is inapplicable, or drew from it forced consequences. . . . But the Church has never touched Probabilism itself; and if the Assembly of 1700 has disapproved of it, it did not pass any censure on it.'—Vol. i. pp. 197—199.

The Jesuits, M. Maynard maintains, never were, — never *would* be mistaken, except in the very best company in the Church. If they are wrong, he always takes care to say that they had *borrowed*. There is something quite amusing in the eagerness with which he transfers to the Church or her great doctors the responsibility of what Pascal attributes to the Jesuits. You cannot point out a reproach against the Jesuits, — seems to be constantly his language, — but I will find its match elsewhere, and that in the highest quarters. If the Jesuits are reproached for extravagant self-laudation in their book, '*Imago Primi Sæculi*,' M. Maynard tells us that Franciscans and Dominicans were not only equally absurd, but impious, in the same way. After apologising for the legitimate enthusiasm and poetic feelings of the young Jesuits who composed it — a family trophy of the Order — and

¹ 'It is well known that in the process of canonization all the writings of the person are examined with the most minute and most severe attention; and if there be found in them one single proposition contrary to the faith or sound morality, the cause proceeds no further, and is stopped for ever.' — (*Maynard's note*.)

reprobating the 'cruelty' 'qu'il y avait à se moquer de cette 'tendresse filiale des enfants pour leur mère, à flétrir ce bonheur 'de famille, à étouffer cette ardeur juvénile qui s'élançait avec 'tant de confiance vers le bel avenir,' &c., M. Maynard observes that Franciscans and Dominicans did worse without exciting remark:—

'Comment les Jansenistes ne voulurent-ils pas se souvenir des "Conformités de la Vie de S. François à la Vie de Jésus-Christ," par F. Barthélemy de Pise, ouvrage extravagant et même impie; de l' "Origo Seraphica Familia Franciscana," du Capucin Gonzague; des "Entraîles de la Ste. Vierge pour l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs," du Dominicain Chouques? Mais sous ce rapport, comme sous tous les autres, ce qui était excusable, même légitime, chez les enfants de S. François ou de S. Dominique, était un crime chez les fils de Loyola.'—Vol. i. p. 217.

There were Casuists, too, in the Church, he says, besides the Jesuits, and Casuists who said as strange things, though Pascal keeps it out of sight;—which, however, he scarcely did;—and the Jesuits did but follow out and perfect what had high and abundant sanction elsewhere. The Père Daniel, says M. Maynard, was able, doubtless not without some zest, to substitute for the *Jesuit* quotations in the Fifth *Provinciale* names and extracts of *Dominicans*, their keen rivals. 'Rappelons-nous,' he says, after Voltaire, (and—if the question of *degree*, and of the organization and power of the Jesuits, is set aside—with truth,) 'que les 'opinions reprochées aux Jésuites ne leur étaient point particulières, et qu'en leur substituant toutes les Universités de 'l'Europe, tous les ordres religieux qui existaient au dix-septième 'siècle, on aurait pu dire aussi bien des docteurs de Sorbonne, de 'Louvain, de Salamanque, des religieux de S. Dominique et de 'S. François, tout ce que dit Pascal des Jésuites dans les *Provinciales*.'¹ Thus, for instance, when Pascal quotes from Escobar, how you may hear mass in a very short time, namely, 'by hearing *different* portions of four masses simultaneously,' M. Maynard, in reply, points out to us that we must not smile: the opinion of which this is a consequence was considerable enough to have a history and growth, and at last the honour of a special limitation. *Dignus vindice nodus*. Viewing it as he does, we shall see in it and the kindred questions, a logical following out of certain truth—mistaken, indeed, as it has turned out, but which seemed so undeniable to all the great theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that no one ventured to oppose it except with the utmost hesitation. Thus Azor 'embraced with repugnance' that 'two successive halves made one mass,'—'entraîné, dit-il, par le nombre et le poids des autorités;,' and those who, like the Jesuits Suarez and Lugo,

¹ Vol. i. p. 212.

resisted the torrent, looked with alarm at the array of great names against them,—‘se montrent effrayés de l'autorité et du nombre de ses défenseurs.’ If it is not so now, it is because Innocent XI. proscribed it; since which time, no theologian has defended it. We may admire, in passing, the singular mode of thought which affects not to be able to see the right and wrong of such a question, except by going to the Pope's decision; and excuses the wrong opinion as quite defensible, till condemned by him.

‘Ces diverses décisions ne sont pas également absurdes. *Il a été longtemps reçu, parmi les théologiens, qu'on satisfaisait au précepte par l'audition successive de deux moitiés de messe; et ce sentiment, quoique faux, n'a jamais été condamné. Puis on a prétendu que cela serait vrai quand même l'ordre des parties serait interverti. Enfin, par une mauvaise conséquence d'une doctrine certaine, qu'on peut satisfaire simultanément au précepte de l'audition de la messe et au précepte de la récitation de l'office divin, et d'une doctrine probable qu'on satisfait par l'audition d'une seule messe à une triple obligation, provenant, par exemple, du précepte ecclésiastique, d'un vœu, de la pénitence sacramentelle, on en est venu à soutenir qu'on pouvait simultanément entendre deux ou plusieurs parties de messe, ce qui détruit entièrement l'intégrité du sacrifice.* Cette doctrine a été proscrire par Innocent XI. (59^{me} Prop.), [*Satisfacit præcepto Ecclesie de audiendo sacro qui duas ejus partes, imo quatuor, simul a diversis celebrantibus audit;*];—et depuis aucun théologien ne l'a défendu. Mais elle était auparavant fort commune, car on la trouve ainsi formulée dans presque tous les auteurs du seizième et du commencement du dix-septième siècle, Soto, Navarre, Medina, [Dominicans,] et ceux même qui embrassent un sentiment contraire, comme les Jésuites Suarez et De Lugo, se montrent effrayés de l'autorité et du nombre de ses défenseurs. Remarquons pourtant qu'on n'en faisait l'application qu'au précepte de l'Eglise; et que ses partisans eux-mêmes généralement en condamnaient la pratique.’—Vol. i. p. 439.

‘O mon père!’ cries Pascal also, tout effrayé, as he says, —and as a Frenchman well might be,—at the list of distinguished Casuists with extraordinary names cited by his bon père!—‘O mon père! tous ces gens-là, étaient-ils Chrétiens?’ ‘Comment, Chrétiens!’ is the tart reply; ‘ne vous disais-je que ‘ce sont les seuls par lesquels nous gouvernons aujourd'hui ‘toute la Chrétienté?’ M. Maynard is not pleased with the joke. ‘Ces noms barroques,’ he says, ‘que cite ici Pascal, et ‘qu'il livre à la risée publique, sont ceux des docteurs encore ‘estimés par tous les théologiens, de saints évêques, et même ‘d'hommes de génie, comme Suarez.’ There is truth and pertinence in the remark. It is Pascal against the great names of the Roman Church: he must be wrong, because he attacked them.

But it is convenient, in a conflict of diversified aspect, to have friends of different sorts, both too great to be attacked, and also not too great to be sacrificed; the one, to bear down

¹ Lett. V.

charges in the general, the other, to carry them off when they become pressing, in the particular. Vasquez and Suarez may confound Pascal by their imposing authority; still there are quotations for which the other sort are useful. He always thinks of Escobar and Bauny being obscure writers when he comes to some inconvenient quotation. 'Bauny is not a *savant Casuiste*,' he says, testily, when Pascal's Jesuit, *ce stupide interlocuteur de Pascal*, describes him as '*pénétrant dans le pour et le contre d'une même question, et trouvant raison partout*.'¹ Escobar is a *bonhomme, qui a trop, beaucoup trop écrit*. He gets quite impatient with such authorities. '*Encore Bauny! Que c'est ennuyeux*.'—'*Escobar, toujours Escobar, et rien qu'Escobar*.' What is Escobar, flanked by Bauny, to represent the Society? In Escobar and Bauny, he finds all that it is necessary to give up. Not that this, after all, is very much; for the reason is always at hand, that their words are quoted by Pascal in an '*abstraction scandalisante*;' that the point of them was blunted by restrictions and conditions; that confessors knew what was meant; that they expressed themselves ill. But when Escobar decides that 'a man may satisfy the Church precept by going to mass, with the intention also of indulging bad thoughts';² or a 'judge receive bribes to pay particular attention to a cause';³ or 'that a man may evade the law of fasting in certain cases, for the reason that no one is bound to alter the order of his meals';⁴ and when Bauny blunders into awkward vagueness about '*occasions prochaines*,'⁵ or says that, if a man begs a soldier to beat his neighbour or burn his barn, he is not bound to compensation, because it is not his act—he not having *forced* the soldier to do it, whom nothing obliged but his own *bonté, douceur, facilité*—M. Maynard gives up such decisions, and laughs with Pascal⁶ at the *bonté* and *douceur* of the burner of barns,—'*for there is nothing else to be done*.' But he insists, that from such insignificant authorities no harm could ever come. The obvious answer is, that, whether absurd or not, they were popular. P. Bauny's *Somme des Péchés*, a large book of a thousand pages,⁷ was in a sixth edition. '*A qui la faute, si ce n'est à vous, qui lui avez donné sa célébrité?*' says M. Maynard, when Pascal talks of the many reprints of Escobar; there might possibly be some colour in the rejoinder, if we were not informed, on other authority, that, of the *forty-two* editions of Escobar, *forty-one* appeared *before*, and *one after*, the date of the *Provinciales*.⁸

¹ Vol. i. p. 284.² Vol. i. p. 437.³ Vol. i. pp. 353, 351.⁴ Vol. i. p. 231.⁵ Vol. i. p. 236.⁶ Vol. i. p. 367.⁷ Vol. i. p. 293.⁸ 'La cherté ou du moins la curiosité s'y mit en effet. Escobar avait été imprimé quarante-et-une fois avant 1656 : il le fut une quarante-deuxième fois en 1656, grâce aux Provinciales.'—Ste. Beuve, vol. iii. p. 52. Hallam, vol. ii. p. 500, speaks of forty editions, and gives the date 1646.

But even Escobar and Bauny M. Maynard is loth to resign to the cruelties of Pascal. 'Mon Dieu!' he cries, 'la doctrine de Bauny fut-elle si relâchée,'¹ that Pascal should risk the honour of the priesthood by revealing his eccentric decisions to the world? '*Nous avons pitié de ce pauvre père Bauny, si maltraité par Pascal, et qu'à notre grand regret nous serons obligé de condamner nous-mêmes en d'autres circonstances.*' So of Escobar, he draws a touching, and possibly a true picture, as a man of boundless and not very accurate labour, undertaken with the kindest intentions, and, like many other good men, perfectly unconscious that, with so much learning, he could say anything ridiculous or mischievous. It is at least a very probable representation. Doubtless Escobar would never have written as he did, but for greater men than Escobar, who set the fashion and showed him the way. Escobar was obviously a man who would never have dreamed of going beyond the spirit or ideas of the atmosphere in which he worked, or the authorities who were his daily and nightly study, and in whom his profound admiration saw a counterpart to the Apocalyptic Vision. If he improved upon them, he had learned from those whom he surpassed the taste for improving on them. He could not understand what harm or what excess there could be in decisions which, in full accordance with a received system, he made in pure charity.² He was astonished, we are told, at his *triste célébrité*. But he is none the worse a representative of what the system of speculating on morality, and that for the practical purposes of the confessional, had been allowed to come to. He showed the use that could be made of the Casuists, as Pascal's conversations show the use that *could be* made of such men as Escobar, (for the *Père Jésuite* of the Letters is a dramatized Escobar,) and, we must add, from the plain historical facts of the period, the use that *was* made of them. And after all, even Escobar is an authority. 'Enfin Saint Liguori cite avec respect *la plupart des Casuistes de Pascal*, et même Escobar, l'homme *aux vingt-quatre vieillards, et aux quatre animaux.*'³

In truth, we must take the liberty of thinking that it is ludicrous to suppose that Escobar would have been allowed to go on writing, and booksellers to go on reprinting, these curious questions and answers, if he had said anything that was so very repugnant to the current notions of those in power in the Order, or in the Church itself. Quite another account would have been given of him if his licences and eccentricities had taken another turn, if he had spoken of the right and sanctions of ecclesiastical precepts, as he did of the *way of satisfying* them;

¹ Vol. i. pp. 284, 285.
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² Vol. ii. p. 454.
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³ Vol. i. p. 208.

if he had taken the explanatory liberties with the Pope's divine right he did with the modes of fasting and hearing mass, or had been as vague in his doctrine about transubstantiation as about '*occasions prochaines*.' Writers did not escape the censure, because they were small people. P. Bauny was, in fact, put in the *Index*. As for himself, *ce pauvre Père Bauny*, 'ce bon père, 'si commode, dont on disait, en le voyant, *Ecce qui tollit peccata mundi!*' it must be said that he snapped his fingers at the *Index*: '*Qu'a de commun la censure de Rome avec celle de France?*' a remark which, as M. Maynard informs us, 'tient à 'un principe Gallican, que nous n'aimons pas, mais toléré par 'Rome elle-même, que l'*Index* n'oblige pas en France.' But according to M. Maynard's view, it was mainly its Erastianism, not its laxity, that led to its condemnation at Rome:—

'Ici on doit remarquer qu'un livre est quelquefois mis à l'*Index* pour une simple formalité omise dans l'impression, ou bien pour quelque principe peu conforme à certaines maximes des Casuistes d'Italie, par exemple, celui du P. Bauny touchant la juridiction des officiers civils sur les clercs; et il paraît qu'on apporta ce motif pour presser la censure de la Somme des Péchés; ce qui n'empêche pas cependant que cet ouvrage ne soit condamnable à d'autres égards, et ne renferme quelques propositions relâchées qui lui valurent la réprobation des évêques de France.'—Vol. i. p. 148.

This, however, according to M. Maynard, is the state of the fact. The Jesuits held nothing but what the Church holds, and therefore have a right to throw their responsibility on her. But the most important point yet remains. What does he tell us of the standard itself, to which he brings these doctrines? In the Letters, an easy theory of religion is contrasted with a strict one. Does M. Maynard mean that the Jesuit theory could not have been the easy one, because it was that of the Church; or that though it was an easy one, it must be right, because it is that of the Church? We must think that M. Maynard has been more resolute in ascribing the Jesuit doctrines to the Church, than successful in disproving that these doctrines were what are usually accounted easy ones.

It is suspicious at starting to find M. Maynard sympathising so strongly with the devotional works criticised by Pascal. He reminds us that the Jesuits had produced something better. But what appeared to Pascal sentimental trifling in the one, and a substitution of childish superstition to S. Mary for real religion in the other, appears to M. Maynard as the very counterpart of modern piety. If he had retorted on Pascal, in return for the cruel immortalizing of the '*Dévotion Aisée*' and the poet of '*Delphine*,' that, after all, that all his wit had been spent on a poor ordinary theological fop of an age of bad taste, a harmless and smirking hanger-on at tea-tables to find them in divinity and wit, it would have been intelligible, if not fair. Not so,

however, M. Maynard; on taste and theology both, he is at issue with Pascal. P. Le Moyne, he thinks, with a little less exuberance of imagination and language, 'might have become a great poet.' He cannot see what he so happily terms, the '*ton musquée et galant*' of Pascal's quotations. The '*Dévotion Aisée*' is *aimable, charmant, délicieux*; its language *ravissant*; its histories like the *doux babil d'un enfant*.' When P. Le Moyne said, that by the rules of true devotion, virtue had been made '*plus facile que la vice, et plus aisée que la volupté*,' and '*le simple vivre incomparablement plus malaisé que le bien vivre*,' he spoke of the joys of a good conscience, and the pains of vice and ambition. When he sneered at melancholy devotees, who thought of nothing but a dreary asceticism, he only meant Port-Royal. We can only say, that it shows that P. Le Moyne and M. Maynard are kindred spirits.

P. Barry's book, '*Le Paradis ouvert à Philagie par cent Dévotions à la Mère de Dieu*,' he gives up, in a literary point of view; but, on the other hand, its spirit, its theology, the devotional practices which it recommends,—some of them, says M. Maynard, of such simplicity, that they make us smile, *esprits forts* that we are, but all authorized by the example of some great saint,—are most edifying. The following shows the principle on which he answers Pascal:—

'Pascal voudrait-il dire que le Père Barry, dans son aveugle confiance, a présenté des pratiques toutes matérielles comme des moyens infailibles de sanctification, sans qu'il fut nécessaire d'y joindre le *plus petit mouvement* de cœur, le *moindre effort* de la volonté? Il l'insinue méchamment; mais c'est une calomnie. "*Donnez tout le cœur à la Mère d'amour*, dit Barry, avec *protestation qu'aucune créature ne le possédera*." Et que fait-il autre chose en tout

¹ 'Le livre de la *Dévotion Aisée*, du Père Le Moine, est une aimable et charmant petit livre; après les ouvrages de Saint François de Sales, nous n'en connaissons pas de plus délicieux, ni de plus encourageant pour la faiblesse humaine. Aussi ce livre fut-il parfaitement accueilli; et dès son apparition, le goût public lui fit une célébrité. Le Père Le Moine n'était pas seulement un saint religieux, mais un homme d'esprit, et un homme du monde. Il parlait à ceux qu'il voulait amener à la pratique de la dévotion, le seul langage qu'il convint de leur tenir. Ce langage fut entendu, le petit livre fut dévoré sans que personne se sentit du poison qu'il contenait; le Jansénisme fut jaloux de ce succès. La facilité de cette dévotion ne consista pas à lui allier des choses coupables ou dangereuses, mais à montrer qu'elle peut s'unir à toutes les conditions honnêtes de la vie, et qu'elle n'est pas incompatible avec les joies et les plaisirs qu'avoue la vertu... *que la religion n'est pas essentiellement cette Thébaïde, ces terreurs, ces desespoirs que rêvait le Jansénisme*, mais que si quelques-uns sont appelés à cette sombre perfection, les autres peuvent le sanctifier dans des conditions communes. Pouvait-on dire autre chose aux gens de monde! et ce langage, n'est-il pas plus propre à faire des Chrétiens que la morale alambiquée dans St. Cyran?... Pour nous, nous aimons ce petit livre, et parcequ'il peut faire du bien à beaucoup d'âmes, et parcequ'il est un véritable curiosité littéraire; nous aimons ces histoires naïves qui ressemblent au doux babil d'un enfant s'entretenant avec son père, et nous ne songeons pas à jeter une pédante critique au-devant de notre admiration... Nous plaignions les esprits revêches et farouches de Port-Royal, de n'avoir pu goûter ce qui nous paraît si charmant et si gracieux.'—Vol. i. pp. 395—404.

son livre, sinon inviter Philagie à consacrer à Marie toutes ses puissances intérieures? Et dans l'endroit même où Pascal est allé chercher ce *petit esclave* si attaché aux créatures, Barry s'écrie: "Donnez-lui votre cœur sans partage, tel qu'il est, et dites-lui ce peu de paroles: 'Sait une consécration à la Ste Vierge, où le cœur est donné sans réserve et avec une effusion charmante.'"—Vol. i. p. 391.

Undoubtedly Père Barry recommends us to consecrate our whole heart to S. Mary,—in words, it may be observed, than which no other can be imagined to express devotion of ourselves to God; but this is no disproof of Pascal's charge, that in default of this consecration, something as short of it as saluting her image, or pronouncing her name, will avail. Père Binet's little book is, it seems, quite an anticipation of modern ideas and feelings:—

'At the moment when the arduous and overwhelming questions of predestination were agitated in the theological world, the Père Binet thought, with reason, that he would do better to leave on one side all these disputes, in which we may lose faith without ever deriving from them a virtue, in order to point out the practical means of arriving at eternal salvation; and he composed his book, entitled *Marque de Prédestination*, which he dedicated to Cardinal Bellarmine. Among all the means of salvation he chose the devotion to the holy Virgin. *This book seems to have been written for our age, and to contain a sort of prophecy of the wonders which we have seen accomplished in our days by the devotion to Mary.* "When all the world was lost," says Binet, in his first page, "God sent Mary on the earth, and by her He gave us Jesus Christ, the author of all our good. Now that all the world seems rushing to its ruin, nothing can assure us so much as *that the devotion of this worthy Mother of God should begin to flourish again in the Church, and that by her intercession God should be favourable to us, and inflame our hearts again.*" All this, it appears, did not please Port-Royal, which preferred plunging into the abysses of grace and predestination rather than simply committing itself to the hands of Mary. Port-Royal did not openly condemn the devotion to the holy Virgin, but as this has something affectionate and tender, which suited not with its doctrines, it preferred a terror, a trembling before God. Consequently, *with reference to certain books which spoke of the worship of the holy Virgin, as we all speak of it, we Christians in 1851, Port-Royal set itself to ridicule certain simple practices, not seeing that impiety would gather up its sarcasms, to turn them against all devotion.* Port-Royal it is which has torn from us that simple confidence, that childhood of faith, those sweet tears of prayer, which are to our critical minds and dried-up hearts, but a charming recollection, when they are not an object of ridicule. We have read Père Binet's little book, and without blushing we confess that it has interested us. To prove his thesis, that the devotion to the holy Virgin is a great mark of predestination, he goes through all the figures of the Bible, all the passages of sacred literature and of the Fathers, where there is allusion to the greatness, powers, and the mercies of Mary. He develops especially that thought, familiar to S. Bernard, that God has given us everything by her, and that this order is henceforth unchangeable; that she is our advocate and our patroness, and that her true servants cannot perish.'—Vol. i. pp. 391—393.

Whether there are not differences between what is childlike and what is childish in religion; whether it matters or not *how*, and *on what object*, the religious affections are exercised, so that

they *are* exercised; whether it be right or not to encourage religious practices and belief by what is apocryphal, must still remain questions while the divisions of Christendom remain. But it can be no question whether what Pascal, as a Roman Catholic, repudiates as a degrading self-deceit, M. Maynard, as a Roman Catholic, accepts both as beautiful in spirit, and as the acknowledged devotional idea of his own time.

From worship and devotion, let us go to practice. The following is an incidental sketch, by one who had good means of observing, of the religion of the day in the time of Louis XIV. It seems to be the echo of Pascal's interpretation of the '*Dévotion Aisée*,' and the '*Paradis Ouvert*,' as opening to the world, '*des moyens d'assurer son salut, assez faciles, assez sûr, et en assez grand nombre.*'

'J'ai appris avec beaucoup de plaisir que M. le Comte de Gramont a recouvré sa première santé, et acquis une dévotion nouvelle. Jusqu'ici, je me suis contenté grossièrement d'être homme de bien; il faut faire quelque chose de plus; et je n'attends que votre exemple pour être dévot. *Vous vivez dans un pays où l'on a de merveilleux avantages pour se sauver. Le vice n'y est guère moins opposé à la mode qu'à la vertu. Pécher, c'est ne savoir pas vivre, et choquer la bienséance autant que la religion.* Ceux qui n'ont pas assez de considération pour l'autre vie sont conduits au salut par les égards et les devoirs de celle-ci. C'en est assez sur une matière où la conversion de M. de Gramont en a engagé: je la crois sincère et hounête. Il sied bien à un homme qui n'est pas jeune d'oublier qu'il l'a été.'

The passage is from a letter to the notorious Ninon de l'Enclos, from S. Evremond, the old favourite of Ninon and of Marion Delorme, the master of gay and easy philosophy in the court of Charles II., and of whom, in proof, we must observe, of his religion, his biographer¹ writes, that 'though very worldly in his morality, he had always held it as a principle to respect religion, and made outward profession of the Catholic faith. He would never allow it to be turned into a matter of pleasantry.'²

Whatever doubt there may be as to the meaning of making

¹ Biog. Univ.—'S. Evremond.'

² 'La seule bienséance,' he said, 'et le respect qu'on doit à ses concitoyens, ne le permettait pas.' The writer quotes the passage we have given, as a proof of his religion, and proceeds to add, that if we could have any doubts 'on the subject of his religion, his will would dispel them, in which he "implores the mercy of God," and leaves a pious legacy for poor Catholics;' and then cites the following verses of S. Evremond on himself:—

'De justice et de charité,
Beaucoup plus que de pénitence,
Il compose sa piété.

'Mettant en Dieu sa confiance,
Espérant tout de sa bonté,
Dans le sein de la Providence
Il trouve son repos et sa félicité.'

'*la dévotion plus facile que le vice, et plus aisée que la volupté,*' in the mouth of a priest, there can be little—whether it be irony or earnest—about its meaning in the mouth of a wit. Yet when M. Maynard wants to convey what he considers a just and true view of religious strictness, in contrast to the rigour and Puritanism of Port-Royal, he goes to seek it in a dialogue between S. Evremond and one of his friends:—

'Elles font,'—says D'Aubigny to S. Evremond, in the conversation between them in St. Evremond's works, speaking of the doctrines of Port-Royal,—'Elles font une violence éternelle à la nature; elles ôtent de la religion ce qui nous console; elles y mettent la crainte, la douleur, le désespoir. Les Jansénistes, voulant faire des saints de tous les hommes, n'en trouvent pas dix dans un royaume, pour faire des Chrétiens tels qu'ils les veulent. Le Christianisme est divin, mais ce sont des hommes qui le reçoivent; et quoi qu'on fasse, il faut s'accommoder à l'humanité. Une philosophie trop austère fait peu de sage; une politique trop rigoureuse peu de bons sujets; une religion trop dure, peu d'âmes religieuses qui le soient long temps. Rien n'est durable, qui ne s'accommode à la nature. La grâce dont nous parlons tant, s'y accommode elle-même; Dieu se sert de la docilité de notre esprit, et de la tendresse de notre cœur, pour se faire recevoir et se faire aimer. Il est certain que les docteurs trop rigides donnent plus d'aversion pour eux que pour les péchés. La pénitence qu'ils prêchent fait préférer la facilité qu'il y a de demeurer dans le vice, aux difficultés qu'il y a d'en sortir.'—Vol. i. p. 202.

Here is a man of the world's view of religion, and the wisdom of this world speaks in it. It was, no doubt, the view of the Court of Louis XIV. M. Maynard offers it as the view of the Church. It is a strange way of expressing the indulgence and condescension of religion. This, says M. Maynard, the Jansenists ignored; and we believe that it is partly true. But if the Jansenists, in reviving the old ideas about penitence, forgot that the Gospel had an indulgent side, those whom they opposed seem to have forgotten that it has a stern one; and what is more, M. Maynard, at this day, in his defence of them, forgets it too. If the Jansenists spoke to all the world the same language, and bound weak as well as strong to counsels of perfection, most assuredly the Casuists spoke as if the mass of Christians were dispensed from all but the veriest shadows of religion, and as if it were necessary to the success of religion that the 'gate' should be declared to be *not* 'strait,' and the 'way' not 'narrow.' And the theologian of the nineteenth century tells us that they were right.

Let us take first M. Maynard's view of perhaps the most prominent feature of the Roman practical system—their system of penitence.

The great feature of the Port-Royalist directors was, that penitence to be effectual must be real and searching; and that the sacraments without this effectual penitence availed nothing.

Here M. Maynard sees the root of their error. In opposition to it he thus states the Jesuit principle:—

‘Understanding a little better the redemption of love, the admirable economy of the Sacraments, those sacred channels which place us in communication with the source of divine graces, *the Jesuits urged men to the participation of the divine mysteries, with the same ardour as the Jansenists displayed in turning them away.* They were convinced with the Church, that nowhere else was there succour for the weakness, or medicine for the wounds of the soul. Jansenism abandoned man to his own resources, while it looked on his faculties as annihilated by sin. The Jesuits, more consistent, bade him walk with God, and borrow continually from the treasures prepared by God’s mercy, the supply needed by his own powers, weakened indeed, but not destroyed. Men, gifted at once with a practical sense of life, and with a boundless charity, on the one hand *they dreamed not of a chimerical perfection, and thought not of transforming the world into a Thebaid, and driving all Christians into the desert:* and on the other, they repelled no one, offering themselves to heal the deepest wounds of the soul, as well as its ailments and its weaknesses, making themselves “all things to all men,” like S. Paul, and feeling themselves obliged to continue the ministry of the Master, who came not to call the righteous, but sinners.’

‘Persuaded that the sinner, if no one holds out a hand, will plunge deeper and deeper into vice, and fall soon into an irrecoverable impenitence, they were eager to snatch him from evil, to interrupt, at least, his sinful habits, to give him, by some act of virtue, a taste of the virtue which he knows not. They did not demand, for admission to reconciliation, those interior dispositions, which even the most perfect do not always attain, and which, consequently, are to him well nigh impossible, in his state of sin and disfavour with God; but only that he should actually place no obstacle in the way of the effect of the Sacrament, whatever might be his future miserable falls, (*quelles que dussent être ses misères futures;*) and they left to grace the care of fortifying his weakness, of rendering his backslidings, at first less frequent, then rare, till he should arrive in due time at a perfect conversion, and the sinner become a saint.’

‘It was possible to abuse this charitable tolerance; who doubts it? Men might sometimes find in the facility of pardon an encouragement to vice; who denies it? But the evil was the exception in this system of direction, while it was the good which was the exception in that of the Jansenists. For one sinner who changed the divine remedy into poison, a thousand found in it recovery and life; for one sinner who would consent to follow the long and painful way opened by Jansenism to reconciliation, a thousand refused to take the first step, and excusing themselves on the ground of the impossibility of virtue, fixed their permanent abode in vice, or fell into despair.’

‘It is not necessary to be a theologian, nor even a Christian, to understand that: it is enough to be a man, and therefore, we leave with confidence to men of the world who may read us, the business of pronouncing between Jansenius and Loyola.’

The appeal to men of the world on a question of strictness of direction is curious. But we would not have M. Maynard too sure of their verdict. They admire strictness, in theory, at least; and they might, moreover, be apt to think that, if confession and penance cannot be worked on a large scale strictly and really, without driving the masses from the altar, or to hang themselves, they may be dispensed with on a large scale altogether. And what, in fact, was the case in that seventeenth

century, when the 'Jesuits had the monopoly of direction, which they held exclusively of the public confidence?'¹ M. Maynard asks, indeed, 'Does any one believe that morals were 'more relaxed at the time when Probabilism was the doctrine 'of nearly all the schools, than in our own, when we hypocritically protest against it?''²—'Quant aux hommes de bien, qu'importe un système spéculatif? . . . Nous concluons donc hardiment que ces systèmes de morale, dont on peut éternellement disputer, n'ont aucune influence sérieuse sur la conduite 'de la vie.' But it is he who tells us this was such an epoch of licentiousness and impiety, that it is a fair argument against the reality of the feeling raised by Pascal on the subject of the bad maxims, 'that there was not sufficient moral sense left to be really revolted by them.'³ If the fact were not notorious, we should learn even from him of the steady progress of irreligion throughout the seventeenth century—of Père Mersenne's⁴ calculation of the number of atheists in 1623,—60,000 in France, 50,000 in Paris, 12 in a single house; of the 'hypocritical reserves which the severe and morose piety of' the great pupil of the Jesuits, 'Louis XIV., as he grew old, imposed on profligacy;' and how to these 'hypocritical reserves,' and this 'severe and morose piety,' succeeded the days of the Regent Orleans and Louis XV.—days of blasphemy and abomination, probably never equalled since the world was made. We must add, however, that he lays this to the account of the Provincial Letters!

Such is the broad principle on which the Jesuit system of direction is defended. To make penitence a work which may alarm the half-hearted, is not only sneered at as '*transforming the world into a Thebaid*,' but plainly stated to be an intentional blow at religion; and to urge on men in general the moral discipline of religion, is to deny the grace, and abolish the use of the Sacraments—to 'abandon man to his own resources.' Indeed, as to what was, *in fact*, the Jesuit principle, there is little difference between Pascal and M. Maynard.⁵

¹ Vol. i. p. 34.

² Vol. i. p. 200.

³ Vol. i. p. 203.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 61.

⁵ 'Take away,' he says, 'from the following statement, the exaggeration, the tone of irony, the spiteful insinuations, and you will have in fact the principle of the Jesuits in the conduct of souls,—the principle which he tells us is the principle of the Church. 'Alas!' says the *bon père*, in the Sixth Provinciale,—'alas! it would have been our first object to establish no maxims but those of the Gospel in all their strictness: and it may be seen sufficiently by the regularity of our own morals, that if we suffer some laxity in others, it is rather by condescension than by design. We are forced to it. Men are now so corrupt, that since we cannot make them come to us, we must go to them; otherwise they would leave us: they would do worse, they would give themselves up altogether. And it is to keep hold on them that our Casuists have taken into consideration the vices to which men

Accordingly the Jesuits' great boast was that they had made confession popular by their system. They had won back to the Roman Church that *prestige* of popular religion which for a time the Reformation had claimed. 'We are overwhelmed,' they say in the *Imago Primi Sæculi*,—*obruimur*,—'by the number of penitents.' With a confidence only equalled by Luther's *Pecca fortiter*, and equally likely to be misunderstood, they protest that—singular change in this sinful world of ours!—men had become more eager to confess than to commit sin, '*Alacrius multo atque ardentius scelera jam expiantur quam ante solebant committi.*' Nothing was more common, '*nil magis moribus receptum,*' than monthly or weekly confession. Many '*no sooner contract a stain than they wash it out.*' Here is an account, indeed, of a popular religion, which M. Maynard does not except to—'*les jeunes Jésuites vantent avec raison,*'—though he charges Pascal, as usual, with '*falsifying*' it, not because he misquotes it, but because he supplies the reason of it.

But how was this brought about? What was that '*pietatis sollertia*,' that '*religiosa calliditas*,' of which the Jesuits boasted? '*Pieuses et saintes finesses*,' '*artifices de dévotion*,' '*adoucissements de confession*,'—these are Pascal's interpretations. 'Admirables paroles!' on the contrary, says M. Maynard, '*qui n'expriment pas d'autres subtilités, ou d'autres finesses que celles de Jésus-Christ même.*' What Pascal denounces, as irreligious, M. Maynard accepts as necessary and Catholic. Thus the Jesuit authorities cited by Pascal seem only intent on removing every obstacle to the facility of absolution. M. Maynard quarrels with Pascal's use of the passages; he says, what is true, that Filiuci and his brethren say something besides this; but still, that they do say this, he allows, and justifies it. A man, he says, kneels down, confesses with shame his faults; says that he is sorry for them; that he has a firm resolution of not committing them again; on the other hand, he is not in any '*occasion prochaine*,' and *nothing proves that he has any affection for sin.* Why not believe him, and absolve him? *You have believed his confession, why not believe his promises.* '*Disons enfin, que dans la pratique on est souvent obligé d'en agir ainsi. Pascal pouvait ignorer; mais les prêtres d'expérience, les missionnaires surtout, le savent bien.*' (ii. 19.) So, again, Suarez and Filiuci are quoted as saying:—

are most inclined in all conditions of life, in order to establish maxims so mild, without at the same time doing violence to truth, that persons must be hard to please if they are not satisfied with them; for the leading design which our Society has in view for the good of religion, is not to repel any one, whoever he may be, in order not to drive the world to despair.'

'That "the priest is obliged to believe his penitent on his word," and, "that it is not necessary that the confessor should persuade himself that the resolution of his penitent will be fulfilled, nor that he himself judge that it probably will; but it is enough that he think that he has at the moment the intention in general, though he may relapse in a very short time." And it is thus that all our authors teach: *Ita docent omnes autores.*'

On which the comment is:—

'It is, alas! but too certain that the confessor must often act thus, under the alternative of reconciling sinners but rarely, and leaving them to besot themselves in their vicious habits. But, by the grace of absolution (which is supposed to be always given, in cases of sufficient disposition), relapses will soon become less frequent, and the conversion finish by being complete.'

Even the startling sentiment, that 'absolution may be given 'to him who avows that the hope of being absolved had led 'him to sin with more ease than if he had not had the hope,' is thus explained:—

'*Encore Bauny! que c'est ennuyeux!* These quotations are made up of passages taken from right and left, at the interval of several folio columns. *N'importe, c'est à peu près cela.* Only Bauny adds: So that the penitent, affected with necessary sorrow, brings to confession the plan of living better: "ce qui ne veut pas dire pourtant, nous l'avouons, qu'il ne soit un peu relâché." But it is not less true, that absolution frequently repeated, will often be the only mode of rescuing a sinner from vicious habits. *The friends of God* are much stronger than his foes against their passions. The return to grace is itself a first victory, which will soon lead to a decisive triumph. There may be exceptions to this rule, this is unquestionable; but all must be left to the prudence of the confessor.'—Vol. ii. pp. 22, 23.

A curious light, this, thrown incidentally on the actual working of one of the seemingly strictest parts of the Roman system. We shall understand this better, when we examine M. Maynard's way of dealing with the subject of contrition and the love of God. Pascal quotes from P. Pinthereau the sentiment that 'all the Jesuit fathers teach, with one consent, that it 'is an error, and almost a heresy, to say that contrition is necessary, and that attrition alone, even conceived by the mere 'dread of the pains of hell, but excluding the will to sin, is not 'sufficient with the sacrament' of absolution. The pithy comment on this is, 'C'est vrai.' 'What, almost an article of faith!' cries Pascal; 'every one else has required at least some love of God to be mixed with this "attrition."' 'P. Pinthereau,' says the comment, 'does not deny it; but still this will be short of contrition.'

What is *contrition*, then, that a Christian may do without it and be justified? What degree of sanctity is it that makes it *more than necessary* for men in general? It is sorrow for sin,

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 27, 28.

which is distinguished from the lower form of *attrition*, by proceeding from, and being joined with, a true and hearty love of God. This true and hearty love of God may vary in degree; but where it exists in any real sense, there is contrition.¹ Attrition is the sorrow which springs from the fear of punishment, a disgust at sin, and though mixed with an 'inchoate love,' it is distinctly said to want real *charity*, or love of God. And the approved Roman doctrine is, we are informed, that a man whose sole motive for being sorry for his sins is the fear of their punishment, and who has nothing but the *motion* to love God, but no true love of Him, *requires* no other frame of mind to fit him for pardon, but is, when he receives the sacrament of Absolution, actually and truly forgiven and justified. The doctrine is, not that he is in *the way*, or may *hope* to be forgiven—it is, that he *is* forgiven; justification is given him, not in promise or foretaste, but in actual possession.

'It is certain that attrition suffices with the Sacrament for the justification of the sinner. Theologians were still disputing on this point at the end of the sixteenth century, the Council of Trent not having decided anything. But the Jansenist doctrine on the *necessity* of contrition justifying by itself, drew afresh the attention of theologians to this important question; and at this day, it *would be almost a heresy*, as P. Pinthereau said, to maintain the insufficiency of attrition, even arising from the sole motive of the pains of hell, provided that it be accompanied by a beginning of love of God, considered as the source of all justice.'—Vol. ii. p. 29.

The reason assigned for this doctrine is a remarkable one. It is, according to Liguori, that contrition, *loving* sorrow, justifies of itself, *without* and *before* the sacrament of Absolution;²

¹ Contrition is defined by the Council of Trent, as '*Animi dolor ac detestatio de peccato commisso, cum proposito non peccandi de cetero*,' and stated to be a necessary part of the sacrament of Penance. But the later theologians, *e.g.* Liguori, hold that the word is a generic one, and comprehends, 1. *Perfect contrition*, which arises '*ex motivo charitatis*.' 2. *Imperfect contrition*, which is called *attrition*, 'which is conceived either from a view of the foulness of sin, or the fear of hell, excluding the will to sin, and including the hope of pardon;' but having only '*amor inchoatus*,' which is different in kind, not only in degree, from the *true love of God*, '*charitas prædominans*,' which, whether more or less intensely, loves God above the creature. '*Nos non negamus requiri in attritione initium amoris, sed dicimus tantum non requiri charitatem prædominantem*.'—*Liguori, Hom. Apost. Tr. xvi. c. 2. No. 8, 14.*

² 'Sacramenta actualiter operantur quod significant; unde verificari debet (ex se loquendo) quod cum sacerdos dat absolutionem, eo momento peccata remittuntur. . . Si ergo in dolore necessario requiritur charitas prædominans, sacramentum nunquam causaret gratiam, quia omnes accederent jam justificati; nam quilibet dolor qui ex charitate prædominante procedit est vera contritio, ut docet S. Thomas; et hoc accedit quoties homini displicet potius gratiæ quam alterius boni amissio; et cum illa sit vera contritio, quamvis exiguus sit dolor, delet peccata.' . . . '*Omnem culpam delet*,' says S. Thomas; and again, '*Per solam contritionem dimittitur peccatum, . . . si antequam absolvetur habeat hoc sacramentum in voto, jam virtus clavium operatur in ipso*.' The love of God spoken of in Scripture cannot, in its lowest degree, be joined with sin; and in its lowest degree is different from that "*beginning of it*" which may be with attrition. 'Si autem in attritione desidera-

and that, therefore, as the sacrament does also of itself justify, it must require, as a previous disposition, *something less* than is sufficient to justify independently of it. If contrition, which implies charity, were necessary, the sacrament would never cause grace, or justify; for the simple reason, that those who came fitly to it, would come already justified. Contrition, he says, is a 'formal act of charity,' which loves God above all things, and which, therefore, according to innumerable passages of Scripture, cannot be joined with sin; 'since, therefore, it is 'certain that the love which loves God above all things, whatever 'it be in degree, (*charitatem prædominantem quamvis remissam*,) 'cannot be joined with sin, it is certain that any sort of contrition, being formally an act of charity, takes away sins.' There would, therefore, be no room left for the proper and real office of the sacrament in justifying, if we suppose that it required a disposition of such intrinsic efficacy as contrition. And M. Maynard does not shrink from the Jesuit's startling conclusion, quoted by Pascal as the *ne plus ultra* of nonsense and laxity joined. 'Que la contrition n'est point du tout nécessaire pour obtenir l'effet principal du Sacrement (*i.e.* justification), mais au contraire, elle y est plutôt un obstacle: "imo 'obstat potius quominus effectus sequatur.'"¹

The doctrine, too, is a curious case of a doctrine developing from a vagueness which gave an advantage to the stricter interpretation, to a clearness which took it away. The process, as given in Liguori, may be compared with Pascal's account of the growth of probable opinions.² A General Council left things in doubt; a Pope, while forbidding either side to censure or insult the other, dropped the admission that the opinion of one was the common opinion of the schools. A moral theologian whom the Church has canonized drew the inference, that since the Pope

retur amor inchoatus, qui sit principium amoris . . . hoc non negatur, et dicimus hoc initium jam in qualibet attritione reperiri, tum metu poenarum a Deo infligendarem, ("*Timor dei initium dilectionis*,") tum spe remissionis et beatitudinis.' But a 'verus charitatis prædominantis actus' is not necessary. Of course, even with contrition, the 'will to fulfil all righteousness,' involves the desire of the sacrament.—*Liguori, Hom. Ap. Tr. xvi. c. 2. No. 16.*

¹ To which the comment is, 'C'est très vrai, puisqu'alors le pécheur est déjà justifié, que le Sacrement n'a plus rien à faire sous ce rapport principal, et qu'il ne peut en augmenter la grâce sanctifiante.' Accordingly, he charges the Jansenists with 'destroying the use' of the Sacrament, for saying that the *absolution of the priest is real, only when it follows the sentence of the invisible Judge*, and requiring in consequence great preparation; '*Nous y voilà*,' says he, when Pascal charges the Jesuits with giving absolution indifferently to all who ask for it, without first considering whether Jesus Christ unlooses in heaven those whom they unloose on earth; '*Nous y voilà; Jésus-Christ doit d'abord délier dans le ciel avant que le prêtre ne délie sur la terre.*' Here is the secret let out of the Jansenist plan. 'In such a case the priest's office was useless, for the sinner was already purified before God.'—Vol. ii. pp. 3—17.

² Proy. VI. 'D'abord, le docteur grave qui l'a inventée l'expose au monde,' &c.

had attested that this *was* the common opinion of the schools, it had become the *morally certain* one, and therefore the opposite the *improbable* one, which no doctor may embrace. 'The Pope's decree,' he remarks, 'does not forbid the opposite opinion to be called *improbable*; for improbability is not a note of cens-
'sure or contumely forbidden by the decree.' And, at last, the public is informed by dignified ecclesiastics, as a matter of notoriety, that it has become 'presque une hérésie' to hold it.¹

Nor is this a mere question of the schools. So practical a question is it, that M. Maynard, with Père Pinthereau, can see no mercy or advantage in the Gospel, if contrition is made identical with saving penitence, and sinners are to be told that justification cannot be had without it:—

'C'est le couronnement de cette doctrine,' says the *bon père*. 'Vous y verrez donc que cette dispense de l'obligation *fâcheuse* d'aimer Dieu est le privilège de la loi évangélique par-dessus la judaïque. "Il a été raisonnable, dit-il, que, dans la loi de grâce du N. T., Dieu levât l'obligation fâcheuse et difficile, qui était dans la loi de rigueur, d'exercer un acte de parfaite contrition pour être justifié: et qu'il instituât des sacrements qui pussent suppléer son défaut, à l'aide d'une disposition plus facile. Autrement, certes, les enfants (les Chrétiens) n'auraient pas maintenant plus de facilité de se remettre aux bonnes grâces de leur Père, qu'avaient jadis ces esclaves (les Juifs), d'obtenir miséricorde de leur Seigneur." — Lett. X.

M. Maynard corrects Pascal, and corrects him as follows:—

'It is not the obligation of loving God that Father Pinthereau treats as "painful," (*fâcheuse*), but the necessity of a perfect contrition in order to be justified. And it is certain that this act [we have seen how Liguori defines it] is so sublime, so difficult to degraded man, plunged in sensuality, that the sinner would have reason to tremble if he had no other means of reconciliation. Yes, the divine economy of the sacraments is one of the most admirable parts of the New Law, one of its great excellences, compared with the law of severity and fear. The sinner, who could never

¹ 'Sed sententia satis communis, quam nos sequimur, tenet sufficere attritionem sine charitate prædominante, quæ oritur ex timore inferni, aut gloriæ amissione, aut ex horrore erga peccati turpitudinem, lumine fidei cognitam: ita tenent Gonet, Canus, Petroc., Tourn., Cabass., Wigandt, Abelly, Navarr., Suar., Tolet., Lugo, Laym., Salmer. et alii multi, cum Bened. XIV. qui asserit quod *post Trid.* cum plausu hanc sententiam omnes scholæ sibi adoptarunt; unde recte dicunt Suar. Less., Castr., Filliuc., Carden., Rainaud., Lugo, Prado, Tanner, Viva et Croix, hanc sententiam hodie *post concil.* esse moraliter certam, et oppositam non esse amplius probabilem. Et quod scholæ, saltem communius, tanquam moraliter certam habeant, constat ex decr. Alex. VII. (5 Maii, 1667.) ubi sub excommunicatione prohibuit, "ne quis audeat alicujus theologicæ censuræ alteriusque injuriæ aut contumeliæ notâ taxare alterutram sententiam, sive negantem necessitatem aliqualis dilectionis Dei in attritione ex metu gehennæ conceptâ, quæ hodie inter scholasticos communis videtur, sive asserentem dictæ dilectionis necessitatem." Attestando ergo Pontifex sententiam negantem esse communioram inter scholasticos, consequenter testatur in scholis haberi communiter certam; dum quisque scit, quod circa sacramentorum valorem alias sententias quam moraliter certas, non posse doctores amplecti. Nec præfato decr. vetuit Pontifex, sententiam oppositam posse nuncupari *improbabilem*; nam improbabilitas non est nota censuræ aut contumeliæ per decretum vetita; especially as we do not deny the necessity of an 'initium amoris.'—Liguori, *Hom. Ap. Tr.* xvi. c. 2. No. 14.

assure himself on the worth of his personal acts, raises himself in perfect security, at this word of the priest, "Go in peace, thy sins are forgiven thee."—Vol. ii. p. 41.

The last part of the letter on the love of God, reads as if it were a caricature. It seems as if, to show the radically false principle of the popular casuistry, Pascal said, Apply the plan of weighing and measuring moral obligation, of fixing the minimum which is safe for conscience, and with which absolution may be granted, of construing rules relating to conscience by the maxim of law, that penal enactments must be interpreted strictly—'*odiosa sunt restringenda et rigorose applicanda*'—of finding out what is the *least* amount of morality and religion which is compatible with a state of grace and assurance of justification—apply this to the '*great commandment*,' the obligation to love God 'with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength.' If you are consistent, you are bound to find a minimum here; you are bound to answer the question,—What is enough to satisfy the obligation which the gospel makes indispensable? On your system, men will come to you, as directors of conscience, as those who translate into practical and feasible reality the general principles of duty, as confessors who can refuse absolution if the measure of duty has not been fulfilled, and ask you, What are we bound to? not in a vague indefinite way, but in detail and fact; and you must be able to tell them with certainty or probability, so as to assure their conscience: and the weak will come as well as the strong. On your pretension, of undertaking to entertain and satisfy all questions definitely, as to how much of obedience is necessary and safe, you must be prepared for questions, as to how often, and when, God is to be loved by Christians who wish for justification and salvation. You must not be content, as preachers, with general exhortations to love to the uttermost; you must, as practical moralists, gravely weigh, discuss, limit, and define—define, too, with practical certainty, for it is a matter for practice, and the love of God is one which concerns consciences very seriously,—what is the least that a man may be allowed to love God. And then Pascal might be imagined going on, with the exaggeration of a *reductio ad absurdum*, to represent the great lights of casuistry, meeting and determining exactly what God intended when He bade men love Him with all their heart—some opining for more, some for less, but all *fixing* the measure, and all, whether they fixed it at once in *three* or once in *five* years, allowing to their colleagues' opinion the benefit of probability, however confident they might be of their own; all forced by a supposed consistency to treat the most transcendent law of religious affection in the fashion of bidders at a Dutch auction.

But it is no caricature. The authorities and decisions which he quotes are real ones. The Casuists *have* found it necessary to settle, whether God *must* be loved once, or three times, or eight times in a Christian's life; Escobar gravely pronounces in favour of the moderate Henriquez, who strikes the mean between the excess of Azor, who is for *eight* times, and the defect of Sanchez, who is for *one*, and prescribes, himself, *three*—the age of discretion, the hour of death, and once every five years. It is necessary to distinguish between cases where the obligation to love God is essential, and where accidental. Vasquez and Suarez have really pondered seriously over the problem of *how often*; Castro Palao had as really 'combated them, and with reason, *merito*;' and it is not Pascal but a real Jesuit who represents the most distinguished theologians so puzzled by this question, of how often is *the love of God obligatory*; and so discordant is their solution *when*, that he despairingly takes refuge in the answer,—*Never*.

But if not a caricature, it must, then, of course, we might suppose, be wrong—say, an exploded extravagance, chargeable on the age, or on a perverse love of system, but which it would be unjust to impute to modern theologians. We might the more be led to think this, from finding very similar propositions condemned by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI. And from finding them thus censured, we might have inferred that the Popes meant to discountenance this fashion, whether scientific or practical, of beating down, under the show of *fixing*, the *obligation* of the love of God, as 'at least scandalous.' But we should only have shown our haste and our ignorance of the effect of a censure. M. Maynard, who addresses his refutation of Pascal to the intelligence of the day, is not a whit behind Escobar or Bauny, or the *bon père* himself, in maintaining the good sense and necessity and practical ends of limiting the *obligation* to love God. It is a natural problem in theological science, and necessary information for confessors and their penitents. The Popes have, indeed, condemned *some* ways of limiting it; but it is a mistake to suppose that that has anything to do with *other* ways. The effect of the censure is not to condemn the method of inquiry, but definite wrong answers. From it results the measure up to which, according to the Church, we are bound to exercise love to God. But this measure is a vague one; and though the more definite answers condemned are wrong, other equally definite ones may be right. To the honour of the Jesuits be it said, that *since* the censure, at least, they have never maintained any of *these* propositions. But the *commandment* to love God must be treated like any other precept or obligation—as we treat a civil law, enjoining

or forbidding; it must be construed strictly and against itself; whatever it does not specify, we are not bound to. And here, except within the very wide limits fixed by the Church, we are not bound to any *time*. Obligatory it is, we know; but *when*, and how often, is an open question among theologians; and it is easier to say when it is not, than when it is.

'In the "great commandment" there is the *negative* and *general* precept, which obliges us, under all circumstances, to do nothing against the love of God, and to observe his law; but there is besides, the *affirmative* and *special* one, which obliges us to formal acts of charity. The *affirmative* precept obliges, first *accidentally*, when there is no other way of returning to favour with God, and of itself also, not *always*, but *from time to time* in the course of life.

'It is on the precept of the love of God in this latter view of it, that theologians dispute.

'Now, there are but few points decided about it by the Church. It results, on the one hand, from the censure of certain propositions, that there is obligation to a formal act of love of God, when we have attained the age of reason, (taking this instant in a certain moral latitude,) at the point of death, and several times during life, so that there should not be between each act an interval of five years, nor a culpable delay; and, on the other hand, that this obligation does not exist, as Baius and Jansenius hold, in all the moments and circumstances of life: all the rest is controverted, and will ever be, among theologians. It is especially impossible to assign, besides the two extreme limits of life, the precise and certain moment when the precept obliges.—Vol. ii. pp. 6, 7, quoting Bossuet.

And therefore all these Jesuits attacked by Pascal are so far from being wrong or even extravagant, that they say nothing but what is perfectly conformable to Catholic truth and wisdom. 'One only,' le père Antoine Sirmond, who is so puzzled to find when it is ever *necessary* to love God, 'may be abandoned to the passionate justice of Pascal;' and even he, well-meaning man, is more sinned against than sinning. Escobar, too, the 'good old Escobar,' who never dreamt of falling into the hands of a Pascal, and was therefore incautious, vexes M. Maynard with his occasional careless slips; but the rest are blameless.

'Suarez is admirable for his wisdom on this point. After having said that the precept of the love of God obliges "*accidentally*," *when a man cannot recur to the sacrament, and has no other means of justification*, and, besides, at the point of death, he adds, "that it also obliges sometimes, *of itself*; like every precept; and besides, the love of God is necessary to salvation, only it is difficult to determine the time of the obligation. But the love of God may not be delayed long after the first use of reason; further, it ought to be reiterated sometimes (*quelquefois*) during life; for it is evident that it is not enough for a man to love once or twice in the course of his existence the God for whom he was created, and who is the last end of his actions. But what ought to be this time? It is for prudence to determine it." Vasquez says nothing more than Escobar attributes to him; but he is speaking only of the precept of contrition. Now the two precepts of love of God and contrition being *certainly* connected together only at the hour of death, Vasquez could not determine any other time. Castro Palao does

indeed combat all these opinions; but we must understand him. He also distinguishes the obligation *per se* and *per accidens*. By violating this last, we sin, not against charity, but some other virtue. "*Pure question de mots qui ne change rien à la pratique.*" For the obligation *per se*, it presses from time to time during life, and it is not right to delay long the accomplishment; and, always submitting himself to the judgment of the prudent, he would regard as grave an omission of three years. He thus ends:—"It is rare that a Christian, except he be of depraved morals, makes himself guilty of this crime; for often he endeavours to dispose himself by contrition for the sacrament of Penitence; often he meditates on the benefit of God and his sovereign bounty, the consideration of which incites in him sentiments of charity." Remarkable words, which show well how all these disputes were purely speculative.—Vol. ii. pp. 35, 36.

The question, then, is worthy of pious Christians, solemn and laborious theologians, anxious penitents, and practical men. Up to a certain point, the illumination of the Church clears up our doubts as to how often in our lives we *must* love God; but even with the light of these decisions much remains vague. Of course it is a good thing to do so as often as we can. M. Maynard bids us remark that all the Jesuits say so, and that they wrote excellent practical books on the subject; but theologians and confessors require to know not only *when we ought*, but *when we must*. And within the limits fixed for the obligation by the Church, it is a charitable and profitable work to thin out as much as possible the *obligation* of specific occasion, because an *obligation* of the Church involves a definite mortal sin, if neglected. 'The Jesuits,' as M. Maynard remarks, though they, as a general rule, teach all the points decided by the Church, '*refute very well those authors, who, on vain reasons, pretend that the precept of charity obliges of itself on all festival days; when an adult receives baptism—going to martyrdom—at the beginning of some difficult and excellent work—on occasion of signal benefit of God—in temptations to hate him—at the reception of the Eucharist—after a mortal sin, in case that a man cannot or will not have recourse to the sacrament of penitence.*'¹ On these occasions it is purely a question of simple probability, whether we are *bound* to love God; some Jesuits, he observes, say we *are*, on some of them; but as the Church has decided nothing on the subject, we cannot get certainty. Therefore to sift these *pros* and *cons* is an employment worthy to occupy their thoughts, their ingenuity, and their time; and they have come for the most part to admirable conclusions.

Such is M. Maynard's *mentiris impudentissime* to Pascal; and having upset his theology, he answers him as an orator and a man. Pascal is a 'calumniator,' a 'sophist,' a dealer in

¹ Vol. ii. p. 7.

'false eloquence,' for contrasting this system with the language of Scripture. 'The theologians,' says his refuter, 'have never dispensed with the love of God, and have spoken only of the time when the rigorous obligation of the precept pressed: voilà la calomnie. The sophistry consists in supposing that the love of God is a thing which may be decreed, and which depends on the theories, more or less subtle, of the schools. *Mais qu'y font ces théories?* Will men love God more or less, according as this or that decision is found in the *folio* pages of theologians? *L'amour de Dieu,*' he continues, *'s'inspire, et ne se décrète pas.'* Doubtless, 'decrees' about affections are strange things: who would think of 'decreeing' how many times a-year a son was to love his father, or inquiring how often the obligation of loving her husband was not binding on his wife. But, then, for what purpose were these decisions? Who did make decrees about the great commandment? Or does M. Maynard think that Pascal complains because theologians had decided on once in five years instead of once a-week? '*Theories of the Schools*'—'*pages in folio of theologians,*'—is it M. Maynard who speaks so slightly of labours which he has just presented as so practically necessary and so admirably executed? Is it he who compares the natural instincts of good sense and good feeling with the weighty maxims of Suarez and Vasquez, and takes refuge from books in the heart? '*L'amour de Dieu ne se décrète pas.*' We cannot set it up in men's hearts by theories and decisions. True, M. Maynard, but may it not be explained away by them?

Now, these belong to a class of subjects in respect to which the Roman Church has been set before us of late in an imposing aspect; subjects in themselves of permanent interest—the principles and tone of clerical teaching, the depth and seriousness and practical reach of theological doctrines translated into systems at work among men—the discipline of Christian life, amid the passions, the confusions, or the opportunities of the world. In all these matters, great, as we very well know, is the boast of the Roman Catholic Church. She, we have been told, has the most refined and severe principles. She has had living examples of them. She, we are told continually, is uncompromising, consistent, uniform, and she only. This is her boast, and, so far as it is true, her strength. By it her defenders override, with no measured triumph, the theological or historical difficulties of her case. All other bodies, they say, are loose, have no principles, or are afraid of them; are tame in their moral spirit, compromisers with evil, shrinking from the realities of faith, systematic smoothers of the rough ascent, and wideners of the narrow way. Rome only, besides a clear and unhesitating

theology, has a great system of spiritual discipline of souls and consciences, and a moral character which results from it and corresponds with it; she only has the secret of a searching and elevating ministry—she only dares to realize that she professes. Protestants, on the other hand, proceed the Roman doctors, will have an easy religion. They want a speedy remedy for conscience. They want to be forgiven at once, every time they sin, and to feel assured that they are so; and for this they invented justification by faith. They want to get rid of the reality of repentance. They want to choose their own way of fulfilling their duty. What they rebel against in the Roman Church, is such real aids and obligations to strictness of life as confession and sacramental absolution. Their self-indulgence shrinks from direction, because the two are incompatible. Rome, only, brings the sinner before his God. Rome, only, will not temporise and parley with the self-deceit of the will. Rome, only, secures penitence by acts. She, only, inherits the spirit of the ancient Church—its inexorable hatred of sin. Conscience cannot escape from her strong grasp, and personal questioning. She leaves it without excuse; and shrinks, as from a profanation, from offering it any relief, except what is real. Rome will give a religion of mercy and consolation, but not an easy religion, not a religion of the world.

This is one popular way of presenting the claims of the Roman Church. If Protestants, then, should object to Port-Royal an exaggerated notion of the sacerdotal office, and of the claims and responsibility of the director—if *they* had charged it with giving too real a sanctity to ordinances, and making religion too strict for man—Roman Catholics, it might have been supposed, could have seen nothing but a consistent carrying out of the principles of the Church. When Port-Royal complained so bitterly of playing with the discipline of the confessional, or the ineffable sanctity of the Eucharist, the complaints, to Roman Catholics, would have at least *meaning*. Injudiciously, perhaps, but surely not groundlessly, the Port-Royalists only wanted to take their Church at her word, and to turn the edge of that primitive and Catholic discipline, which cut so deep in controversy with heretics without, against worldliness, and connivance with worldliness, inside the Church. They would seem to be only holding up to the careless multitudes within her pale the standard of religious depth and reality, which her divines presented to their opponents as incapable of accommodating itself to what the world asks for in religion.

But, it seems, they were mistaken. Bossuet thought them in extremes, though he had many points of sympathy with them. But if we are to take such representations as have just been

given, with the air of authority, of the spirit and demands of the Church, their view was radically false. The system which looked so uncompromising and stern in dealing with the individual conscience, when turned towards those without, must wear quite a different aspect when turned to those within;—with whom it is no longer a question about what will best silence them, but about what they can best be got to submit to; In presenting that discipline before them, theologians are, it seems, to remember before what sort of persons it is held up: they are masses of variable character, who look with an evil eye on restraints and inconveniences—a multitude of believers, indeed, but a very mixed one, whose general good will may be trusted, but not to the extent of submitting to any very sharp pressure. Unstable, wayward, halting between right and wrong, it takes but a little to scare or offend them; their worldliness, unruliness, suspiciousness, obstinacy, feebleness, are to be lamented, but, if the Church is to control them, must be allowed for. When speaking of discipline within the Church, the standard is to be set for the weak, the capricious, the self-willed, who form the bulk of actual living mankind. Hold up before *them* the rule of the strong and the perfect, and it is simply driving them from the altar and the confessional.¹ Have, by all means, a high standard besides; have it for the strictly disposed, and keep it for them; but with the multitudes you must be easy, or they will break from you altogether.

We will venture to say that, were he in controversy with an Anglican or a Lutheran, no divine in France would insist more strongly and more feelingly on the austere sanctity of Roman Catholic discipline than M. Maynard. Not Port-Royal itself would be more absolute in statement or inexorable in logic. But he is dealing with domestic difficulties, and with discipline as a system to be realized. In the former case he might have claimed for his communion the maxims of S. Augustin and S. Bernard. In the present, he puts the Jansenist rigorists to confusion by appealing to the indulgent good sense of men of the world, the *mitis sapientia* of the court of Charles II. This may be very sensible; only, what is now the recommendation and boast of the Roman system, when dealing with the necessities of the faint-hearted and petulant multitude within, is, after all, its old taunt against Protestantism—that it is an easy religion.

¹ 'Si l'absolution,' says P. Caussin, 'doit être refusée à ceux que l'espérance d'être absous a portés à pécher avec plus de facilité, l'usage de la confession devra-t-il pas être interdit à la plupart du monde? et il n'y aurait plus d'autre remède aux pécheurs qu'une branche d'arbre et une corde.'—'Le P. Caussin a raison en somme,' observes M. Maynard, vol. ii. p. 24.

Here, then, we observe *another* aspect of the Roman Church ; we do not say that it is not a practical and natural one, but it is *another*. Indeed, the truth is, that in this discussion, our feeling varies, according as we view things broadly or in detail. Look at the discipline of the Church in the gross, and the Jesuits seem to have a good deal to say. They professed to be indulgent, yet watchful and persevering. Look at the special and necessary parts of its machinery, and the way in which it affects theological questions, and Port-Royal seems irresistible. We cannot help allowing the practical common sense of the Jesuit view of mankind, and the way to get hold of them ; but it is equally obvious, that it led them into a most singular maze of theological entanglement, and that the intermediate steps which linked their most unbending dogmatism with the infinite wants and changes of living character, were a series of slippery and prevaricating inventions, without even the poor merit of real subtlety. Keep out of sight what absolution is held to be by the Roman Church, and we think only of the charitable condescension which brings home to the individual penitent the prospect of mercy, and faints not, nor despairs, though ever so often disappointed. But view absolution, not as a subsidiary portion of a great practical machinery for dealing with the waywardness of man, but in itself—as it is defined and zealously exalted in decrees of councils and commentaries of divines, the certain channel of justification—and the condescension seems a strange one, which cheapens such a gift into a mere auxiliary and complement to the most incipient and tentative act of improvement. Yet, it may be said, what were the Jesuits to do ? The Roman Church had strictly defined what absolution was, and to maintain, in its integrity, the Roman dogmatism, was the end and the pride of their institute. On the other hand, in popular practice absolution was inseparably connected with confession, and compensated for its burden. The two things went together, and could not be separated. Their theological duty to Rome led them to extend and enforce to the uttermost the unrestricted and literal interpretation of her language ; their practical duty, to keep up the attachment of the masses to her discipline. They were debarred by the one from restricting the effect of the sacrament ; by the other, from making difficulties in the way of its reception. In their theology, it was all, and even more than all, that any Catholic doctors had made it : in their practice, it must sink to be a solace and encouragement, not to be easily denied even to the lowest and most doubtful class of penitents. To those who objected, they had the practical argument, that nothing less than this *encouragement* would bring men to confess. Absolution, whatever it was, was indis-

pensable. Yet Port-Royal had logic on its side, and right reason and feeling too, when it urged that this was a tremendous price to pay for keeping up a popular system of confession; that it was sacrificing absolution to confession—a divine sacrament and supernatural gift to moral control and moral training for the lowest of Christians. They only urged indisputable truth, when they said that, doctrinally, absolution had never been held to be the preliminary, but the end and crown of Christian repentance and amendment. As disputants, they tore to pieces the flimsy refinements with which the Jesuits reconciled their theology with their practical system: as Christian divines, they raised their voice in behalf of the reality and the seriousness of Christian penitence, and denounced the fearfully short-sighted wisdom, which, for any seeming advantages, could undermine the sincerity of character, by attempting to fight self-deceit with weapons of its own.

But however accounted for, here is *another* aspect of the Roman Church. And it is hard to see how, if it is true, the former one is not, we will not say untrue, but greatly exaggerated. We repeat, we are not undertaking to pass judgment on the internal quarrels of the Roman Church, or to say which is the true interpretation of the Council of Trent about contrition and attrition. But we observe this: that in fixing, for practical discipline, among themselves, the *minimum* of moral disposition sufficient for justification and salvation, modern Roman doctors, claiming very loudly to speak for their Church, *pronounce*, and *pronounce for certain*, on a *very low one*: the *minimum*, be it observed, not for *ecclesiastical* pardon, for long-suffering, or encouragement, or hope, but for present justification, for giving the sinner the *assurance*, on the highest earthly warrant, that God has actually blotted out his sins, and restored to him His favour. And they do it on the express ground that nothing else will work; that the mass of men must have this assurance or revolt from religion.

If this is so, however it be explained, it is not too much to say, that no Evangelical doctrine which connects instant and actual justification, over and over again, with the act of faith, short of avowed Antinomianism, can *require*, in the way of moral disposition, *less*. A religion which allows the sinner to set his conscience at rest, and feel complete assurance of pardon and justification, with no moral qualification but sorrow and fear—except in promise,—which allows its teachers to say, that contrition is so far beyond the reach of ordinary Christians, that to insist on it to them is to narrow, and almost evacuate the mercy of the Gospel,—which allows its discipline to be controlled by theories and practical rules, which, if true, turn nine-

tenths of all the sermons on repentance into mere declamation, —we do not say, must be, but certainly *may be*, in the hands of those who choose, logically and consistently, an easy religion; and has extremely little reason to taunt other systems with theories, which make too free with the terms of the Gospel, and yield too speedy a cure to the smarts and impatience of conscience.

From theological let us proceed to moral explanations. How does M. Maynard deal with the broad fact of Pascal's mass of startling extracts from the popular Casuists? We will state generally the grounds to which he appeals, before we illustrate them by instances. First, he has recourse to the counter charge of false quotation and misconstruction—a very good answer, so far as it is true, but a dangerous one to quibble about; and no other name can be given to a very large proportion of M. Maynard's criticism. He will scarcely ever trust us with a passage quoted in full. He prefers to give what he calls analyses or *exposés* of so and so's doctrine, smooth, guarded, and pointless, which present a far more curious contrast when compared with the downright original, than any of Pascal's unfairnesses. Then, as we have already said, he complains of Pascal's always quoting Escobar and Bauny, which, if Escobar and Bauny spoke only for themselves, might be reasonable; but as they carefully inform us, and the fact is plain on the face of it, that they are servile repeaters of a method which they thought every one accepted, and simply represent the latest results of the labours of others, whose wisdom all admire, it is not so much in place.¹ Then we

¹ The following is Escobar's account of his compilation:—*At ego solummodo memoro reserationem factam ab Agno suis auctoribus Jesuitis. . . . Qualibet igitur in materia in primis auctorum Societatis exhaurio, Medullam Confessoriorum in Examen exponendam, indicatis generatim auctoribus. Mox circa materias singulas, speciales Doctorum meorum resolutiones ad principiorum generalium praxim attexo, jam specialiter auctorum nomina et scripta citans, jam sola nomina recensens. Hoc ingenue profiteor, me nihil toto in hoc libello scripsisse, quod Societatis Jesu non acceperim ex Doctore. Quas enim proprias passim resolutiones innuo, ex schola Societatis aperte deductas existimari. Licet autem profiteor totum meum opus ex Societatis Doctoribus texuisse, non ideo assero omnes sententias omnium esse, (ut non bene Caramuel intellexit) sed singulas singulis tribuendas, ut aperte ostendo, dum fere nunquam pro una sententia, duos Doctores recenseo. Dum autem eorum refero dictorum varietatem, non ideo me idem sentire affirmo. Problematum moralium volumina quæ edidi, quæ digero post unam et alteram contradictoriam relatum sententiam, quid sentiam aperiunt. Porro licet Societati Jesu summula hæc omnem attribuit sententiam, non ideo indico, propriam esse Societatis, nullam enim propositionem exprimo, quæ non possit gravissimis extra Societatem Doctoribus confirmari. Quod si sæpe videar me laxioribus opinionibus adhaerescere, id certe non est definire quid sentio, sed exponere, quid sine conscientie latione Docti poterunt cum eis visum fuerit expedire ad sedandos penitentium animos, ad præcæm adducere.*

This edition, Lyons, 1659, after the date of the *Provinciales*, has the licence of the Provincial to print the book, (which had been recognised by two fathers of the Society,) for nine years—dated 1644—the approbation of two doctors of theology of

are told that casuistry and moral theology are not popular sciences; that they are a system which cannot be understood, except as a whole; that questions necessarily are very different in the abstract and in practice; that when people have to deal with the infinity of human characters, and sins, and circumstances, the questions which must arise are necessarily intricate and strange; and that we have only to try and state in general terms any set of ordinary practical difficulties, and the ways by which we should ordinarily, in daily life, get through them, to see both how puzzling such subjects are, and how easy to make any *practical* general rules seem grossly lax. Then, it is suggested that we look differently on a crime *before* and *after* it has been committed; that we may forbid most severely, in the abstract, what, when it comes to be realized in a particular person, we do and must judge in a very different way; and that those decisions which shock us so much as they stand, in naked formality, would be applied by ourselves unconsciously, in the case of an actual penitent, whom we saw before us.

On these principles we are told that we may understand the purpose and meaning of these much vilified books. They were meant, not for lay Christians *before* the act, but for confessors *after* it; to teach the priest how to measure and deal with what could no longer be helped;—the utmost that he had a right to exact, and the least that he might accept;—not to teach the penitent the means of eluding duty, and still escaping sin. They represent not what men are to be taught to do, but only how far they may be allowed *not* to do as they are taught. ‘They are not *receipts* given to penitents, to sweeten for them ‘the remedy of confession, but rules of conduct and judgment ‘for priests.’ ‘This simple reflection,’ adds M. Maynard, ‘causes ‘to fall to the ground all the accusations of Pascal.’ And they are to be considered as coming first to the knowledge of the penitent, and the mass of people, when applied to their case by the confessor. They were not intended for the public; they were written in Latin, and the world has no business to know these rules, nor Pascal to divulge them. Thus M. Maynard, after asking whether there is no danger in so many *subtle*

the University of Paris, a Carmelite and a Minor, certifying that they had found nothing in it dissonant from the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman faith, and judged it worthy of publication, dated 1644; the licence of the ordinary in consequence of this approbation, and the consent and permission of the civil power.

He goes through, in the way of short questions and answers, the subject of Moral Theology, under seven heads, to which he applies in allegory the seven seals of the book of the Apocalypse. These are—*Laws, Sins, Justice, Censures, Virtues, State of Life, Sacraments*: each division, or *examen*, after discussing general principles, ends with a chapter of practical solutions, entitled ‘*Praxis ex Societatis Jesu Schola*,’ on the previous subjects.

questions on morality, in such speculatively bold decisions, which must necessarily 'briser bientôt les liens de l'abstraction, pour 'entrer dans le domaine des faits,' thus answers:—

'Peut-être. Mais songeons bien que les Casuistes n'écrivaient que pour les confesseurs, et non pour le monde. encore moins pour les plaisants; que leur maximes, dont il peut être facile d'abuser, ne s'adressaient pas à la foule ignorante ou corrompue, mais à des hommes graves, instruits, vertueux, &c. . . . Leurs livres étaient écrits en Latin, qui n'est pas la langue de la multitude; c'étaient des énormes en folio, inabordable à la foule légère, des œuvres à formes techniques et barbares, peu attrayantes pour la frivolité. Aussi étaient-ils renfermés dans les écoles et les bibliothèques, sans que jamais une main profane eût songé à les ouvrir pour en répandre le secret et le prétendu venin sur le monde. . . . Tout cela devait rester un mystère entre le confesseur et la conscience coupable. Le poison, si tant est que les Casuistes en renfermassent, devait être exclusivement confié aux mains habiles et prudentes des médecins des âmes, qui l'auraient toujours transformés en remède salutaire. Aussi Escobar, fut-il tout étonné du rétentissement que son œuvre avait en France. Cet humble religieux ne pouvait comprendre sa triste célébrité: cet homme, à l'âme et aux intentions si pures, concevait encore moins qu'on détournât de leur sens et de leur but les conseils qu'il avait adressés exclusivement aux confesseurs, pour les aider à diriger leurs frères dans la voie du bien.'—Vol. i. pp. 206, 207.

No doubt. The books might be written in Latin and in folio; the confessor as careful as he could be to keep Escobar out of 'profane hands.' But, besides that among people like the French, what was to be read in Latin could not long be kept secret from those whom it concerned—not to say that an indiscreet Père Bauny might publish French '*Sums of Theology*,'—it does not seem to have occurred to M. Maynard, that supposing a sufficient degree of intelligence and memory in the penitent, he might come to comprehend these rules by their application to his own case; and supposing him to be weak and self-deceiving, he might abuse this knowledge as much as if he had learnt it straight from Escobar or Pascal. And where every Christian was supposed to come to the confessional, and the mass of them to require the benefit of these indulgent decisions, it is not easy to suppose, with M. Maynard, that it is to Pascal and the Jansenists that the world in general is indebted for its knowledge that such decisions exist, or to imagine that it must have waited till it learned them from such informants, before it could have taken practical advantage of them. And with respect to M. Maynard's distinction, we must add, that a simple inspection of these books is sufficient to show that they were meant to tell the priest, not only how to judge of the past, but to advise about the future.

Thus, however, the inculcated system is defended—on the ground of its being a highly practical one. Its startling results are but the anomalies which attend all working systems.

Arguments may prove them wrong, but they turn out right in practice. But besides this, M. Maynard has two more defences in reserve. Side by side, or alternately, with the plea that it is *highly practical*, is the plea that it is *only speculative*. Having proved that it is intended only for the confessional, and that the confessional cannot do without it, M. Maynard offers us another point of view. It is, he says, the inevitable development of logical consequences; the mere course of abstract thought—subtle intellect, analysing metaphysically, or playing with possibilities, in the greater men; simple '*logomachies*' in the lesser. '*Systems of morality*,' says M. Maynard, '*about which we may dispute for ever, have no serious influence on life*;' and this casuistry was a '*veritable science, more metaphysical than moral, which, on pain of appearing incomplete, was bound to embrace all questions that were possible and even chimerical*.'¹ Its startling conclusions were simply the result of '*studies purely speculative*.'² Even those about duelling, tyrannicide, and killing false witnesses, which were condemned for their practical danger by the Pope, '*were certainly*,' we are informed, '*admissible in principle and in theory*.'³

Finally, when, in some particular case, the general suggestions of its being practically useful, or merely speculative, or both, have been gone through, and we have been further reminded of that '*candid and charitable simplicity*, which would not impose on 'the weak shoulders of men anything more than the least heavy burden possible, and sometimes placed itself outside the Gospel 'in seeking to reconcile our duties and our miserable doings,' he treats the whole matter as a trifle not worth talking about—as something, on the face of it, absurd and impossible, except as a little flourish of sportive subtlety; and turns round on us and laughs in our face, for being such simpletons as to suppose, that the inculcated Casuist ever meant his words to be taken in earnest.

We are rather at a loss to describe the general effect upon our mind of M. Maynard's way of arguing. It is, more than anything we can bring to mind, like the equestrian performer, who is carried round the ring, jumping from one horse's back to the other. The Abbé employs two main principles, the necessities of a practical, and the liberty of a speculative system; and his argument has the appearance of invoking, as soon as he is embarrassed in the use of one, the assistance of its apparently discordant opposite. Thus it proceeds, through a series of alternations, to its triumphant close. And at length, when it

¹ Vol. i.² Vol. i. p. 200.³ Vol. i. pp. 200, 205, 309.

ends, we are left to reflect whether what has so much engaged our attention is anything more than elaborate nonsense.

M. Maynard's mode of defence will be best understood by an instance or two.

It may be remembered, for instance, that Pascal quotes a number of remarkable dicta about duelling, and homicide in general. M. Maynard deals with them at considerable length. He notices that they arose in a state of society when there was little public law.¹ He reminds us that these decisions are of a *local* kind:—

'La doctrine, qu'on peut tuer pour l'honneur n'est guère admise que par les théologiens *étrangers*, en Espagne surtout, où l'honneur n'est pas une passion seulement, mais une sorte de religion. Les Jésuites inculpés sous ce rapport ne se sont pas écartés de l'enseignement reçu dans leur pays. Ce peut être un tort, mais on ne saurait leur en faire, sans injustice, un crime propre et personnel. Ces théologiens se fondaient sur ce que l'infamie est pour un homme de cœur pire que la mort: il doit donc être permis de défendre l'honneur comme la vie elle-même.'

Critical persons might think it equally strange, that so large a proportion of Roman doctors as the theologians of Spain and Italy, should be called anywhere, even in France, '*étrangers*;' and that *local* feelings about honour and bloodshed should be a reason for their playing fast and loose with the Sixth Commandment. However, M. Maynard, after discussing the limits of what is allowable on the subject, thus sums up what he considers to be their real drift and purport:—

'Nous achevons cette discussion, sans craindre d'avoir mis le poignard aux mains des assassins, quoique nous ayons exposé, sans la frapper en général d'anathème, la doctrine des Jésuites. Nous ne croyons pas que jamais un glaive se soit aiguisé à ces théories *purement spéculatives*, ou qu'on ne proposait pas pour règles de conduite, mais d'appréciation d'un fait accompli. En les offrant aux confesseurs, les théologiens ne leur disaient pas: "Voilà ce que vous pouvez permettre, encore moins conseiller:" mais, "Voilà où il y a crime, voilà un fait moins coupable, voilà une défense entièrement légitime. Néanmoins, sans vous arroger la mission de vouer à l'enfer un meurtrier qui n'a fait qu'user de son droit rigoureux, ayez bien garde de le féliciter de sa conduite, comme s'il avait accompli un acte de vertu, et engagez-le à préférer désormais à tout la divine douceur de l'évangile.

'Telle était la seule doctrine qu'on prêchât au peuple. Les décisions de l'école, choquantes au premier aspect, moins choquantes cependant dans les principes que dans les applications que les théologiens se croyaient obligés de donner toutes, ne devaient pas être communiquées au public. Si elles présentent quelque danger, l'imprudence n'est pas dans les théologiens, mais dans ceux qui les ont divulguées.'—Vol. i. p. 313.

This is the *general* view of the matter. The theologians wished to secure a liberal and long-suffering considerateness in

¹ 'Les maximes des Casuistes sur l'homicide et le duel se sentaient nécessairement du régime féodal et barbare, dans lequel elles étaient toutes naturelles.'

the confessors whom they instructed. They were not to be hasty and sour, even with homicides. On the other hand, they were to 'take care not to *felicitate them on their conduct*.' The theologians had foreseen even this contingency, and provided against it.

But when we come to the decisions *one by one*, they are defended, not for their practical good, but for their impossibility. These nice rules, so minutely analyzed, these delicate balancings, so wisely adjusted by prudence and charity, finally turn, it appears, into nonsense when taken literally. The decision complained of is merely one of the *speculative* 'applications, of which the theologians thought themselves bound to give all.' The question is a minutely practical one; but the answer, though equally minute, is only speculative. The greatest subtlety and care are shown, for instance, in marking out when a duel may be fought; circumstances carefully distinguished, as whether 'a gentleman is known "*pour n'être pas dévôt*,"' so that he will be thought to act from fear of man and not of God, and so that men will call him, *gallina et non vir*; he is directed not to intend to fight a duel, but only to *walk about in a field*:—and the end of it all is, that we are informed, 'that this, though probable in speculation, is extremely difficult in practice,' and that the careful Casuist himself is related to have prescribed the contrary in his book '*De Charitate*.'

Again, Molina names *about* the sum—four or five ducats—for less than which we *may not* kill a thief who is stealing, but will not 'dare to condemn' a man who kills for a crown or less; Escobar draws from Molina's estimate, that 'we may regularly (*regulariter*) kill the thief for the value of a gold crown;' and Pascal represents Molina as estimating at *six or seven ducats* the value for which we *may* kill the thief. '*Voilà*,' says M. Maynard,² '*ce qui s'appelle une bonne calomnie*.' However, he gives up Escobar. Why is Escobar wrong?—for wrong he is,

¹ 'None of our duels,' he says, 'would find in these *purely metaphysical decisions*, any principle of justification.' (Vol. i. p. 322. Lett. 7me.) If Layman says, '*Je n'ose pas condamner*,'—(not '*je ne vois pas qu'on puisse condamner*,'—here is one of Pascal's 'falsifications,') 'a man who accepts a duel,' it is only in view of a '*considerable loss*,—which explains the *illusion of the Casuists*:' and besides, this is only in *rare cases, almost chimerical ones*.' (Vol. i. p. 325.) If Jesuits are quoted, saying that 'we may kill false-witnesses,' we are told that it was not they only, for 'that this doctrine was then common in the schools;' but the Jesuits regard it as lawful only '*en ce qui touche la conscience*, c'est à dire, suivant le droit naturel, rigoureux, en dehors des prohibitions positives, et des inconvénients qui en sont inséparable dans la pratique.' (Vol. i. p. 327.) 'The Casuists, evidently, reason almost always for men in a state of nature, obliged to do justice for themselves; this is what they call *speculation*; but in practice, that is, in the state of society, they forbid it absolutely.' (Vol. i. p. 334.)

² Vol. i. pp. 337, 338.

his proposition having found its way into the condemned list of Innocent XI. All that M. Maynard sees in it is excess of precision, whether over-speculative or over-practical, he does not say. It is morally impossible to fix the sum; and, he adds, 'l'Eglise n'ayant rien décidé sur ce point,' (how much the thief might be killed for,) 'et n'ayant condamné qu'une proposition,' (31^e du Décret d'Innocent XI.) qui autorisait à tuer pour un écu d'or, somme régulièrement parlant insuffisante, on doit être très-réservé à cet égard.¹

To take another subject, Pascal accuses the Casuists of explaining away the duty of attention in the acts of worship. The Church tells men to go to mass; it is hard to imagine for what purpose but to pray, and to pray rightly; and equally hard to imagine, how any other way of going could be prescribed, or thought of. But it was not so simple a matter, and gave rise to great questions, about how, and when, and with what intention the precept was to be satisfied. There were *pros* and *cons* on the subject; there was a severe school which exacted attention; another which maintained that the Church cannot command internal acts. As an extreme specimen of what could be put out to the world on this point, we will quote the following passage from Caramuel, whose name will be remembered by readers of Pascal—not a Jesuit, though a warm admirer of the order, and an enthusiastic votary of the *generous and clement* way of philosophising about moral questions. The Casuist Diana was said by envious rivals, 'esse agnum Dei, qui tollit peccata mundi.' Caramuel is explaining the phrase in Diana's honour: ²—

'Let Navarrus,' he says, 'and the old Casuists have their own glory; let them be lions and get praise for their severity; be you the lamb, praised for benignity. Let those who please follow the lions—those who distrust with me their own frailty will more wisely follow you. *Hi sunt*,' he proceeds, '*qui cum mulieribus non sunt coinquinati virgines enim sunt, et sequuntur agnum quocunque ierit.*'

Of this he gives the following allegorical exposition:—

'These are the disciples and admirers of Diana. The opinions of Doctors at this day "*differunt genere.*" Some are *masculine*, others *feminine*, not to

¹ Vol. i. p. 310.

² It occurs in a letter to the Sicilian Casuist Diana, also not a Jesuit, in which Caramuel sets forth his friend Diana's European reputation and well-grounded claims to promotion at the hands of the Holy See. Diana was the Casuist whose 'industry had made many opinions probable which were not so before.' '*Tota æmulorum oblocutio pervenit ad columnas Herculis cum dicunt, Dianam esse Agnum Dei qui tollit peccata mundi. Idem ego frequenter inculco ut te commendem, . . . ejus industriâ multas opiniones evasisse probabiles quæ antea non erant. Si jam sint probabiles quæ antea non erant, jam non peccant qui eas sequuntur, licet antea peccaverint: ergo si ejusmodi peccata ab orbe literario Diana sustulit, merito dicetur esse Agnum,*' &c.

speaking of neuters. In the last century there were many moral opinions, defenceless, inconsistent, difficult, labouring under all the imperfection of women—they have been succeeded by others, well-guarded, consistent, and very easy; and they who look with favour on these later opinions are not only warriors but virgins. But why? I will shortly explain. Navarrus, and all who require internal attention in the Divine Office, for instance, considering the liveliness of the human mind, conclude that a man can scarcely or not at all satisfy the duty without some venial distraction; and so with equal solidity they philosophise about the other precepts. But we, who on the other hand take a generous view, and confirm our opinion by armed reasoning, are not only warriors but virgins: for we can so satisfy "the Hours," and also the other precepts of the Church, so as not to fall into even a light fault. For continued exercise (*prolatio*), and every external act, is most easy; and human laws of superiors, ecclesiastical or secular, do not enjoin internal ones. Then the conscience which has wrought without venial sin is a virgin, and most brave champion, which fears not to be conquered, for she cannot be, against her will. So we hold, and because hither we have been led by this "Regular" Lamb,¹ philosophising generously and with clemency, we follow the Lamb, (that is, Diana,) whithersoever he goeth. For we are sure that his doctrines are confirmed by so large a number of theologians, that it is enough, when any one asks whether this or that is lawful, to answer, ΑΥΤΟΣ ΕΦΕΑ, *i. e.* *Diana dixit*."—*Caram. Theol. Fundam.* pp. 23, 24. Francof. 1652.

An extravagance of the seventeenth century, it may be said. We should say so, for ourselves. This Caramuel von Lobcowitz we should have looked upon simply as the buffoon and jack-pudding of casuistry. But we are checked by M. Maynard, who, while disclaiming all obligation to defend one who was not a Jesuit, informs us that he was a 'Bishop, and a very virtuous 'one, though a man of ardent imagination rather than of solid 'judgment;' and, though allowing that Caramuel made many mistakes in his book, exerts himself with ludicrous gravity to put a creditable construction on his famous '*conclusio conclusioem*' and its corollary, why Jesuits may *not* kill Jansenists. And we find, further, that, whatever we may think of him, he had a brilliant and successful career.² 'His moral doctrines in theology, indeed, were so decried, that those who are 'furthest from rigorism would not like to be suspected of the 'smallest leaning towards his opinions;' but they cannot be said to have hindered his honours or promotions.

¹ Diana was a Canon-Regular.

² He wrote seventy-seven large volumes. He converted 2,500 heretics. He fought against the Swedes at Prague, at the head of his troop of drilled ecclesiastics. He was the Envoy of the King of Spain to the Emperor. He shone at Salamanca, Alcalá, and Louvain. He was successively titular Abbot of Melrose, and Vicar-General of the Cistercians in England, Abbot of Dissemburg, Bishop of Niessy, and Suffragan to the Archbishop of Mayence, Vicar-General to the Archbishop of Prague, Bishop of Königsgratz. The year after Pascal had been quoting him in Paris, Alexander VII. gave him the bishopric of Campagna, and to supply his printing expenses, the King of Spain that of Vigevano, in which he died in 1682.

³ Biog. Univ.

But now, let us see how, not Caramuel, but M. Maynard, speaks of the kindred decision of certain theologians, that 'it was sufficient to be present at mass in body, though absent in mind, *pourvu qu'on demeure dans une contenance respectueuse extérieurement.*' On this, M. Maynard observes as follows; the diffidence of himself and his client are remarkable, in the presence of the 'great theologians,' whom they venture to differ from, or to follow with reluctance:—

'This decision, like the following ones, appears at least singular, in its abstract form. But it depends on a question long debated among theologians: whether the Church can command an internal act, either directly, or at least indirectly, so far as it is necessary for giving to the external act a real virtue. After a great number of authors whom he cites, Coninch maintains the negative, *out of respect*, he says, *for S. Thomas,*' (because there can be no command, but so far as there is power to *punish*, and, therefore, power to *judge*: and the Church, except in confession, can only judge and punish external acts.) 'According to this opinion, which we do not hold, but which has been defended by great theologians, Coninch advances, 1, That the ecclesiastical precept is satisfied by hearing mass without bringing to it any interior affection, provided that one be present with external respect, so as to exercise truly an external act of religion, and be in external communion of prayer with the priest. But, 2, he adds, what Pascal has taken good care not to say,—that a man so violates the precept of natural right, bidding us to attend mass with devotion, and sins against the respect due to God and the holy mysteries. Thus understood, the sentiment may be false, and we believe it such; but it does not in any way *facilitate the use of holy things*, and does not lead either to contempt of the sacrifice, or impiety, or even to negligence in the accomplishment of religious duties.'—Vol. i. pp. 435, 436.

Unless the restrictions reduce the rule simply to no sense at all, it certainly seems considerably 'to facilitate the use of holy things.' A precept of the Church—to violate which is mortal sin—about a religious act, which to be worth doing at all must be an inward act, yet restrained exclusively to the external act;—satisfied as a precept, yet involving sin in the mode of satisfying;—the doctrine maintained stoutly by great and wise doctors, and yet, though intelligible only as a practical matter, condemned by its maintainers, except in speculation;—all this presents a curious union of conditions. The practical Escobar, however, goes a step further. He lays down, that mass may be heard '*comme il faut,*' by a person not only absent in mind, but intent on bad thoughts, and present for the purpose of indulging them: '*qu'une méchant intention, comme de regarder les femmes avec un désir impur, jointe à celle d'ouïr la messe comme il faut, n'empêche pas qu'on n'y satisfasse.*' Very shocking, indeed, says M. Maynard; but what can you do? you may be out of temper with Escobar, but Escobar will answer you that he is simply arguing from a doctrine maintained by great

authorities, about the '*comme il faut*' of hearing mass: no one can help 'logical consequences:—

'Cette vilaine proposition est inexcusable, bien qu'elle suive assez logiquement du sentiment que l'Eglise ne commande pas les actes intérieurs.'—Vol. i. p. 437.

Besides, he *supposes*, all the time, that the outward attention to the service is kept up simultaneously: '*il suppose toujours, que l'attention extérieure subsiste.*' Then M. Maynard bids us observe that '*il ne justifie pas ces mauvais regards dans la circonstance, encore moins en eux-mêmes, et il y verrait volontiers un infâme sacrilège.*' But having done what was candid in admitting, in Escobar's name as well as his own, that this would be '*un infâme sacrilège,*' and for himself, that Escobar's conclusion was a '*vilaine proposition,*' he proceeds to express his inability to see what can be the harm of it, or what people can mean by quibbling about such a trifle: '*Puis pour la pratique, il nous est impossible de comprendre en quoi tout cela peut nuire à la piété Catholique: ce sont de subtilités d'esprit misérables, scabreuses même, si l'on veut,*' (candid man!) '*et rien de plus.*' Why then put these miserable subtleties in practical books? Oh! he says, they have their use; practical questions for confessors may arise, which they may be wanted to answer. 'On pourrait, cependant, ajouter, que toutes ces questions n'étaient pas absolument oiseuses, et qu'elles tendaient à décider si, quelque pût être le péché commis par le pénitent pendant la messe, il était obligé d'entendre une autre.' So that rather than trust the confessor's common sense, to settle whether, to comply with the command of the Church, a man who had abominably profaned one mass was bound to hear another, Escobar might 'tend to decide it' by putting in his book that the Church's precept could be satisfied by an '*infâme sacrilège,*' without erring, apparently, in more than judgment. Is there much difference between Caramuel and M. Maynard?

We will take one more case;—that of what M. Maynard terms the 'theory of equivocations and mental restrictions:'¹ a theory, which, he says, 'had been known in the schools for two centuries;' and so far from the Jesuits having been its inventors, 'at the date of the *Provinciales*, it would not have been easy to find more than three or four theologians of an opposite sentiment.' 'A doctrine so universally adopted must have solid foundations;' and, as it has continued to be taught in the Church by strict theologians, even after the condemnation of certain propositions by the Pope, we must conclude that only its abuses were condemned.

¹ Vide Lettre IX.

How, he says, can you do without *some* theory to reconcile veracity with other often conflicting duties? and what harm can there be in *this* one, when its maintainers tell you never to apply or use equivocation when it is not right, or in a wrong way? The following *exposé* of its principles is stated to be but an analysis of the learned Jesuit Sanchez:—

‘It is necessary,’ he begins, ‘first, to shelter from all accusation of falsehood divers holy personages of the Bible, who appear in word and deed to have departed from the way of simple and straightforward truth, *e. g.* Abraham and Isaac, Jacob calling himself the eldest son to his father, the angel of Tobias taking the name of some high person in Israel. Several saints of the New Testament appear to have had recourse to equivocation; and certain expressions of our Lord are hard to explain in their obvious and natural sense.’

Then after noticing that a man is often placed between contradictory obligations, he states as follows the distinctions by which the Casuists saved equivocation from the guilt of lying, and guarded its right use:—

‘The objections to the “*system of equivocations*” are obvious; but any other system is just as open to difficulty, especially as applied to the facts of the Bible. Nevertheless, the holders of the system of equivocation could not rest under the charge of excusing lies and deceit. So they establish two sorts of restrictions, one allowed, the other forbidden; the “*purely mental*,” where it is absolutely impossible to discover the truth, and the “*sensible*,” of which the sense *might be discovered* by certain signs or circumstances, though more often it must remain hidden. Again, they distinguished between the equivocation *sensible*, and the equivocation *at pleasure* (*forgée à plaisir*), of which the meaning is purely arbitrary.

‘In this manner, say they, not only is a person without the intention of deceiving, but he does not *necessarily* deceive at all, because it is *possible* to discover the truth; and there is no injustice, for it is assumed that one party has no right to know, nor the other to reveal the truth. So there is no wish to “*faire accroire une chose fausse*,” as Pascal says; such an intention would be condemned by all theologians. Moreover, there is no mischief done to human society, for equivocations are not resorted to under every circumstance, but in exceptional cases, where there are grave inconveniences in discovering the truth, and a real necessity and duty to keep it silent.’—Vol. i. pp. 421, 422.

So far for *general* statement. If a theory were true because it is wanted, it is clear that it is often inconvenient, hard, undesirable—sometimes wrong, to state truth. But, as M. Maynard truly remarks, ‘the real difficulty is in its application.’ Does it help us out of our perplexities? The difficulties of astronomy remained after the invention of cycles and epicycles. M. Maynard admits, indeed, that in their application of the ‘solid’ and safe principles, the theologians were occasionally mistaken; but, ‘why should that be made a crime in them?’

Pascal, for instance, quotes from Sanchez, ‘*that we may swear that we have not done something which we have done, by under-*

'standing mentally, that we did not do it on such a day, or before we were born, or with some such circumstances.' Here is certainly a very definite way of using equivocation, and escaping, we are told, lying or perjury. M. Maynard appears to think that it only wants the rules, conditions, and restrictions, omitted by Pascal, to make it a practical solution of possible perplexities. But it seems, that all the conditions necessary are contained in the passage which we have quoted above—an analysis of this same Sanchez. M. Maynard is easily satisfied. Pascal goes on to another particular case, yet stronger. Filliucci is more definite even than Sanchez. M. Maynard *appears*—we cannot say for certain more—to accept this also, as a satisfactory way of escaping from the difficulties of veracity. At any rate he will not give up Filliucci. Pascal observes, that he says that Sanchez's method of equivocation is neither lie nor perjury:—

'Parceque c'est "l'intention qui règle la qualité de l'action." Et il y donne encore une autre moyen plus sûr d'éviter le mensonge. C'est qu'après avoir dit tout haut, *Je jure que je n'ai point fait cela*, on ajoute tout bas, *aujourd'hui*; ou qu'après avoir dit tout haut, *Je jure*, on dise tout bas, *que je dis*; et que l'on continue ensuite tout haut, *que je n'ai point fait cela*. Vous voyez bien que c'est dire la vérité. Je l'avoue, lui dis-je; mais nous trouverions, peut-être, que c'est dire la vérité tout bas, et un mensonge tout haut: outre, que je craindrais que bien de gens n'eussent pas assez de présence d'esprit pour se servir de ces méthodes. Nos pères, dit-il, ont enseigné au même lieu, en faveur de ceux qui ne sauraient pas user de ces restrictions, qu'il leur suffit, pour ne point mentir, de dire simplement, qu'ils n'ont point fait ce qu'ils ont fait, pourvu qu'ils aient en général l'intention de donner à leur discours le sens qu'un habile homme y donnerait.'

We will here quote the curiously stated decisions of the Penitentiary on '*Amphibologia*,' and then our readers may judge for themselves of M. Maynard's comments on him and on Pascal:

'Filliucci, after stating, on the question, "whether, if the *amphibologia* be solely mental, it is lawful to *swear*?"—that it is a *probable* opinion that it is not lawful, but a *more probable* one that it is; "for that, out of the word spoken and the mental restriction is made one compound speech in which is no falsehood, and that it is free for a man to compound his speech of terms spoken and mental;" and after proving this by S. Gregory, who says that "the Prophet sometimes joined the word which one sounded by the mouth, to the word of the mind, which is reason," confirms his position thus: "It is confirmed by the example of Christ's words, '*of that day no man knows*,' and '*I go not up to this feast*,' in which one thing is said in the outward words, and another understood in the internal ones." He then says that the mental restriction ought not to be arbitrary, but proportionate to the words and matter, so that, *with explanation*, the words might be understood in the intended sense; and he gives the following rules, "*ad utendum amphibologiam*."

'Fourthly, I inquire, with what caution must *amphibologia* be used? I answer, and say, first, besides what has just been observed, two modes may be assigned for persons endued with judgment; the first is, to

have the intention of expressing the outward words materially, and for greater security; when the person begins, for instance, by saying, *I swear that*—to interpose in a low voice the mental restriction, *to-day*—and then to add in a loud voice, “*I did not eat this or that;*” or, “*I swear that*”—then interpose, “*I say that*”—then finish in a loud voice, “*I did not do this or that;*” for so the whole speech is most true. The second way is, to have the intention of not completing the speech merely by external words, but, at the same time, with a mental restriction; for a man is at liberty to express his mind wholly or partially. But for the untaught, who cannot understand ambiguous expression in the particular, (*pro rudibus qui nesciunt in particulari concipere amphibologiam*), it is sufficient if they have the intention of affirming or denying in the sense which in reality contains truth; for which it is necessary that they should know, at least in the universal, that they can deny in some true sense, otherwise they could not speak in a true sense.’

He then says that this mode of expression by ambiguous words, especially where the restriction is mental, is not to be used without a ‘*just cause* ;’ otherwise a fault is committed, and if with an oath, a grave fault; and proceeds to inquire *what* sort of fault. Is it a lie? and, if sworn to, perjury? He answers, that it is *probable* that it is, and gives reasons why; but *more probable* that it is not:—

‘I say, in the second place, that it seems more probable that in strictness it is not a lie, or perjury. The principal reason is, that he who so speaks and swears has not the intention of saying what is false, or swearing to it, as is presupposed; and what is expressed, in strictness has *some true sense*, which the person intends; therefore he does not lie (from Navarr. cap. *Humane Aures*, 22, 9, 5). For the intention characterises (*discernit*) the action. It is confirmed from S. Thomas, 2. 2. 9, 55, Art. 3, where cunning (*astutia*) is said to be the vice contrary to prudence; but he who uses “*amphibologia*” is, at the utmost, astute; therefore, &c. . . But it is not repugnant to human truth and good faith, because it is not opposed to it by a defect of truth, but by an excessive occultation of truth. Hence it is that to confirm this by an oath is not strictly perjury, but a certain want of religiousness (*irreligiositas quædam*), and if there be scandal, from the outward semblance of perjury, it will be brought to the evil of that; which [evil] has most place in ambiguous expression with mental restriction, as Suarez rightly teaches.’—*Fill. Moral. Quæst.* Tr. xxv. cap. xi. nn. 325—331.

Such is Filliucci’s statement, little more than copied, as is the wont of these writers, even to the illustrations, from a predecessor—in this case, one of the greatest of the Casuists, Suarez. M. Maynard thus excepts to Pascal’s use of it:—

‘We have nearly the same thing to say of Filliucci as of Sanchez. This principle, that “*the intention regulates the quality of the action*,” has been quoted by Pascal in a very dishonest way. It means merely that we must never, even in case of mental restriction, have the intention to deceive, but only to hide a truth which our neighbour has no right to know. Such is also the sense of the general rule, “*to have the intention to give to our words the sense which a clever man (un habile homme) would give them*.” This rule is for the ignorant who may use ambiguous terms (*cette règle est pour les ignorants qui useraient d’amphibologie*). As it is never allowed to speak

contrary to our thought, then, if they do not understand the expedient which they use, (*s'ils ne comprennent pas le tour dont ils se servent*,) they ought to have the intention in general of giving to it the sense which a clever man would give it.—Vol. i. p. 425.

There is something delightful in the simplicity with which M. Maynard disposes of the matter, by merely tacitly translating the restriction which Filliucci thinks sufficient. We must add, as we have so often had the distinction between speculation and practice, that Suarez, the original authority, assures us that this doctrine, so stated, is '*practice securissima*.'

These are the sort of subjects on which, according to M. Maynard, men cannot be expected to be of one mind—the subjects to which the doctrine of Probabilism applies. 'If there are in morals some points which are certain, there are others which are not, which come into the domain of the probable, and of opinion. Do what we will, take up what system we please, there will always be controverted principles, embarrassing cases, through which we cannot guide ourselves by a certainty and evidence which do not exist, but only by the glimmering twilight of reasons or authorities more or less plausible.'² The men whom Pascal accuses of such diversity of sentiment, are, he says, agreed, 'first on all the principles which are certain or defined by Scripture, tradition, and the Church; then on all the doctrines commonly received in the Catholic schools. As for *controverted opinions*, whatever system of morals we embrace, we shall never be agreed.'³

But he treats with scorn the idea that these open questions, and, as he allows very often, singular solutions of them, could have the smallest effect on feeling, opinion, or practice. He coolly parallels them to the books of medical and legal science,—an analogy which might perhaps do for the questions, if they had not the answers to them. We must oppose to M. Maynard's opinion, one which on this point is at least as 'probable.' On a matter of fact, at least, the authority of the famous Caramuel may be of weight. An injudicious director may yet be a fair witness, especially against himself; and so great was his confidence in his favourite science, that he could afford the admission that M. Maynard shrinks from. Caramuel attests the fact, that 'inconvenience' did result from many of the most probable opinions of the schools; only he thinks it a very paltry argument to infer, that therefore they are not probable:—

'You will say that from this doctrine,' [he is speaking, we may observe, of the famous *conclusio conclusionum* of Pascal's seventh Letter,] 'many inconveniences arise, and therefore it is to be rejected. And I answer, that

¹ Suarez de Rel. tom. ii. tr. 4. lib. iii. c. 10. n. 4.

² Vol. i. p. 199.

³ Vol. i. p. 241.

to say, "From such and such an assertion great dangers and mischiefs arise, therefore it is false," is not a good consequence." [He then instances, e.g. an assertion which might throw a whole kingdom into a revolution, yet would not be the less true, and proceeds—it will be observed that we are quoting him only as a witness to fact.] 'Hence it is that I judge that the highest inconveniences (*summa inconvenientia*) follow from many opinions, which are at this day in vogue in the schools, yet that these opinions are not therefore improbable. For many inconveniences arise from mental restrictions; many from secret compensations; many from the permission to kill an unjust judge or witness, which some grant; many also from the opinion which teaches, that of secret things the Church judges not; many from others: notwithstanding which inconveniences, these opinions, in the terms in which they are at this day delivered in the schools, are at the very least most probable, and may not be condemned by any (*sunt ad minimum probabilissimæ, et a nemine damnari possunt*).'—*Theolog. Fundam.* No. 1150. Ed. Franc. 1652.

To this we are quite aware that there is a summary and specious answer. It is, that the Popes, in spite of Caramuel, have condemned these discreditable opinions, and banished them for ever from the teaching of the Church. Whatever might be said inconsiderately in 1650, yet when Alexander VII. and Innocent XI. spoke, a few years later, Jesuits and all submitted with absolute reverence to the decision of Rome, and no theologian can be cited who has since then said these things.

To this a rejoinder might be supposed, that it was but a make-believe condemnation, or one brought about accidentally by the policy or revenge of the moment; that when Rome meant to condemn in earnest, as in the case of the Jansenists, there was no mistake in her way of doing it; that here, though she happened to fix on most of the propositions quoted by Pascal, she simply condemned them in their bare literal sense, and said nothing as to why and how she condemned them; that Casuists might still treat the censures as sullen lawyers do an Act of Parliament,—maintain that their method was unrebuked, and that the propositions were condemned, not as morally shocking, but merely verbally inexact, and might still hold others next door to them with impunity. It might be urged, that apparently they had only become wrong, since and because the Popes condemned them, and their previous tolerance indicates that it was little more than a formal stigma.

On the other hand, it might be said, that it is unfair thus to explain away the obvious purport of the Popes' act; that we ought to take it for what it looks like—the condemnation of a dangerous mode of thought or expression in certain palpable samples of it, as Jansenism was condemned in the Five Propositions, or in the 101 of the Bull *Unigenitus*; that the propositions are nearly the same as those which Bossuet got condemned by the Assembly of 1700, and we know that he condemned in them the spirit and system which had produced them.

Now how does M. Maynard deal with this? For it is obvious that for him, in proportion as it removes one difficulty, it brings in another. Apparently, at least, if it clears the Popes, it compromises the Casuists; and in proportion as we give weight and significance to the condemnation, it seems to fix on them the load of a mischievous and at length intolerable teaching,—intolerable even to that very authority of which they were the champions. The fact, of course, he more than admits. ‘Long before 1679,’ he says, ‘the Jesuits had been able to cite more than thirty of their theologians, anterior even to the *Provinciales*, on the necessity of the love of God in penitence. With much stronger reason, then, did they abstain, after the pontifical sentence, to teach any of the propositions condemned by Innocent XI.’¹ Whether the mistake was practical, ‘these men, who were led astray by benevolent and pure intentions, to impose on weak men the least burden possible,—renounced their error as soon as it was pointed out to them by their superiors, and especially by the Holy See; and thus the evil was dried up at its source;’² or whether it was but mere speculation, ‘they renounced even their abstractions, as soon as any point of doctrine had been prescribed by the Holy See. Thus it would be impossible to cite a single theologian who has permitted the murder of the unjust judge, or of the false witnesses, since the censure of the 18th proposition of the decree of Alexander VII.; and the most celebrated authors,’ it is added, with some boldness of assertion, ‘had not waited till then to condemn it in their works.’³ We do not for a moment doubt the submission; yet M. Maynard seems to make more of a merit of it than is quite intelligible. The sacrifice of submitting to be debarred from such propositions as that ‘the love of God is not necessary for penitence,’ or that ‘we may seek occasions of sin for our own good or that of our neighbour,’ does not seem so very hard, any more than the glory very singular of not having maintained them.

But we should, it appears, be grossly mistaken, if we saw in these censures any such condemnation, or even discountenancing, of principles, or methods of arguing or stating, as the Bull *Unigenitus* is of Jansenism as a whole. The decrees of Alexander and Innocent are, we are told to observe, censures, not of doctrines, but of *propositions*. The propositions are given up, of course; and there is an end of the matter. But the authors are not named, and are therefore untouched. What the Church has decided upon is nothing but certain extreme and lax applications of a recognised way of treating moral questions. The

¹ Vol. i. p. 183.² Vol. i. p. 210.³ Vol. i. p. 304.

propositions are to be taken one by one, as separate, isolated, for the most part trifling, or accidental mistakes, each to be set down to the account of him who made it: and who does not make mistakes? And as we are not to gather from the censure that the Church meant to notice them as an aggregate and significant phenomenon, such as Pascal sees in them; so, on each subject touched by the propositions, beyond the strict letter of the proposition censured the condemnation does not reach.

It was, for instance, as M. Maynard tells us, a *common doctrine* at the time in the schools¹—by no means confined to the Jesuits, and, indeed, not accepted by several of them—that it is lawful to kill beforehand false witnesses against us. ‘Speculatively, indeed,’ says M. Maynard,² ‘it will be legitimate, for it flows logically from natural right, general principles, and analogy with permitted cases;’ and it is difficult to see in what this ‘horrible consequence’ ‘differs from the case of unjust aggression and lawful self-defence.’ And the theologians ‘added almost always,’ that speculatively only was it lawful. Turned into practice, ‘it would involve an almost inevitable sin.’ Therefore, and so far only, it was condemned. The practical dangers (which for once M. Maynard admits) ‘caused to be absolutely condemned by the Popes a certain number of propositions on this subject, certainly admissible in principle and in theory. But the theologians who confined themselves within the limits of pure abstraction and metaphysical precision are not touched by these censures.’ The general doctrine on homicide, which Pascal imputes to the Jesuits, is not merely unjustly made peculiar to them, but ‘has never been condemned by the Church.’³ So with the ‘*système des équivoques*,’ which we have already alluded to:—

‘The adversaries of this system,’ says M. Maynard, ‘object to the propositions condemned by Innocent XI. and the Clergy of France in 1700. It would be singular enough,’ he proceeds, ‘that if the system of equivocations was absolutely condemned, it should continue to be taught by a great number of theologians with the full cognizance of the Church, and by theologians, too, very little suspected of relaxed moral opinions. . . . We must suppose, therefore, that it is only the abuses and excesses of the system which are touched by the censure. That this answer is founded in reason may be seen by the examination of the condemned propositions. The 26th of Innocent XI. permits, without distinction, every restriction, even purely mental, under every circumstance, with or without reason; the 27th measures the use of it only by the private advantage of him who uses it, without regard to the public interest, often opposed to private, or to the exceptions laid down by theologians; the 28th authorizes reservations in cases where the public good, law, and morality require a plain and straightforward oath, by a culpable abuse of the principle, that a man is

¹ Vol. i. p. 327.² Vol. i. pp. 303, 304.³ Vol. i. p. 310.

not obliged to avow a secret crime; and in other ways it tends to favour intrigue and bad means of arriving at employments.'—Vol. i. pp. 423, 424.

Again, P. Bauny asks, '*Les valets qui se plaignent de leurs gages peuvent-ils d'eux-mêmes les croître en se garnissant les mains d'autant de bien appartenant à leur maîtres, comme ils s'imaginent en être nécessaire pour égaler les dits gages à leur peine?*' and answers, '*Ils le peuvent, en quelques rencontres, comme lorsqu'ils sont si pauvres en cherchant condition, qu'ils ont été obliger d'accepter l'offre qu'on leur a faite, ou que les autres valets de leur sorte gagnent d'avantage ailleurs.*' 'Voilà,' says M. Maynard, '*encore une matière fort délicate.*' Innocent XI. and the Assembly of 1700 have condemned the proposition, that "*men-servants and maid-servants may take in secret from their masters, wherewith to compensate their labour, which they judge to be greater than the salary which they receive.*" This seems absolute and clear; and M. Maynard says it is a blameable doctrine, inasmuch as it leaves the estimation of the value to the interested party, and opens the gate to an infinity of domestic thefts. But, he adds, not even P. Bauny taught this proposition. What he exactly means by this we are at a loss to understand, unless he means that P. Bauny used *other words*.

But he proceeds himself to ask,—'Follows it from this that 'in certain circumstances, infinitely rare if we please, servants 'may not use secret compensation?' He replies that, under certain conditions—*e.g.* the certainty of the debt—its being a matter of rigorous justice—impossible to be otherwise recovered—free from scandal or injury to a third party—and the debtor not liable to have to pay twice,—it is 'certainly permitted,' to creditors in general. The concurrence of conditions is rare, and therefore it is a question rather speculative than practical; but where they do concur, all theologians allow it. And why should *servants* be excepted? By all means, he says, make more severe conditions for them, as they are more liable to make mistakes—'*à la bonne heure—mais doit-on les priver absolument du droit de compenser eux-mêmes les injustices de maîtres durs et impitoyables? Les théologiens, Jésuites ou non, n'ont pas eu ce triste courage.*' They justify the principle by the example of Jacob and Laban, and 'leave the domestics in 'the condition of other creditors, only with greater limitations,' all which, we are told, P. Bauny gives. The permitted cases are, 1, when agreement for increase of wages in proportion to increased usefulness is not kept; 2, when servants have been *forced* into a service for fear of starving. But Bauny excepts from this liberty the case of servants, 1, taken out of pure compassion; or, 2, at their own request; or, 3, not under worse

condition than others. '*Avec ces limitations, la décision de Bauny n'est pas dangereuse, surtout si le confesseur est laissé juge, et bien rarement trouvera-t-il son application.*' And thus the honour and the intention of both Pope and Casuist, though seemingly of directly opposite views, are judiciously reconciled. But it brings forcibly before us how difficult a thing it must be to 'condemn' a proposition.

So much for the effect of the condemnation. It is a *fait accompli*, to be treated with all respect. But M. Maynard suggests that its importance is still further diminished, if we consider its history:—

'Madame de Sevigné is too amusing,' he observes, 'when she affects so much pity for her "*pauvres frères*," whom she makes into victims when they were really persecutors. . . . "When they did not consult the Pope," she says, "they were schismatics; when they complain to him about these *opinions probables*, they are rebels." *Eh! oui, sans doute, Madame*; they first did not consult the Pope, for fear of hearing the condemnation of their heretical doctrines; they afterwards have recourse to him to denounce faithful priests, and trouble further the Church and the State. In the first case, were they not *schismatics*; in the second, *rebels*? *Louis XIV. was therefore wise in placing his agents on the great roads, to prevent any such communications between the Pope and the Jansenists.* But he did not succeed in barring that passage to them, and the denunciation reached Innocent XI. The Pope then pronounced on the question of fact, not on that of right, and condemned, in 1679, the sixty-five propositions, as he was bound to condemn them, wherever found, to show that the Church does not approve laxities in morality. But he did not attribute them to the Jesuits, or condemn them as corrupters of morality.'—Vol. i. pp. 182, 183.

But, though it might have been owing to the unfortunate failure of the efforts of Louis XIV. to stop them, that the Jansenists succeeded in forcing the Pope to consider an inopportune question, his decision, when forced, could be but one way, and was right. A modest foot-note, however, ventures further to insinuate the intrusion of a cause which takes off still more from the real, though not the formal effect of the act. The Jesuits knew the Pope's duty better than himself sometimes; but a price must be paid for helping a man in spite of himself:—

'We must observe, however, that Innocent XI. did not love the Jesuits, and wished to change their Institute. He was a great and holy Pontiff, but inflexible even to harshness, jealous of his rights even to obstinacy, and impracticable when his authority was in question. In the affair of the Regale, the Jesuits had shown themselves more French than Roman. He had sent them his briefs, which the Parliament suppressed, with orders to publish them and certify their authenticity. The Jesuits remained neuter, *et ne voulurent pas se rendre impossibles en France en s'opposant aux lois du royaume.* He had even entrusted to P. Dez a brief of excommunication against Louis XIV., but the Jesuit took care not to publish it. He kept it secret, to leave the Pope time for reflection; and in fact Innocent XI. withdrew it himself, acknowledging in the end how wise had been the

¹ Vol. i. pp. 294—296.

conduct of the Jesuits. This however did not prevent him from entertaining a grudge against them; and the condemnation of the sixty-five propositions, though just in itself, was without doubt an act of revenge.—Vol. i. p. 183.

From a writer who, in the case of Jansenism, argues that Infallibility means nothing unless it includes Infallibility as to fact, this is remarkable. Which is the true interpretation of the censures, must be settled between those who think most about the meaning of the propositions, and those who feel most about the honour of the Jesuits. It is at least ambiguous, whether it is public feeling or the censures of Rome, which prevents Escobars and Caramuels from appearing now.

Such is M. Maynard's way of vindicating a system, whose speculations and practical decisions ranged with equal boldness and equal solemnity, and with equal arbitrariness in relaxing or tightening, from the obligation of the first and great commandment to the problem whether chocolate were meat or drink,¹ or whether, and in what shape, using tobacco violated the eucharistic fast.² We are familiar with the gross exaggerations of its meaning and design, made for party purposes—for a Maynooth bill, for instance—on one side. Here we have equally gross shuffling and effrontery, to get rid of obvious facts, on the other.

¹ *Quid de potione in Hispania, aut Occidentali India, dicta vulgo "chocolate?"* Aliquando dixi pro potu haberi, sed parum meriti jejuniu relinquare ob vires, quas jejunanti adjicit, omnino inedia sublata, aut impedita; nec absolute cuperem usum hujusce potionis, uti mortificationi jejunii ab Ecclesiæ intentæ apprimè adversantem; at magis auctoritati adhærens quam rationi, potum esse assero, sed non uti condit abusus, sed quemadmodum potio ab Indis ad Hispaniam pervenit. Unde "*chocolate*" ovis aut lacte conditum potus non est, sed cibus substantialissimus. Item hujusmodi potio admodum crassa in notabili quantitate jejuniu violat. Verum "*chocolate*" liquidum adeo, ut unicæ potioni uncia una adhibeatur saccharo necessario potus est, et absque scrupulo assumi potest. Unicam potionem appello quod capit commune vas, quod *vicara* vulgo assolet appellari. Quod si assignata proportionem ea potionis quantitas conditur, licet vas non semel evacuetur, jejuniu non solvitur, temperantia fortasse violata, quia potus est, quemadmodum de vino asserimus.—*Escobar*, Tr. i. Exam. xiii. cap. 3. Praxis sec. 8. *J. de Jejuniu*.

² II^a regula est: ad frangendum jejuniu requiritur ut accipiatur aliquid per modum comestionis aut potationis: quare communiter dicunt Suar. Lugo, Conc. Holzm. Ronc. Escob. Croix, Elb., *quicquid dicant aliqui pauci*, non lædere jejuni. tabacum per nares sumtum, licet aliquid illius descenderet in stomachum, ratione allatâ . . . saltem ait Bened. XIV. hoc est permissum propter usum universalem inter fideles receptum.

Pariter, tabaci fumus ore haustus non frangit jejuni, ut etiam communiter docent Suar. Vill. Trullenc. &c. cum eodem Bened. XIV. qui similiter testatur hanc esse hodiernam consuetudinem, confirmatam communi DD. consensu. Limitant tamen Salmant., et dicunt frangere jejuni. qui ex proposito transmitteret fumum in stomachum, dicendo quod hæc esset vera comestio, dum talis fumus etiam aliquo modo nutretur; sed hæc limitatio communis et probabilis negatur ab Escob. Præp. March. Viva, Spor. Renzi. Tamb. Diana, &c. Et ratio est, quia fumus non sumitur per modum cibi, nec est cibus in se comestibilis aut manducabilis, quem voluerit Ecclesia prohibere, juxta communem DD. sensum.—*Liguori*, *Hom. Ap. Tract.* xv. p. 3, n. 38, 39.

We are not going here to reduce and adjust these rival extravagances; but it may be said, that to fair examination, the truth does not seem to lie very deep.

If we look into its history, its first cause is to be sought in the inherited habits of thought, which had been formed in the middle age schools. The extravagant licence of speculating and deciding had passed from doctrine to questions of morality and conscience; it was the fashion and mania of the day; serious men competed in the hardihood and strangeness of their solutions, and good men seemed to take a pride in finding out how much they could allow—in speculation at any rate—to be lawful. Conditions, restrictions, distinctions multiplied of course; but so did the authorities and decisions, inventing doubts, extending liberty, and taking away scruples. It is all done in these countless folios of Moral Theology, just as if it had no more to do with real human action than with the movements of the stars—all for the mere pleasure of speculating, and with the zest of a race in avoiding a corner, and the inventiveness of a legal debate, in pressing or giving the slip to the letter of an Act of Parliament.

Its next cause was the practical needs of casuistry—the endeavour to fix what cannot be fixed, the limits, in every possible case, of mortal sin. Casuistry may be a natural growth of the wants of conscience, and its place in a system like that of Rome is obvious. Whether it can supply those wants or not, the attempt to do so may doubtless be made with fairness and soberness; and it is impossible to doubt the ability or religious mind of many, whose meditations it has engaged. Such, in spite of Pascal, were Suarez and Vasquez. But its extent and its utility are limited; and the mischief of which it may be the occasion is obvious, if it becomes formal, or attempts to supersede or overshadow the individual conscience. And this tendency was plainly visible even in the best writers of the class. Doubtless moral questions are very important and often very hard ones. But there are endless questions on which no answer can be given except a bad one,—which cannot be answered in the shape proposed at all. We may think it very desirable to be able to state in the abstract, yet for practical use, the extreme cases, which excuse killing, or taking what is not our own; but if we cannot get beyond decisions, which leave the door open for unquestionable murders or thefts, or shut it only by vague verbal restrictions, unexplained and inexplicable, about '*prudence*,' and '*moderation*,' and '*necessity*,' and '*gravity of circumstances*,' it is a practical illustration of the difficulty of casuistry, which seems to point out, that unless we can do better,

we had best leave it alone. But these men were hard to daunt. They could not trust the consciences of mankind with principles of duty, but they could trust without a misgiving their own dialectic forms, as a calculus which nothing could resist. Nothing in the feelings or actions of men was too fleeting, too complicated, too subtle to be grasped, analysed, expressed and laid up for use, by means of the verbal technicalities of their method. No question would they dismiss as insoluble or absurd.

The consequence was twofold. Their method often *did* fail, and in the attempt to give exact formulæ of right and wrong action, they proved unable to express the right without comprehending the wrong with it. Then as it was not their way to reopen and reexamine, they were driven on that strange maxim for a practical philosophy, that much might be lawful in speculation which was unlawful in practice. They did not shrink from consequences; but they, or at least their defenders, took refuge in the alleged unfairness of taking them at their word. But it is scarcely possible to believe that this scientific impotence was the only consequence of their misdirected labour. From all evil designs the leaders, at any rate, may be safely absolved; though whether they did not lose their sense of the reality of human action, in the formal terms in which they contemplated it, may be a question. But though the *design* of corrupting morality is one of the most improbable charges against any men, the *effect* may more easily follow, even where not intended. When great authorities lay down conclusions which seem to relax the strength of obligation, man must cease to be the creature of affected self-deceit and mixed character, which we know him to be, if any verbal guarding can save them from misleading him—misleading under the pretence of obedience. These Casuists would not trust the individual conscience; and it had its revenge. They were driven onwards till they had no choice left between talking nonsense, or what was worse. They would ticket, and control, and provide for the most evanescent and mixed forms of will and feeling. They would set conscience to rights in minutest detail; and so they had to take the responsibility of whatever could not be set to rights. Nature outwitted them; it gave up its liberty in the gross, and then forced them to surrender it again in detail. They claimed to lay down exactly the measure and shape of every form of stealing; so whenever the letter of their rules did not hold there was no stealing. Nay, it made them avowedly allow for its waywardness in the rules they laid down, as the price of its submission to control at all. And thus, at length, under the treatment of compilers and abridgers, and under the influence of

that idea of authority, which deferred to *opinions*¹ on the same rule as it deferred to *testimony*,—exhibited in the coarsest brevity, and with the affectation of outbidding the boldest precedents,—grew up that form of casuistry which is exhibited in the Escobars and Baunys; which professing to be the indispensable aid to common sense, envelopes it in a very Charybdis of discordant opinions; amid whose grotesque suppositions, and whimsical distinctions, and vague yet peremptory rules, bandied about between metaphysics and real life, the mind sinks into a hopeless confusion of moral ideas, and loses every clue to simple and straightforward action.

A modern reader is more disposed to see in it mere stupid pedantry than mischief. Able and serious men of the time, on the other hand, were revolted in seeing stupid pedantry pretending to be the guide of human conduct, and showing itself off as the latest invention of modern wisdom. Doubtless both views may be exaggerated. The system may have done good in its earlier and healthier state; possibly it may also have been too antiquated and worn out to do evil in its subsequent formal overgrowth. If it is said to have been too absurd to be important, we can understand if we do not accept the view. But it is asking a hard thing to beg us to believe, as M. Maynard does, *both* that these decisions were harmless, *and* that, with a few exceptions, they were very wise; both that they had a practical use and effect, and yet were not mischievous. If it can be made out that they are *only* matter for laughing, we are quite as much inclined to laugh as to be indignant; but if we are to be serious about them, there is only one way of being so.

One point more remains to be noticed. An old writer tells us that '*cæcitatibus duæ species facile concurrunt, ut qui non vident quæ sunt, videre videantur quæ non sunt.*' The remark is singularly borne out here. So convinced is M. Maynard of the evil of the Jansenist doctrine and system of direction, in exacting so much and such strict preparation for absolution and communion, and insisting so strongly on their uselessness and danger without a real change of life, *that in one way only can he account for it.*²

¹ 'Une opinion probable est celle qui a un fondement considérable. Or l'autorité d'un homme savant et pieux n'est pas de petite considération, mais plutôt de grande considération. Car si le témoignage d'un tel homme est de grand poids pour nous assurer qu'une chose se soit passée, par exemple à Rome, pourquoi ne le sera-t-il pas de même dans un doute de morale.'—Sanchez, quoted in Prov. V., vol. i. p. 240.

For instance, he quotes from S. Cyran,—'Pour recevoir le sacrement de l'Eucharistie, il faut être en état de grâce, avoir fait pénitence de ses péchés, et n'être pas attaché, ni par volonté ni par négligence, à aucune chose qui puisse déplaire à Dieu.' 'Ceux qui demeurent volontairement dans les moindres fautes et imperfections sont indignes du sacrement de l'Eucharistie;' with passages recommending

It is impossible, it appears to him, that men could state the claims of religion so rigorously, except for one object, *to drive men to refuse them altogether*. Accordingly, he comes to the conclusion, that Jansenius, S. Cyran, and Arnauld were *disguised infidels*; and labours to show, from a story of the time, coupled with their otherwise inexplicable severity, that Port-Royal was a deistical plot, as a Jesuit of the day expressed it, *'to ruin the mystery of the Incarnation, to make the Gospel pass for an apocryphal story, to exterminate the Christian religion, and to raise up Deism on the ruins of Christianity.'*

Such is the only way in which M. Maynard can explain the appearance in the seventeenth century, in his own communion, of the austere language of the Fathers of the Church. And this is not a passing insinuation. As P. Brisacier assured the Jansenists that he called them *'gates of hell and pontiffs of the devil,'* not *'par forme d'injure, mais par la force de la vérité,'* so M. Maynard maintains, in a special essay¹ of sixteen closely printed pages, the high historical probability of the Jansenist plot of Bourg-Fontaine, for the annihilation of Christianity. *'Si l'axiome de logique,'* he says, *'ab actu ad posse valet illatio, peut trouver ici son application, au doit conclure qu'il est au moins fort possible que le dessein de détruire le Christianisme ait été pris à Bourg-Fontaine, car les différents points qui l'auraient composé ont été essayés par S. Cyran et ses disciples; voilà qui est incontestable.'* *'Pour conclure en un mot; des preuves indirectes et rétroactives semblent établir la réalité du projet de Bourg-Fontaine; des preuves péremptoires démontrent que la foi de Port-Royal sur les Sacrements, sur l'Eucharistie, sur l'Eglise, et sur l'essence même du Christianisme, étaient au moins suspectes. Quand même ils se seraient trompés sur quelques points, les Jésuites n'étaient ni téméraires ni calomnieux dans leurs accusations.'*² *'Le croyez-vous vous-mêmes, misérables que vous êtes?'* was Pascal's indignant challenge to his opponents then, and it is the only one worth giving at any time.

This reminds us that we have spent more time than enough on M. Maynard. Some of that famous order of which he has made himself the champion, might afford him precedents in deliberately arguing for moral paradoxes. P. Hardouin comprised Pascal in his list of Atheists. P. Raynauld proved a

the newly converted, or those guilty of some special sin, to abstain for a time from communion. On this M. Maynard can only put the construction, *'Traduction libre mais exacte de tous ces passages; "ne communiez jamais, car vous en êtes et en serez toujours indignes."*—Vol. ii. pp. 219, 220.

¹ Introd. à la 16me Province. vol. ii. pp. 215—231.

² Vol. ii. pp. 218, 231.

heresy in every article of the Apostles' Creed. But, one of them, at least, probably both, did it in joke. M. Maynard has forgotten Scaliger's wise saying, *Ars est etiam maledicendi*. The most determined enemy of S. Cyran or Arnauld, who at this day affected to doubt their *Tridentine* faith about Penance and the Eucharist, would peril his character for candour; but the man who gravely pretends to maintain, and asks us to believe, that they were deliberate infidels, is far past criticism. He might as well prove that they had horns and tails.

Here we take our leave of him. Yet he has laid us under an obligation. He has realized to us—no longer, indeed, in an unsuspicious and communicative, but in an irritated mood—the Jesuit father of the Provincial Letters, a well-meaning man, and as far as possible from purposing any harm, but dulled into a positive incapacity for perceiving that there is any harm in what is wrong, if his friends say it.

But, after all, this man is but a blind and injudicious repeater,—seduced into print by that cheap gift which Frenchmen have, a plausible and flimsy rhetoric,—of the views and assertions of De Maistre,¹—of that fashionable theory concerning the Roman Church, which itself does what is its heaviest and justest charge against opponents of that Church—prefer to call good evil, rather than submit to be checked and controlled by facts. He but follows the stream, and talks, as he can, the fearless sophistry which he hears admired. But we cannot congratulate the French Church, if he is an average specimen of the men who are promoted to her titular dignities, set over the education of her dioceses,² and encouraged to publish by the 'favourable opinion of the highest ecclesiastical authority existing in France.'

¹ V. De Maistre, de l'Eglise Gallicane; the parallel between Hobbes and Jansenius.

² 'Appelé à travailler auprès de vous à la grande œuvre de l'éducation.'—*Dedication to the Bishop of Agen*.

NOTICES.

A PRETTY edition of 'Wilson's Sacra Privata,' (Cleaver,) with ritual notes, has been published as a companion to 'Wilson on the Lord's Supper,' illustrated on a similar plan. The notes in either work are replete with learning and curious research; occasionally they give exaggerated importance to circumstances of a local and temporary character; but within the same compass it would be difficult to find more information on the order and ceremonial practice of the Church of England.

'English Alice,' by A. J. Evelyn, Esq. (Pickering,) is 'A Poem, in Five Cantos.' Mr. Evelyn assures us that in Seville of the present day the Inquisition is in full force, and hands off young English ladies to dungeons, where their joints are wrenched and racked just as in Foxe's Martyrs. We give a specimen of the poetry: Scene, the dungeons of the Inquisition: 'It'—viz. 'the judge's cold and hissing tone'—

'It says, "Clerk, once more ask the prisoner this,—"
For a young secretary had his seat
Below the judge, sleek, slim, and grimly neat,—
"Will she confess the details of the flight,"' &c.

The intervention at the heroine's critical moment is in a high style of art, just as English Alice is about to be 'hurled' into the torture-chamber:—

'A lacquey enters in disorder'd haste—
"How now?" exclaims the judge; "whence 'this ill-placed
Intrusion?" "Sir, the English Consul stands
Without, and instant liberty demands
Of entrance."—"Then we'll go to him—remove
The prisoner."—"Nay, most courteous judge,"' &c.

'The English Consul' is not to be taken in—he quotes Cromwell—all hearts tremble—the Inquisition collapses, and it is a satisfaction to know that

'Alice is free! and walks secure from harm,
Beneath the ægis of her country's arm.'

'Gilbert Arnold' (Bentley) is a smart little book in green and gold. It appears to be an exaggerated advertisement of the Sermons preached in S. Paul's, Covent Garden.

'The Divine Master,' (Masters,) is somewhat more ambitious in language than suits our own taste; but it is a work which will doubtless attract. The sustained dialogue between the Soul and the 'Divine Master' is not, we think, the happiest, or indeed the safest, mode of conveying devotional instruction: it leads to an occasional lowering of the subject; and in the way of composition, a prolonged metaphor becomes cold. But there can be no question of the good intentions of this writer: while we may reasonably differ on the minor qualifications of style and expression.

Professor Rymer Jones has published the second volume of his delightful 'Natural History of Animals,' (Van Voorst.) The scientific merits of this work—we may say the same of the Series with which it is connected—are undoubtedly great: but what we most admire is the kind, loving, sympathising relation towards God's lower creatures which they encourage and display. Natural History so treated becomes almost a domestic history—a set of family and biographical memoirs.

From the same publisher we have received the first seven parts of a new series of the 'Instrumenta Ecclesiastica,' published under the auspices of the Ecclesiological Society. We are not sure that in practical utility this collection does not surpass its well-known predecessors. We especially select Parts IV. and V. for Colonial use: a copy of these drawings of a Wooden Church would save a Colonial diocese hundreds of pounds, and a greater consumption of failure and disappointment. The series is executed with great delicacy; and not only with a firm grasp of the ancient spirit of design, but with as clear a view of the necessity of adapting old forms and feeling to modern requirements. If 'Ecclesiology' were once, and, perhaps, not altogether unjustly, charged with pedantry, it is a satisfaction to find its later developments so eminently practical. Indeed, the mere archæological merits of this series are among their least important recommendations.

While we are chronicling second volumes and continuations, we desire to record 'The Conquerors of the New World and their Bondsmen,' (Pickering,) of which we spoke favourably on the appearance of the first volume. We repeat this commendation to its successor.

We do not go to the extent of acquiescing in all Mr. Charles Smith's 'Inquiry into the Catholic Truths hidden under certain Articles of the Creed of the Church of Rome,' (J. W. Parker,) of which the third part has just appeared, 'on the Mass and Transubstantiation.' But we must say that the series is full of thought, and embodies a deep and full appreciation of the mysteries of the Christian kingdom. Mr. Smith seems to represent, or to recal, the school of H. More and his Cambridge followers. We cannot think the study of the subject complete without reference to these able and original publications.

Mr. Dowell's 'Catechism on the Services of the Church of England,' (Rivingtons,) is full, and laborious, and sound.

Mr. Murray's cheap series, 'Railway Reading,' has received many pleasant instalments. Lady Eastlake's 'Music and Dress;' pleasant at the close of the London season. 'The Honey Bee;' quite a summer book, and to be read with summer accompaniments. 'The Flower Garden;' equally seasonable. 'Oliphant's Journey to Nepal;' one of the very best of the series, and one which will serve to show holiday travellers what in the great unexplored East still awaits them. To commend again what everybody commends, is tedious, if necessary.

'The Jubilee Year of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,' (Bell,) has, and very successfully, reached its second edition, enriched with the contributors' names. It is a graceful memorial of a memorable occasion.

'Outlines of Ecclesiastical History,' (J. W. Parker,) by Mr. W. H. Hoare. In small manuals of this kind, verbal and minute accuracy is everything.

We regret that Mr. Hoare has not superintended the press. At p. 19 we read of 'Praxeas, Nætus, and Beryllus,'—at p. 54 we find Nestorius advanced before the Catholic Church, and the 'Eutycheans' enjoying the same preference. This work is founded a good deal on Dean Waddington's Ecclesiastical History.

Mr. Pott's 'Confirmation Lectures, preached at Cuddesden,' (Masters,) are above the average.

'Oremus,' (Rivingtons,) we fear, is a collection below the average even of religious verses.

M. Cely Trevilian, Esq.—is the second name the archaic form of *silly*?—has, in his 'Examination of the sign $\chi\xi\tau$, Rev. xiii. 18,' (Binns and Goodwin,) discovered the Beast of the Apocalypse in Louis Napoleon. 666, we are assured, means 6,000,000; but the President was elected by six millions; therefore the President is the Beast. Q.E.D. Not content with this notable discovery, Mr. Trevilian goes further: in a very tantalizing way, after having so satisfactorily disposed of $\chi\xi\tau$, he assures us that after all the sign is not $\chi\xi\tau$ but $\xi\iota\tau$ = 60. 10. 6., which looks very like 76. But this would not suit Mr. Trevilian, who wanted to juggle 1066 out of it, which, by some cabalistical process, he says means Louis Napoleon. But how to get 1066 out of 60. 10. 6.? Why, says Mr. Trevilian, by making the middle figure the most important; just as over 'a shop door, you read *Silversmith Payne Jeweller*,' p. 17. Actually all this is in print; and as a clincher to the argument, the prominence given to the figure 10 signifies the 10 May. We commit arithmetic and numerical signs to Mr. Trevilian: the truths of numbers can avenge themselves: to be told that six hundred is only a form of six millions requires no reprobation. But why should Mr. Trevilian play cabalistical tricks with grammar and the doctrine of gender: cannot he leave the poor Graces alone? why does he talk of (p. 27):—

'Vultus non omnibus una?'

We can hardly keep pace with the publications which multiply upon us, upon the engrossing question of Synodical action, and the admission of the lay element into Church assemblies; that both these subjects may be discussed with temper and judgment, is our sincere wish. But since at the present moment even the expression of opinion has its dangers, we content ourselves with announcing, 1. 'Synodal Action necessary to the Church:' a letter to Mr. Gladstone, by Mr. Caswall, (Mozley.) 2. 'Suggestions for practically carrying out the Principle of Lay Cooperation in the Synods of the Scottish Church,' (Aberdeen: Brown.) 3. 'The Law, Constitution, and Reform of Convocation,' (J. H. Parker.) 4. 'Some Objections to the Revival of Ecclesiastical Synods answered, by Mr. G. D. Wheeler,' in a University Sermon, (J. H. Parker.) 5. 'Church Synods the Institution of Christ,' a Sermon preached in York Minster, by Mr. George Trevor, (Bell.) 6. Archdeacon Sinclair's 'Charge' (Rivingtons,) against Synodal action. 7. 'The Appeal to Convocation:' Archdeacon Wilberforce's Charge, (Murray.)

Mr. W. R. Scott, a name new to us, has printed a very promising pamphlet, 'A reply to Mr. Goode,' (Masters,) on the necessity of the Episcopal question. Archdeacon Churton and Mr. Harington have left something yet to glean in this field of discussion; and Mr. W. B. Flower, in his 'Non-Episcopal Orders: a Letter to Mr. Goode,' (Masters,) on the same subject, has completed the discussion with vigour and freeness. Mr. Goode,

nothing daunted, and always ready to pick a quarrel with everybody, and to take for a personality every hint at heterodoxy, advertises a 'Letter to Sir W. P. Wood, on the acceptance of the Prayer Book in a non-natural sense.' The assertion was general enough: has Mr. Goode his especial reasons for making the taunt a personal one?

To Mr. Jebb we are indebted for an earnest 'Plea for what is left of the Cathedrals, &c.' (Rivingtons.) It was directly called out by Lord Blandford's Bill: but the occasion or the necessity for some such protest has not passed away. The fate of capitular corporations is curious enough. When, ten or twenty years ago, Church Reform was the order of the day, Churchmen saw that the only hope for the Chapters was in making them useful. This purpose has been defeated from that day to this by those who are now most clamorous against Cathedrals. If it was the policy of the Whigs to destroy Cathedrals and stalls by filling them with unworthy incumbents, they have gone far to succeed.

'What are the best Means of Reclaiming our lost Population?' (Leeds: Harrison,) is the authoritative Report of Suggestions made by the Leeds Clergy on the division of services, and other practical measures, which, when first made, attracted much attention, and, in some not unnecessary particulars, much criticism.

'Specimens of Old Indian Poetry,' translated from the Sanskrit, by Mr. Griffith, Boden Scholar, (Hall, Virtue & Co.) is the work of one who is a perfect master of metre and language. If, as we have no reason to doubt, its fidelity is equal to its force and English style, we may pronounce Mr. Griffith's 'Specimens' a distinct and important contribution to English literature.

'The Emphatic New Testament,' by Mr. John Taylor, (Taylor, Walton & Co.) is an attempt to mark the emphasis and relative value of each word by a system of corresponding differences in type. Practically this amounts to a kind of pictorial commentary; since it is obvious that interpretation turns on emphasis. In proportion to the skill displayed in the execution of this task—and we are not disparaging the pains bestowed on it—are the controversial difficulties which it involves. The obvious objection to the principle of such a work is, that it confines the sense to a single emphasis;—*ex. grat.* The Lord's Prayer: everybody feels that one of the blessings belonging to this prayer is the variety and succession of emphases—that is, of successive and parallel senses and applications of which it admits. Mr. Taylor's attempt, of course, practically excludes all meanings but one.

Perhaps the most important book of the quarter is Mr. Cleveland Cox's 'Sympathies of the Continent, or Proposals for a New Reformation,' (J. H. Parker.) The body of this work consists of a translation of Hirscher's 'Present Crisis of the Church,' with parallel illustrations from contemporaneous French and Italian works. Dr. Hirscher is a Roman Catholic, a dignitary of Freiburg, Breisgau, and a writer of large and European reputation. His proposition is for another Reformation: he goes very deeply into the practical necessities of the Church, especially those arising from its separation from the State. But we may perhaps state the drift of the work best in its author's own words: 'A third point to which the Church must direct its immediate attention, is the satisfaction of that general

'desire, which is prevalent, for certain reforms. This desire is of long standing, and very familiar to us. What is wanted is, for example, an improvement in the worship of the Church; a revision of its liturgical formularies; the translation of the Liturgy into the vulgar tongue; communion in both kinds; the reform of the confessional; the simplification of ceremonies, and such like changes. So too we need an amelioration of the ecclesiastical discipline; the abolition of the forced celibacy of priests; and the revision of certain ecclesiastical obligations. We need further improvements, for example, in the Table of Lessons, and a greater variety in the selections from the Gospels and Epistles. We need emancipation from that tyranny which imposes upon the faithful, as Catholic doctrine, matters which have never been settled by the Church. Finally, we require reforms in the constitution of the Church; the revival of Synodal institutions; and the proportionate participation of Clergy and Laity in the affairs of the Church.'—Pp. 180—182.

To these points Dr. Hirscher subsequently adds, p. 209, masses for the dead; p. 211, indulgences; p. 216, abuses connected with confraternities and special devotions; p. 220, the *cultus* of the saints, &c. These are the practical matters which one so distinguished in the German Church feels bound to call attention to: these abuses, he says, must be remedied; must be remedied in Synod; and in this Synod Laymen must have a voice. But why does the present time so imperatively call for this reform? Because the Church is thrown on its own resources: the Church must develop its own life: the State when connected exercised a reforming influence; that being withdrawn, the Church must supply its own corrective tendencies; especially must the laity discharge, in the Church and for the Church, those functions which hitherto the State performed *ab extra*. Thus, according to Dr. Hirscher, it seems that the new development of lay influence depends upon the separation of the Church from the State. In these views Dr. Hirscher is by no means singular: it is known that he represents a large class. Lately the German Bishops in Synod all but arrived at some reforming resolution. In France—in Italy—even in South America, the same spirit is at work. These are certainly signs of a reformation of Romanism from within, and of a direct upheaving of the spiritual life of the Church by its own power: as such they deserve the utmost attention from ourselves. And the striking similarity of the circumstances with our own, on such subjects as clerical education, schools, and the voluntary offerings of the people, towards which Dr. Hirscher directs his especial attention, makes this work very applicable to ourselves. There is hardly one of the subjects of the day mooted among ourselves which is not illustrated by Dr. Hirscher. We commend this volume to general and immediate attention.

In a long and able Introduction, Mr. Coxé draws out the general and diffused 'Sympathies of the Continent' in the reforming direction; and he takes occasion to clear away some objections and misunderstandings connected with his own—the American—Church. We select a passage which sufficiently indicates the spirit in which Mr. Coxé has treated his subject:—

"If ever Christians re-unite, as all things make it their interest to do, it would seem that the movement must take its rise in the Church of England. . . . She is most precious, and may be considered as one of those

'chemical *intermèdes*, which are capable of producing a union between 'elements dissociable in themselves.' So wrote the Count de Maistre, a 'close observer of the Continental Protestants, and of the Russo-Greek Church; but one of the most bigoted Ultramontanists that ever strove to 'make the worse appear the better reason in behalf of Rome! Perhaps he 'said it "not of himself." It was written before the present century 'opened, and what sign of such a *movement* existed then? But now, when 'we find "deep calling unto deep"—religious movement characterising the 'whole Church; and all that is not unreal and re-actionary, setting towards 'one result, it becomes England and English Christians to recognise this 'noble mission of their Church. Is not the *movement* which now agitates 'her, the expected beginning of better things for the world? It is certainly 'a Catholic movement in its spirit and tendencies, and coincides with that 'which has been already characterised, as it exists in Hirscher. It sets 'not towards Rome; but, far beyond Rome and Mediævalism, it seeks 'after the primitive and the pure. So far from being papal, it is, in a good 'sense, popular. While Mediævalism runs counter to all the habits and 'principles of the English race, wherever it is found, this movement, like 'Hirscher's, seeks to meet the wants and instincts of men in society, and 'to adapt itself to the condition of the world. Instead of isolating the 'priesthood, and keeping the laity at a distance, it breathes the genuine 'spirit of ancient Catholicity, in its philanthropy, its sympathy for the 'masses, and its desire to employ the mighty energies of the people in 'honourable services and holy undertakings. With all its divine right and 'high conservatism, it yet understands the popular element, and knows 'how to produce harmonious action between it, and what is exclusively 'sacerdotal. It is impossible that this movement should not be highly 'popular with Englishmen, when once it is purified from the obloquy and 'the defilement which have befallen it, through the morbid enthusiasm of 'some who have shared its earliest and most dangerous excitements.'—Pp. 48—50.

'The Eclipse of Faith,' (Longman,) is a very remarkable book. It is a reply—and an adequate reply—to Mr. Francis Newman's recent 'Phases of Faith;' and to the mysticism of the new school of spiritualizing infidelity. The argument is conducted with great skill, it combines the true Socratic irony with the Socratic dialogue. There is wit, too, as well as wisdom in the discussion: and though the writer—Mr. Rogers, of the 'Edinburgh Review'—holds views different on many important matters from our own, we must award him the honour of a distinguished defence of revelation in the present work—a work in which depth of thought is relieved by great clearness and force of style.

We sympathise with the purpose of the series of Tracts proposed on 'The Restoration of Belief,' (Cambridge: Macmillan,) and, as far as the first number brings them out, with the immediate objects and method of their writers. But we cannot reconcile ourselves to a more decisive commendation of what is necessarily, at present, so undeveloped.

'Evenings at Sackville College,' (Masters,) announces its character. It is a collection of 'Legends for Children.' To this there would be no objection were all the narratives simply fictitious, but they lay claim to various degrees of credibility: and the last, 'by way of contrast,' is the Bedminster

Coal-pit accident. It is unquestionably true that the writer gives notice that he does not demand the same amount or character of belief to all his narratives: but it argues more critical powers than children have, or ought to have, when we expect them to distinguish between this fact, a few months old, and the story of 'S. Sebaldu and the Icicles.' We may tell a child that legends are not true: but to read them from the *Times* newspaper would be somewhat perplexing.

We have only just received the same active writer's 'Lectures on Church Difficulties,' (Masters.) We have, however, seen enough of them to pronounce them both lively and vigorous, and, as far as we have read, entirely sound disquisitions on the 'subjects of the day.' They are written in a free flowing way; with terse and apt illustration: and if they occasionally verge on the familiar, it must be remembered that few or none were delivered in public. The disquisition on Sermons struck us forcibly.

Mr. Johns' 'History of Spain, for Children,' (Masters,) perhaps not improperly, lays no claim to historical criticism. We have the old stories of Count Julian and Don Roderick, and of the Cid, which are probably as true as those of Tarpeia and Curtius. However, it is all pleasant enough to read: and we would not deprive children of their sweets. Niebuhrism has made history dull work for young folks.

Miss Fourdrinier's 'Our New Parish,' (Pickering,) without having a very ambitious aim, hits its mark: and to say this is considerable praise. The plan of this little work is to illustrate the first of each of the Church Services celebrated in a new church by some appropriate tale: the stories have point and are carefully written. But their length often outweighs the incidents. The Church and its appointments; its once a month Communion, and apparently its once a week prayers, demanded and have produced a level, and perhaps common-place series of annals. Under better circumstances the authoress had very likely produced a better work.

To those, and we believe they are many, who admire the 'Tales of Kirkbeck,' another volume, 'Our Doctor,' &c. (Masters,) will be an agreeable present. It is equal to its predecessors: and if we do not pronounce a glowing eulogium, it is because, as we have often said, this class of fictions directly religious is not to our taste. We have never yet reconciled either our theological or literary sympathies with them. The writer is very prolific—too much so, we think, for a lasting reputation. Another story, 'a domestic tale,' is announced from the same hand. The substance of our distaste to this class of books is summed up well enough in a passage which we have lighted upon in a remarkable work, which we have not read, but which we intend to read, 'Reminiscences of Thought and Feeling.' 'George the Fourth's Queen Caroline,' and we own to be astounded at our ally, 'observed in her broken English when somebody offered her a religious novel, and which she declined to peruse,—"If I have no-velle, let me have no-velle, and if I have ser-mone, let me have ser-mone, but don't let me have both at once;" and there was great justice, as well as shrewdness, in the remark.'

Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, have printed a 'Translation of Plato's Republic,' (Macmillan.) Under such antecedents, it is almost superfluous to announce a sound and scholarly version. It is more: it is, and a rare virtue in classical transla-

tions, 'done into choice English.' Besides this, it has a sensible introduction, and a close analysis. The translations of the interspersed hexameters are cleverly rendered in the corresponding metre.

Archdeacon Wilberforce's Charge, 'The Appeal to Convocation,' (Mozleys,)—we have previously alluded to its reference to Convocation and the question of Synods—contains some reflections on practical matters which are important. On Church-rates he takes, we think, a sensible line:—

'None of us, probably, will deny, however strange it may appear to ourselves, that there may be persons who are sincerely opposed to the Church to which reason and habit has attached us. But whatever sentiments may have prevailed at other times, or in other countries, it is to be hoped that there are few Englishmen in the nineteenth century who would wish to coerce the consciences of others. It follows that, whatever be the religious opinions of our fellow-countrymen, they must be allowed to enjoy the protection of those equal laws which secure our persons and property. Now, it may be questioned how far this is consistent with the practice of calling upon men to take an active part in maintenance of a faith which they believe to be erroneous. It is true, of course, that those who purchase a property have no right to complain of the deductions to which they know it to be incident: if a man buys only 9-10ths of an estate, he has only 9-10ths of it. But this merely implies that the Church has a right to such payments as depend upon the active support of former benefactors; it does not fully meet the question of church-rates, as levied in the present day. The ancient law requires all persons who occupy houses or lands to assemble and to tax themselves for the maintenance of their parish church, and for the expenses of public worship. Now, it is one thing that these objects should be defrayed at the public expense; and another, that every individual should be called upon, by his own vote, to affirm their propriety. Even dissenters might think it desirable that a church should be provided for the poor, though they do not themselves frequent it, and Churchmen, on the other hand, might claim to retain rights which had been once conceded to them, without choosing to appeal to the liberality of Separatists. But the peculiarity of a church-rate is this—that, though imposed by the general law of the land, it yet requires the personal cooperation of every individual. Various members of Parliament have lately declared that they will give no vote for bestowing any additional grant on the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth, but that they feel reluctant to touch existing endowments. Here you see the principle out of which the cry against church-rates has arisen. If churches were endowed with a certain sum for their sustentation, or if they had in any way a claim upon the public purse, there would be no appearance of an individual grievance; but you call all dwellers in the parish together, you require them to levy a tax upon themselves for the maintenance of the fabric, and the supply of the sacramental elements, though they are allowed to deny the utility of public worship, and the validity of sacraments. And if it be asked how this anomaly has arisen, the answer is the same as before. The objector can hardly wonder that the ecclesiastical laws make no allowance for his opinions, since they take no note of his existence. To make rates, and to be eligible as Church-wardens, are correlative facts; the same circumstance which entitles a

'man to the last exposes him to the former. If the one be a grievance to the Dissenter, so is the other to the Clergy. Both arise from the fact that the ecclesiastical laws assume that no one is allowed to live in this country who is not a member of the National Church; so that they can neither make allowance for the difficulties of the Dissenter, nor guard against his intrusion. And are not all persons interested in getting rid of such a system of fictions as this? If it is inconvenient to the Dissenter, is it not ten times more prejudicial to the Church, which an antiquated system of law obstructs at every turn? Are our spiritual courts to go on for ever, like the seven sleepers, assuming that the coinage of James I. is still the current money of the realm?'—Pp. 17—19.

His observations on the vexed question of the lay element are also of value:—

'A third point of delicacy and importance will have to be considered—the expediency of reinforcing Convocation by a house of lay representatives. That such a thing will be done can hardly be doubted, nor will I deny that it ought to be done. But it will be of paramount moment not to forget the great truth that the Church is a divine, not a human institution—that its principle of guidance is not natural reason, but divine grace: and, therefore, that it makes its appeal not to the common sense of mankind, but to the constituted depositories of the faith. The Church was founded by our Lord himself in His holy apostles; it discharges its trust through the ministration of those offices which are dependent upon the gift of orders, so that the custody of doctrine was of necessity lodged in the same hands to which the function of government was committed. The guardianship of the ancient faith was always understood, therefore, to lie in the College of Apostles and in the collective body of their successors the Bishops, to whom was committed the awful function of representing the Divine Founder of the Church. Such was the necessary effect of entrusting the gift of orders, and, therefore, the administration of sacraments, to their keeping; and such was the rule which was practically observed in the ancient Church. The admission of the second order of ministers to a part of this responsibility has resulted, not wholly without precedent, from the circumstances in which the bishops of our two provinces have been placed by their isolation from the rest of Christendom. But it can never be allowable to reverse the principles of a divine institution, and to substitute the law of nature for that of grace. It must not be forgotten, therefore, that the custody of doctrine lies in those who have a spiritual commission—that it pertains to them by virtue of that original character, which the Divine Head impressed upon his Church—that His promise of guidance belongs, in its plenitude, not to individuals, but to the collective body—that it pertains to individuals, only while they retain their place in that whole, in which they are members; and, therefore, that no change can be admissible, which would break in upon the fundamental law, that Christ's Church is a spiritual kingdom founded in His holy Apostles.

'If this principle can only be maintained inviolate, great advantages may follow from associating the lay representatives of our communicants with the Convocation of the clergy. It is obvious how great would be its effect in the attainment of practical reforms. But that which is of the highest importance, is that nothing would so surely disabuse the public mind of the erroneous impression that Parliament represents the English

' Church. The error is not an unnatural one, considering that the changes in the aspect of our political heavens have been as gradual as they have complete. At present, however, Parliament expresses the minds of nearly 30 millions of our fellow-countrymen, of whom not above a third are nominally members of our Church. How, then, can it stand in the same relation to us as when none could be a voter or a legislator who was not a communicant? But this will never be practically felt till a body exists which occupies the same place which was once occupied by Parliament. Neither can it be any sacrifice of principle that the lay representatives of our communicants should concur in public measures so long as they are ready to admit—as Parliament formerly did—that if "any cause of the law divine happened to come in question," or of spiritual learning, it ought to be "declared interpreted, and showed, by that part of the body politic called the spirituality, now being usually called the English Church." '—Pp. 21—23.

And also on the general subject of our changing relations to Parliament:—

' It is obvious enough how this has happened, and how injurious is its effect, both to the clergy and the Church. We have two sets of laws—one civil, the other ecclesiastical; one created by Parliament, the other by Convocation. The principle of our civil laws has been entirely changed during the last two centuries. First came the Toleration Act, in 1688; then the Union with Scotland, in 1706; lastly, the repeal of the Test Act, in 1828, and that of Roman Catholic Disabilities, in 1829. The effect of these alterations has been not only to give the most perfect legal toleration to men of all opinions, but to cut asunder the relations by which the Church was formerly bound to the ruling power of this realm. This is the necessary result, whether good or evil, of giving power to the mass of the people, while the people are divided in religious opinions. But, while this change has been going on in our civil laws, our ecclesiastical laws have remained wholly unaltered. They continue to take it for granted that the constitution of this country does not allow any person to be an Englishman who is not also a Churchman. They make no provision for any other case. They deal with the clergy as though this were truly the state of things. And hence results a mass of fictions and anomalies, injurious in many ways to all parties; but by which the Church herself is incomparably the greatest sufferer. Her own formularies declare the due use of ecclesiastical discipline to be a criterion of a true Church. And why, then, is it abandoned? Because to acknowledge changes which it was impossible to avoid, is thought a greater evil than to retain laws, which it is impossible to execute. The Court, at which we are at present assembled, is held for the professed purpose of enforcing ecclesiastical discipline. Now, there are two principles on which it might be grounded. When the State and the Church are identical, as they were in England in the reign of

¹ 'Should a house of lay-representatives ever be united to Convocation, there are two rules which must be laid down as fundamental principles of their incorporation, unless we are prepared to give up our claim to be a part of the ancient Church Catholic: first, that all questions which involve doctrine should be decided by the Spirituality; secondly, that it should belong to the Spirituality to determine what questions do, and what do not, involve doctrine. This would leave to the laity that secular part of ecclesiastical affairs, which our ancient constitution assigned to Parliament.'

'Elizabeth, Church discipline can be enforced by temporal penalties. When 'the State and the Church are not identical, as before the time of Constantine, it can only be maintained by allowing the Church to act as an independent corporation, and to exercise authority over her own voluntary 'members. But the Church of England can neither adopt the one principle 'nor the other. She cannot act as a voluntary corporation, because her 'laws assume that she is identical with the State. She cannot employ the 'principle of coercion, because she is not really identical with it. So that 'she has the incumbrances of State succour without its benefits; her 'responsibilities are measured by one rule, her jurisdiction by another.

'That the evil referred to is not a visionary one is shown by the wide 'dissatisfaction recently manifested among the clergy. In a Letter of the '13th February, 1852, the Archbishop of Canterbury says that he has lately 'communicated "to a large assembly of bishops, the memorial respecting 'the burial service, signed by 4,000 clergy. The bishops," he adds, "generally sympathise with the memorialists in the difficulties to which they 'sometimes find themselves exposed with reference to the terms of that 'service. But I am sorry to report further," he concludes, "that the 'obstacles in the way of remedying those difficulties, appear to them, as at 'present advised, to be insuperable." Now, it is obvious, as his Grace 'says, that the difficulty cannot be remedied by any act of their lordships, 'however deeply they may feel the hardships which it frequently inflicts. 'And cases have occurred in this Riding, as well as elsewhere, which would 'sufficiently exhibit it. For there can be no cure so long as we keep up 'a law which is adapted, like the 68th canon, to a state of circumstances 'which no longer exists. This canon was passed two centuries and a half 'ago, when no such thing as dissent was tolerated in England. The state 'of our civil law at that period may be understood from the fact, that four 'years after it had been enacted, Whiteman was burned at Lichfield, and 'Legate at Smithfield, for denying the Trinity. Can we wonder that the 'rules which had their origin in such a system of law, are inapplicable to our 'present position? Would our militia fight with advantage if they were 'restricted from the employment of every weapon which has come into use 'since the invention of gunpowder? Yet this rule was passed by Convocation, and by Convocation only can it be amended. It touches upon 'spiritual questions, with which no other body in the country is competent 'to deal. For it can hardly be thought decent that the internal affairs 'of the Church should be discussed by the Roman Catholic or dissenting 'members of Parliament. So that either we must appeal to the Church's 'assembly, or we must continue under the grievances and anomalies from 'which it has power to relieve us.'—Pp. 14—16.

Of Sermons we have to put on record, 1. 'The Temptation of our Blessed Lord; a series of Lectures by Mr. T. Tunstall Smith,' (Hatchard.) 2. 'Life and Death;' some affecting Discourses by Mr. C. C. Spencer, (Cleaver.) 3. 'Sermons, addressed to a Country Congregation;' carefully prepared for their specialties by Mr. E. T. Codd, (Masters.) 4. 'The Revelations of Astronomy; by Mr. Steel, preached at Harrow School,' (J. W. Parker.) 5. 'Our Founder's Claim; preached on S. Barnabas' Day, at S. Barnabas, Pimlico, by Mr. Skinner,' (Hayes,) which contains a recognition, neither tardy nor grudging, of Mr. Bennett's zeal and successes.